OICA comments on WP.29-181-10

Source: WP.29-181-10

*: document WP.29-181-10, OTP = Open Telematics Platform
Content overview

FIA proposal on OTP Protection profile of an Automotive Gateway*

- Access to and modification of software and data on the vehicle by authorized third parties (non-restricted/unlimited read/write access)

- Introduction of an “Automotive Gateway” to be installed in each and every vehicle as “one and only” connection to the “outside world” (incl. every authorized third party)

- Introduction of an “Automotive Gateway Administrator” (neutral entity) as exclusive authorization body granting access

- Introduction of a Protection Profile for this Automotive Gateway (incl. Common Criteria)

*: document [WP.29-181-10](https://example.com), OTP = Open Telematics Platform
Issues identified
Access to & modification of data by 3\textsuperscript{rd} parties (1/3)

- Would this concept of unrestricted read-write-permissions require providing the detailed information (VIN-based) on internal vehicle communication of each and every vehicle on the road (e.g. communication matrix)?

  If yes:
  - The requirement is far beyond existing Repair & Maintenance Information requirements
  - The capability and the way to access specific data depends on the specific configuration of each individual vehicle. It is hence VIN-based (depending on the trim level and options chosen, it may change after SW updates).
  - Intellectual property will be concerned.
  - How does a third party know which type of data is available on which individual vehicle?
  - Safety/security risk (see next pages)
Issues identified
Access to & modification of data by 3rd parties (2/3)

- **Changing software/data without OEM involvement creates**
  - Safety and security issues (operational and functional safety, cyber security etc.)
  - Responsibility / liability issues (Who will be held responsible in case of an accident?)
  - Change of type approval relevant software/data will affect the conformity of vehicles in the field

- **Tracking of software/data modifications**
  - Who is documenting 3rd party software/data modifications on each vehicle?
  - Will the 3rd parties be obliged to have a Cyber Security Management System and a Software Update Management System?
Issues identified
Access to & modification of data by 3rd parties (3/3)

- Issue of increased traffic on communication busses (CAN, LIN, etc.)
  - Delivery of safety relevant signals may be delayed

  With **limited** access for third parties

  With **unlimited** access for third parties
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway administration (1/2)

- Purpose of the Automotive Gateway Administration: Granting authorized access for 3rd parties
  - Who should this entity be?
  - Will this entity take over responsibility for safety/security and compliance to vehicle type approval?
  - On which legal basis should this entity act?
    - Access to data is NOT regulated on UN level
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway administration (2/2)

- Qualification/certification of 3rd parties receiving authorization
  - On which basis?
  - How will safety and security be covered?
  - How will Type Approval Compliance be covered?
  - Will the 3rd parties be obliged to have a Cyber Security Management System and a Software Update Management System?
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway device (1/4)

- Who is developing / manufacturing / certifying / maintaining this component?
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway device (2/4)

- Who is overall responsible for the component incl. its safety and security?
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway device (3/4)

- How to ensure proper implementation within the different vehicle architectures?
Issues identified
Automotive Gateway device (4/4)

- Is it the intention that the Automotive Gateway is the one and only communication channel between the E/E architecture and outside world?
- If yes, how is time critical communication ensured via this gateway (e.g. for ADAS)
- See also Annex (FIA Presentation TFCS 11-14)
Issues identified
Software/Data modifications by 3rd parties

- How will 3rd parties be required to follow the requirements of UN R 156 “Software updates”?
- How is a 3rd party required to conduct a risk assessment in context of safety and security before providing an update?
- How will the information on the software versions be documented and made available for the vehicles on VIN basis?
- How is compliance with Vehicle Type Approval ensured and who will be held responsible in case of non-compliance?
Industry concerns on FIA proposal regarding OTP Protection profile of an Automotive Gateway

- **The Proposal is not technology neutral**
  - All vehicles would need to install a specific automotive gateway that responds to the requirements.

- **The Proposal requires the creation of a centralized and worldwide accepted agency**
  - Who shall create and finance this new agency?
  - Will this agency take the responsibility of vehicle safety/security and type approval compliance?

- **The Proposal creates new safety/security risks for the vehicle user**
  - Even if the communication with the automotive gateway is secured, it creates new safety risks for the vehicle user
  - Adding a new “door” to the system and “copy” the key for that door to all the authorized third parties creates more risk to “lose” the key
  - A vulnerability within the standardized access would not be limited to one vehicle but would impact all vehicles using this standardized access

- **The Proposal is not clear with regard to the responsibilities and compliance to vehicle Type Approval**
Annex