



**GENERAL DIRECTOR
FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION**

Warsaw, 27 .01.2014

Michał Kietsznia

DOOS-tos.442.9.2011.JA

**Mr Oleh Proskuriakov
Minister of Ecology and Natural
Resources of Ukraine**

Your Excellency,

I am grateful for the received letter of 20.12 2013 with the record of the transboundary consultation for Khmelnitsky NPP 3 and 4 conducted in Kiev on 22.08.2013 as well as some additional information.

The attachment consist of 3 documents:

1. Diagram “Unified state system of civil protection and place in it NNESC „Energoatom””
2. Diagram “Interaction NNESC “Energoatom” with external organizations in case of emergency”
3. Document „Completion of the construction of KhNPP 3 and 4” referring to the requests of the Polish party from the transboundary consultation

With regards to the responses to the Polish requests, that were submitted during the transboundary consultations, I provide comments and remarks of the Polish party:

- 1. The Polish party requests the detailed environmental impact assessment of the Khmelnytska NPP included in the EIA report after its completion following the transboundary consultations.**

With regard to the information provided to the request 1

Thank you for information on the course of the EIA procedure. Poland expects to receive a detailed environmental impact assessment as part of the final report on environmental impact in accordance with the declaration of the Ukrainian party. Since it contains information about full environmental impact assessment, this document will be made public for comments and remarks in Poland .

- 2. The Polish party requests for the findings of the analyses that justify the choice of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) scenarios, supported by the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), as the representative scenarios for the purposes of contingency planning.**

With regard to the information provided to the request 2

Thank you for information on the scope of the planned analyses. Polish party expects to receive the results of the analyses in accordance with declaration of the Ukrainian party made in Kiev.

- 3. The Polish party also requests for the safety analyses demonstrating the ability to contain the melted core inside the reactor vessel and to maintain the integrity of the containment during and after a severe accident (with core meltdown).**

With regard to the information provided to the request 3

Thank you for information on the scope of the planned analyses. Polish party expects to receive the results of the analyses in accordance with declaration of the Ukrainian party made in Kiev.

- 4. The Polish party requests for the results of the deterministic analyses of the impact of a collision with a big passenger aircraft (of ca. 400 tonnes), particularly of the collision with the containment of the nuclear reactor and other nuclear power plant facilities that are important for the nuclear safety and radiological protection; in case such analyses are not considered relevant, a detailed, supported by analyses rationale of such standpoint.**

With regard to the information provided to the request 4

Thank you for information on the scope of the planned analyses. Polish party expects to receive the results of the analyses in accordance with declaration of the Ukrainian party made in Kiev.

5. **The Polish party postulates that analyses of the possibility of simultaneous failure of more than one power unit were conducted and the findings made available, along with the environmental impact assessment of such failure, including the transboundary context.**

With regard to the information provided to the request 5

Thank you for information on the scope of the planned analyses. Polish party expects to receive the results of the analyses in accordance with declaration of the Ukrainian party made in Kiev.

6. **The Polish party requests the provision of the list of the facilities, constructions and systems (including auxiliary ones) that exist and the use of which is expected, for each of the power units 3 and 4, including the following information for each facility:**
 - a. **The percentage of construction readiness**
 - b. **The material strength parameters determined during the experiments and analyses conducted (such as: shear strength, compressive strength, vibration resistance)**
 - c. **Relation of the parameters listed in point b) to the parameters assumed during the design stage**
 - d. **Detailed description of the conducted or planned repair and renovation activities concerning the particular components**

With regard to the information provided to the request 6

The Ukrainian party replied to Point 6 a) level of sophistication of buildings and construction of blocks 3 and 4 and the scope of assessment for parameters of strength of materials, types of recommendations and the overall conclusion arising from this evaluation was described briefly (see section 6b)). Referring to the explanation on the issue of irrelevance of providing information that was requested in 6 c) and 6 d), I would like to remind you that the Ukrainian

party agreed to share data at meeting in Kiev . The provisions of the Espoo Convention do not apply directly to the description of the plant structure elements, but require that potential impact on the environment and human health of the planned investments is presented alongside preventive and minimising measures. The security of the plant is crucial for assessing the potential risk of failure. In addition, Khmelnytsky Nuclear Plant will be built using 20-year-old structural elements. Therefore, the Polish party has the right to request information proving that the structures have not been subject to alterations which could affect the technical condition and would like to ask to complete the documentation sent with the information contained in 6 c) and 6 d).

- 7. The Polish party requests for another analysis of the dispersion of radionuclides from emergency releases at altitudes of 30m and 100m using the meteorological conditions at the boundary of Poland indicated by the Polish party and in keeping with the conservative meteorological conditions in Ukraine; and the provision of the findings of these analyses.**

With regard to the information provided to the request 7

The Polish party has appended to the letter some data on meteorological conditions representative of the Polish territory as concluded in the consultations. These data include the results of measurements from synoptic stations obtained in the years 2008-2012 in the format described in the Polish language. In addition, descriptions of data were translated into Russian. If you need further clarification, please contact Mr Rafal Dąbrowski from the State Nuclear Agency (dabrow@paa.gov.pl).

On the basis of the meteorological data submitted, the Ukrainian party declared, during the consultations, to calculate any risks for the Polish territory assuming higher releases, i.e. at the level of the containment dome and outlet from the venting chimney. The comment that higher volume of releases results in greater dispersion of radionuclides and therefore creates lower risks is correct with regard to the risks present in close proximity to the nuclear power plant, namely in the area of Ukraine rather than Poland. Please submit the results of the calculations made.

- 8. The Polish party requests for the existing off-site emergency plans for the Khmelnytsky NPP units 1, 2 and units 3, 4, at the time these plans are developed, in**

accordance to the commitment made by the Ukrainian party; and the provision of the legal regulations concerning the content of emergency plans, in order to enable the Polish party to undertake activities in real time concerning emergency actions.

With regard to the information provided to the request 8

The Ukrainian party provided a general description of emergency plans with 2 diagrams depicting the structure of the Ukrainian civil defence system and an interoperability diagram of various state institutions, and Energoatom agencies in the event of a failure. The Polish party requested specific information about off-site emergency plans for existing blocks 1 and 2 and for blocks 3 and 4 once these have been developed. Sending Ukrainian legislation requirements for off-site emergency plans was also requested.

Please complete the data as agreed in the consultations.

Yours sincerely,

Piotr Otawski
on behalf of General Director for Environmental Protection
Vice General Director for Environmental Protection

Enclosure:

Meteorological data from Polish territory with results of measurements from synoptic stations obtained in the years 2008-2012 (CD)

To the attention of:

Mr Janusz Zalewski, Deputy Minister of the Environment
Mr Janusz Włodarski, Chief of the Polish Nuclear Agency
Mr Jerzy Nawrocki, Director of Polish Geological Institute
Ms. Ewa Figel, Director of the Eastern Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ms. Gabriela Szuba, Deputy Director of the Minister's Office in the Ministry of the Environment
Ms. Beata Sielewicz, Regional Director for Environmental Protection in Lublin