I. INTRODUCTION

1. The title of the paper is a question: why is it important to know about diasporas? A related question is, important to whom? One approach to answering these questions is to highlight that it is important for policy makers, particularly in migrant-sending states, to understand how diasporas affect and are affected by their policies. Currently, because comparatively little is known about diasporas, policy makers find it difficult to understand how their diasporas are impacting on important policy areas, and about how various elements of their policies are impacting on their diasporas. As a result, diaspora policies in migrant-sending states can often be incoherent. Moreover, because relatively little is known about diaspora policies, the

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1 This paper has been prepared at the invitation of the secretariat.
establishment of international norms and standards regarding them can also be difficult. Therefore, this paper argues that it is important to know about diasporas, and about diaspora policies, because it is important to make these policies better. In a sense, then, its central question is really, Why is it important to make better diaspora policies?

2. By discussing why ‘good’ diaspora policies are important, this paper makes the case for improving the data systems on diasporas at the national and international levels. The paper proceeds in two sections. The first section briefly defines the term diaspora and evaluates some existing sources of data on diasporas. The second section discusses what ‘good’ diaspora policies are and why they are important, and touches on what kinds of data needs such policies present to national and international policymakers.

II. DIASPORAS AND THEIR DATA

A. Defining ‘diaspora’

3. The meaning of the term diaspora has been debated extensively since its popularity in academic and policy discourse began to boom in the late 1960s. Perhaps the most central debate has been whether the term should only be used to refer to specific historical groups – especially but not only the Jews. At one extreme, some scholars have argued that the term should only refer to ‘victim’ groups dispersed through coercion, who maintain an antagonistic relationship with their host societies (for discussion see Safran 1991, 1999; Cohen 1995, 1996). At the other extreme, many researchers use the term very loosely to refer to any group residing outside its place of origin – and even to any group exhibiting the same characteristic – for example there have been references to a ‘gay diaspora’ (and even, oddly, to an ‘egg and cream diaspora’ (Tölölyan 1994, 2000)).

4. There is general agreement among diaspora theorists that overuse of the term should be avoided in order to preserve its analytical value. The current consensus seems to be that the essential features of a diaspora group are: dispersion to two or more locations, ongoing orientation towards a ‘homeland’, and group boundary maintenance over time (see Butler 2001; Brubaker 2005). This fairly accommodating definition of the term diaspora remains true to archetypical cases such as the Jews, and also permits its use in relation to specific non-traditional emigrant groups as part of discussions about globalization and transnationalism (see Reis 2004; also see Hugo 2006).

B. Evaluating existing data collection

5. There are significant ongoing difficulties with existing quantitative data on emigration and diasporas (see Hugo 2006; Dumont and Lemaître 2004). Most states do not collect data from everyone who departs, making it difficult to study flows, while measuring stocks of expatriates is still more challenging: as Hugo writes, “From the perspective of national census taking, expatriates are demographically similar to deaths, in that information on the people involved cannot be obtained directly from them because they are not living within national boundaries at the time the census is taken” (Hugo 2006: 111). In addition to this basic problem, Hugo and others discuss further difficult questions regarding who to include and how to measure. For
example, should short-term sojourners be included as well as settled expatriates? Should non-citizens with long-term residence rights be counted when abroad – and if so how? What about students and working holiday makers who are widely dispersed but only for a short time? And what about the children and later descendents of immigrants – whose defining characteristics as members of a diaspora may be intangible and context-dependent feelings of identity?

6. Most of these questions are difficult to resolve using existing quantitative data on diasporas. Existing data are limited to two main types of sources: aggregated census data collected in the countries where emigrants reside, and smaller surveys, typically employing snowball sampling methods (e.g. see Hugo 2006; Gamlen forthcoming). Both census and snowball data are less-than-perfect sources, but they have different strengths and weaknesses as measures of diasporas: census data are significantly more reliable and representative, while snowball samples can be somewhat more valid.

7. Since the inclusion of a question on birthplace in most national censuses from the year-2000 round, it has been feasible for researchers to measure the size and characteristics of expatriate populations by aggregating data culled from the censuses in the various countries where expatriates live. This method was brought to prominence in a study by Dumont and Lemaître (2004). An ongoing initiative based on a similar method is the Global Migrant Origin Database maintained by the Migration and Development Research Centre at the University of Sussex (Migration DRC 2007). Similar techniques have been attempted by individual countries (e.g. see Bryant and Law 2004).

8. The main strength of the method is that birthplace is a variable that can give reliable and representative measurements. On one hand birthplace does not change as an individual ages and moves around, and on the other hand censuses in theory measure every member of the relevant populations. However, as a number of authors have pointed out, census data have several important weaknesses: for example they are known to systematically undercount foreign-born residents: they may be deliberately excluded from the census population, feel it does not apply to them, or avoid it for fear of clandestine behaviour being exposed (e.g. see Hugo 2006: 114). A more fundamental problem, however, is that definitions of ‘immigrant’ are not consistent across countries: for example, in the so-called classical immigration countries an immigrant is a foreign born person, whereas in other countries such as Japan and Germany an immigrant is a person of foreign nationality (for discussion see Dumont and Lemaître 2004: 3-4).

9. I would like to highlight a further weakness of census-based data, which is that it is not based on a valid measure of ‘diaspora’. A valid measure is one that measures the concept it is supposed to. From Brubaker’s (2005) and Butler’s (2001) discussions mentioned above, it is clear that birthplace is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of diaspora membership.

10. On one hand, not all locally-born people exhibit two of the essential characteristics of diaspora: maintenance of a relationship to their ‘homeland’, and self-awareness of a common bounded identity. Being born in a country by chance does not ensure that one will continue to deeply identify with it once one has left – especially if at a young age. On the other hand, some emigrants rapidly assimilate to similar cultural environments and do not maintain a distinct and separate identity beyond the first generation.
11. On the other hand, some people living abroad may feel a strong sense of identification and connection to a ‘homeland’, despite having been born outside of it. For example people may develop a very strong attachment to the homeland of their spouse and descendants. Members of indigenous groups may retain a strong sense of belonging across several generations. On this point it is worth remembering that if birthplace were a criterion of diaspora membership, most Jews would not qualify. Finding a better proxy than birthplace is not necessarily straightforward: self-declared ethnicity, nationality/citizenship, and birthplace all demarcate overlapping but separate groups – none of which is exactly coextensive with a diaspora. Thus, measuring diasporas and their characteristics using census data – even when this data is based on recently improved measures – inevitably bears high risks of measuring something other than the actual target population.

12. By contrast, notwithstanding its real and acknowledged weaknesses, snowball sampling – where respondents are identified by referral – may be capable of selecting primarily from a population that validly qualifies as a ‘diaspora’. Online questionnaires distributed through ‘chain emails’ have become popular tools for conducting surveys of transnational groups (e.g. see Hugo 2006; also see http://www.keanewzealand.com/news/eoc-summary.html). The biggest criticism of this method is the traditional one of sampling on the dependent variable, which tends to exaggerate the absolute size of diasporic populations (for discussion see Portes 2001: 182-83). Although this is an important criticism, it must be remembered that size is not all-important. Consider, for example, that although migrants only comprise around 2% of the world’s people (Castles and Miller 2003: 4), no one would argue that migration is anything other than extremely significant globally.

13. On the upside, snowball sampling can increase the likelihood of selecting from a population with two key “diasporic” characteristics: self-identification with the group, and connection to the homeland (see “Defining ‘diaspora’” above). Firstly, snowball samples are self-selecting: respondents by definition self-identify as part of the target group. Secondly, snowballing outwards from the origin country through social networks can increase the likelihood that only those with an active connection to the homeland are sampled. So: although it is not possible to estimate the absolute size of a diaspora population through snowball sampling, it is likely that members of such a sample will be, on the whole, more ‘diasporic’ than respondents identified by a more reliable characteristic such as birthplace. On the downside, sampling on shifting characteristics such as ‘identity’ and ‘connection’ makes for unreliable measurements: someone who identifies strongly as a member of a diaspora in one context may not in another, while levels of connection wax and wane over time.

14. In sum, the main point here is not to extol the virtues of snowball sampling, but to point out that there are clearly underlying problems with both the main existing sources of quantitative data on diasporas. In lieu of a better alternative, using census and snowball samples together may mitigate the weaknesses of both and capitalize on their somewhat complementary strengths.
III. WHY SHOULD DATA COLLECTION BE IMPROVED?

15. This paper argues that data collection on diasporas and on diaspora policies should be improved so that better diaspora policies can be made. Why should such policies be made? This question is discussed below.

16. Two prior questions are, what are diaspora policies, and what are “good” diaspora policies? In this paper, diaspora policies are defined as state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders. These range from state-sponsored celebrations and awards for expatriates, to bureaucratic units dedicated to the diaspora, to external voting rights and bilateral agreements on social security benefit portability, right through to the range of mechanisms through which origin states attempt to extract finances, expertise, and influence from their diasporas. Diaspora policies are most often interpreted as facets of ‘external’ or ‘extra-territorial citizenship’ (Bauböck 1994; Laguerre 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Lee 2004; Glick Schiller 2005; Barry 2006): by incorporating the diaspora into the state, these policies redefine or reconfigure what it means to ‘belong’ to ‘national society’.

17. There have been a number of different attempts to taxonomize diaspora policies. For example, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) and Chander (2006) adopt a straightforward distinction between economic, political and cultural devices of sending states. In the same vein, Barry (2006) identifies legal, economic and political instruments that apply to emigrant citizens. Levitt and De la Dehesa (2003) distinguish between bureaucratic reforms, investment policies, political rights, state services abroad, and symbolic politics. Gamlen (2006) classifies diaspora policies according to how they contribute to expanding citizenship beyond territorial borders, distinguishing ‘capacity building policies’ aimed at cultivating or recognizing diaspora communities, from mechanisms aimed at extending membership privileges and obligations to these diaspora communities. In addition, it is worthwhile to distinguish between micro-level diaspora policies, which are typically ad hoc and often uncoordinated, and macro-level diaspora policies which aim at coherent “joined up” or “whole of government” approaches to emigrants and their descendants. Here the author advocates the latter type of policy; that is, by “good” diaspora policies are meant coherent diaspora policies. In principle, a policy of “no policy” or a policy of rejecting the diaspora could be coherent, but here the specific interest is in coherent efforts to “engage” emigrants and their descendants in national society.

18. The paper will now discuss three main reasons why this kind of coherent macro-level diaspora engagement policy might be important for policy makers at the national and supranational and global level. Firstly, it is pointed out that there is a growing need to govern migration at the global level, and that this requires better understanding of how groups such as diasporas fit (or do not fit) into the international system. Secondly, the paper highlights that migrant-sending states have certain moral obligations to ensure that their inevitable impact on diasporas is fair, rather than arbitrary or exploitative. Thirdly, it is suggested that it may be in migrant-sending countries’ interests to have good diaspora policies – so that they can capitalize on opportunities to promote migration and development, and so that they can manage the impacts of transnationalism on existing public institutions.
A. Global Migration Governance

19. Migration is subject to increasing governance efforts at the global level. This is apparent in the activities of established institutions such as UNHCR and IOM, and in newly formed bodies such as the Global Migration Group and the Global Forum on Migration and Development, both of which have emerged since the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005). It is also evident in changing norms concerning how states should relate to migrants.

20. Better data on diasporas and diaspora policies could help to better understand the workings of “global migration governance” (see Betts 2008). A great deal is said and written about immigration, but it is typically forgotten that every immigrant is also an emigrant, with transnational ties to a society and state of origin. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, most discussions of global governance focus on the international level, involving interactions among nation-states. Migration is conceived either as a domestic issue involving states and immigrants, or as an international issue involving migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states. But interactions between states and emigrants also play a crucial role in governing migration - a role that is still far from clearly understood. In order to understand this role, better data are needed both on the migrants themselves, and on the ways that states of origin can and do influence their emigrants’ attitudes and behaviour through their policies.

21. Secondly, thinking and acting as if immigration control were the only facet of migration governance tends to exclude migrant-sending states from international dialogue over migration policy. Rather than responsible actors with a legitimate stake in governing migration, sending states are sometimes portrayed as problem-states that export their problems to the rest of the world by driving their own people abroad. In reality, migrant-sending states may have important and legitimate interests in how migration policy is made, and more systematic data collection on transnational relations could promote better understanding of what their proper role should be.

B. Obligations

22. There are normative arguments for and against the deliberate formation or coordination of diaspora policies.

(a) Cases against diaspora policies

23. Two of the most important cases against a coherent “macro-level” policy of engaging or incorporating the diaspora can be summarized as follows: a) states have a primary duty to their taxpayers, and b) states should not interfere with those who choose to exit.

24. Firstly, then, a number of scholars question whether diaspora policies divert government efforts away from the people to whom they are directly responsible. As Glick Schiller and Fouron write, “efforts to … portray the diaspora as the hope of the nation channel energy and resources away from struggles for social and economic justice. These efforts also divert attention from the root causes of … continuing economic and political crisis” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999: 358). At the same time, diaspora policies are seen to give non-residents too much say in
local decision-making, potentially violating Aristotle’s dictum that ‘the rulers should be the
ruled’. As David Fitzgerald writes: “emigrants make policies to which they are not as directly
subject as resident citizens…[and] it is much easier for emigrants to claim rights of citizenship
than for states to enforce the duties of emigrant citizenship” (Fitzgerald 2006: 116).

25. Secondly, critics ask whether diaspora policies violate the norm that dissenting citizens
should be permitted to express dissent by exiting the state without interference. Basch, Glick
Schiller and Szanton Blanc warn of a situation in which “the nation's people may live anywhere
in the world and still not live outside the state…wherever its people go, their state goes too”
(Basch, Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994: 269). In some cases diaspora data collection and
policy is a mode of unwanted and unjustifiable state surveillance and control. For example, until
the early 1990s, the Moroccan state attempted to retain a close watch on ‘its’ emigrants in
Europe through “a network of a control and spying networks consisting of Moroccan embassies,
consulates, mosques, and government-controlled migrant associations such as the infamous
Fédération des Amicales des Marocains, better known as ‘Amicales’” (De Haas 2007: 17).
Though they were nominally established “to help Moroccans abroad to develop social and
cultural activities”, these associations in reality allowed the Moroccan government to exert
control over emigrants, preventing them from forming their own associations, and from voting or
integrating into their host societies (De Haas 2007: 17-18; also see Brand 2006: 45-91).

(b) Cases for diaspora policies

26. These critiques of diaspora policies should not go unquestioned. While it is clear that
diaspora policies must avoid over-serving ‘outsiders’, the interests of residents and non-residents
are overlapping rather than conflicting. Indeed, consideration of the diaspora dimension is
increasingly important for maintaining the effectiveness of existing public institutions and
practices (see below). As increasingly mobile populations move in and out of countries, making
contributions in one place and drawing on public resources in other places, it is as much a
mistake to differentiate diaspora populations too strictly from domestic ones as it is to ignore the
differences between them.

27. Nor is it straightforward to suggest that states are unjustifiably interfering when they make
policies towards emigrants. Notwithstanding cases such as the Moroccan Amicales, when a
dissenting citizen emigrates and renounces their citizenship, they have a great deal more freedom
to disregard or protest against their origin state than most fellow dissenters at ‘home’. Nor are all
emigrants dissenters: emigrant groups often explicitly seek to engage with their origin state. For
example, systems for collecting data on diasporas have often been developed by emigrant lobby
groups themselves, who are not only consenting to but actively seeking incorporation into their
origin state. For example, the formation of the Irish Abroad Unit, which contributes significantly
to the welfare of Irish emigrant populations in Britain, was precipitated largely by lobby groups
who managed to demonstrate the importance of the emigrant population by producing their own
data on it.

28. Similarly, as external voting becomes the norm, it is worth remembering that elected
representatives have duties towards expatriates as members of their constituencies.
29. Even when diaspora communities do not explicitly request state intervention it is not straightforward to say that intervention is unjustified. For example, most states – if not all – make some provision for extra-territorial members – whether through bilateral agreements, property rights, consular assistance and so on. It seems perfectly reasonable for a state that provides benefits to its diaspora to expect something in return. Depending on the level of benefits the state provides, this ‘something’ might reasonably be anything from permission to collect data, to permission to collect tax. Indeed, this is fundamentally a kind of ‘no representation without taxation’ argument.

30. The opposite argument – ‘no taxation without representation’ – is also a case for diaspora engagement policies in situations where some or all of an expatriate’s income falls under the origin state’s tax net – such as in the USA and several other countries. Expatriates who are taxed by their origin state are entitled to benefits, which the state cannot provide without carefully considered policy based on information about the needs of that population. The ‘no taxation without representation’ argument can be generalized further: if a state ‘governs’ its citizens, it has obligations to treat them fairly. There has been much said about transnationalism and the decline of nation-states, but migrant-sending states still control whether and how people are able to exit (Lunt et al 2006: 29), and even the conditions under which they may live in another country. Holding a particular passport determines what countries a person can enter and what services they can access when they get there. To the extent that they restrict the choices available to individuals, migrant source states still very much play a role in ‘governing’ their diasporas, and arguably have an obligation to do so fairly, in ways that are not discriminatory or exploitative.

31. Even so, it is often the case that they govern their diasporas in arbitrary and unjust ways. For example, a British citizen who has spent their working life in Britain and decides to retire to any of the so-called ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries (e.g. South Africa, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), will receive a pension frozen at the amount they are entitled to at the moment of retirement. The pension will not be indexed to inflation. As Gordon Clark (2002) notes, this policy has been challenged unsuccessfully in the High Court of England as recently as 2002, when Justice Stanley Burton ruled that, though it would be discrimination for a government to vary the value of pensions to contributors in the UK, the government was perfectly justified in varying the value of that pension outside UK jurisdiction. “This is an outrageous judgment.” Clark writes. “It justifies gross inequalities between UK pensioners, imposing considerable hardship on those who have been resident for many years in non-eligible countries” (Clark 2002: 2104).

32. In short, it is routine for states to ‘govern’ their diasporas in ways that would be considered discriminatory and exploitative at home, but this is neither desirable nor necessary. Such injustices are remediable through coherent and fair macro-level diaspora policy-making, based on a sound evidence base.

C. Interests

33. Normative arguments are not the only ones in favour of forming better diaspora policies. There are at least two reasons why it may be in the interests of migrant-sending states to make a
concerted effort to “engage the diaspora”: firstly because the involvement of diasporas may present sending states with certain policy imperatives, and secondly because such policies may offer unique opportunities.

(a) Imperatives

34. As populations become increasingly mobile and transnational, national policies require greater understanding of diasporas in order to function properly. As Robert Didham and Denise McGregor’s paper (this session) notes, there are key legal reasons why migrant sending states need to know how many people living outside the country have citizenship rights such as the right of return, the right to vote, and social benefits like healthcare and pensions.

35. To broaden this point: the ongoing effectiveness of existing economic and social policies depends on a better understanding of transnational dynamics involving diasporas. In the realm of economic policy: inward and outward migration patterns interact in complex ways with labour market dynamics, and trade and investment patterns – yet economic policy-makers only have decent data on inward migration and tend not to systematically study the economic impact of their diasporas unless it is a very obvious one (for example, when GDP would be devastated without remittances).

36. Similarly, social policy has to grapple with populations that are increasingly mobile and spread their lives across “two or more nation-states (and therefore welfare states, tax and fiscal systems)” (Lunt, McPherson, and Browning 2006: 29). This raises important questions surrounding the burden of care for children and the elderly: parents retiring abroad can leave increased childcare burdens on young working families, while young people emigrating can increase the number of elderly people with no family support – impacts which both have implications for public care provision (Lunt et al 2006: 32-35). For example, “most national pension schemes were not designed with mobility in mind” (Lunt et al 2006: 30) and, as mentioned above, problems can arise when there is no bilateral agreement between the country where contributions are made and the country where the migrant retires, or if countries which fail to index pensions (also see Holzmann et al 2005; Clark 2002). Better understanding of these dynamics, along with more coherent policy approaches towards them, could lead to more fiscally efficient outcomes.

37. In short, the impact of diasporas on existing public institutions and policies is a complex area, and one that is becoming increasingly important – but it is also one that has traditionally been approached in an arbitrary and ad hoc manner, based on migration data that only shows half the picture. The out-migrants are invisible. As Didham and McGregor point out, in addition to the same information we require for any other population group, we also need to know how these people – the invisible out-migrants – identify and connect with their home countries. This, as much as their geographical location, determines the relevance of diasporas to economic, social and political processes in the home country. And we need to know more about the drivers, dimensions and impacts of existing policies pertaining to diasporas. With such data it may be easier to adapt efficiently and equitably to the changes brought about by globalization and transnationalism.
(b) Opportunities

38. The argument that proactive “diaspora engagement” policies are an opportunity to further national interests can be summarized in one phrase: migration and development. The main thrust of the argument is that specific types of policy intervention can enhance flows of remittances, investments, knowledge transfers and political influence through diaspora groups back into their homelands.

39. This approach to migration and development can sometimes be overly simplistic and aspirational, assuming (or rather hoping) that migration causes development. This would be especially convenient for wealthy receiving countries with angst about the numbers of migrants they receive, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would clear them of the allegation of ‘stealing’ human resources from less-developed countries (instead they would be seen to be promoting a win-win outcome). And secondly, it would raise the possibility (in some people’s minds) that continued migration can act as form of development aid to migrant-sending countries, and that the resulting development might eventually eliminate the incentives for unwanted immigration in the first place.

40. In fact, matters are somewhat more complex. For a start, the causal relationship between migration and development works in both directions. For example, Martin and Taylor (1996) have identified a ‘migration hump’: a trend whereby, up to a point, development causes migration rather than vice versa. According to this theory, as incomes rise, the poorest of the poor gain the means to escape their predicament, and it is only when incomes rise to the top of the upper-middle-income band – around $10,000 per annum – that out-migration rates start to fall again.

41. In short, the relationship between migration and development is not simple, nor is it a cure-all for development challenges. It is also important to point out that the kinds of diaspora engagement policies prescribed to foster migration and development in low- and lower-middle-income states are frequently also found in developed countries – either as normal parts of state apparatuses (see Gamlen 2006, 2008) or as deliberate ‘strategies’ to ‘catch up’ with leading economies (Larner 2007).

42. Having made these caveats, the paper will now examine the main ways in which diaspora engagement policies are sometimes considered to benefit their home countries: by facilitating remittances, investments and knowledge transfers, and by offering opportunities for political influence.

(c) Remittances

43. The significance of remittances has become a cornerstone of migration and development literature. To repeat one of the best known development mantras, in 2006 the total value of global remittance flows to developing countries topped US$220 billion (having almost doubled in the previous four years), and only foreign direct investment flows supplied poorer countries with more stable currency than remittances.
44. As Ian Goldin and Kenneth Reinert (2006: 176) note, developing country governments usually welcome remittances as contributions to national development because they reduce poverty and boost living standards among recipients, and can have a stabilizing effect during periods of upheaval.

45. Many countries have implemented policies to facilitate and capture remittances. These policies range from increasing access to remittance infrastructure and opening up competition in the remittance market (see World Bank 2005); to matching each dollar remitted through official channels with state funds (as in Mexico’s *tres por uno* scheme); to duty-free allowances on goods brought home (along the lines of the Philippines’ *balikbayan* boxes); to free passport issuance for remittances over certain amounts (in India and Pakistan).

46. Enthusiasm for remittances as a development panacea has been tempered by the reminder that they are private not public funds – state interference in the form of efforts to ‘channel’ remittances into national development goals are frowned upon, and it is warned that donor states should not see remittances as a substitute for development aid.

(d) Investments

47. Many countries, whether developing countries like India and China or developed OECD members like Ireland and New Zealand, turn to well-connected expatriates to help attract direct investment. For example, the Irish Development Agency pursued an aggressive strategy utilizing Irish-American business connections and arguments about the availability of skilled expatriate labour in order to attract computer-chip giant Intel to Ireland. As an outgrowth of recommendations from Boston Consulting Group surrounding how to increase FDI, New Zealand has set up a ‘World Class New Zealander’ network of high profile business-people in key markets, hoping to attract wealthy expatriates and ‘friends of New Zealand’ to invest in the country. Wealthy expatriates of all stripes are also increasingly targeted as philanthropists by cultural and artistic institutions (including universities) in their homelands.

(e) Knowledge transfers

48. The rise of ‘New Growth’ economic theories, which conceive of knowledge as the engine of growth, has stimulated interest in promoting transfers of knowledge and technologies from abroad in order to promote economic growth at home. There are two main types of policy. One based on facilitating returns of a temporary (or sometimes long-term) nature, by providing consultancy or fellowship opportunities for expatriate researchers. The classic example is UNDP’s long-standing TOKTEN programme, but there are many others across a range of countries – for example, Australia provides globally competitive ‘Federation Fellowships’ to attract back and retain top scientists (see Hugo, Rudd, and Harris 2003: 68).

49. The other type of knowledge transfer policy is based around cultivating what are sometimes called ‘diaspora knowledge networks’ (see Kuznetsov 2006) – dispersed networks of researchers from the same country who collaborate on scientific projects in the hope of benefiting their homeland. New Zealand has two initiatives of this type which have recently attracted attention: the first is the ‘Kiwi Expats Association’ (Kea New Zealand), which draws
together networks of expatriates in the hope of increasing New Zealand’s levels of venture capital for investment in research and development (among other things). The second is the ‘Beach-heads’ programme - arranged by well-connected kiwi expatriates - under which up-and-coming New Zealand companies are vetted to receive mentoring from senior businesspeople in offshore markets.

(f) Political influence

50. A number of public or semi-public agencies in migrant-sending states see affluent and influential expatriates as lobbyists and spokespeople in bilateral or multilateral contexts (Gamlen 2006: 17). For example, many states openly aspire to cultivate an equivalent of the Israeli and Irish emigrant lobbies in Washington DC. At a lower level, it is common to find efforts – for example through maintaining close and cooperative relations between consular posts and migrant associations – to cultivate emigrants as good ‘ambassadors’ for the sending state.

IV. CONCLUSION

51. This paper has argued that it is important to know about diasporas – and about diaspora policies – because more coherent macro-level diaspora policies are needed. Knowing about diasporas and making coherent diaspora policies requires better data collection at the national and supranational levels.

52. There is a need for better collection of statistics on diasporas at the national level. Specific types of data that need to be collected have been discussed by others in this session (Didham and McGregor). These include not only the standard kinds of information required about any population, but also nuanced information about the identities and activities that connect diasporas to their states of origin.

53. While some data needs can probably be met primarily through national-level efforts that are well coordinated, some kinds of information are effectively global public goods that cannot practically be maintained at the national level. For example, comparative data on diaspora policies themselves would be best collected at the multilateral level, to facilitate the development of international norms and standards. Yet there appears to be no supranational or international organization charged with monitoring the conduct of states towards their diasporas. This is but one instance of a more general need, highlighted by Didham and McGregor, for international cooperation in the pursuit of better data surrounding diasporas.

54. Along with the important practical tasks of deciding what questions to ask, making sure everyone asks them, and making the data available, there are a set of normative considerations regarding collecting and using information about people who have exited the territory of ‘their’ state. For example, will such data be used for the purpose of unwanted and unjustifiable surveillance? Will it lead to policies that interfere in the lives of political and economic exiles? How exactly will those who pay for data collection - and the policies that it fosters - benefit from it?
55. Attempting to answer these kinds of questions might help to move towards migration policies that better serve the needs of states, migrants and the international community.

V. REFERENCES


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