Economic Commission for Europe
Inland Transport Committee
Working Party on Rail Transport
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Item 5 of the provisional agenda
Rail Security

Development of an International Rail Security Observatory

Note by the secretariat

I. Mandate

1. At its last session, the Working Group on Rail Transport (SC.2) – based on the recommendation of the task force on rail security (ECE/TRANS/SC.2/210, Annex) to set up a technical working group (TWG) that would become a unique internationally accepted focal point for rail security – requested the secretariat to prepare a background note on rail security that should include secretariat proposals for possible further development of the issue for consideration at its next session (ECE/TRANS/SC.2/216, para. 16).

II. Security of rail transport

2. At its sixty-first session in November 2007, SC.2 invited the International Union of Railways (UIC) to organize a workshop on rail security that would take place during the SC.2 session in November 2008. Following the 2008 workshop, SC.2 asked its Chair and Vice-Chair to incorporate the main conclusions, in cooperation with the secretariat, into an SC.2 review of security issues that should include the proposal to establish an informal task force to follow-up on the major rail security issues identified by the workshop. The review was submitted to the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Transport Division in December 2008.

3. The task force met for the first time on 14 May 2009. It decided that it would focus in particular on the following topics: (i) international regulations, (ii) exchange of good practices and (iii) the economics of rail security. Generally, it was agreed that a “broad definition of security, including low-level crime as well as sabotage and terrorism, was most appropriate because low-level criminal activities are encountered daily by rail...
operators and standard crime-protection techniques can be used to thwart sabotage and terrorism threats as well”.

4. The task force suggested three main recommendations:

(a) An international approach to rail security: best practice guidelines for the installation and use of specific security tools could be useful for national authorities which would be most qualified to decide on the specific deployment of such tools;

(b) Security tool box: a task force recommended that national authorities develop a suitable architecture for a toolbox of guidelines and good practices. This could be accomplished by setting up a TWG that would become a unique internationally accepted focal point for rail security;

(c) Cost-benefit analysis: a task force agreed that the cost-benefit analysis of rail safety measures could be applied to a limited extent to security problems.

5. It can be derived from the suggested recommendations and the work of the task force that the need exists for a central body that would disseminate best practices and data on rail security. This central body could have a coordination role among Governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with the main objective of developing a global database – observatory on best practices and data sharing. As the task force concluded, for the time being, mandatory rules and standards for railway security at the UNECE level are neither desirable nor necessary. Facilitation of policy decisions through best practices, knowledge and data sharing should be the objective of the observatory body.

III. Initiatives at international level

6. The secretariat did a thorough search of international organizations for regulations and/or references to rail transport security, best practices and data – concentration and dissemination. The following is a summary of what was found during that search.

A. International Union of Railways

7. The Security Platform. It was created by the UIC Executive Board in June 2006 and restructured in 2008 at global level. The main tasks of the Security Platform are:

(a) Annual congresses, alternately on general policies and more specialised subjects;

(b) A Steering Committee meeting every quarter involving the UIC regions (and the special Collaboration des services de police ferroviaire et de sécurité (COLPOFER) group for Europe), UIC departments (passenger, freight, rail system/infrastructure) and professional and political partners (Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER), European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM), European network of Railway Police Forces (RAILPOL), International Association of Public Transport (UITP), etc.);

(c) Three permanent working groups: (1) Human factors, chaired by Russian Railways (RZD) (Russia), (2) Security technologies, chaired by Ferrovie dello Stato (Italy), (3) Strategy and regulations, chaired by the National Railway Company of Belgium (SNCB) (Belgium);

(d) Ad hoc working groups at the request of UIC members.

8. The Security Division:
(a) Acts as a permanent contact point;
(b) Coordinates or ensures external UIC security representation in international organizations, seminars, conferences, etc.;
(c) Produces draft texts concerning railway security;
(d) Ensures information is shared and the UIC security website is kept up-to-date.

9. Research projects:
(a) Protectrail: Project taken up by the European Commission (EC) as part of the 3rd call for proposals for the seventh European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation; it aims to develop an integrated European railway security system;
(b) Restrail: Research project taken up by the EC as part of the fourth call for proposals for the seventh European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation; it aims to reduce the incidence of suicide and trespassing on railway property and lessen their impact on operations;
(c) European Rail Research Advisory Council (ERRAC): In consultation with UIC members, UIC Security is involved in defining research topics to be pursued in the field of railway security to prepare for the fifth call for proposals for the seventh European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation.

B. European Rail Infrastructure Managers

10. EIM was established to promote the interests and views of independent infrastructure managers in Europe, following liberalization of the railway market. EIM works to improve the development of the rail transport mode. It also acts as an advocacy organization towards the European Institutions together with the industry. Since the beginning of 2006, rail security has been a concern for EIM members, mainly as a reaction to the events in Madrid and London. This takes into account both counter terrorism and security in the broader sense. EIM members believe that EIM has a role as a united group in international projects and developments, especially those that aim at improving the protection of rail infrastructure. In addition, EIM believes that a platform to exchange information and recommended best practices should be established at the European level.

11. In a very clear position EIM has decided to promote a policy on security and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) in relation to the rail transport system that reflects the concerns of EIM members. The first steps to achieve these objectives are:
(a) Definition of EIM’s future security roles and responsibilities in relation to both high speed and conventional rail;
(b) Development of the basic principles for security inside the rail system;
(c) Involvement in the development of European Union legislation;
(d) Guidance for business cases for rail security.

C. European Commission and European Railway Agency

12. Security division of land transport and dangerous goods – EC Urban Transport Security Group: The EC established this in April 2008 to be an information sharing group at the European level. The EC established a two-tier approach with a “national focal points” steering group and providing guidance to two technical working groups: Working Group I (WGI): organisational measures and incident management; and Working Group II (WGII): surveillance and detection. The focal points are nominated by interested member States.
The working groups include national experts, either government or industry based. There have been two meetings to date of the national focal points group. In the interim there have been two meetings of WGI and one of WGII.

D. International Association of Public Transport

13. The Security Commission (SecCom) has members from around the world and is the UITP member’s forum for professional discussions on all issues concerning public transport security (PTS), including technological, operational and management aspects. The SecCom seeks to study, assess and promote innovative operation and technology for enhanced PTS. Its activities include:

(a) two plenary meetings/year;


E. International Working Group on Land Transport Security

14. The priorities of the International Working Group on Land Transport Security (IWGLTS) are:

(a) Technology – use of technology and technological advances in land transport security including, but not limited to CCTV, behaviour detection, and travel document checking equipment;

(b) Public awareness – efforts to increase public awareness related to passengers recognizing and reporting suspicious behaviour to appropriate transit and security officials; remaining alert and vigilant, knowing what to do and how to act during a land transport incident;

(c) Risk assessment – systematic methodology for assessing the risk (threat, vulnerability and consequences) surrounding a land transport system in order to employ risk-based security and mitigation measures;

(d) Stakeholder partnerships – guidelines regarding stakeholder roles and responsibilities; Improved communication and information sharing between governments and land transport security stakeholders; guidelines for training and personnel background checks;

(e) Mitigation actions – preventative or response measures employed to minimize the impact of a land transport incident including but not limited to the following: design of rail stations and rolling stock to better withstand an attack; behaviour detection; canine programmes; evaluation of stations for mitigation needs; and conducting exercises.

F. Collaboration des services de police ferroviaire et de sécurité

15. In 1981, some western European railway companies and law enforcement authorities founded a collaborative body named Collaboration des services de police ferroviaire et de sécurité (COLPOFER) (as an independent specialised group of UIC in order to intensify their cooperation on security issues. Thanks largely to European integration, COLPOFER developed over time and now has 38 members – railway companies from 27 countries. The intensified cooperation between law enforcement authorities and railway operators’ security organizations which is taking place in the framework of COLPOFER includes:

(a) Exchanging experiences and information between members concerning the fight against crime in the rail environment;
(b) Defining a common strategy as regards railway security;
(c) Elaborating recommendations aimed at improving the security level in the rail environment and handling the feeling of insecurity of individuals (customers as well as railway staff).

16. COLPOFER’s organization is based on:
(a) The Board (General Secretary, Chair, Vice-Chair) as well as the Coordination Group in charge of management;
(b) Conferences (General Assemblies) making all decisions relating to organization;
(c) Working Groups dealing with matters assigned to them during the General Assemblies;
(d) Operational cooperation relying on direct communication between members related to security issues which have to be solved promptly and without formalities;
(e) External cooperation with other organizations working on rail security issues.

G. European network of Railway Police Forces

17. RAILPOL is the international network of police organizations of EU Member States that are responsible for the performance of railway-related police tasks. It also analyses all fields of railway police deployment and summarizes best practices by means of an exchange of practical experiences. RAILPOL conducts an intensive exchange of experiences as part of its comprehensive committee activities, uncovers weak points and areas where action is needed and submits concrete proposals for solutions to European decision-making bodies.

18. RAILPOL promotes cross-border cooperation between railway police forces by preparing and organizing joint deployment and coordinated measures. RAILPOL has created a virtual network to ensure a constant flow of information in respect to national and international cross-border issues. Police authorities in all member countries take an active part in the exchange of police information via this network.

H. AMTRAK Police Department

19. The Amtrak Police Department is committed to maintaining the safety and security of the rail-traveling public, improving the quality of life of Amtrak personnel, and safeguarding trains and rails by building partnerships to enhance capacity to protect America’s railroad.

20. Amtrak Police, Transport Security Administration (TSA) personnel and law enforcement officers from federal, state, local, rail and transit police officers deploy at passenger rail and transit stations to exercise counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. This coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and right-of-way patrols, increased security presence on board trains, explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections and counter-surveillance.

I. Transport Security Administration

21. While United State and local governments are primarily responsible for rail security, TSA have taken a number of steps to ensure the security of these crucial assets by working in concert with the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, industry experts, and local counterparts. Among the tasks of TSA are:
(a) Training teams and deploying manpower and resources to the field;
(b) Developing, testing, and activating new technologies;

(c) Conducting site assessments to improve the ability of state, local and private sector partners to strengthen security;

(d) Developing recommendations for securing freight rail.

J. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

22. With fifty-six States from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization. It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of its participating States into practice through its unique network of field missions.

23. The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects. It addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence – and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, and democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities. The OSCE undertakes numerous activities to support economic growth, including the strengthening of small – and medium-sized enterprises, monitoring the economic impact of trafficking and taking action against corruption and money laundering.

IV. International Rail Security Observatory

24. The terrorist attacks in New York City, Madrid, London and Moscow have shown the capability of a small number of individuals to kill and cause large-scale destruction. These events have also turned the world’s attention to the need to better secure transport systems.

25. There are many reasons why transport is a relatively easy target. Firstly, transport systems have not been designed to cope with security threats. Transport authorities have typically stressed the development of transport networks which facilitate a smooth flow of passengers and cargo while meeting safety – not security – standards. Secondly, transport means and infrastructure are very accessible. Road vehicles are available everywhere and they can be used as weapons or to transport weapons.

26. Infrastructure such as rail lines including bridges and tunnels, are in the open and largely without surveillance. In transport facilities, large numbers of people often congregate in a predictable manner. Thirdly, transport is complex. Each mode has its own specific infrastructure, vehicles and regulatory requirements. Passengers and/or goods are carried. There are thousands of non-transport companies that interact on a daily basis with the transport sector. International aspects add to this inherent complexity as national regulations and norms typically differ. Sharing knowledge and best practices as well as data and statistics on rail security would facilitate government decisions for policies and measures to be taken and therefore effectively prevent terrorists from exploiting the weakest links.

27. SC.2 has adopted (i) the definition of railway safety as “the socially required level of absence of risk of danger in the rail transport system where risk relates to personal accident, injury or material damage; and (ii) the definition of security in railways as “the protection of human beings, transport means and transport infrastructure against unauthorized and unexpected actions of any kind”.

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28. As mentioned above, there are many initiatives by different organizations on rail security but few of them focus on data harmonization, collection and dissemination and sharing of best practices. The data collected from these organizations is either generic and in parallel specialised for their members or specific regions, or dedicated to specific themes such as rail police, integrated rail security systems, etc. and mainly do not cover the ECE region.

29. Significant initiatives exist in national and regional levels on rail security. The secretariat after having reviewed these existing initiatives concludes that a gap exists in ECE level regarding:

(a) harmonization or definitions;
(b) data collection; and
(c) sharing of best practices on rail security.

30. Therefore the secretariat suggests the setting up of a non-official body to be known as the International Rail Security Observatory (IRSO) which would play the role of coordinator and facilitator on rail security definitions harmonization, data collection and dissemination and best practices collection.

31. The main tasks of IRSO would be as follows:

(a) Objective: The main objectives and tasks of IRSO should be:
   (i) Harmonization of rail security definitions (terms and data). The definitions regarding rail security and of different data should be agreed and harmonized so as to be correctly evaluated and interpreted;
   (ii) Collection and dissemination of harmonized data on rail security from ECE region and globally whenever possible; when data harmonized definitions are established, collection should be the next step. The challenge would be to find ways to disseminate such sensitive data;
   (iii) Collection and dissemination of best practices by per theme of rail security in the ECE region and globally whenever possible. The challenge is not to create a list of best practices since this already exists. The challenge would be to set the conditions where the best practices would apply;
   (iv) Preparation of an annual publication (electronic or hardcopy) with the above-mentioned data and best practices incorporated that would further facilitate their dissemination.

(b) Terminology: For “rail security” the terminology adopted by SC.2 applies which is: “the protection of human beings, transport means and transport infrastructure against unauthorized and unexpected actions of any kind”;

(c) Composition: The Observatory should include experts from the public sector (e.g. government ministries, EC, Commonwealth of Independent States, etc.), intergovernmental organizations (e.g. ECO, OSJD, OTIF) and the business sector (CER, COLPOFER, EIM, RAILPOL, UIC, etc.);

(d) Meetings – organization: The Observatory should be an unofficial group of SC.2. If there is a need for meetings then these meetings should take place back to back with the sessions for SC.2. Otherwise IRSO would be an agenda item of SC.2 and all the issues should be discussed during SC.2 sessions.
V. Guidance by SC.2

32. SC.2 may wish to consider the above proposal and provide guidance to the secretariat on further action in this field.