Collected Action Items for SGS-11

1. Post the comparison of the GTR and the European regulation (following the review of the report by EC)

2. Japan will confirm the acceptance of the Group’s proposal that, if the day is missing from the tank date, it will be assumed to be the first of the month.

3. China will propose text for Part A Section 4.3 on the use of compressed air instead of hydrogen in the tank test.

4. OICA and CS to develop strong rationale for Part A for the proposed change in the initial (baseline) burst pressure in Section A.5.1.1.1. - needs to discuss how this is at least as stringent as the current EU directive.

5. Japan will compile a justification for the proposed change to four times (4x) initial cycles versus the current number 22,000.

6. Japan will obtain additional information on the pass/fail criteria for the proposal related to Residual Strength Burst Test.

7. TUV and OICA to survey experts (container manufacturers) on the appropriateness or impact of the proposed change to the drop test.

8. Secretary will insert modified text on revised engulfing fire test

9. Japan will propose language to justify the inclusion of Method 1, Method 2, and the engulfing fire test, including definition of bare container and shielding components.

10. BMW will develop an additional proposal to fully address the issue of the localized fire test for LH2 tanks. The changes in the temperature profile of the test and the effect on the manufacture of the tank might be very complicated - need to consult with impacted parties.

11. BMW to review cryo-compressed presentation and determine if it can be posted on the website. Shareable presentation will be sent to Secretary and posted on the website, as permitted.

12. TUV to provide report on the safety risk assessment of CH2 and LH2

13. Secretary to post the presentation by Chris Sloane on Proposed material Qualification Test and the paper on Embrittlement

14. Chris Sloane to check on the availability of the Powertech Report

15. OICA to draft a paragraph on the rationale to focus on the three safety-critical high-pressure components only.