

**UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE**  
**WORKING PARTY ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (WP PPP)**

**Proposed Draft**

**UNECE STANDARD ON PPPs IN RENEWABLE ENERGY**

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**UNECE Standard on PPPs in Renewable Energy**

**Implementing the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  
through effective  
“People-First Public-Private Partnerships”**

<b>Abbreviation and terms</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
<b>ATI</b>	African Trade Insurance Agency
<b>COD</b>	Commercial operation date
<b>EMDE</b>	Emerging markets and developing economies
<b>EPC</b>	Engineering Procurement and Construction.
<b>GENCO</b>	Generating company
<b>IFI</b>	International Finance Institutions (multilateral and bilateral development banks)
<b>IPP</b>	Independent power producer
<b>LD</b>	Liquidated damages
<b>Load</b>	An electrical load is an electrical component or portion of a circuit that consumes electric power. A "load centre" is centre of concentrated electricity demand, such as town, city or industrial facility.
<b>MIGA</b>	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
<b>MW</b>	megawatt (being 1,000,000 watts)
<b>NDCs</b>	Nationally Determined Contributions according to the Paris Agreement
<b>Offtaker</b>	Purchaser of electricity (in particular, in the context of energy (RE and non-RE) PPPs, the purchaser under the PPA)
<b>PPA</b>	Power purchase agreement
<b>PPP</b>	Public private partnership
<b>PRG</b>	Partial risk guarantee
<b>PSA</b>	Power sale / supply agreement
<b>RE</b>	Renewable energy
<b>REFIT</b>	Renewable energy feed in tariff
<b>REIPPPP</b>	South Africa's Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program.
<b>SE4ALL</b>	Sustainable energy for all
<b>SPV</b>	Special purpose vehicle
<b>UNECE</b>	United Nation's Economic Commission for Europe
<b>UN SDGs</b>	United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals
<b>VfM</b>	Value for Money

1 **I. Introduction**

2 **The Importance of Renewable Energy (“RE”) to Sustainable Development**

3 The United Nation’s commentary on the progress of Sustainable Development Goal 7 in 2016 states,  
4 inter alia, “Energy is crucial for achieving almost all of the Sustainable Development Goals, from its  
5 role in the eradication of poverty through advancements in health, education, water supply and  
6 industrialization, to combating climate change.”<sup>1</sup>

7 Furthermore, the United Nation’s commentary on the progress of Sustainable Development Goal 13  
8 in 2016 states, inter alia, “climate change presents the single biggest threat to development, and its  
9 widespread, unprecedented impacts disproportionately burden the poorest and most vulnerable.”<sup>2</sup>

10 Accordingly, access to sufficient, dependable and affordable RE is crucial to attaining the United  
11 Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (“**UN SDGs**”).

12 **The Role of RE PPPs in Sustainable Development**

13 The UN SDGs cannot be realized unless the private sector is mobilized – and on a significant scale.  
14 SDG 17 (Revitalize global partnerships for sustainable development)<sup>3</sup> calls for partnerships between  
15 the public and the private sector as well as civic society.

16 Public Private Partnerships (“**PPPs**”) are a mechanism for facilitating private sector participation in the  
17 delivery of RE infrastructure projects. PPPs can mobilize private sector capital, technological and  
18 operational know-how, and risk appetite to develop, design, finance, build, operate and maintain an  
19 RE infrastructure project.

20 **Renewable Energy PPPs as an alternative to ‘traditional’ public procurement of energy**  
21 **projects**

22 Compared to traditional public procurement where a public entity finances and contracts for a specific  
23 good or service and retains much of the risk of public service delivery, a distinguishing feature of a RE  
24 PPP is the allocation of a significant portion of that risk to the private sector. They are particularly  
25 valuable in RE projects because the private sector is able to deliver:

- 26 > **Technology:** where the service requires external expertise and government will not be able to  
27 provide it independently;
- 28 > **Quality of Service:** where the private sector would significantly enhance the quality of service  
29 compared to what the government could extend independently;
- 30 > **Time:** where the private sector would expedite the project implementation significantly; and
- 31 > **Cost Savings:** where there would be a considerable reduction in the project cost and also the  
32 service cost with the involvement of the private sector.

33 **Useful Definitions**

34 For the purposes of this RE Standard, the International Energy Association’s definition of **Renewable**  
35 **Energy** is acknowledged: *“Renewable energy is energy that is derived from natural processes (e.g.*  
36 *sunlight and wind) that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind,*  
37 *geothermal, hydropower, bioenergy and ocean power are sources of renewable energy.”<sup>4</sup>*

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1 Sustainable Development Goal 7, “Progress of Goal 7 in 2016”, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg7>.

2 Sustainable Development Goal 13, “Progress of Goal 13 in 2016”,  
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg13>.

3 Sustainable Development Goal 17, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17>.

4 <https://www.iea.org/about/faqs/renewableenergy/>

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## 41 **II. Objective of the Standard**

42 This Standard provides policymakers with guidance and implementation tools for the design and  
43 implementation of People First PPPs in the RE Sector.

## 44 **III. Scope of the Standard**

45 This Standard provides introductory, high level guidance to policy makers as to some of the key  
46 issues related to People First RE PPPs.

## 47 **IV. Central questions**

48 'People First PPPs' are PPPs, which (a) are seen as synonymous with the purposes of the UN  
49 SDGs; (b) out of all the stakeholders, put people as the main beneficiaries of the projects; (c) increase  
50 access to water, energy, transport, and education especially to the socially and economically  
51 vulnerable members of society; (d) promote social cohesion, justice and disavow all forms of  
52 discrimination based on race, ethnicity, creed and culture; (e) focus on improving the quality of life of  
53 communities, fighting poverty and creating local and sustainable jobs; and (f) contribute to ending  
54 hunger and promote the empowerment of women.

### 55 **People First for Renewable Energy PPPs**

56 In general terms, a host Government that undertakes 'People First' RE PPP projects would prioritize  
57 (in order):

- 58 • a sufficient amount of RE generation capacity is developed to meet electricity demand;
- 59 • RE generation assets in its country are prudently operated and maintained over the useful life of  
60 those assets; and
- 61 • consumers are charged the lowest possible tariff, and the Government takes on the lowest  
62 possible fiscal burden, in order to enable the above two objectives to be met.

### 63 **Environmental and Social Sensitivity**

64 Another important component of RE projects that are SDG compliant and put people first is  
65 environmental and social sensitivity. RE projects have an impact on the environment. After all, they  
66 rely on natural systems to generate energy and if not designed, implemented and operated in full  
67 compliance with domestic environmental and social protection laws, and international best practice  
68 standards, they risk having a negative impact on the environment. Governments must therefore:

- 69 • implement policies to guide the partnership with respect to environmental and social impacts;
- 70 • establish a process to identify and assess those impacts;
- 71 • develop a management programme, including mitigation measures, which address the impacts  
72 throughout the life of the project;
- 73 • employ communication and disclosure practices that identify and communicate with stakeholders  
74 who are affected by the project, and
- 75 • institute a grievance mechanism system to resolve outstanding stakeholder issues, in particular  
76 for projects which involve resettlement.

77 For example, large-scale RE PPPs, in particular hydropower projects can have adverse effects on  
78 ecosystems which sustain community livelihoods far beyond the vicinity of the project. Accordingly,  
79 People First RE PPPs must avoid or mitigate irreversible impacts on biodiversity, natural habitats and  
80 protected areas and be aware of the breadth of potential stakeholders, however remote to the project.

81 People first is not just the environment though. RE PPPs and the power they produce have the  
82 potential to create jobs and economic opportunities, increase access to education and improve

83 personal security, and even promote gender balance through structuring and procuring the  
84 partnership or providing power to underserved areas so women can grow their business.

### 85 **Maximizing people benefits**

86 To maximize the benefit a RE PPP project brings to people, host Governments should explore how  
87 their renewable energy projects can deliver more value. Mandatory requirements in a RE PPP  
88 programme however require diligent and realistic assessments of what the partners, suppliers, and  
89 projects can provide. Making economic development criteria part of the project selection process can  
90 be a powerful tool; however, it might have an adverse impact on tariffs. Equally, community  
91 shareholding can contribute positively to public benefits, yet require an increased tariff in order to  
92 protect the commercial viability of the project.

#### 93 **A. Project types and examples**

94 RE PPPs typically involve solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower and/or bioenergy based energy  
95 generation. They also typically come in two distinct types of structural arrangements:

96 (a) concession based agreements, which may be entered on a project-by-project basis, or  
97 under a co-ordinated procurement programme of multiple projects, where the private entity  
98 undertakes the delegated public energy service, and

99 (b) Joint (Equity) Ventures where a mixed public and private entity is formed to undertake the  
100 provision of energy.

101 Many EMDE countries have successfully implemented co-ordinated RE PPP procurement  
102 programmes, including for example Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Some smaller EMDE countries  
103 have also moved towards co-ordinated procurement programmes, often with targeted technical and  
104 financial support from IFI and development cooperation actors, for instance, in Uganda, Honduras  
105 and Indonesia.

106 Although the typical RE PPP structure is understood as a privately sponsored project with non-  
107 recourse or limited recourse project financing, in EMDE countries the government usually must also  
108 provide some level of guarantee to back up the utility's obligations to the private partner. This could  
109 also occur through subsidies to support the tariff rates, in particular if end-user tariffs are not cost  
110 reflective, or governments holding (directly or indirectly) some portion of the equity and/or debt for the  
111 project in order to make it feasible.

#### 112 **Common features of RE Concession Structures**

113 RE PPPs are typically concession structures where the government confers the right to develop and  
114 operate the RE facility to a private party and also agrees to buy some or all of the power it will  
115 produce through a 'power purchase agreements' (PPA).

116 RE concessions also include most or all of the following features:

- 117 • a single-purpose project company or "special purpose vehicle" (SPV) established and owned by  
118 shareholders (often referred to as "Sponsors"), which will take on the responsibility of designing,  
119 financing, constructing, operating and maintaining the power generation facility over the life of the  
120 contract;
- 121 • a long term (typically 20-25 years) power purchase agreement between the SPV and the  
122 'offtaker', which is often a Government owned utility;
- 123 • an agreement between the SPV and the host Government (such agreement often referred to as  
124 an "**Implementation Agreement**", "**Concession Agreement**", "**Government Support**  
125 **Agreement**" or similar) which sets out various rights and obligations between the SPV and the  
126 host Government;

#### 127 **Joint Venture RE PPPs**

128 Another model is when the public entity and a private partner hold shares of an energy venture jointly  
129 and the project along the same principles as an independent power producer (IPP) (an independent

130 entity that generates power to sell to a utility or other end user). . However, joint ventures present  
 131 additional administrative and corporate governance challenges (for example conflict of interest and  
 132 regulatory interference issues) which may arise as a consequence of the institutionalized partnership.

133

Renewable Energy Procurement Programmes		Single Concession RE PPP		Joint Venture RE PPP	
Pros	Cons	Pros	Cons	Pros	Cons
Scalability Likely lower power tariffs Lower transaction costs per project Attract investors and financiers more efficiently	Require long-term dedicated governmental support and complex sectorial arrangements  Often require costly public support instruments	Potentially quicker to implement than a full RE PPP programme	One off transaction, so no scale and less added capacity  Higher transaction and financing costs per MW, thus higher tariffs in most cases	Involvement of utility in JV may make RE PPP quicker  Dividends as revenue source	No scalability  Potential public interference and conflict of interest

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135 **B. Pros and Cons of RE PPPs**

136 Complexity

137 Carrying out RE projects as PPPs can ensure that each risk is allocated to the party best able to  
 138 manage and/or mitigate that risk. If done properly, this ensures, for example, that host Governments  
 139 and utilities are not burdened with the risk of facility creation and generation. This risk allocation  
 140 exercise also typically adds a high degree of rigour to the project analysis.

141 However, RE PPPs require a relatively large number of public and private participants to agree on a  
 142 complex, interconnected allocation of risk and return. This can be very difficult to manage and require  
 143 sophisticated technical, financial, legal, and/or transactional capacity.

144 For example, risks which are not allocated to the host Government and/or utility will initially be  
 145 allocated to the SPV, either explicitly in the PPA or Implementation Agreement, or impliedly by failing  
 146 to allocate those risks to the host Government and/or utility. In turn, the SPV will divide these risks  
 147 and allocate them again to other contractors, investors, insurers, lenders, or other stakeholders best  
 148 able to manage the risk, . One consequence is that the stakeholder who is ultimately expected to  
 149 bear a certain risk may not be involved at the stage when that risk is defined and initially allocated to  
 150 the SPV, which in turn can lead to an unrealistic assignment of risk and increase the chance for  
 151 renegotiation or other work out arrangement. Governments must therefore be prepared to tackle the  
 152 complexity of partnering with a private partner and utilizing private finance to accomplish their energy  
 153 needs.

154

155 **C. PPPs Meeting People First Objectives – Replicability, Scalability, Equity, Efficiency,**  
156 **Sustainability, Effectiveness Demonstrated**

157 In light of the 2030 Sustainable Agenda, and going beyond just measuring VfM of projects, the  
158 concept of “People First PPPs” provides a metric which seeks to measure the degree to which a  
159 project delivers ‘value for people’ (VfP) and whether the PPP is ‘fit for purpose’ for the UN SDGs, i.e.,  
160 its ability to provide poverty alleviation, the degree to which it brings transformational effect to the  
161 communities it serves, etc.

162 A People First RE PPP therefore achieves more than simply energy generation. It should improve  
163 health and environmental quality in the location in which it is located by not only generating green  
164 energy in a clean and sustainable way, but reducing the negative effects of non-renewable energy  
165 generation like burning coal and gas. People First means projects are designed to create jobs and  
166 effect technology transfer to local markets to reduce unemployment and boost local and regional  
167 economic capacity. Projects that are implemented to make electricity more broadly available and  
168 accessible to people and improve personal security, improve access to healthcare, and offer people  
169 the ability to be more productive. Projects that create energy independence, reduce reliance on  
170 carbon based fuels, mitigate the negative effects of fluctuations of fuel markets on host governments  
171 and their citizens, and create long term savings for the government and the people.

172 To make this level of impact, however, most governments will need multiple projects and a full suite of  
173 RE projects, and while individual projects can bring great benefits, the most efficient outcomes can be  
174 achieved with procurement programmes that bring economies of scale. For this reason the  
175 recommended approach for governments is a RE Procurement Programme.

176 This Standard acknowledges, however, that each government’s needs are different and single  
177 concession RE PPP or Joint Venture RE PPPs may also be suitable depending on, for example, the  
178 capacity of the jurisdiction to take on a comprehensive programme, the amount of generation  
179 required, the locational or system needs (such as grid coverage or reliability factors), and the  
180 financing and contracting/partnering approach. These single facility RE PPPs could also feed into a  
181 larger programme or act as pilot projects to test concepts, build capacity, and feed into a full RE PPP  
182 procurement programme.

183 **V. Delivering the Models**

184 **General**

185 RE PPP procurement programs should be closely considered by governments. Governments must  
186 weigh, alongside their sustainable development goals, their generation needs, capacity of the  
187 utility(ies) and governmental host institutions, the generation technology in question, overall strategy  
188 toward RE generation, and more. After making a full assessment, a RE PPP procurement  
189 programme may be developed through a phased approach to allow for institutional capacity  
190 development, price discovery and overall risk reduction for both the host Government and private  
191 sector.

192 The success of an RE PPP procurement programme is therefore a function not only what the host  
193 Government decides to do, but also how it goes about the design of programme. The ‘how’ aspect of  
194 PPP programs is about:

- 195 • the process of programme development which a host Government implements from the start;
- 196 • the consistent process and activity of stakeholder engagement – including affected local  
197 communities, private investors, financiers, transmission system operators, off-takers, relevant  
198 ministries, etc.; and
- 199 • the size and impact of the programme and the individual projects within it.

200 An RE PPP procurement programme should educate stakeholders about the ultimate project cost and  
201 its impact on the consumer over time, the affordability of electricity for the population at large and  
202 other affected parties (departments of finance, utilities, private sector as an off-taker, energy intensive  
203 users etc.), and the environmental impact of such initiatives and plans for mitigation.



204 Depending on the size of the programme, it can place a significant strain on the balance sheet of a  
205 country, especially where revenues are constrained by regulation or the ability of the consumer to  
206 pay. This is true for both the utility, which has to purchase additional RE capacity at potentially higher  
207 cost, as well as for host Governments who provide explicit or quasi-sovereign guarantees. The impact  
208 of RE PPP projects and programs should therefore be subjected to cautious due diligence and a  
209 comprehensive review of a country's ability to meet its obligations under the RE PPP programme.

210 An efficient RE PPP procurement programme should also be embedded in a broader process or  
211 integrated planning which should include realistic supply and demand forecasts, least cost planning  
212 associated with the energy mix, resource assessments, transmission network development and  
213 broader power sector development. It is incumbent upon a host Government to assess the building  
214 blocks of its programme, for example, availability of data on resource assessments, transmission  
215 risks, and land titles, and design a process that takes its strengths and weaknesses into account.

216 RE PPP programmes targeting intermittent power sources impose additional requirements to a  
217 country's grid absorption capacity and management. Ignoring these principles usually leads to a  
218 higher cost of service and a risk mitigation programme which leaves the host Government with risk  
219 that could otherwise be borne by the private investors<sup>5</sup>.

#### 220 Selection of Appropriate RE PPP projects / Baseline requirements for Private interest

221 Due to the high upfront investment costs, RE PPP projects generally require a significant degree of  
222 long-term investment certainty. However, the decision as to which PPP model is the most suitable  
223 depends on a variety of factors. One challenge faced by host Governments is determining simply  
224 whether an infrastructure project (RE or otherwise) is best suited to be delivered by a PPP.  
225 Governments should acknowledge that RE PPPs are not the panacea for all energy development  
226 initiatives, and it is therefore crucial in the planning phase to select RE projects that fit within the  
227 government's overall energy strategy but are well suited to the PPP model. Financial feasibility and  
228 operational objectives are key to this assessment, but private sector interest and overall viability of the  
229 project will be key to attracting qualified partners.

#### 230 Efficient Risk Allocation

231 Risk is ideally allocated to the party best able to manage and/or mitigate that risk, despite the fact that  
232 it may not be fully controlled.

233 Nevertheless, these risk examples associated with RE generation and PPPs are by their nature very  
234 difficult to control for Governments:

- 235 • risks associated with matching electricity supply and demand. This is particularly relevant for  
236 large RE PPP programs or projects, whose installed capacity may sometimes exceed 100% of a  
237 host country's total peak demand (including the reserve capacity) at the time of inception;
- 238 • exchange rate risks (capital and repayment);
- 239 • 'political force majeure' risks, such as war, civil disturbance, terrorist attack, currency  
240 convertibility, etc., which are not within the direct control of the host Government; and
- 241 • climate change that may affect the efficiency of the systems or their level of generation.

242 A project's cost of capital will also reflect to some degree these actual and perceived risks associated  
243 with carrying out the project. Such risk categories might include inflation risk, interest rates risk,  
244 political and regulatory risk, project design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance risks,

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<sup>5</sup> For example, a comparison of the outcomes of RE programs in India and Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of the programme initiated by the Indian Government, wind and solar projects in India regularly result in levelized tariffs in Rupees equivalent of \$0.08/kWh, where 50% of the tariffs goes towards capex and O&M, and 50% to interest and equity return. In contrast, a Sub-Saharan African project which did not follow such a process, would probably end-up with a tariff of US\$ 0.12/kWh, where the level of capex and opex would be the same as with a project in India, with almost a 3.0x multiple going to equity return.

245 and demand and regulatory risks.

#### 246 Risks Typically Allocated to the Public Sector

247 Risks commonly allocated to the host Government include change in law, change in tax, failure of  
248 Government authorities to issue requisite permits and consents (which have been properly applied for  
249 and diligently pursued by the project company), undue interference by public authorities / officials,  
250 war, civil commotion/unrest, strikes, and in some cases unforeseeable ground conditions. In countries  
251 with weak FX spot and forward markets – tools that could help mitigate the risk of currency  
252 convertibility and of macroeconomic crisis - projects are sometimes made viable by involving  
253 supranational Political Risk Guarantee products.

254 Where risk events which have been allocated to the Government arise, and they are sufficiently  
255 prolonged or have sufficiently severe effects such that an early termination of the contract arises, the  
256 Government will typically be required to purchase the generation facility. The purchase price will  
257 almost certainly be one which (a) covers any termination and transfer costs, (b) repays outstanding  
258 debt, (c) returns equity invested, and (d) provides a negotiated return on equity.

259 It is worth noting that if circumstances giving rise to requiring the host Government to purchase a RE  
260 project's assets were to arise, it very possible that those circumstances may:

- 261 • affect most if not all energy (RE and non-RE) PPPs in a host country (e.g. the applicable  
262 circumstance may be a prolonged civil war); and
- 263 • coincide with a period when the host Government is least able to pay (and many EMDE host  
264 Governments may be unable to pay the early termination buyout price at any time).

265 A wide disparity exists, however, in current market practice as to the formulation of the early  
266 termination buyout price formula (and resulting quantum of that price), so governments should  
267 carefully consider fiscal impacts of such termination provisions. Accordingly, host Governments  
268 should:

- 269 • ensure that all relevant host Government personnel understand the surrounding issues and risks  
270 involved;
- 271 • ensure that contingent liabilities which crystalize upon early termination are kept to the minimum  
272 level required for project financing, and
- 273 • engage specialists in these areas where necessary.

274 One particular risk worth highlighting is 'grid risk'; i.e., the risk that the electricity grid is not able to  
275 accept the electricity made available by the project company. Even when grid outages are caused by  
276 a force majeure event, project lenders in particular will require (as a condition to the provision of  
277 finance) that this risk is allocated either to the utility and/or to the host Government (i.e., that they  
278 should be obliged to reimburse the RE PPP for the revenue which it would have otherwise lost), on  
279 the bases that (a) the RE PPP cannot realistically insure against events which may be caused or  
280 occur anywhere on the electricity grid, and (b) the utility has the dual duties of ensuring that the grid is  
281 robust in the first place, and re-instating the grid promptly if for any reason it is knocked out of service.

#### 282 Risks Allocated to Investors

283 Different classes of investors have different risk appetites. This reality should be acknowledged and  
284 embraced. Generally, the private sector is willing to take the following risks: project cost,  
285 construction, technology, operation and maintenance.

#### 286 **Improving the Baseline**

287 To build a RE PPP programme which will have the transformational effect called for in the UN SDGs,  
288 host Governments should aim to develop an RE policy framework which will bring not only successive  
289 projects but drive down the cost of RE PPP transactions. Some practical measures include:

- 290 • **policy guidelines** - identification by the public sector of priority technologies and regions for  
291 investment, as well as lists of potential projects / project sites;

- 292 • **resource mapping** – mapping RE resource, collecting RE resource data (wind speed, irradiation,  
293 hydrology, etc.) on an ongoing basis and publishing this data;
- 294 • **investor guidelines** - development of detailed investor guidelines, which set out clearly all steps  
295 investors must take, including in particular permits and consents, etc., which must be obtained  
296 from Government authorities from project initiation through to commercial operations, as well as  
297 guides to the tax treatment and investment incentives available;
- 298 • **standardised project agreements** – development of a full suite of realistic, technology specific,  
299 bankable project documentation that is also customisable;
- 300 • **engagement of external advisors** – working with financial, legal and technical advisors can help  
301 designing an efficient RE PPP programme or project in line with international best practice,  
302 attracting more prospective investors, and driving the competition up and prices down. Associated  
303 costs can be sponsored through MFI support programs or recuperated through the project;
- 304 • **site selection, early project development** - site selection or identification of priority locations by  
305 the public sector, as well as carrying out preliminary legal and technical due diligence which can  
306 be shared with all shortlisted bidders;
- 307 • **RE appropriate grid code** – acknowledging RE, and the specific requirements and technical  
308 limitations of various RE technologies, in the grid code, and development of detailed RE grid  
309 connection guidelines; and
- 310 • **Interconnection and associated costs** – governments, utilities and / or regulators must provide  
311 uniform and transparent interconnection procedures, guidelines and application forms for RE  
312 generation connection. It is also important to provide transparency on how required grid network  
313 upgrades triggered by RE PPP are identified and associated cost responsibilities allocated to  
314 specific generation projects.

## 315 **Financing**

316 RE PPP with project costs above circa US\$20 million +/-<sup>6</sup> are typically project financed; however,  
317 project finance often requires cumbersome and expensive processes leading to higher upfront  
318 transaction costs and extended negotiation and preparation timelines. Sponsors (and Governments)  
319 will need to accommodate project lenders who are more risk averse than investors/sponsors (as  
320 lenders expect a lower return than the project sponsors).

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<sup>6</sup> There are no hard and fast rules; however, most project lenders have minimum deal sizes, below which they are not prepared to incur the significant time and expense required in project preparation (which in turn is to a large extent fixed regardless of the project size).

321 RE PPPs that are project financed are structured to:

- 322 • maximize the ratio of debt finance to equity investment, as the interest rates required by  
323 lenders are typically much lower than the returns sought by equity investors;
- 324 • lend against the expected long-term income stream flowing from the power purchase  
325 agreement (“PPA”) (project finance), and not against the value of the underlying assets or a  
326 balance sheet (corporate finance);
- 327 • compensate the parties should the RE PPP project terminate early (i.e., before the expiry of  
328 the natural term of the PPA), because the expected value to the equity investors and lenders  
329 of the underlying infrastructure (i.e., largely immobile infrastructure with no certainty of a  
330 customer or means of earning income) is minimal at best;
- 331 • accommodate project lenders; and
- 332 • minimize recourse to the investor’s balance sheet.

### 333 **Transaction Documentation**

#### 334 Power Purchase Agreements

335 Recognition should be given to the PPA’s central role in raising finance from the private sector in RE  
336 PPP. Its role is to create the expected income stream against which financiers provide finance. In RE  
337 PPPs, the PPA performs several important roles, including:

- 338 • providing the expectation of a long-term income stream against which the project will be financed;
- 339 • providing the contractual mechanisms for the sale and purchase of electricity; and
- 340 • setting the contractual obligations of the project company, in particular with respect to attaining  
341 the commercial operation date (“COD”) of the project, and post-COD performance standards.

342 Each PPA will also require project specific tailoring to address such issues as:

- 343 • commissioning test procedures;
- 344 • whether a ‘capacity charge plus energy charge’ tariff structure is appropriate, or ‘delivered energy  
345 plus deemed energy’ tariff structure is appropriate;
- 346 • the methodology for calculating deemed energy; and
- 347 • appropriate performance requirements and the methodology for calculating performance.

348 It should be recognized that (a) a single PPA will not be appropriate for multiple generation  
349 technologies, and (b) if the PPA has not been tailored to a specific technology, it is unlikely to be  
350 ‘bankable’ for any technology. Crafting the PPA requires expert advice to optimize various provisions  
351 including liquidity support, economic stabilization, required performance standards and end of term  
352 transfer obligations (if any).

353 Finally, although the PPA is the cornerstone of RE PPP documentation, the PPA is part of suite of  
354 documentation which works together to allocate risk and responsibility between RE PPP  
355 stakeholders; thus even the best PPA is not ‘bankable’ without the package of documentation which  
356 surrounds it.

#### 357 Liquidity Support

358 A strong utility credit rating is usually key for underpinning a credible RE PPP programme or project.  
359 The reality in many countries is that utilities struggle to keep up with cost recovery and have poor  
360 payment track record. An important effort of host Governments therefore should be to map out a path  
361 for strengthening utility creditworthiness.

362 ‘Liquidity support’ mechanisms (that ensure timely payment to the project company) are also  
363 important and can occur through bank guarantees, letters of credit, or a cash escrow account. In

364 many instances the bank guarantee or letter of credit provider will in turn require further backstopping  
365 with, for example, cash collateral or a partial risk guarantee provided by another credit worthy entity  
366 such as MIGA or some regional insurers, e.g. African Trade and Insurance Agency (ATI) in ATI  
367 member countries.

### 368 **Lowering Risk Perceptions**

369 Lowering risk perceptions may also be achieved by improving the financial viability and performance  
370 of the electricity subsector as a whole through measures such as:

- 371 • implementing cost-reflective and adequate end-user tariffs, so that the utility (offtaker) is not  
372 perceived to be structurally loss making and thus a high credit risk;
- 373 • improving the utility's revenue collection performance, e.g. by promoting pre-paid metering, again  
374 so that the utility is perceived to be on a sound(er) financial footing; and
- 375 • ensuring that the utility develops a good track record of timely payment to its existing IPP  
376 suppliers.

377

### 378 **Feasibility for low and middle income countries**

#### 379 **Fiscal Burden**

380 RE PPPs in EMDE countries face many of the same challenges as those in more affluent countries,  
381 but those challenges can have a much larger impact on the success or failure of a project or  
382 programme in a low and middle income country. For example fiscal burden of a project should be  
383 accounted for in all jurisdictions, but the cost of a project and its contingent liabilities can have a  
384 disproportionate impact in an EMDE country over that of its more wealthy neighbours.

385 This, coupled with the fact that host Governments have only partial (and sometimes quite limited)  
386 control over the risks allocated to them, it is clear that certain classes of termination events, for  
387 example an early-termination 'put option' and any accumulated claims, could bankrupt the host  
388 country or, at least, significantly curtail public expenditure available for public services. While there is  
389 no 'magic bullet', host Governments should at least:

- 390 • address the issues surrounding fiscal burden openly with all stakeholders;
- 391 • ensure that the Ministry of Finance (or equivalent), and where appropriate the Government  
392 Cabinet (or equivalent), (i) is fully apprised of the contingent liabilities which the host  
393 Government will take on in connection with an RE PPP, and (ii) formally approves the  
394 Government taking on those contingent liabilities;
- 395 • consider how it accounts for contingent liabilities which arise under 'put and call option'  
396 arrangements (or explicit sovereign guarantees if these are used); and
- 397 • embrace the other policy standards recommended in this document as a means of reducing the  
398 cost of project delivery, which in turn has a direct impact on fiscal burden.

#### 399 **Electricity tariff**

400 Electricity tariffs are also an important socio-economic factor in EMDE countries. Low electricity prices  
401 may not only facilitate industrial development, but also decrease the financial burden on the poor.  
402 Thus, achieving lowest possible cost of electricity production must be a focus of People First PPPs in  
403 the RE sector. Host Governments should explore possibilities to lower project development and  
404 financing costs through appropriate regulatory and fiscal measures.

### 405 **New innovative RE PPP models**

406 Achieving financial close on RE PPPs in EMDE countries is difficult. Innovations should be embraced,  
407 especially for smaller projects where the predevelopment and project costs of implementing existing  
408 models can be prohibitive. Simplified contracts and project models are also recommended in order to

409 combat the complexity, expense, and high level of technical, financial, legal, and/or transactional  
410 capacity that is often needed.

411 In addition, in many EMDE countries, the first power generation (RE and non-RE) PPPs were  
412 individually negotiated on an *ad hoc* basis. In some circumstances these lead projects set *de facto*  
413 market standards, and host Governments should employ new models such that over time they are  
414 able to wind back at the margins, e.g. the support that is expected projects, more favorable terms and  
415 conditions, etc.

#### 416 REFITs

417 EMDE countries should also consider renewable energy feed in tariff (“REFIT”) regimes which  
418 typically:

- 419 a. provide for a prescribed feed in tariff (i.e., wholesale electricity tariff for sale of electricity under the  
420 PPA between the generation company and the buyer/offtaker, which is typically a Government  
421 owned utility) for different generation technologies and classes of generation capacity, often also  
422 providing different tariffs for different sizes of projects; and
- 423 b. prescribe standard form PPAs (and perhaps other project documents) and set out standard  
424 procedures for carrying out qualifying projects.

425 One necessary consequence of an REFIT regime is that the prescribed tariff for a particular project  
426 will almost certainly either be:

- 427 • too high, i.e. more than what would be required in order to attract the private sector investment  
428 required to carry out the project. In this case the project’s private investors may be thought of as  
429 being over-compensated at the expense of electricity consumers (and/or host Governments to the  
430 extent of any subsidy of the tariff); or
- 431 • too low, i.e., less than what would be required in order to attract the capital investment required to  
432 carry out the project, in which case certain projects which may well be very worthy for any number  
433 of reasons will not be financed by the private sector.

434 In current market practice, REFITs are likely to be suited to RE projects:

- 435 • which are too small to justify bespoke negotiations or procurement processes;
- 436 • where the benefit of certainty outweighs (i) the cost of some projects being over-compensated,  
437 and (ii) the risk that other projects will not be carried out as the REFIT tariff is too low for those  
438 particular projects; and
- 439 • where the generation technology and costs associated with it are well established and fairly  
440 stable, e.g. not in the case of solar PV over recent years, where reverse auctions have discovered  
441 rapidly reducing costs.

#### 442 **Role of the Regulator**

443 Financiers of RE PPPs in EMDE countries typically will not take the risk that regulated or market-  
444 determined wholesale electricity tariffs throughout the life of their project will stay at a level which will  
445 make the project economically viable. This may be due to perceived inexperience of the electricity  
446 regulator, perceived risk of political interference, or simply a ‘chicken and egg’ issue of the electricity  
447 regulator not having a sufficient track record of tariff setting, and thus being precluded from gaining  
448 and demonstrating that experience. It is thus common feature of electric power RE PPP in EMDE  
449 countries is a requirement for a long-term (20-25 year) contractually agreed tariff, together with  
450 contractually agreed mechanisms to adjust the tariff should various risk events arise.

451 Building market acceptance of the regulator’s role will result from the absence of actual or perceived  
452 political intervention in the performance, decisions and awards made by the regulator. Independent  
453 regulators staffed with strong professionals will be more successful in attracting international  
454 investment into RE PPP.

455 **Payment for Capacity**

456 It should be recognized that the private sector incurs fixed costs associated with constructing,  
457 financing and operating RE infrastructure regardless of the extent to which the public sector utilizes  
458 that infrastructure. Accordingly, Governments in EMDE countries should expect payment under the  
459 PPA to be based on availability (including 'deemed availability') not on utilization.

460 **Dispatchability**

461 In many EMDE countries the grid can be less reliable and 'trip' from time to time, in some case many  
462 times each month. The grid is also more likely to be prone both to constraints and to downtime during  
463 upgrades and even 'small' projects even though small can account for a material percentage of  
464 overall generation capacity. As a result, in these circumstances, if and when the grid is down and/or  
465 constrained, and the off-taker has a true 'must take' obligation, the off-taker can be in breach of  
466 contract, giving rise to an obligation to pay damages and potentially triggering cross-default provisions  
467 in other contracts.

468 In the alternative if there is a dispatch right (with an obligation to pay for deemed energy if it does not  
469 dispatch), then the deemed energy charges which arise would typically be identical to the damages  
470 which would have been payable for breach of contract under a 'must take' contract but the off-taker  
471 could also be in default and/or trigger 'cross-default' provisions in other contracts

472 **Other Issues**

473 Risks resulting from climate change are often underestimated when host Governments and project  
474 sponsors analyse an RE PPP projects viability. It is important to diligently analyse and address such  
475 risks in early stages of an RE PPP project and agree on a fair share of subsequent revenue risks and  
476 eventually consider available insurance instruments.

477 **Indicators of Compliance**

478 Access to energy / universality (electricity, cooking fuel, etc.)

479 Share of renewables in the national mix

480 Reduction in air, water, land pollution

481 Reduction in poverty

482 Economic productivity

483 Healthcare outcomes

484

485