

**МІНІСТЭРСТВА  
ПРЫРОДНЫХ РЭСУРСАЎ І АХОВЫ  
НАВАКОЛЬНАГА АСЯРОДДЗЯ  
РЭСПУБЛІКІ БЕЛАРУСЬ**

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**МИНИСТЕРСТВО  
ПРИРОДНЫХ РЕСУРСОВ И ОХРАНЫ  
ОКРУЖАЮЩЕЙ СРЕДЫ  
РЕСПУБЛИКИ БЕЛАРУСЬ**

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Комитет по осуществлению  
Конвенции об оценке  
воздействия на окружающую  
среду в трансграничном  
контексте

**О предоставлении отчета  
SEED-миссии**

Министерство природных ресурсов и охраны окружающей среды Республики Беларусь свидетельствует свое уважение Комитету по осуществлению Конвенции об оценке воздействия на окружающую среду в трансграничном контексте (Конвенция Эспо) и, ссылаясь на письмо Комитета по осуществлению от 10 мая 2017 г., имеет честь предоставить отчет миссии МАГАТЭ по оценке площадки и проекта Белорусской атомной электростанции с учетом внешних событий (SEED-миссия).

Миссия SEED установила, что Республика Беларусь должным образом учла все внешние факторы при проектировании БелАЭС и подтвердила пригодность Островецкой площадки для строительства и безопасной эксплуатации с учетом всех внешних рисков и угроз.

При реализации ядерно-энергетического проекта Беларусь с ответственностью относится к обеспечению ядерной и радиационной безопасности. Продолжается планомерная работа с МАГАТЭ, в том числе активно задействуя экспертные и оценочные миссии Агентства. Помимо миссии SEED, в течение прошедшего года Беларусь приняла миссию по оценке инфраструктуры ядерного регулирования (IRRS), официально пригласила миссию pre-OSART (ожидается в 2018 году с учетом рекомендуемых сроков проведения миссии за 3-6 месяцев до загрузки ядерного топлива) и миссию EPREV (предмиссия состоялась 25-27 января 2017 г., миссия намечена на март 2018 г.).

Беларусь и далее намерена сотрудничать с соответствующими международными организациями и иными заинтересованными

партнерами. В качестве одной из мер укрепления доверия к проекту строительства Белорусской АЭС проводятся консультации по механизму проведения партнерской проверки результатов стресс-тестов европейскими регуляторами.

Беларусь заинтересована в участии во внеочередной сессии Комитета, созываемой для обсуждения затрагивающего наши интересы вопроса, и готова дать все необходимые разъяснения в ходе предстоящего заседания. Белорусская сторона исходит из того, что литовские партнеры также могут быть заинтересованы в участии. Вновь подтверждаем высказанную ранее позицию о неприемлемости для белорусской стороны предложения Комитета о проведении научно-технического анализа документации по оценке воздействия БелАЭС на окружающую среду и вовлечения в данный процесс третьей стороны.

Министерство природных ресурсов и охраны окружающей среды Республики Беларусь, пользуясь случаем, выражает надежду на плодотворное сотрудничество в сфере охраны окружающей среды.

Первый заместитель Министра,  
Национальный координатор Республики  
Беларусь по Конвенции Эспо



И.В.Малкина

The Implementation Committee  
under the Convention on  
Environmental Impact Assessment  
in a Transboundary Context

**Subject: SUBMISSION OF SEED-MISSION REPORT**

The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry of Natural Resources) presents its compliments to the Implementation Committee under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) and referring to the letter of the 10<sup>th</sup> May 2017 of the Implementation Committee has the honor to forward the IAEA mission's report on a Site and External Events Design for the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (SEED-mission).

The SEED-mission concluded that the Republic of Belarus duly took into account all external factors in the Belarusian NPP construction design and confirmed the suitability of the Ostrovets site for construction and safe operation, taking into account all external risks and hazards.

Belarus is responsible for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety during the implementation the nuclear power project. Systematic work with the IAEA is continued, including active involvement of expert and evaluation missions of the Agency. In addition to the SEED-mission, during the last year Belarus carried out mission on the assessment of nuclear regulatory infrastructure (IRRS), provided the pre-OSART mission (being expected in 2018, taking into account the recommended terms of the mission 3 - 6 months before nuclear fuel loading) and the EPREV mission (preparatory mission took place on 25 - 27 January 2017, the mission is scheduled for March 2018) with official invitation.

Belarus further intends to cooperate with relevant international organizations and other interested partners. As one of the measures, aimed at strengthening confidence to the Belarusian NPP construction project, consultations on the practical arrangement for peer-review of the stress-tests results by European regulators are held.

Belarus is interested in participating in an ad-hoc session of the Implementation Committee convened to discuss the issue affecting our interests and is ready to give all necessary explanations during the upcoming meeting. The Belarusian side proceeds from the possible interest of

Lithuanian partners to take part in it. We reiterate our earlier position on the unacceptability for the Belarusian side of the Committee's proposal to conduct a scientific and technical evaluation of the documentation on environmental impact assessment of the Belarusian NPP and involve a third party into this process.

Taking this opportunity the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic of Belarus expresses the hope for fruitful cooperation in the field of environmental protection.

Annex: SEED-mission report on 32 pages in 1 copy.

First Deputy Minister,  
National Coordinator of the Republic  
Belarus on the Espoo Convention



Iya Malkina

**INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY****REPORT****EXTERNAL EVENTS SAFETY SECTION  
SITE AND EXTERNAL EVENTS DESIGN (SEED)  
REVIEW SERVICE****Safety of the Belarusian NPP against Site  
Specific External Hazards****Minsk, Belarus  
16–20 January 2017**SITE AND EXTERNAL EVENTS DESIGN REVIEW SERVICES  
conducted under IAEA Technical Cooperation Project BYE2006/07/01

“Safety of the Belarusian NPP against Site Specific External Hazards”

DEPARTMENT OF TECHNICAL  
COOPERATION  
Division for EuropeDEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY  
AND SECURITY  
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety



**IAEA**

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## REPORT

### EXTERNAL EVENT SAFETY SECTION SITE AND EXTERNAL EVENTS DESIGN (SEED) REVIEW SERVICE

# Safety of the Belarusian NPP against Site Specific External Hazards

**Mission date:** 16–20 January 2017

**Location:** Minsk, Belarus

**Facility:** Belarusian Ministry of Energy

**Organized by:** IAEA  
Technical Cooperation Project BYE2006/07/01

<b>IAEA Review Team:</b>	RZENTKOWSKI, Greg	IAEA, Director of NSNI
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	ALTINYOLLAR, Ayhan	IAEA, Nuclear Safety Officer
	DONOVAN, Jeffrey	IAEA, Press and Public Information Officer
	SOLLOGOUB, Pierre	External Expert (France)
	KATONA, Tamas	External Expert (Hungary)

*“Findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from the IAEA Programme are intended only to assist national decision makers who have the sole responsibility for the regulation and the safe operation of their nuclear power plants. Moreover, they do not replace a comprehensive safety assessment which needs to be performed in the framework of the national licensing process”.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of Belarusian Government, the IAEA conducted a Site and External Events Design (SEED) mission for the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) situated at the Ostrovets site. The IAEA and Belarusian Ministry of Energy (hereinafter “the Counterpart”) agreed on the objectives, scope and the Terms of Reference for the SEED mission during a preparatory meeting held in Minsk, Belarus, from 25 to 27 July 2016.

The Belarusian SEED mission key objective was to review the relevant NPP design parameters against site-specific hazards to determine whether all necessary safety aspects were adequately considered, as outlined in IAEA Safety Standards.

The scope of the review covered aspects related to site-specific hazard characteristics and design parameters, as outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, it comprised the following safety elements:

- screening of site hazards;
- site characterization and design parameters;
- site hazards and conditions monitoring; and
- specific challenges related to external events in light of lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

The SEED review mission was conducted by a team of four IAEA staff members and two international experts from 16 to 20 January 2017. The counterpart, the Belarusian Ministry of Energy, was represented by the Vice Minister, directors, managers and technical staff from the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, and other involved institutions participated in the review.

The Review Team assessed information provided by the Belarusian counterpart and concluded, based on a comparison between site characteristics and design parameters, that appropriate steps were followed to adequately addresses all necessary aspects of site safety and site-specific design parameters for the Belarusian NPP for relevant external hazards. Furthermore, the Review Team concluded that appropriate measures have been taken to address challenges related to external events in light of lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and that consideration should be given to future developments of relevant safety improvements.



## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. BACKGROUND

The IAEA's statute tasks the Agency with developing Safety Standards and supporting Member States in the application of those standards. Member States can request safety review services to determine how well they are applying the Safety Standards. In the areas of site selection, site evaluation and design of facilities against external events, the IAEA offers the Site and External Events Design (SEED) review services.

SEED Review Services offer several optional modules, such as reviews focused on the Member State's regulation, on the selection of the site, on the site environment or on the design safety against external hazards. Member States choose modules depending on their needs. The Review Team leader, in consultation with the host, sets the schedule, objectives and the scope of SEED Review Services during a preparatory meeting with the Counterpart. This enables the IAEA Secretariat to prepare for the main review mission and to select international experts depending on the subject and expertise to be covered.

Belarus began site selection activities in the early 1980s. Initially, 74 locations were identified, with the number reduced to three after considering safety risks and economics. At the end of the site selection process, the site located in Ostrovets was selected as the most suitable site for the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The Belarusian NPP received a construction license in September 2013 for the first unit and in February 2014 for the second unit. Construction was underway for both units at the time of review service.

In 2008, the IAEA conducted two Site Safety Review missions at Belarusian authorities' request. The Agency's first involvement in site-related activities in Belarus started with these missions aimed to evaluate and, if possible, resolve outstanding safety related issues of geotechnical aspects concerning three potential sites.

In September 2014, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the IAEA to conduct a SEED mission. After a series of consultations, three IAEA staff members and one international expert conducted a preparatory meeting in July 2016 to establish the objectives, scope and Terms of Reference for the SEED mission.

This report summarizes findings and conclusions from the SEED review service for the Belarusian NPP conducted in January 2017.

### 1.2. OBJECTIVES

The Belarusian SEED mission key objective was to review the relevant NPP design parameters against site-specific hazards to determine whether appropriate steps were followed to adequately address all necessary safety aspects, as outlined in IAEA Safety Standards.

The Terms of Reference documents the SEED mission's specific objectives as follows:

- determine whether the screening process adequately evaluates hazards selection based on clear defined criteria and uses appropriate data to obtain reasonable conclusions;
- determine whether the selected site contains or adequately addresses all necessary aspects of site safety for the nuclear installation;

- determine whether the site-specific design parameters for selected hazards have been derived appropriately based on the results of hazard analyses;
- advise on the implementation of site monitoring; and
- evaluate the resolution of specific concerns revealed by the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

### 1.3. SCOPE

The scope of the review covered aspects related to site specific hazard characteristics and design parameters, as outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, [1]. Specifically, the mission scope comprised the following safety elements:

- Screening of the site hazards
  - Review the process of selecting screening hazards to consider
  - Basis for screening and screening results
- Site characterization results includes:
  - Human-induced hazards
    - ✓ Aircraft crash
    - ✓ Offsite Explosion
    - ✓ External fire
    - ✓ Accidental discharge of explosives or toxic clouds
    - ✓ Electromagnetic interference
    - ✓ Damage of water retaining structures such as dams
    - ✓ Accidental discharge of corrosive/chemical aggressive liquid into surface and ground water
  - Natural external hazards
    - ✓ Flood
    - ✓ Tornado
    - ✓ Strong winds (hurricane)
    - ✓ Seismic hazard
    - ✓ Geotechnical
    - ✓ Meteorological (precipitation, temperature and wind)
- Site related design parameters
- Site Monitoring
- Specific challenges related lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, including hazard assessment methods, use of uncertainties, adequacy of the design basis against external hazards, margins, combination of hazards, PSR, cliff-edge effect of hazards impact.

## 2. CONDUCT OF THE MISSION

The review was prepared with the development of Terms of Reference, including objectives and scope. Preparations also included identifying documents needed for the review. The Review Team's preliminary activities comprised reviewing documents provided by the Counterpart, and requesting clarification where needed. In advance to the mission, the Review Team also developed preliminary comments and recommendations aimed to support the Counterpart in its work to align with IAEA Safety Standards. The main review was conducted in plenary sessions and parallel working groups with results discussed and agreed by the IAEA Review Team as a whole. Final review findings and conclusions were discussed and delivered to the Counterpart at the exit meeting.

### 2.1. PREPARATORY WORK

The Terms of Reference including the objectives and scope of the SEED mission were discussed and agreed during the preparatory meeting held in Minsk, Belarus, from 25 to 27 July 2016. Documentation containing the required information for the review, including the relevant chapters of the PSAR, was made available to IAEA Review Team prior to the SEED mission. To facilitate the review process, the IAEA Review Team, as part of preparatory work, developed a set of review tables including the preliminary findings and relevant site characteristics and associated design parameters.

### 2.2. REFERENCE FOR REVIEW

The main references for review include: (i) Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the Belarusian NPP PSAR [1], and (ii) relevant IAEA Safety Standards summarized below:

Code	Title	Edition
SF-1	Fundamental Safety Principles	2006
NS-R-3 (Rev.1)	Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations	2016
SSG-35	Site Survey and Site Selection for Nuclear Installations	2015
SSG-9	Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations	2010
SSG-18	Meteorological and Hydrological Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations	2011
NS-G-3.6	Geotechnical Aspects of Site Evaluation and Foundations for Nuclear Power Plants	2004
NS-G-3.1	External Human Induced Events in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants IAEA	2002
NS-G-3.2	Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Air and Water and Consideration of Population Distribution in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants	2002
SSG-21	Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations	2012

### 2.3. SEED MISSION

The SEED mission took place from 16 to 20 January 2017 at the Ministry of Energy in Minsk, Belarus. Participants included the Minister and Vice Minister of the Ministry of Energy, directors, managers and technical staff from Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant (operator) supported by Atomstroyexport (contractor), Atomproekt (general designer) and other national institutions. A list of participants is available in Appendix I and the mission programme in Appendix II.

The identified issues were presented in detail following a standard process in line with SEED Guidelines. All safety issues were presented as following:

- Issue identification
- Issue clarification
- Counterpart views and measures (self-assessment by the Counterpart)
- Assessment by the Review Team (comments/recommendations)

The issue clarification part of the presentation explained the safety relevance by referencing the applicable IAEA safety standards' paragraphs, and highlighted which safety requirements the Counterpart appears not to have met. After safety issues are identified the Review Team provides recommendations for actions to resolve any such issues and discuss these with the Counterpart. The Review Team also made suggestions for less safety relevant issues to improvement of practices and documentation in line with IAEA Safety Standards. Examples of good practices were also highlighted.

The counterpart provided excellent support for conducting this mission and responded to all IAEA requests for clarifications in a comprehensive and timely manner.



### 3. MAIN FINDINGS

#### 3.1. SCREENING PROCESS

The review process is summarized in Table 1, Appendix III.

The review led to the general conclusion that the Counterpart performed a systematic and comprehensive screening of external hazards using sound and well-documented criteria. The Review Team has recognized this screening process as a good international practice.

In addition, the Review Team reached the following specific conclusions:

- the screening criteria were adequate for the selection of hazards and these were considered in a detailed assessment; and
- the screening processes for electro-magnetic interference and lightning need to be better documented in Chapter 2 of the PSAR.

#### 3.2. SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND SITE DESIGN PARAMETERS

The review process is summarized in Table 2, Appendix III.

The Review Team assessed information provided by the Belarusian counterpart and affirmed that appropriate steps were followed to adequately address all necessary aspects of site safety and site-specific design parameters for the Belarusian NPP for relevant external hazards. In addition, the Review Team concluded that:

- site specific parameters are enveloped by the NPP design parameters;
  - meteorological parameters are enveloped by the design parameters with sufficient margin to accommodate climate change effects, and
  - the seismic design parameters are enveloping the site specific conditions, and
  - the site-specific seismic ground motion response spectra derived from site response analysis, in the low frequency range, show potentially inconsistency with the soil profile dynamic characteristics;
- protection against aircraft crashes is provided by design and by administrative measures to control and restrict the aircraft traffic (i.e., by a no-fly-zone) in the region near the site.

#### 3.3. SITE MONITORING

The review process is summarized in Table 3, Appendix III.

The review led to the general conclusion that hazard monitoring programmes are adequate and properly documented in the PSAR.

### 3.4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT

The team and the Counterpart shared views and experiences to improve protection of people and environment against consequences of impact of external events on nuclear installations. The discussion focused on IAEA Safety Requirements<sup>123</sup> revised in 2016 to enhance protection against external events and accidents and mitigate consequences should an accident occur. These measures include assessment of external hazards and design basis, safety margins, and beyond design basis provisions for accident prevention and mitigation in relation to external hazards.

The Counterpart presented design safety features that had been introduced because of lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and an outline of its ongoing Stress Test programme. The Counterpart also confirmed its commitment to finalize Level 1 and 2 PSA before starting commercial operation.

The Review Team suggested that consideration should be given to future developments of safety improvements related to challenges highlighted in the IAEA Director General's Report on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, and its five technical volumes.

The Review Team noted also that the commitment to finalize Level 1 and Level 2 PSA for both internal and external events is in line with good international practice.

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<sup>1</sup> Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3 Rev.1, IAEA, 2016)

<http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10882/Site-Evaluation-for-Nuclear-Installations>

<sup>2</sup> Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1 Rev.1, IAEA, 2016)

<http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10885/Safety-of-Nuclear-Power-Plants-Design>

<sup>3</sup> Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4 Rev.1, IAEA, 2016)

<http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10884/Safety-Assessment-for-Facilities-and-Activities>

## 4. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the review of the PSAR Chapters 2 and 3 related to site specific hazard characteristics and design parameters and discussions held with the Counterpart, the Review Team concluded that appropriate steps were followed to adequately address all necessary aspects of site safety and site-specific design parameters for the Belarusian NPP for relevant external hazards. Furthermore, the Review Team concluded that:

- systematic and comprehensive screening of external hazards was performed using sound and well-documented criteria;
- site specific parameters are enveloped by the NPP design parameters
- hazard monitoring programmes are adequate and properly documented in the PSAR; and
- appropriate measures have been taken to address challenges related to external events in light of lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

The Review Team offered also the following suggestions:

- the section documenting electro-magnetic interference and lightning should be improved in the Chapter 2 of the final SAR;
- the site-specific seismic ground motion response spectrum should be properly documented in the final SAR, taking into account soil conditions and international practice (IAEA Safety Standard Series SSG-9); and
- consideration should be given to future developments of safety improvements related to challenges highlighted in the IAEA Fukushima Daiichi Accident Report following completion of the stress test and PSA Level 1 and 2.

The Review Team noted that the Counterpart's practices in the following areas are in line with good international practice:

- commitment to conduct Level 1 and Level 2 PSA for both internal and external events before starting the commercial operation of the NPP; and
- comprehensive screening of site-specific external hazards.

## 5. REFERENCES

1. Preliminary safety analysis report of Belarusian NPP
2. SF-1 Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA 2006
3. NS-R-3 (Rev.1) Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA 2016
4. SSG-35 Site Survey and Site Selection for Nuclear Installations, IAEA 2015
5. SSG-9 Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA 2010
6. SSG-18 Meteorological and Hydrological Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA 2011
7. NS-G-3.1 External Human Induced Events in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA 2002
8. NS-G-3.2 Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Air and Water and Consideration of Population Distribution in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA 2002
9. NS-G-3.6 Geotechnical Aspects of Site Evaluation and Foundations for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA 2005
10. SSG-21 Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA 2012

## APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF PARTICIPANTS


### A.1 IAEA REVIEW TEAM:

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3. Ayhan Altinyollar	Nuclear Safety Officer IAEA/NSNI/EESS
4. Jeffrey Donovan	Press and Public Information Officer OPIC
<b>IAEA EXTERNAL Experts</b>	
1. Pierre Sollogoub	External Expert, France
2. Tamas Katona	External Expert, Hungary

### A.2 COUNTERPART:

<b>Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, Republican Unitary Enterprise – the customer for NPP construction and the operator</b>	
1. Vitali Malisheuski	Deputy chief engineer for engineering support, head of industrial-technical department
2. Nikolai Grusha	Head of team for cooperation with state agencies and organizations
3. Mikhail Pigoulevski	Lead specialist for cooperation with state agencies and organizations
4. Alexandr Parfyonov	Deputy chief engineer for safety and reliability
5. Rinat Valeev	Head of reliability and safety analysis department
6. Sergey Zubov	Deputy head of radiation safety department
7. Andrey Vorobiov	Head of individual dosimetry control laboratory
<b>Atomstroyexport Engineering Company, JSC (Contractor)</b>	
1. Sergey Prikhodko	Director for designing Belarusian NPP
2. Evgeniy Tolstov	Lead specialist
3. Evgeniy Krasnov	1st category engineer of engineer survey department

4. Sergey Popov	Deputy head of engineer survey department
<b>Atomproekt Company (General designer)</b>	
1. Dmitriy Shkritelev	Director for designing Belarusian NPP
2. Pavel Bezrukov	Deputy director for designing Belarusian NPP
3. Yuriy Ermakovich	Deputy chief engineer of the project
4. Georgiy Kostrov	Lead specialist of construction department
<b>Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection</b>	
1. Nadezhda Zilanevich	Head of urban projects evaluation department
<b>Republican Center for Hydrometeorology, Radiation Control and Environmental Monitoring</b>	
1. Maria Germenchuk	Head of the centre
2. Olga Zhukova	Head, department of R&Ds for radiation and environmental monitoring
3. Viktor Melnik	Head, service of scientific and methodological support to hydrometeorological surveys
4. Lyudmila Zhuravovich	Head, service of hydrology and agrometeorology
<b>Centre of Healthy</b>	
1. Alena Nikolaenko	Head of radiation safety laboratory
<b>Belniptenergoprom, Republican Unitary Enterprise</b>	
1. Andrei Katanayev	Lead specialist of industrial-technical department
<b>Centre of Geophysical Monitoring</b>	
1. Arkady Aronov	Director
2. Rustyam Seroglazov	Deputy director
<b>Geoservice, Production Republican Unitary Enterprise</b>	
1. Oleg Lazhevich	Director
2. Yury Zaika	Chief geologist
<b>Sosny Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research</b>	
1. Alexander Trifonov	Deputy general director
<b>Institute for Nature Management</b>	
1. Valery Khomich	Deputy director
2. Natalia Tomina	Research specialist
<b>Research and Production Centre for Geology</b>	
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## APPENDIX 2 - MISSION PROGRAMME

Time	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
9:30-10:30	Opening Introduction of Participants Approval of the Agenda  Preliminary comments on External Hazard Screening	Preliminary comments on Site Specific Natural External Hazards Characterization Results	Preliminary comments on Site Specific Human Induced External Hazards Characterization Results	Preliminary comments on Site Monitoring Discussions and clarifications Conclusions on Site Monitoring	Presentation of the Summary Report  Discussions on the main conclusions of SEED Safety Review Mission
10:30-11:00	Coffee Break				
11:00-12:30	Discussions and clarifications on the process arriving to screened out and screened in hazards	Discussions related to: Flood Tornado Strong winds Other Meteorological Hazards	Discussion Related to: Aircraft crash Offsite Explosion External fire	Summary of The Review Findings	Closing Session Meeting with the Ministry of Energy Media Event Adjourn
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break				
14:00-15:30	Discussions and clarifications regarding Basis for screening Hazard	Discussions related to: Seismic hazard Geotechnical Characteristics and Hazards	Discussion Related to other human induced hazards e.g. explosive or toxic clouds, Electromagnetic interference, etc.  Preliminary Comments And Discussions on Specific Concerns Related to Fukushima Accident External Events	IAEA Team working on the Summary Report	
15:30-16:00	Coffee Break				
16:00-17:00	Conclusions on External Hazards Screening	Conclusions on Natural External Hazards Characterization Results	Conclusions on Human Induced External Hazards Characterization Results and Fukushima Concerns	IAEA Team working on the Summary Report	



### APPENDIX 3 - REVIEW TABLES

TABLE 1 SCREENING OF HAZARDS

No.	Hazards Screening	Screening Criteria	Screening Results	Remarks
1	Aircraft crash	Probability Screening Value = $T=10E-6$ (per one year) Ref <u>P-SAR Chapter 2 Sub-chapter 2.2.1.1</u>	Screened in for detailed hazard assessment.	Detailed Aircraft Hazard Assessment was carried out. Protection measures for big aircrafts are: admin measure – establishing No Fly Zone and diversion of the air corridors. Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.1.8</u> Design protection measures implemented for small aircrafts (military aircrafts are not considered). Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 3.5.1.1.2</u> The design provides safety conditions in case of a crash of a light aircraft of 5.7 tons at 100 m/s. Considered and estimated a possibility of a crash into the NPP site and a direct crash into the NPP unit of aircraft of all types including military aircraft. Administrative measures include no-fly zone and diverting flight corridors. Ref.: <u>P-SAR 2.2.1.1.</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
2	Offsite Explosions	DP < 30 KPa НП-064-05 Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.3</u>	Screened out	Conservatively design protection for 30KPa pressure wave was done (part of the standard design). Ref. <u>P-SAR 2.2.1.3, 2.2.3</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
3	External fire	SDV = 2km НП-064-05 Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.2, 2.2.3</u>	Screened out	No protective measures needed. Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.2, 2.2.3</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
4	Accidental discharge of explosive or toxic clouds	SDV= 5 and 10x km НП-064-05 Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.6, 2.2.3</u>	Screened out	No protective measures needed. Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 2.2.1.6, 2.2.3</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
5	Electromagnetic	No sources in site	Screened out	Suggestion = add this in Chap. 2

No.	Hazards Screening	Screening Criteria	Screening Results	Remarks
	interference	vicinity. P-SAR Chapter 8.3.2.7		of FSAR. Ref. P-SAR Chapter 8.3.2.7 No protective measures needed. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
6	Corrosive/chemical aggressive liquid accidental discharge into surface and ground water	No sources in site vicinity Ref. P-SAR 2.2.1.5, 2.2.3	Screened out	No protective measures needed. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
7	External Flood	Dry site River mean elevation=117.4 m Design Base Flood=127.8 m Site Elevation=179.3 m P-SAR Chapter 2.3.2 page 336	Screened out	Dry site demonstrated. Ref. P-SAR Chapter 2.3.2 <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
8	Seismic Hazards: Ground Motion	Cannot be screened out PGA=0.1g	Screened in SL2 PGA=0.1g T=10,000y	Detailed SHA done. Design provisions PGA=0.12g (BAL 7) Ref. P-SAR 1.7.5.3, 2.4.2 Main reactor equipment: 0.12g Safety system equipment and piping: 0.12g Engineering structures, buildings and facilities 0.12g <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
9	Seismic Hazards: Fault Displacement	No capable faults within 5 Km radius. Ref. PSAR Ch. 2.4.2	Screened out	Based on Site Vicinity Detailed Investigations P-SAR Ch. 2.4.2 <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
10	Geotechnical: Liquefaction	Low seismicity and ground water level HP-064-05	Screened out Low seismicity and deeply occurring water level HP-064-05	Based on geotechnical and seismic assessment No site/soil improvement measures are necessary P-SAR Ch. 2.4.1.7.3 <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
11	Geotechnical: Slope Stability	No natural slopes / flat site P-SAR Ch. 2.4.1	Screened out	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
12	Geotechnical: Cavities/Karstic Formations	No karst/Cavities P-SAR Ch. 2.4.1	Screened out	Based on Site Vicinity Detailed Investigations P-SAR Chapter 2.4.1 <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
13	Meteorological: Extreme precipitation	T=100 y	Screened in	Detailed investigations carried out. Ref. PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1 <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>

No.	Hazards Screening	Screening Criteria	Screening Results	Remarks
14	Meteorological: Extreme temperatures	T=100 y	Screened in	Detailed investigations carried out Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
15	Meteorological: Extreme winds	T=100 y HP-064-05	Screened in	Detailed investigations carried out Design protection provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
16	Meteorological: Tornadoes	T=10,000 y HP-064-05	Screened in	Detailed hazard assessment done. Design protection provided Ref <u>PSAR 2.3.1.1</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
17	Meteorological, rear straight winds Hurricanes	T=10,000 y HP-064-05	Screened in	Detailed hazard assessment done. Design protection provided Ref <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
18	Meteorological: Lightning	HP-064-05 Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 8.3.2.7</u>	Screened in	Hazard Assessment done Design protection provided Ref. <u>P-SAR Chapter 8.3.2.7</u> <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
19	Dust Storms	HP-064-05	Screened out	No design protection needed. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
20	Volcanic Hazards	No active volcanos Ref. HP-064-05	Screened out	No design protection needed. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>

**TABLE 2 SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND DESIGN PARAMETERS**

No	Site Parameter	Site Characteristics	Design Parameters	Remarks
<b>Hydrological parameters</b>				
1	Maximum Flood Elevation	+127.8 m(Baltic Sea) T=10,000 Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.2</u>	+179.3m(Baltic Sea) Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.2.1.4</u>	Design site level mark is 51.5 m higher than the maximum estimated water level. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
2	Maximum Elevation of Groundwater	159.69-167.88m Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.4.1.7.2</u>	+179.3m (Baltic Sea) Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.2.1.4</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<b>Meteorological parameters</b>				
<i>Air Temperature</i>				
3	Maximum dry bulb temperature and coincident wet bulb temperature 1% annual frequency of exceedance 2% annual frequency of exceedance 100 year return period	0.01% = 37.4 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	Design 52 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.6</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
4	Maximum non-coincident wet bulb temperatures 1% annual frequency of exceedance 2% annual frequency of exceedance 100 year return period	0.01% = 37.4 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	Design 52 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.6</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
5	Minimum dry bulb temperature 98% annual frequency of exceedance 99% annual frequency of exceedance 100 year return period	0.01% = -50 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	Design -61 °C Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Ultimate heat sink</i>				
6	Meteorological conditions resulting in the minimum water cooling during any 1 day (5 days)	Non-exceedance level: -25,5 0C – 2% -22.2 0C – 8%	Non-exceedance level: 10% = -22,0 0C	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>

	Historic worst case	Relative humidity 80% Construction climatology CHB- 2.04.02-2000	Relative humidity 81% 1.4 m/s Ref.: Calculation 'Specification of cooling capability of spray cooling ponds. PSAR Ch. 12.3.2.1.5.4	
7	Meteorological conditions resulting in the maximum evaporation and drift loss during any consecutive 30 days. Historical worst case	Non-exceedance level: 10% T 23,9 Relative humidity 69% Wind velocity at 10 m height: 1.4 m/s Ref.: Calculation 'Specification of cooling capability of spray cooling ponds'. PSAR Ch. 12.3.2.1.5.4	T = 23,90C Relative humidity 69% Wind velocity at 10 m height: 1.4 m/s Ref.: Calculation 'Specification of cooling capability of spray cooling ponds'. PSAR Ch. 12.3.2.1.5.4	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Wind speed</i>				
8	3 second gust wind speed 100 year return period	Ultimate gust wind speed recorded: 36 m/s 54 m/s for T=10,000y Ref. PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1	61 m/s Ref. PSAR Ch. 3.10.6	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Precipitation (liquid equivalent)</i>				
9	Local intense precipitation Probable maximum precipitation 100 year return period	Maximum precipitation recorded: 101 mm/day 1075 mm/year Ref. PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1	160 mm/day for T=10,000y 1160 mm/year for T=10,000y Ref. Belarusian NPP Design, vol. 1, 5.3.1.1.4.	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>

<i>Snowpack</i>				
10	Ground snowpack weight 100 year return period	Maximum storage of water in snowpack: 195 mm 3 kPa for T=10,000y Ref. PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1	4.3 kPa 270 mm <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Freezing precipitation (Ice storms)</i>				
11	Ice thickness and concurrent wind Speed 100 year return period	2.1 mm for a wire cable of 10 mm thick at 10 m height Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1.48</u>	5 mm for a wire cable of 10 mm thick at 10 m height СП 20.13330.2011 Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1.48</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Lightning</i>				
12	Lightning strike frequency Lightning strikes per year	0.5/km <sup>2</sup> per year According to Gidromet (Belarus) statistics	3/km <sup>2</sup> per year According to CO 153-34.21.122-2003	Considered in the design <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Tornado</i>				
13	Maximum horizontal Wind speed Translational speed Rotational Speed Radius of Maximum Rotational Speed 10 000 year return period	17 m/s 70 m/s 80 m 2,94*10 <sup>-6</sup> per year Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	24 m/s 95 m/s 285 m Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
14	Pressure drop 10 000 year return period	6 kPa Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	11.1kPa Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
15	Massive tornado missile 10 000 year return period	No missiles Fujita scale tornado intensity rating for Belarusian NPP = 2,5 According to ПБ-022-	1800 kg Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>

		01 for values less than F3 tornado missiles are not taken into consideration. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>		
16	Rigid tornado missile 10 000 year return period	No missiles Fujita scale tornado intensity rating for Belarusian NPP = 2,5 According to ПБ-022-01 for values less than F3 tornado missiles are not taken into consideration. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	125 kg 200 mm  Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
17	Small rigid tornado missile 10 000 year return period	No missiles Fujita scale tornado intensity rating for Belarusian NPP = 2,5 According to ПБ-022-01 for values less than F3 tornado missiles are not taken into consideration. Ref. <u>P-SAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	2.5 cm  Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<i>Hail</i>				
18	Historical maximum hail stone size	8-10 cm 11.07.1953  Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1</u>	Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.1.3</u>	Load rate is lower than the design value for tornado missiles. No additional calculation required. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
19	Concurrent terminal velocity	No data	Ref. <u>PSAR</u>	Load rate is lower than the design value for tornado missiles. No

			<u>Ch.3.10.1.1.3</u>	additional calculation required.  <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<b>Freezing precipitation and frost related phenomena</b>				
20	Nominal ice thickness;	2.1 mm for cable diameter of 10 mm at 10 m Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1.48</u>	5 mm for cable diameter of 10 mm at 10 m СП 20.13330.2011 Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.3.1.1.48</u> Page 225	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<b>Change of meteorological hazard with time</b>				
21	Changes in air and water temperatures Changes in frequency and intensity of phenomenon	Clarified		Extreme meteorological parameters are well bounded by the design parameters resulting in margins that can accommodate climate changes effects. <u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
<b>Seismic parameters</b>				
22	Ground Motion Response Spectra for SL1	0.055g Ref. <u>PSAR Ch.2.4.2</u>	0.06g Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 1.7.5.3</u>	Broadband design ground response spectrum accepted as design basis
23	Ground Motion Response Spectra for SL2	PGA=0.10g GRS shape Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.4.2</u>	0.12g GRS Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.1.3</u>	Suggestion to derive site specific GRS according to par. 9.3 SSG-9 and include it in FSAR. <u>Conclusion: No safety issue since design GRS envelop site conditions.</u>
<b>Geotechnical parameters</b>				
24	Minimum Static Bearing Capacity	Vertical force at foundation base.  1) Reactor building Na = 1671316 kN	Foundation ultimate bearing capacity in terms of vertical force.  Nu = 26600509 kN	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>



		<p>2) Steam chamber Na = 123480 kN</p> <p>3) Other nuclear island facilities Na = 120000-588000 kN</p> <p>4) Turbine building Na = 1229406 kN Foundation capacity rating was carried out according to MP 1.5.2.05.999.026-2011 PSAR Ch. 3.12</p>	<p>Nu = 1189192 kN</p> <p>Nu = 933000-39000000 kN</p> <p>Nu = 36319706 kN PSAR Ch. 3.12</p>	
25	Minimum Shear Wave Velocity	<p>300-500 m/s under foundation level Foundation capacity rating was carried out according to MP 1.5.2.05.999.026-2011 'Design standards for foundations of NPP facilities' Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.4.2</u></p>	<p>250 m/s Ref. <u>PSAR Ch.3.11.1.4</u></p>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues</u>
26	Maximum Settlement	<p>1) Reactor building Settlement 205.3 mm Tilt 0.00037 Rad</p> <p>2) Safety class 1 buildings and facilities (cast reinforced concrete) Settlement 27-153</p>	<p>300 mm 0.001</p> <p>180 mm 0.001</p>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>

		mm Tilt <0.001  3) Safety class 2 and 3 buildings and facilities (frame constructions) Settlement 22-70 mm Tilt <0.005  4) Cast reinforced concrete buildings Settlement 34-100 mm Tilt <0.005  Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.5</u>	120 mm 0.005  180 mm 0.005  Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 3.10.5</u>	
27	Expansion, uplift	Under-dilative soils Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.4.1</u>	None at the base of reactor compartments	During construction, under-dilative soils are excavated This phenomenon may occur at an elevation higher than the foundation level. Conclusion: no safety issues.
<b>Human Induced external event parameters</b>				
28	Aircraft Hazards on Plant SSCs	Probability Screening Value = $T=10E-6$ Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.2.1.1</u>	Screened in	Detailed Aircraft Hazard Assessment was carried out. Design protection measures implemented for small aircrafts. (military aircrafts are not considered). Ref. P-SAR Chapter 3.5.1.1.2 The design provides safety conditions in case of a crash of a

				<p>light aircraft of 5.7 tons at 100 m/s. Protection measures for larger aircrafts are: admin measure – establishing No Fly Zone and divert of the air corridors.</p> <p>Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.2.1.1.8</u></p> <p>The possibility of aircraft crash of Belarusian military aircraft was screened out.</p> <p>The possibility of aircraft crash of Lithuanian military aircraft is <math>4.2 \times 10^{-12}</math> per year (based on the corresponding data provided by the Lithuanian authorities.</p> <p>Conclusion: no safety issues.</p>
29	Human Induced External Hazards on Plant SSCs (e.g. explosions, fires, release of toxic chemicals and flammable clouds, pressure effects)	N/A	Screened out	<p>Conclusion: <u>no safety issues.</u></p>
30	Grid Stability	Ref. <u>PSAR 8.1.2.13</u>	Screened in	<p>Considered Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 8.1.2.13</u></p> <p>Conclusion: <u>no safety issues.</u></p>

TABLE 3 HAZARDS MONITORING PROGRAMME

	<b>Hazards Monitoring</b>	Remarks	Remarks
1	Seismic monitoring	Monitoring programme provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.6.2.4</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>
2	Monitoring of geotechnical parameters (Global positioning system, Settlement monuments, In situ settlement plates etc.)	Monitoring programme provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.6.2.6 and 2.6.2.7</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>
3	A monitoring programme for groundwater,	Monitoring programme provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.6.2.5</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>
4	A meteorological monitoring system for basic atmospheric variables,	Monitoring programme provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.6.2.2</u>	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>
5	A meteorological warning system for rare meteorological phenomena (e.g. hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes),	Arrangements for meteorological warnings are in place.	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>
7	A water level gauge system (Hydrology).	Monitoring provisions are provided. Ref. <u>PSAR Ch. 2.6.2.1</u> (surface water)	<u>Conclusion: no safety issues.</u>