Economic Commission for Europe
Inland Transport Committee
Working Party on Customs Questions affecting Transport
126th session
Geneva, 28 September – 1 October 2010
Item 3 of the provisional agenda
Activities of other organizations and countries of interest
to the Working Party

Implications of the World Customs Organization Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade for the TIR Convention

Note by the secretariat*

I. Mandate

1. At its 123rd session, the Working Party mandated the secretariat to study the implications of the World Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE) for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) legal instruments in the area of border crossing facilitation (ECE/TRANS/WP.30/246, para. 10), in particular the TIR Convention, 1975. At its 124th session, the Working Party briefly considered such a study, as contained in document ECE/TRANS/WP.30/2010/1. Given the complexity of the issues at stake and the availability of the underlying document in English only, the Working Party requested the secretariat to take the necessary steps to have it translated. The present document has been prepared on the basis of document ECE/TRANS/WP.30/2010/1 for translation into the official UNECE languages.

* This document was submitted late due to late receipt of length waiver.
II. Implementation of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade and TIR Convention

A. Implementation: national or international basis

2. To facilitate the steady implementation of SAFE, the international Customs community has agreed to follow a phased approach. The Framework is going to be implemented at various stages in accordance with each country administration’s capacity and legislative authority. To facilitate this process, WCO can assist each Member to determine its capacity building needs and suggest possible solutions. These capacity building initiatives will also cover the Customs integrity and training development considerations.

3. It has been debated whether SAFE should be categorized as a voluntary or a compulsory programme. On one hand, it is presented as a platform and is called a framework. Its initial version comprises only 40 pages and the WCO Members have only signed “letters of intent” to implement it, moreover no incorporation deadline has been set. On the other hand, considering the promotional power of WCO, one can be certain that SAFE will shape the vast majority of the future Customs security initiatives, which can only become effective when Customs administrations agree on bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

B. Implications of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade for the TIR Convention

4. SAFE and the TIR Convention have different scopes: the former addresses the issue of supply chain security while the latter deals with an international Customs transit procedure and, inter alia, revenue protection. The TIR Convention is a legally binding treaty while SAFE is a set of standards whose implementation is optional and dependent on appropriate national legislation or additional bilateral or multilateral arrangements. From a legal point of view, both instruments are independent from each other and can be applied in parallel without any collision. The implementation of SAFE falls within the scope of Article 47 of the TIR Convention as a set of measures and controls imposed on grounds of public security.

5. The TIR Convention is essentially a tool to facilitate international transport of goods, in particular border crossing. Many barriers to international transport have been removed by means of the application of the TIR transit procedure. Although Customs transit is only one aspect of border crossing facilitation, its importance is crucial. However, if, in addition to Customs transit issues, many other requirements for international transport and trade are introduced, their application can inadvertently impede the facilities provided for in the TIR Convention. For example, if countries which are Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention apply, as part of SAFE, the obligatory submission of an advance electronic cargo declaration, this requirement may lead to border delays in the course of TIR transports. Therefore, the Contracting Parties should give proper consideration to various initiatives in the Customs area, especially of a global nature, study the implications that their implementation may entail for the smooth functioning of the TIR procedure and analyse whether it is feasible to harmonize the provisions of the TIR Convention and these initiatives.
III. Analysis of the World Customs Organization Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade Pillar I Standards

A. Standard 1 – Integrated Supply Chain Management

6. This standard requires that the Customs administration should follow integrated Customs control procedures as outlined in WCO's Customs Guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management (ISCM Guidelines).

7. The comparative analysis of the TIR Convention and technical specification of Standard 1 (Annex to the present document) shows the following consistencies between the Convention and SAFE:

   (a) TIR Convention ensures the integrity of the consignment from the time the goods are loaded into a container, or if not containerized, onto a vehicle or a combination of vehicles until they have been released from Customs control at destination;

   (b) the Customs office of departure must take all necessary actions to enable the identification of the consignment and the detection of any unauthorized interference within a TIR transport;

   (c) TIR Convention forms an integrated Customs control chain within a TIR transport;

   (d) Customs authorities verify the Customs seals integrity within a TIR transport;

   (e) TIR Convention institutes a legal basis for international cooperation between Customs administrations on Customs control over international road transport.

8. Further analysis (Annex) reveals that a number of elements of SAFE may be incorporated into the TIR Convention in the course of the e-TIR project:

   (a) Submission of an advance electronic cargo declaration on inbound, outbound and transit goods for risk assessment for security purposes;

   (b) Use of the WCO Customs Data Model which defines the electronic message formats for relevant Cargo declarations and includes all the data elements listed in SAFE that may be required in advance for security purposes;

   (c) Creation of international electronic messaging system for the exchange of information on high-risk goods, departure notifications, including the control results, as well as corresponding arrival notifications for security purposes.

9. It may further be considered that the incorporation of the following elements of SAFE may be done by amending the relevant Articles or adding a new security Annex to the Convention:

   (a) Obligation for TIR Carnet holders to submit advance electronic cargo declarations on inbound, outbound and transit goods for risk assessment for security purposes;

   (b) Time limit for the submission of an advance electronic cargo declaration;

   (c) Data structure of an advance electronic cargo declaration;

   (d) AEO status which can give the TIR Carnet holder an opportunity of becoming a part of an Authorized Supply Chain.
10. Lastly, according to the analysis, the following elements of SAFE are difficult to include in the TIR Convention, but they may be incorporated into the “Harmonization” Convention:

   (a) Single Window concept;
   (b) Integrated Border Management.

B. Standard 2 - Cargo Inspection Authority

11. Standard 2 requires that Customs administrations should have the authority to inspect cargo originating, exiting, transiting (including remaining on board), or being transshipped through a country. Likewise, according to the TIR Convention, all Customs offices involved in the TIR procedure have the authority to inspect originating, exiting or transiting cargo in the course of a TIR transport.

C. Standard 3 - Modern Technology in Inspection Equipment

12. This standard requires that non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment and radiation detection equipment should be available and used for conducting inspections, where available and in accordance with risk assessment. This equipment is necessary to inspect high-risk containers or cargo quickly, without disrupting the flow of legitimate trade.

13. In fact, the TIR Convention contains no obligation or recommendation to use modern inspection equipment for facilitation purposes. Taking into consideration the facilitating role of the TIR Convention, it seems that Standard 3 would require an amendment to the Convention in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to TIR Convention.

D. Standard 4 - Risk-Management Systems

14. Standard 4 requires that Customs administrations should establish a risk-management system to identify potentially high-risk shipments and automate that system. The system should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and identifying best practices. The relevant elements of this standard may be incorporated into the TIR Convention as a result of the eTIR project, namely:

   (a) Development of automated system that use risk management to identify cargo and container shipments that pose a potential risk to security and safety based on advance information and strategic intelligence;
   (b) The system should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and identifying best practices.

E. Standard 5 - High-Risk Cargo or Container

15. In accordance with Standard 5, Customs should use sophisticated methods to identify and target potentially high-risk cargo, including - but not limited to - advance electronic information about cargo shipments to and from a country before they depart or arrive; strategic intelligence; automated trade data; anomaly analysis; and the relative security of a trader’s supply chain.

16. High-risk cargo and container shipments are those for which there is inadequate information to deem shipments as low-risk, that tactical intelligence indicates as high-risk,
or that a risk-scoring assessment methodology based on security-related data elements identifies the shipment as high-risk.

17. Comparative analysis of the TIR Convention and technical specification of this standard does not reveal any obligation or recommendation in the TIR Convention to use sophisticated methods to identify and target potentially high-risk cargo. Taking into account the facilitating role of the TIR Convention, it is possible to incorporate Standard 5 by making an amendment to the Convention in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to TIR Convention.

F. **Standard 6 - Advance Electronic Information**

18. Standard 6 demands that Customs administrations should require advance electronic information on cargo and container shipments in time for adequate risk assessment to take place. This standard is closely connected with the following issues contained in Standard 1 of Pillar I:

   (a) Cargo declaration;
   (b) Time limit;
   (c) WCO Data Model;
   (d) Risk assessment.

19. In the course of the eTIR project, the following elements may be incorporated into the TIR Convention:

   (a) Creation of computerized Customs systems to process advance electronic information for security purposes;

   (b) Use of the electronic message specifications of the WCO Data Model;

   (c) Implementation of IT security, digital signatures, data privacy and data protection.

G. **Standard 7 - Targeting and Communication**

20. In accordance with this standard, Customs administrations should provide for joint targeting and screening, the use of standardized sets of targeting criteria and compatible communication and/or information exchange mechanisms; these elements will assist in the future development of a system of mutual recognition of controls.

21. Taking into account that Targeting and Communication should be based on IT technologies, it may be suggested that Standard 7 be incorporated into the TIR Convention in the course of the eTIR project.

H. **Standard 8 - Performance Measures**

22. Standard 8 requires that Customs administrations should maintain statistical reports that contain performance measures including, but not limited to, the number of shipments reviewed, the subset of high-risk shipments, examinations of high-risk shipments conducted, examinations of high-risk shipments by NII technology, examinations of high-risk shipments by NII and physical means, examinations of high-risk shipments by physical
means only, Customs clearance times and positive and negative results. Those reports should be consolidated by the WCO.

23. Obviously, this standard goes beyond the TIR Convention and cannot be implemented within its frame.

I. Standard 9 - Security Assessments

24. This standard requires that Customs administrations should work with other competent authorities to conduct security assessments involving the movement of goods in the international supply chain and to commit to resolving identified gaps expeditiously.

25. Comparative analysis of the TIR Convention and technical specification of this standard does not reveal “Security Assessments” elements in the TIR Convention but, taking into account that Standard 9 is a facilitating measure, it may be incorporated by amending the Convention by means of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to TIR Convention.

J. Standard 10 - Employee Integrity

26. According to this standard Customs administrations and other competent authorities should be encouraged to require programmes to prevent lapses in employee integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity. It seems unreasonable to incorporate this standard into TIR Convention due to the fact that this element goes beyond the scope of the TIR Convention.

K. Standard 11 - Outbound Security Inspections

27. This standard requires that Customs administrations should conduct outbound security inspection of high-risk containers and cargo at the reasonable request of the importing country. The technical specification of this standard is not reflected in the TIR Convention but, taking into account that Standard 11 is a facilitating measure, it may be incorporated into the Convention through an amendment in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to TIR Convention.

L. Summary of Pillar I analysis

28. The table below presents a short summary of the comparative analysis of the Pillar I standards and the TIR Convention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar I standards</th>
<th>TIR Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard 1 – Integrated Supply Chain Management</td>
<td>Partially incorporated. Missing elements may be incorporated in the course of the eTIR project, by amending relevant Articles of the TIR Convention and/or by adding a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 2 – Cargo Inspection Authority</td>
<td>Fully incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar I standards</td>
<td>TIR Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 3 – Modern Technology in Inspection Equipment</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the Convention by an amendment in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 4 – Risk-Management Systems</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the TIR Convention in the course of the eTIR project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 5 – High-risk Cargo or Container</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the Convention by an amendment in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 6 – Advance Electronic Information</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the TIR Convention in the course of the eTIR project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 7 – Targeting and Communication</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the TIR Convention in the course of the eTIR project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 8 – Performance Measures</td>
<td>Not incorporated. Not reasonable to incorporate into the TIR Convention because it goes beyond the scope of the Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 9 – Security Assessments</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the Convention by an amendment in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 10 – Employee Integrity</td>
<td>Not incorporated. Not reasonable to incorporate into the TIR Convention because it goes beyond the scope of the Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 11 – Outbound Security Inspections</td>
<td>Not incorporated. May be incorporated into the Convention by an amendment in the form of an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Analysis of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade Pillar II Standards

A. Standard 1 – Partnership

29. This standard stipulates that Authorized Economic Operators involved in the international trade supply chain will be engaged in a self-assessment process measured against pre-determined security standards and best practices to ensure that their internal policies and procedures provide adequate safeguards against the compromise of their shipments and containers until they are released from Customs control at destination.

30. The TIR Convention does not envisage partnership programmes aimed to enhance supply chain security. If Contracting Parties decide to implement the AEO concept within the TIR Convention, the modalities of such a programme are to be elaborated and incorporated into the Convention as a mutually recognized model. A new security Annex to the TIR Convention may be the right place for this model and the following technical elements can be used for programme modelling:

   (a) Customs-to-Business partnership programme should allow for the flexibility and customization of security plans based on the AEO’s business model;

   (b) Customs administrations and AEO should jointly determine and document the appropriate partnership security measures that will be implemented and maintained by the AEO;

   (c) The jointly produced Customs-to-Business partnership document should have written and verifiable processes to ensure, as far as possible, and in accordance with the AEO’s business model, that the AEO’s business partners, including manufacturers, product suppliers and vendors, declare their intention to comply with the security standards set forth in SAFE;

   (d) Periodic reviews of the AEO’s processes and security measures based on risk should be conducted and should be consistent with the security procedures set forth in the respective business security-related agreement.

B. Standard 2 – Security

31. Standard 2 demands that Authorized Economic Operators must incorporate predetermined security best practices into their existing business practices. The specification of this standard comprises the following elements:

   (a) The Authorized Economic Operator will implement security measures that assure the security of buildings as well as those that monitor and control exterior and interior perimeters and access controls that prohibit unauthorized access to facilities, conveyances, loading docks and cargo areas;

   (b) Access control of facilities in the secure supply chain should incorporate managerial control over the issuance and adequate control of identification badges (employee, visitor, vendor, etc.) and other access devices, including keys, access cards, and other devices that allow for unfettered access to company property and assets;

   (c) Access control to facilities in the secure supply chain should incorporate prompt and thorough removal of a terminated employee’s company-issued identification and access to premises and information systems;
(d) Trade-sensitive data should be protected through use of necessary automated back-up capabilities, such as individually assigned password accounts that require periodic recertification, appropriate information system security training, and protection against unauthorized access to and misuse of information;

(e) Personnel security programmes should incorporate screening of employees and prospective employees, as appropriate and as allowed for by national legislation. These programmes should include periodic background checks on employees working in security-sensitive positions, noting unusual changes in an employee’s apparent social and economic situation;

(f) In accordance with the AEO’s business model, security programmes and measures should be in place to promote the integrity of a business partner’s processes that are related to the transportation, handling and storage of cargo in the secure supply chain;

(g) Procedures should be employed to ensure that all information used for cargo processing, both electronic and manual, is legible, timely, accurate, and protected against alteration, loss or introduction of erroneous data. The AEO and Customs will ensure the confidentiality of commercial and security-sensitive information. Information provided should be used solely for the purposes for which it was provided;

(h) AEO shipping or receiving cargo should reconcile it with the appropriate shipping documentation. The AEO shall ensure that cargo information received from business partners is reported accurately and in a timely manner. Persons delivering or receiving cargo must be identified before cargo is received or released;

(i) AEO should conduct specific training to assist employees in maintaining cargo integrity, recognizing potential internal threats to security and protecting access controls. The AEO should make employees aware of the procedures the company has in place to identify and report suspicious incidents.

32. If Contracting Parties decide to implement the AEO concept within the TIR Convention, the above elements are to be incorporated into the Convention as requirements for the AEO authorization.

C. Standard 3 – Authorization

33. This standard envisages that Customs administrations, together with representatives from the trade community, will design validation processes or quality accreditation procedures that offer incentives to businesses through their status as Authorized Economic Operators. These processes will ensure that they see a benefit to their investment in good security systems and practices, including reduced risk-targeting assessments and inspections, and expedited processing of their goods.

34. If Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention decide to implement the AEO concept in the TIR Convention, the following elements of the Standard 3 specification are to be taken into account:

   (a) Customs administrations should cooperate (by various means) with business partners to determine joint benefits to be derived by collective participation in the secure supply chain;

   (b) Customs administrations should be receptive to the concerns of the AEO and its authorized representatives and determine, in consultation with them, a formalized method of communication that ensures that issues are properly received, addressed and resolved;
(c) Customs administrations should document the tangible benefits that the administration expects to provide (within its jurisdiction) to fully engaged business partners in the secure supply chain. These benefits should be measured and reported, and should keep pace with obligations as Customs phase in national programmes;

(d) Customs administrations should agree on mutual recognition of AEO status;

(e) Customs administrations should, where appropriate, seek or amend provisions and implement procedures to expedite the processing for consumption or export of shipments that are determined to be in a low-risk category for security concerns;

(f) Customs administrations will derive benefits through the enhanced security of goods in the international supply chain, where improved intelligence processes, risk-assessment capabilities and better targeting of high-risk consignments will lead to optimized use of resources;

(g) Customs administrations, as well as AEOs, will derive benefits from the use of self-assessment and verification.

D. Standard 4 – Technology

35. In accordance with Standard 4 of Pillar II, all parties will maintain cargo and container integrity by facilitating the use of modern technology. This standard is a very important element which links the TIR Convention with SAFE and forms the basis for the incorporation of the AEO concept into the TIR Convention: AEOs should conform, at a minimum, to the current requirements as set forth in various international agreements, including, but not limited to, the 1972 Customs Container Convention and the TIR Convention, 1975.

36. If Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention decide to include Standard 4 of Pillar II into the TIR Convention, they are to follow these elements of its specification:

(a) Customs administrations should encourage and facilitate, through appropriate incremental incentives, the voluntary use by AEOs of more advanced technologies beyond mechanical sealing for establishing and monitoring container and cargo integrity, as well as reporting unauthorized interference with container and cargo;

(b) AEOs should have documented procedures that set forth their internal policy regarding the affixing and processing of cargo and containers that employ high-security seals and/or other devices that are designed to prevent tampering with cargo;

(c) Customs administrations should have documented procedures that set forth its seal verification regime, as well as its operational procedures for addressing discrepancies;

(d) Customs administrations and AEOs should maintain an open dialogue on areas of common concern to collectively benefit from advancements in industry standards and container integrity technologies, as well as mutual operational readiness as related to identified instances of security seal breach.

E. Standard 5 - Communication

37. In accordance with this Standard Customs administrations shall regularly update Customs-Business partnership programmes to promote minimum security standards and supply chain security best practices.
38. Should Contracting Parties decide to implement the AEO concept in the TIR Convention, the following elements of this standard can be useful for establishing communication procedures:

(a) Customs should establish, in consultation with an AEO or its representatives, procedures to be followed in the event of queries or suspected Customs offences, including providing the AEO or its agents with telephone numbers where appropriate Customs officials can be contacted in an emergency;

(b) Customs should engage in regular consultation, at both the national and local level, with all the parties involved in the international supply chain to discuss matters of mutual interest including Customs regulations, procedures and requirements for premises and consignment security;

(c) The AEO should be responsive to Customs coordination of the above-described outreach efforts and contribute to a dialogue that provides meaningful insight to ensure that the programme remains relevant and well-grounded in minimum security standards that benefit both partners.

F. Standard 6 - Facilitation

39. Standard 6 requires that Customs administrations must work cooperatively with AEOs to maximize security and facilitation of the international trade supply chain originating in or moving through its Customs territory.

40. If Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention decide to include Standard 6 of Pillar II into the TIR Convention, they are to follow these elements of its specification:

(a) Customs administrations should seek or amend provisions and implement procedures that consolidate and streamline the submission of required information for Customs-related clearance to both facilitate trade and identify high-risk cargo for appropriate action;

(b) Customs administration should establish mechanisms to allow for business partners to comment on proposed amendments and modifications that significantly affect their role in securing the supply chain.

G. Short summary of Pillar II analysis

41. The table below summarizes the comparative analysis of the Pillar II standards and the TIR Convention:
VII. Possible Incorporation of Pillar I and Pillar II Standards into the TIR Convention

A. Core security elements to be incorporated

42. The above analysis has demonstrated that a lot of security elements of SAFE are not spelt out in the TIR Convention, due to the fact that these two international instruments deal with different subjects, namely supply chain security and international Customs transit. If the Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention make a decision to incorporate the Pillar I and Pillar II standards into the TIR Convention, it makes sense to focus on the following core security elements envisaged by SAFE:

   (a) Advance electronic information;
   (b) Risk management;
   (c) Outbound security inspection;
   (d) Customs - business partnerships based on the AEO concept.
B. **Advance electronic information for security purposes**

43. As for the advance electronic information, joint efforts are undertaken by the Contracting Parties to fully computerize the TIR system. The main objective of the computerization is to establish an international, centralized database in order to facilitate the secure exchange of TIR related data between national Customs systems. The availability of TIR related electronic data as advance cargo information at a stage prior to the presentation of the consignment to the Customs office of departure, en route and of destination, will allow Customs to develop and apply internationally integrated risk management tools, which can be used also for security purposes.

44. The obligation of the TIR Carnet holder to submit electronic information for security purposes in the form of specific advance notification may be implemented by adding a new paragraph to Article 47 which must have a direct reference to a new Annex on supply chain security measures within TIR transport. This new “security” Annex must contain the data model for TIR security notifications complying with the cargo declaration data model in the WCO Framework.

45. Furthermore, the above new paragraph of Article 47 should specify the exact time when the TIR security notification or declaration has to be lodged with the Customs authority. The WCO Framework of Standards defines that, in case of road transport operations, the Customs should not require the advance declarations to be submitted more than 1 hour prior to arrival of the goods at the border Customs office.

C. **Risk management and outbound security inspections**

46. Risk management and outbound security inspections are linked to advance electronic information for security purposes. That is why they can be mentioned without detailed specifications in a new paragraph to Article 47 as facilitation tools for security control. It is also possible to add a new comment to Article 47 with some explanations of risk management in the security context.

D. **Business partnership**

47. In accordance with Pillar II of the WCO Framework, each Customs administration shall establish a partnership with the private sector in order to involve it in ensuring the safety and security of the international trade supply chain. The main focus of this pillar is the creation of an international system for identifying private businesses that offer a high degree of security guarantees in respect of their role in the supply chain. These business partners should receive tangible benefits in such partnerships in the form of expedited processing and other measures.

48. Considerations of the inclusion of Customs-to-business partnership and the AEO concept in the TIR Convention are given below.

VIII. **The TIR Convention and Authorized Economic Operator**

A. **Concept of Authorized Economic Operator**

49. The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) is defined in SAFE as “a party involved in the international movement of goods in whatever function that has been approved by or
on behalf of a national Customs administration as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards”.

50. The Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) is a voluntary scheme under which operators in the supply chain increase their security performance in exchange for incentives.

B. TIR Carnet holder and Authorized Economic Operator

51. The party practically involved in the international transport of goods under the TIR procedure is the TIR Carnet holder. The TIR Carnet holder status is granted only to international road transport operators who have been authorized by Customs authorities on the basis of strict criteria laid down in Annex 9, part II. The authorization can be withdrawn if these criteria are no longer fulfilled.

52. The main criteria are:

(a) sound financial standing;
(b) absence of serious or repeated offences against Customs or tax legislation;
(c) proven experience or capability to engage in international transport and knowledge in the application of the TIR Convention;
(d) a written declaration of commitment that the operator will comply with all Customs formalities and will pay the sums due if requested to do so by the competent authorities.

53. Authorized access for operators to use the facilitation measures provided by the TIR Convention was introduced in 1999. The purpose of this measure was to prevent Customs fraud as well as to reduce the risk of non-payment of Customs duties and taxes.

54. As outlined in the table below, some criteria for the TIR Carnet holder are consistent with the conditions and requirements for AEO as specified by WCO in the Authorized Economic Operator Guidelines and SAFE, 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Economic Operator</th>
<th>TIR Carnet holder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrated compliance with Customs requirements</td>
<td>Absence of serious or repeated offences against Customs or tax legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This element requires that the AEO has not committed over a determined period an infringement/offence as defined in national legislation, which would preclude designation as an AEO.</td>
<td>A written declaration of commitment that the operator will comply with all Customs formalities and will pay the sums due if requested to do so by the competent authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial viability</td>
<td>Sound financial standing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This element requires that the AEO has a good financial standing which is sufficient to fulfil its commitments with due regard to the characteristics of the type of business activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55. On the other hand, SAFE contains numerous additional security conditions and requirements for AEO concerning satisfactory system for management of commercial records; consultation, co-operation and communication; education, training and awareness;
information exchange, access and confidentiality; security of cargo, means of conveyance, premises and personnel; trading partner security; crisis management and incident recovery; measurement, analyses and improvement. Details can be found in Section 5.2 of SAFE, 2007.

C. Incorporation of the Authorized Economic Operator security elements into the TIR Convention

56. If the AEO security elements are included into the TIR Convention, this will not affect the current rights and responsibilities of TIR Carnet holders: they will continue to use benefits of the Convention without being necessarily certified as authorized economic operator for the purposes of security. However, bearing in mind the spirit of the TIR Convention and a general intent of the Contracting Parties to simplify administrative formalities in the field of international transport at frontiers, it may be argued that further facilitation could be provided by giving TIR Carnet holders, if they so wish, an opportunity of applying for a mutually recognized status of secure transport operator, being an equivalent to AEO in SAFE. It should be understood, however, that major benefits of such a status are likely to be realized outside the scope of the TIR Convention.

57. If the Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention take a decision to incorporate the AEO security elements into the Convention and provide TIR Carnet holders with the possibility to apply for the security status similar to the one AEO has in accordance with SAFE, all these elements should be used as conditions and requirements for the authorization of TIR Carnet holders.

58. There seem to be two ways how to incorporate the AEO security elements into the TIR Convention:

(a) Add the missing elements to Annex 9, part II of the TIR Convention as specific requirements for the authorization of natural and legal persons to utilize TIR Carnets;

(b) Add a new security annex to the Convention with the aim of giving each person authorized to utilize TIR Carnets (Annex 9, part II) the possibility to apply for the secure TIR operator status in accordance with additional security conditions and requirements which are defined in SAFE, 2007.

59. Approach (b) is more flexible. It will not change the requirements and conditions for the transport industry to utilize TIR Carnets, while giving each TIR Carnet holder a chance to be certified by the Customs as secure TIR operator that will be mutually recognized by the Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention. It is as a voluntary scheme for the TIR Carnet holders that can increase their security performance within the international supply chain.

60. This approach will not require re-examination of the conditions which have already been examined when granting authorization to utilize TIR Carnets, such as:

(a) Sound financial standing;

(b) Proven experience or capability to engage in regular international transport and proven knowledge in the application of the TIR Convention;

(c) Absence of serious or repeated offences against Customs or tax legislation;

(d) A written declaration of commitment that the operator will comply with all Customs formalities and will pay the sums due if requested by the competent authorities.
61. A TIR Carnet holder, seeking the status of secure TIR operator, should comply with the following additional minimum security conditions and requirements based on SAFE:

(a) It must have a satisfactory system for management of commercial records which permits Customs to conduct any required security audit of cargo movements;

(b) It must establish a working mechanism to maintain consultation, cooperation and communication with the Customs on security matters;

(c) It must have and implement educational, training and awareness programmes on cargo integrity and supply chain security among its personnel;

(d) It must have information exchange, access and confidentiality procedures to ensure accuracy of cargo information and its timely filing with Customs;

(e) It must have a documented information security policy and procedures and/or security related controls to protect its data bases and archives against the loss of information and unauthorized access;

(f) It must establish and maintain procedures in respect of cargo, conveyance, premises and personnel security;

(g) It must implement measures allowing a clear identification of its business partners in order to secure international supply chain;

(h) It must develop and document, in cooperation with the appropriate authorities where advisable or necessary, security crisis management programme and incident recovery plans;

(i) It must regularly measure, analyse and improve assessments of the security risks in its operations and take appropriate measures to mitigate those risks.

62. A TIR Carnet holder who meets the above security criteria will be recognized by the Customs in all Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention as a safe partner in the international supply chain. This means that it does everything in its power to reduce threats in the supply chain where it is involved. The secure TIR transport operator status enhances its reputation and allows facilitations of security controls. It could therefore be chosen as a mutually recognized secure business partner, when another secure economic operator is looking for new partners for its secure supply chain.

63. If the Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention make a decision to incorporate the AEO security elements into the Convention, they will not only have to adopt the conditions and requirements for secure TIR Operators but also to indicate security benefits that can be enjoyed by them, based on the indicative list of possible benefits suggested by SAFE (see para. 5.3 of SAFE), for example:

(a) Expedited processing of the goods and documents for security purposes;

(b) Minimum number of cargo security inspections;

(c) Priority use of non-intrusive inspection techniques when examination of the goods is required;

(d) Free access to names and contact information for other secure operators (AEO), with the consent of these operators;

(e) Free access to information on recognized security standards and best practices.

64. In addition, the Contracting Parties should elaborate, possibly in a new security annex, general principles of validation and certification (authorization) procedures as well
as conditions of denial, suspension, revocation or withdrawal of the AEO status, on the basis of principles outlined in para. 5.4 of SAFE.

D. **Short summary of conditions required for the TIR Carnet holder to obtain Authorized Economic Operator status**

65. The table below presents a short summary of the conditions required for the TIR Carnet holder to obtain the AEO status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe Framework</th>
<th>TIR Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrated compliance with Customs requirements</td>
<td>Incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial viability</td>
<td>Incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory System for Management of Commercial Records</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Training and Awareness</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Exchange, Access and Confidentiality</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Security</td>
<td>Partially incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing elements may be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conveyance Security</td>
<td>Partially incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing elements may be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises Security</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Security</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading Partner Security</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management and Incident Recovery</td>
<td>Not incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May be incorporated as a part of a new security Annex to the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IX. Conclusions

66. The TIR Convention already includes a number of elements which can be used with the aim to enhance international supply chain security and which are compatible with the relevant SAFE Framework standards. However, given the different scopes of the two legal instruments, a lot of elements from SAFE are not present in the TIR Convention.

67. In particular, the Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention are recommended to consider the following core elements of SAFE with a view to their inclusion into the TIR Convention:

(a) Advance electronic information.
(b) Risk management.
(c) Outbound security inspection.
(d) Customs-to-TIR Carnet holders partnership based on the AEO concept.

68. The incorporation of the “Advance electronic information” and “Risk management” elements can be achieved in the framework of the eTIR project, while the inclusion of “Outbound security inspections” may be done through an Explanatory Note or Comment to Article 47 on supply chain security or as a part of a new security Annex to TIR Convention. This Annex can also integrate other missing elements of SAFE, inter alia, Customs-to-TIR Carnet holders partnership based on the AEO concept.

69. According to SAFE, all SAFE standards and programmes, including AEO, are voluntary. Therefore, applying for the AEO status within the TIR Convention should remain optional for transport operators, and the incorporation of the AEO security elements into the TIR Convention should not lead to discrimination between TIR Carnet holders with and without the AEO status. In other words, all facilities provided for in the TIR Convention have to be offered to authorized TIR Carnet holders irrespective of their AEO status. This principle may lead to difficulties when Contracting Parties define the security benefits for the owners of the AEO status, as these benefits would go beyond the scope of the TIR Convention.
Annex

Analysis of the technical specifications of Standard 1 of Pillar I of the World Customs Organization Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I)</th>
<th>Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part 1 General control measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Customs control</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Revised Kyoto Convention provides in the General Annex (Standard 6.1) that all goods, including means of transport, which enter or leave the Customs territory, shall be subject to Customs control. For the purpose of Standard 1, the integrity of the consignment has to be ensured from the time the goods are loaded into the container, or if not containerized, onto the means of transport until they have been released from Customs control at destination.

The “Customs control” element of Standard 1 is in conformity with the following provisions of the TIR Convention concerning Customs control and consignment integrity:

1) As a rule, the goods are carried under the TIR procedure in secure road vehicles or containers the load compartments of which are so constructed that there shall be no access to the interior when secured by Customs seal and that any tampering will be clearly visible (Annexes 2 and 7).
2) Vehicles and containers must be previously approved for international transport under Customs seals. The Certificates of Approval are recognized in all Contracting Parties to the TIR Convention (Articles 3, 12, 13 and Annexes 3, 4 and 7).
3) The goods are carried under cover of an international Customs document, the TIR Carnet, which serves as a single Customs transit declaration and guarantee document (Annex 1).
4) The TIR Carnet includes the Goods Manifest which specifies the particulars of all the goods in the consignment for control purposes (Annex 1).
5) The TIR Carnet includes the Certified report which must be filled in when the Customs seals are broken or the goods are destroyed by accident en route (Annex 1).
6) The TIR Carnet may only be presented to Customs offices of destination if all Customs offices of departure have accepted the TIR Carnet (Article 18).
7) For purposes of control, the goods and the road vehicle, the combination of vehicles or the container must be produced together with the TIR Carnet at the Customs office of
Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I) | Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis
---|---

departure, at the Customs offices en route and at the Customs office of destination (Articles 19, 21).
8) The results of the Customs controls must be recorded by each Customs office in the TIR Carnet (Article 24, Annex 1).
9) The provisions of the TIR Convention do not preclude the application of restrictions and controls imposed under national regulations on grounds of public morality, public security, hygiene or public health, or for veterinary or phytopathological reasons (Article 47, para. 1).

**Risk assessment**

In the integrated Customs control chain, Customs control and risk assessment for security purposes is an ongoing and shared process commencing at the time when goods are being prepared for export by the exporter and, through ongoing verification of consignment integrity, avoiding unnecessary duplication of controls. To enable such mutual recognition of controls, Customs should agree on consistent control and risk management standards, the sharing of intelligence and risk profiles as well as the exchange of Customs data, taking into account the work which has been carried out within the context of the WCO Global Information and Intelligence Strategy. Such agreements should foresee the possibility of joint monitoring or quality control procedures to oversee the adherence to the standards.

Apart from the comment to Article 23 "Escort of road vehicles", the TIR Convention does not spell out risk assessment, but this element of Standard 1 can be incorporated into the Convention in the framework of the eTIR project and/or as a part of a new security Annex.

**Controls at departure**

The Customs office of departure must take all necessary actions to enable the identification of the consignment and the detection of any unauthorized interference along the supply chain. In respect of maritime containerized consignments, any such screening, risk assessment and action should be taken prior to loading the container onto the ship. The ISPS Code (b1630-37) outlines in broad terms the measures which should be taken by the countries of transit and destination are given protection by the controls which are carried out at departure and which are certified by the Customs authorities at the office of departure (Explanatory Note 0.5 to Article 5).

A. This element of Standard 1 is in conformity with the following TIR provisions:
1) The countries of transit and
2) The Customs authorities of the

---

1 International Ship and Port Facilities Security
the port facility. In addition, Customs administrations along the supply chain should agree to use an electronic messaging system to exchange Customs data, control results and arrival notifications, in particular for high-risk consignments. If necessary, Customs administrations should modify their enabling statutory authority, so that they can fully screen high-risk cargo.

The country of departure must take all measures that are necessary for satisfying themselves as to the accuracy of the goods manifest (Article 19).

3) Particulars on the TIR Carnet relating to the goods must agree with the particulars given on the Customs documents which may be required in the country of departure (Explanatory Note 0.5 to Article 5).

4) The requirement that the Customs office of departure should check the accuracy of the goods manifest implies the need to verify at least that the particulars in the goods manifest tally with those in the export documents and in the transport or other commercial documents relating to the goods; the Customs office of departure may also have to examine the goods. The Customs office of departure must also, before affixing seals, check the condition of the road vehicle or container (Explanatory Note 0.19 to Article 19).

5) For the TIR system to operate smoothly it is essential that the Customs inspection at the office of departure should be stringent and complete, since the functioning of the TIR procedure depends upon it. The following in particular should be prevented:

- false declaration of goods allowing for other goods to be substituted during the journey;
- carriage of goods not entered in the TIR Carnet manifest.

(Comment to Article 19 "Inspection at the office of departure").

B. The “Controls at departure” element of Standard 1 requires that the Customs administrations along the supply chain should agree to use an electronic messaging system to exchange Customs data, control results and arrival notifications, in particular for high-risk consignments. At present, the efforts are undertaken to fully computerize the TIR system (the eTIR project) and to establish an international database in order to facilitate the secure exchange of data between national Customs systems.
### Sealing

In the interest of supply chain security and the integrated Customs control chain, in particular to ensure a fully secure movement from stuffing of the container to release from Customs control at destination, Customs should apply a seal integrity programme as detailed in the revised Guidelines to Chapter 6 of the General Annex to the Revised Kyoto Convention. Such seal integrity programmes, based on the use of a high-security mechanical seal as prescribed in ISO 217712 at the point of stuffing, include procedures for recording the affixing, changing and verification of seal integrity at key points, such as modal change. Additionally, Customs should facilitate the voluntary use of technologies to assist in ensuring the integrity of the container along the supply chain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. This element of Standard 1 is in conformity with the following provisions of the TIR Convention concerning the seals integrity:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The Customs authorities of the country of departure shall take such measures as are necessary for affixing the Customs seals or for checking Customs seals affixed under the responsibility of the said Customs authorities by duly authorized persons (Article 19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Customs office of departure must also, before affixing seals, check the condition of the road vehicle or container and, in the case of sheeted vehicles or containers, the condition of the sheets and sheet fastenings, as this equipment is not included in the Certificate of Approval (Explanatory Note 0.19 to Article 19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) As a general rule, the Customs authorities of the Customs offices en route of each of the Contracting Parties accept the Customs seals of other Contracting Parties, provided that they are intact. The said Customs authorities may, however, if control requirements make it necessary, add their own seals (Article 22, para. 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) The Customs seals accepted by a Contracting Party have in the territory of that Contracting Party the benefit of the same legal protection as is accorded to the national seals (Article 22, para. 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) If the Customs authorities conduct an examination of the goods in the course of the journey or at a Customs office en route, they shall record in the TIR Carnet particulars of the new seals affixed (Articles 24, 35).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) If the Customs seals are broken en route otherwise than in the circumstances of Customs examination the certified report in the TIR Carnet must be completed (Article 25).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. As laid down in the comment to Article 22 "Specifications of Customs seals", the TIR Convention does not address the

---

2 International Organization for Standardization
issue of standards and requirements for Customs seals. It only stipulates that, as a general rule, Contracting Parties must accept Customs seals affixed by other Contracting Parties. Thus, specification of Customs seals is left at the discretion of national Customs authorities. However, with a view to ensuring high security of Customs sealing, it is essential that Customs administrations use seals which conform to up-to-date international standards and requirements in this field. In this context, the attention of Customs authorities is drawn to the guidelines to Chapter 6 of the General Annex to the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (revised Kyoto Convention) as well as to minimum requirements for Customs seals laid down in Specific Annex E, Chapter 1 of the said Convention elaborated under the auspices of the World Customs Organization (WCO).

Unique Consignment Reference (UCR)

Customs administrations should apply the WCO Recommendation on the UCR and its accompanying Guidelines.

A. UCR is not mentioned in the TIR Convention. The primary role of the UCR is to establish a unique reference to the commercial layer of the transaction between the customer and the supplier. This reference must relate to the “Contract of Sale” between the Supplier and the Customer and has nothing to do with the relationship between the various players within the TIR procedure.

B. The TIR Convention operates with its own reference - the TIR Carnet number. However, it does not exclude the possibility of indicating UCR in the TIR Carnet as data for official use on the basis of national or international law. Moreover, the indication of UCR could be introduced in the framework of the eTIR project.

Part 2 Submission of data

Export Goods declaration

The exporter or his/her agent has to submit an advance electronic export Goods declaration to the Customs at export prior to the goods being loaded onto the means of transport or

A. The TIR Convention envisages neither the submission of an advance electronic export Goods declaration to the Customs by the exporter for security purposes, nor the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I)</th>
<th>Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>into the container being used for their exportation. For security purposes the Customs should not require the advance export Goods declaration to contain more than the details listed in SAFE. The exporters have to confirm to the carrier in writing, preferably electronically, that they have submitted an advance export Goods declaration to Customs. Where the export Goods declaration was incomplete or simplified, it may have to be followed up by a supplementary declaration for other purposes such as the collection of trade statistics at a later stage as stipulated by national law.</td>
<td>obligation of the exporter to confirm to the carrier in writing, preferably electronically, that it has submitted an advance export Goods declaration to Customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The TIR Convention does not cover the exportation procedures and, therefore, should not be modified with a view to incorporating the underlying element. It does not preclude, however, the use of an advance electronic export Goods declaration within a computerized TIR procedure in the future, for example, if there is an interface between the national electronic exportation system and the eTIR system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo declaration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The carrier or his/her agent has to submit an advance electronic cargo declaration to the Customs at export and/or at import. For maritime containerized shipments, the advance electronic cargo declaration should be lodged prior to the goods/container being loaded onto the vessel. For all other modes and shipments, it should be lodged prior to arrival of the means of transport at the Customs office at export and/or import. For security purposes, Customs should not require more details than the details listed in SAFE. The advance cargo declaration may have to be followed by a supplementary cargo declaration as stipulated by national law.</td>
<td>A. The TIR Convention does not provide for the “Cargo declaration” element of Standard 1, meaning that the carrier has no obligation to submit an advance electronic cargo declaration to the Customs at export and/or at import for security purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Taking into consideration that the advance electronic cargo information is one of the core principles of SAFE as well as one of the provisions of the modified EU Customs Code, it may be incorporated into the TIR Convention with the aim to enhance TIR transport security and to facilitate security checks at Customs borders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The best way to incorporate this element of Standard 1 into the TIR Convention is to address this issue in the course of the eTIR project.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import Goods declaration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importer or his/her agent has to submit an advance electronic import Goods declaration to the Customs at import prior to arrival of the means of transport at the first Customs office. For security purposes, Customs should not require more details than the details listed in SAFE Framework. Where the import Goods declaration was incomplete or simplified, it may have to be followed up by a supplementary declaration for other purposes such as duty calculation or the collection of trade statistics at a later stage as stipulated by national law.</td>
<td>A. The TIR Convention does not envisage that the importer or his/her agent has to submit an advance electronic import Goods declaration to the Customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. It would not be logical to modify the TIR Convention with the aim to implement the “Import Goods declaration” element of Standard 1, because it covers a subsequent Customs procedure (importation) which follows the TIR regime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Authorized Supply Chain provides the possibility to integrate the export and import information flows into one single declaration for export and import purposes, which is being shared between the Customs administrations concerned.

### Exchange of information for high-risk consignments

As part of the integrated Customs control chain, Customs administrations along the supply chain must consider Customs-to-Customs data exchange, in particular for high-risk consignments, to support risk assessment and facilitate release. Such an electronic messaging system could include the exchange of notifications about the export transaction, including the control results, as well as a corresponding arrival notification. National legislation must contain provisions to allow Customs to transmit information they collect for their purposes to other Customs administrations. If not, such provisions must be developed and enabled. The Guidelines for the Development of National Laws for the Collection and Transmission of Customs Information may be used as a basis to develop these provisions. In addition, existing WCO tools such as the Johannesburg Convention and the Model Bilateral Agreement may serve as a basis to exchange information on high-risk goods.

#### Time limit

The exact time at which the Goods and Cargo declarations have to be lodged with the Customs administration at either export or import should be defined by national law after careful analysis of the geographical situation and the business processes.
B. The best way to incorporate these elements into the TIR Convention is to do this in the course of the eTIR project and, possibly, reflect them both in a new security annex to the Convention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I)</th>
<th>Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>applicable for the different modes of transport, and after consultation with the business sector and other Customs administrations concerned. Customs should provide equal access to simplified arrangements to Authorized Economic Operators regardless of the mode of transport. However, in order to ensure a minimum level of consistency and without prejudice to specific situations, Customs should not require the advance declarations to be submitted more than:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containerized cargo: 24 hours before loading at port of departure.</td>
<td>The concept of “Single Window” could be addressed in the framework of the “Harmonization” Convention, rather than in the TIR Convention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk/Break bulk: 24 hours before arrival at first port in the country of destination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short haul: At time of “Wheels Up” of aircraft.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long haul: 4 hours prior to arrival at the first port in the country of destination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rail</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 hours prior to arrival at the first port in the country of destination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 hour prior to arrival at the first port in the country of destination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WCO Data Model**

Customs administrations should ensure that their respective IT systems are interoperable and are based on open standards. To this end, Customs should use the WCO Customs Data Model, which defines a maximum set of data for the accomplishment of export and import formalities. The Data Model also defines the electronic message formats for relevant Cargo and Goods declarations. The WCO Data Model includes all the data elements listed in SAFE that may be required by way of advance information for security purposes. This element is taken into due consideration within the eTIR project.

**Single Window**

Governments should develop co-operative arrangements between Customs and other Government agencies involved in international trade in order to facilitate the seamless transfer of international trade data (Single Window concept) and to exchange
Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>risk intelligence at both national and international levels. This would allow the trader to electronically submit the required information once to a single designated authority, preferably Customs. In this context, Customs should seek close integration with commercial processes and information flows in the global supply chain, for example, by making use of commercial documentation, such as the invoice and the purchase order, as export and import declarations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Integrated Border Management**

Governments should develop co-operative arrangements among their government agencies that are involved in international trade. Governments should also work with the border agencies of neighboring foreign governments in order to maximize the harmonization of border control functions. The implementation of such co-operative arrangements could address border issues such as national and international cooperation and co-ordination and the adoption of international standards. Integrated border management should lead to the facilitation of trade through a secure supply chain. In order to assist Customs administrations, the WCO has developed a guide to Integrated Border Management.

**Part 3 Authorized Supply Chain**

**Authorized Economic Operators**

Authorized Economic Operators who meet the criteria specified by the Customs in accordance with SAFE Framework should be entitled to participate in simplified and rapid release procedures on the provision of minimum information. The criteria include having an appropriate record of compliance with Customs requirements, a demonstrated commitment to supply chain security by being a participant in a Customs-Business partnership programme, and a satisfactory system for managing their commercial records. Customs administrations should agree on mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operator status.

A. The TIR Convention does not contain the AEO concept as such, in the sense of persons who meet specific criteria stipulated by SAFE for security purposes.

B. The TIR Convention determines the status of the TIR Carnet holder as a transport (economic) operator authorized to utilize TIR Carnets. The TIR Carnet holders must have sound financial standing and have no serious or repeated offences against Customs and tax law, but they are not obliged to comply with the supply chain security criteria.

C. Taking into consideration that the AEO concept is one of the cornerstones of SAFE as well as part of the modified EU
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical specifications of Standard 1 (Pillar I)</th>
<th>Relevant provisions of the TIR Convention and their analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs Code, it may be incorporated into the TIR Convention with the aim to give TIR Carnet holders an opportunity of becoming a part of the Authorized Supply Chain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authorized Supply Chain

The Authorized Supply Chain is a concept under which all participants in an international trade transaction are approved by Customs as observing specified standards in the secure handling of goods and relevant information. Consignments passing from origin to destination entirely within such a chain would benefit from an integrated cross-border simplified procedure, where only one simplified declaration with minimum information would be required for both export and import purposes.

The concept of “Authorized Supply Chain” goes beyond the scope of the TIR Convention.