ÿWPC²- ûˆ Ñ×baS¦ˆFì[í^ [—þ -§Dðh»ÉSÙÔp ì975Àƒ&ŒfâE0Æ×ù¶äN×9¢*i=±¾à(ÿ9ö÷¥è½:õ¿ßVzÀz‰êbtùNîÉèu‚;UùpÑ>çÉ?Åù‡ã´°tÂW|ì®ÝâF+ƒ+-Öú³Pd6ìZ¬³ …0Ó&(3Mì[i¨m9Ïéváf';0öç믨dU’+½òµÂW;ß÷So°*T\#¨» U¹ž´6,F~½Û¤…Þ°…Ô«LïânúiÁeÄHQ?Œ/Yê§ÖÄóÿ0ùÙX'¶AB­’ô“ð´V¿›C—P‡f¢KCCš?»‹c>ËOUBY†-/Û)”¾(S¬( ÔY_UŽ¡¡îüOeë)ü‡ÐM b3J±öôv“èQ¤Bð ½0FŽt~j+[ò-ûº¡ô6²í´˜ùÊ ¿NT#ﲫ±º¬JÂK@K ¿îòÊÚ ±>×ÉÝ—F› æÕ@{m˜êÊ,îwO/JÉ ñ’‹j.ÍG©ÏŠy§å\Ñ5Á M"”2žòNˆÏ$Ò#ïùݲ¸²„@ñ⟠„]j#Ñ<@7UBT^Œà:rÚŸ?O´ñ®]扪x]UN %d 0*jU(>” JÒ w@ 4\ p hC 0F f U> H P X ` ah U>| 0Dº 0xþ U:v°°°š³³ÒM$W:: B‘ 0_®F  S 0£```ÇT×U>+ i ìn CZ! 0F"Çã$U>ª%ª%ª%ª%ßè%Ç& 0 FÌ&Ì&Ì&Ì&Ì&Ì&Ì&Ì&Ì&)))))))ü)*Ç*ß*Çä*«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+«+°+(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ïp$¡¡ÑTRW Ï6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€X¡aXXXÔÔ€ôæBôXX¡aÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  Ñ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regularc:\office\wpwin\template\logo\pp.wpt ‘v’D“ìžDŸv D¡D¢V£ì¦vÈA7$Êj%3|x¦  €G@ÐTABLE A (3¹è$§§Ý ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq+XXXÔÔ€ô6)ôXXq+ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular11121314TABLE A<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular(ÿÿ$òòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó/(/!2œ3$¤¤Ý ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq+XXXÔÔ€ô6)ôXXq+ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÓ33Ó€€€€òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó/<þ6X9`("Courier 12cpi ùÝ ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝPAGES€8,€9,€10€AND€11€(FIGURES€3A,€3B,€4€AND€5)€PREPAREDÐ , ÐFOR€OFFSET€9832453FINALÎ  ' &CES/PAU/1998/50Luu .28   ÈÝ ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝPAGE€17€(FIGURE€9)€PREPARED€FOR€OFFSET€ Ñ Æ Ñ MÝ ƒ%wŠ%ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ@ÆÈÑà ƒ àòòÙƒÅ×!ÙÚ  Ú3Ú  Úóó/à Û àÝ  ÝÔ‡ôv]ôôôv]ÔFemales€reach€the€age€of€first€marriage€about€two€years€earlierÐ ‚ Ðthan€males€of€the€same€birth€cohort,€given€the€average€age€difference€betweenÏspouses.€€However,€irregularities€of€the€age€pyramid€generally€affect€the€sameÏbirth€cohorts€of€either€sex.Ô#†ôv]ôôôv]þ#Ô d(­Ï$‘‘òòÙñòòñññÙÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó/c:\office\wpwin\template\draft.wpt Ý ƒ%wŠ%ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ@ÆÈÑà ƒ àòòÙƒÅ×!ÙÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó/à Û àÝ  ÝÔ‡ôv]ôôôv]ÔFor€a€given€year,€the€absolute€number€of€births€is,€at€a€factor€ofÐ j Ðabout€2.05,€the€product€of€the€TFR€and€the€(weighted)€mean€size€of€femaleÏbirth€cohorts€of€childbearing€age.Ô#†ôv]ôôôv]þ#Ô(,O2wŠ$¥¥Ý ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq+XXXÔÔ€ô6)ôXXq+ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÑÆÈÑà ƒ àòòÙƒÅ×!ÙÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó/à Û à* ½Ý ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€,Xq1XXXÔÔ€,ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝFigure€6€prepared€for€offset JÝ ƒ%wŠ%ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ@ÆÈÑà ƒ àòòÙƒÅ×!ÙÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó/à Û àÝ  ÝCompleted€fertility,€when€adjusted€for€the€mean€age€at€maternityÐ Æ Ð(so€that€the€completed€fertility€of€the€birth€cohort€or€generation€g€has€to€beÏcompared€with€the€total€rate€for€the€year,€g€+€m(g),€where€m(g)€is€the€meanÏage€at€maternity€within€the€generation€(g),€can€be€likened€to€the€movingÏaverage€of€the€TFR.<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular1 âÝ ƒ ¹è'ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝCES/PAU/1998/5Ð Ø Ðpage€Ú  Ú2Ú  ÚÌ 9Ý ƒ0¹è(ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝÓ! ++þ°œX!Óà þ àà Â à€€€CES/PAU/1998/5Ð Ø Ðà þ àà Â à€€€page€Ú  Ú2Ú  ÚÌ(3¹è$¨¨Ý ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq+XXXÔÔ€ô6)ôXXq+ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  Ý ½Ý ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€2Xq1XXXÔÔ€2ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝFigure€9€prepared€for€offset<èÀ( 9Z &Courier Regular ÕÝ ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝPAGES€5€AND€6€(FIGURES€1€AND€2)€PREPARED€FOR€OFFSET€6(3¹è$¦¦Ý ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq+XXXÔÔ€ô6)ôXXq+ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  Ý òÝ ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝPAGES€13,€14€AND€15€(FIGURES€6,€7€AND€8)€PREPARED€FORÐ , ÐOFFSET€H ½Ý ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝFigure€7€prepared€for€offsetJ ½Ý ƒ8¹è&ÝÒ+ÒÒ ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÝ  ÝFigure€8€prepared€for€offsetL øÝ ƒ%wŠ%ÝÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ@ÆÈÑà ƒ àòòÙƒÅ×!ÙÚ  Ú4Ú  Úóó/à Û àÝ  ÝIn€reality,€the€linkages€are€based€not€on€the€TFRs,€but€on€theÐ ` Ðage„specific€fertility€rates,€having€due€regard€for€the€continuity,€bothÏtransversal€and€longitudinal,€of€the€projected€rates.ÌÌÌà@vv)pàðMððMððMððMððMðÝ ƒïp!ÝÑTRWÏ6Á&ÿA43Ø'Ï6Á&ÿA4ÿ3Ø'TÑÒ+°ÒÒ °ÒÑ}°ÑÑØ°ÑÔUKUS.,ÔÔ€Xq1XXXÔÔ€ôv]ôXXq1ÔÓ  ÓÓÆÓÑ  ÑÝ  Ý›ÑbØÑщ}ÑÓ ++“°œXÓà “ àDistr.Ìà “ àÔ% ‡ ÔGENERALÔ%† wÔÌÌà “ àÔ% ‡ ÔœCES›/PAU/1998/5Ô%†ªÔÌà “ àÔ% ‡ Ô21€October€1998Ô%†åÔÌÌà “ àENGLISHÌà “ àOriginal:€€Ô% ‡ ÔFRENCHÔ%†?ÔÌÌÌÌÌÓ$++Xª*—X++h$ÓUnitedNations€Economic€à@PP#pà€€€œ€€€Government›ˆà€ÙÙ=µ#àUnitedNations€ˆÐ ªH  ÐCommission€for€Europe*à@PP#pà€€œ€€€›€of€Hungaryˆà€ÙÙ=µ#àPopulation€FundˆÐ p  ÐÌÌRegional€Population€MeetingÌBudapest€œ(Hungary),€7ðMð9›€December€1998ÌÌÌÌÌà@6 6 pàFertility€in€Europe€and€North€AmericaˆÌÌÌà@%pàprepared€by€ˆÌÌÌà@%pàœGrard›€œCalot›ˆÌà@àà'pàœDirector›ˆÌà@00pàEuropean€Demographic€ObservatoryˆÌà@ÆÆpàSaintðMðœGermain›ðMðenðMðœLaye›,€FranceˆÌÌÌÌ̛̜Ìà ƒ àDocument€prepared€by€œGrard›€œCalot›€for€the€Regional€Population€MeetingÏ(Budapest,€7ðMð9December1998).€€The€œopinions›€expressed€in€this€document€areÏthose€of€the€author€and€do€not€necessarily€reflect€the€opinions€of€theÏGovernment€of€Hungary,€the€Economic€Commission€for€Europe€or€theÏUnitedNations€Population€Fund.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ ö*”#. ÐÌà ƒ à*€€The€Regional€Population€Meeting€is€in€the€work€programme€of€theÏConference€of€European€Statisticians.ÌÌÌœÌGE.98ðMð32453›€€(E)Ð  `0þ(5 ÐÑØbÑÑ}‰Ñà@¨¨)pàNOTEˆÌÖ€.ÿÿ֜ր/ÿÿÖ›ÌÌÌÌÌÔ*wƒ !ddd Xdd Xdd X+µ#+µ#wÔÔ,Šdd ÔÔ+  ÔÐ  – ¤ ÐAny€data€provided€under€the€heading€ð ðYugoslaviaðð€relate€to€the€FederalÐ ú  ÐRepublic€of€Yugoslavia,€which,€in€accordance€with€the€General€AssemblyÏResolutions47/1€and€47/229,€of€22September1992€and€5May1993,Ïrespectively,€cannot€œcontinue€automatically›€the€membership€of€the€formerÏSocialist€Federal€Republic€of€Yugoslavia.Ð    ÐÐ    Ðà@àà'pàCONTENTSˆÌÌà€%"%"Hµ#àòòPageóóˆÐ ~Œ ÐÌÓ0++ô!£#‚Xª*—X++Xª*—X0ÓOverview€of€developments€in€western€Europe€and€North€Americaà“ô!ô!Hô!.››Gàœˆà€í"í"Jµ#à4€›ˆÐ   ÐÌOverview€of€developments€in€eastern€Europeà“ô!ô!Hô!.““5àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à16€›ˆÐ – ¤ ÐÌTotal€fertility€rate€and€completed€fertilityà“ô!ô!Hô!.[[7àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à18€›ˆÐ " 0 ÐÌTotal€first€marriage€rate€and€proportion€of€everðMðmarriedÌby€age€50€in€birth€cohortsà“ô!ô!Hô!.SS%àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à19€›ˆÐ t ‚  ÐÌCauses€of€variations€in€fertilityà“ô!ô!Hô!.,àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à20€›ˆÐ   ÐÌPossible€government€action€to€influence€the€fertility€rateà“ô!ô!Hô!.ÓÓEàœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à22€›ˆÐ Œš  ÐÌFuture€fertility.€€Demographic€projectionsà“ô!ô!Hô!.““5àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à24€›ˆÐ &  ÐÌNew€forms€of€family€life€and€social€policyà“ô!ô!Hô!.““5àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à26€›ˆÐ ¤² ÐÌFor€intensified€international€cooperationà“ô!ô!Hô!.//4àœˆà€‰"‰"Iµ#à27€›ˆÐ  0> ÐÓ0++Xª*—X++ô!£#‚Xª*—X0Óà@6 6 pàòòFertility€in€Europe€and€North€AmericaóóˆÐ ò ÐÌà ƒ àIn€the€course€of€the€last€50years,€fertility€in€Europe€andÏNorthAmerica€has€seen€very€contrasting€developments,€both€in€space€and€inÏtime.€€Let€us€first€consider€the€developments€in€westernEurope€andÏNorthAmerica,€and€then€those€in€easternEurope.€€With€regard€toÏwesternEurope,€we€will€distinguish€four€zones:€€the€northern€zone€(Denmark,ÏFinland,€Iceland,€Norway€and€Sweden),€the€western€zone€(Belgium,€France,ÏIreland,€the€Netherlands€and€the€United€Kingdom),€the€central€zone€(Austria,ÏGermany,€Luxembourg€and€Switzerland)€and€the€southern€zone€(Greece,€Italy,ÏPortugal€and€Spain).ÌÌòòOverview€of€developments€in€western€Europe€and€North€AmericaóóÐ :H  ÐÌà ƒ àIn€western€Europe€and€North€America,€where€the€demographic€transitionÏwas€largely€completed€or€in€the€process€of€being€completed,€the€period€betweenÏthe€two€wars,€marked€notably€by€the€economic€crisis€of€the€œ1930s›,€wasÏcharacterized€by€generally€low€fertility€rates,€lower€in€a€good€many€countriesÏthan€the€generation€replacement€rates€(figure1).€€The€authors€of€the€firstÏpopulation€projections,€made€before€the€Second€World€War,€did€not€anticipateÏany€significant€resurgence.ÌÌà ƒ àHowever,€shortly€afterwards€came€what€would€eventually€be€called€theÏbaby€boom.€€This€went€through€its€ascending€phase€during€the€war€yearsÏthemselves€in€two€European€countries€„€Sweden€and€Switzerland€„€that€remainedÏoutside€the€conflict.€€Elsewhere€in€western€Europe,€the€boom€did€not€becomeÏfully€apparent€until€the€end€of€the€hostilities,€but€it€then€manifested€itselfÏwith€great€vigour,€even€if€taken€as€a€whole,€in€terms€of€total€rates,€theÏincrease€in€fertility€between€the€early€œ1930s›€and€the€late€œ1950s›€in€a€countryÏlike€France€(about€+0.8€child€per€woman)€was€identical€to€that€observed€inÏSweden€or€Switzerland€(figure1,€graph€at€bottom€right).€€In€North€America€theÏbaby€boom€assumed€still€larger€dimensions€than€in€Europe,€the€total€rates€forÏthe€United€States€and€Canada€reaching,€respectively,€3.0€and€3.4children€perÏwoman€in€1950,€then€3.7€and€3.9€in€1957€(figure2).€€On€the€other€hand,€inÏAustria€and€Germany,€where€fertility€had€increased€in€the€late€œ1930s›,€thereÏwas€no€rise€from€1945€to€1955.€€In€southern€Europe,€where€the€demographicÏtransition€came€later,€the€baby€boom€was€hardly€noticeable,€fertility€beingÏstill€high€around€1950.€€During€the€period€1955ðMð1965,€total€fertility€ratesÏgenerally€showed€an€upward€trend€in€western€Europe€and€North€America,€owingÏpartly€to€lower€ages€at€marriage€and,€consequently,€at€maternity;€added€to€theÏnormal€annual€number€of€births€(i.e.€that€which€would€have€been€observed€allÏthings€being€equal)€was€the€surplus€resulting€from€these€lower€ages€ofÏmarriage€and€childbearing.€€The€lowering€of€the€age€at€marriage€was€by€then€aÏwell„established€phenomenon,€which€had€started€to€become€manifest€shortlyÏafter€the€First€World€War;€it€was€to€continue€until€the€midœ„1970s›€(and€even€upÏto€the€beginning€of€the€œ1980s›€in€southern€Europe),€with€a€shift€towardsÏearlier€family€formation.€€The€increasing€rarity€of€higherðMðorder€births€(fourÏor€more)€combined€with€the€lowering€of€the€age€at€marriage€had€the€effect€ofÏreducing€the€average€age€at€maternity.ÌÌœ›œÔ€7"ݰ3Æ+ŠŠÔÐ  ž+6(5 ЛØØà ƒ àThe€late€œ1950s›€in€North€America,€the€midðMðœ1960s›€in€western€Europe€and€theÏearly€œ1970s›€in€southern€Europe€were€marked€by€a€sudden€and€drastic€shift€inÏthe€pattern€of€fertility€(figures2€and€4).€€Within€a€single€decade,€the€totalÏrates€fell€by€more€than€onechild€per€woman,€a€variation€probably€withoutÏprecedent€in€human€history€during€untroubled€times€(with€no€wars,€foodÏshortages€or€epidemics).ÌÌà ƒ àIn€the€first€place,€it€is€especially€fertility€after€25years€or€atÏfairly€high€parities€(women€already€having€at€least€twochildren)€that€is€theÏmost€affected€(figureœ3A›).€€At€the€end€of€5€to€10years,€the€fertility€of€theÏfirst€part€of€fertile€life€begins€in€its€turn€to€decrease,€whereas€the€trendÏis€reversed€after€25years:€€consequently,€age€at€maternity€not€only€ceases€toÏfall€but€actually€begins€to€rise€very€rapidly€(figure5)€to€the€point€where,Ïafter€about€10years,€it€reaches€values€close€to€those€observed€a€halfðMðcenturyÏearlier.€€Furthermore,€the€combination€of€the€lowering€of€the€rates€at€youngerÏages€of€fertility€and€the€rise€in€those€rates€at€higher€ages€has€had€theÏeffect€for€the€past€20years€of€keeping€the€total€fertility€rates€for€variousÏcountries€(Austria,€Belgium,€France,€Germany,€Netherlands,€Switzerland,ÏUnitedKingdom)€relatively€steady€or€in€moderate€decline,€but€at€a€low€level.ÌÌà ƒ àNorthern€Europe€towards€the€midðMðœ1980s›€nevertheless€registered€a€certainÏrecovery€in€the€total€rates€(graph€at€top€left€in€figure4),€although€thisÏseems€to€have€lost€momentum€after€a€few€years.€€The€most€spectacular€case€isÏthat€of€Sweden,€where€the€indicator€rose€from€1.6€to€2.1€children€per€womanÏbetween€1983€and€1991,€then€fell€back€to€1.5€in€1997.€€In€North€America,€whileÏthe€total€rate€for€Canada€has€remained€at€approximately€1.6„1.7€children€perÏwoman€since€the€early€œ1980s›,€that€of€the€UnitedStates,€which€never€droppedÏbelow€1.8,€has€almost€attained€the€generation€replacement€level€since€1990.ÌÌà ƒ àIn€southern€Europe,€where€the€rise€in€fertility€rates€at€advanced€agesÏis€still€not€very€marked€and€where€the€fall€at€the€beginning€of€fertile€lifeÏis€rapid€(figureœ3A›€for€Italy),€total€rates€have€reached€the€lowest€levelsÏever€observed€(1.1€to€1.2€children€per€woman€in€Spain€and€Italy€in€1997:€Ïgraph€at€top€right€in€figure4).ÌÌœ›œÔ€AÖŒ+ŠPÔÐ   b& Лñ‘ñØ Øñ‘ñà ƒ àThe€fall€in€underðMð25€fertility€coincided€with€a€rapid€decrease€in€theÏnumber€of€marriages.€€The€total€first€marriage€rate€had€usually€ranged€inÏEurope€between€90€and€110€first€marriages€per€100€females,€correspondingÏwithin€female€birth€cohorts€to€a€proportion€of€neverðMðmarried€by€age€50€ofÏaround€5€to€10%€(figure€6).€€The€total€first€marriage€rate€initially€began€toÏfall€in€northern€Europe€(as€from€1965€in€Sweden)€and€then,€from€the€first€halfÏof€the€œ1970s›€onwards,€the€decline€gradually€spread€throughout€western€Europe.€ÏToday,€the€rate€in€many€countries€is€scarcely€50€to€60€first€marriages€perÏ100females,€and€has€even€been€lower€than€50€since€1990€in€Sweden€(1997:€€45).€ÏThis€fall€in€the€total€first€marriage€rate€reflects€a€shift€from€legalÏmarriage€towards€cohabitation,€with€marriages€themselves€being€contracted€atÏincreasingly€later€ages€(figure7).€€While€losing€a€large€part€of€its€socialÏsignificance,€marriage€has€at€the€same€time€become€very€sensitive€to€changesÏin€social€and€tax€legislation.€€Thus,€in€Austria€on€three€occasions€(1972,Ï1983€and€1989)€and€in€Sweden€(in€1989),€sudden€increases€in€the€number€ofÏmarriages€were€recorded€mainly€in€the€last€quarter€and€especially€in€DecemberÏof€the€years€in€question€because€of€new€laws€entering€into€force€on€theÏfollowing€1January€(figure6).ÌÌà ƒ àThe€fall€in€œnuptiality›€has€entailed€an€often€very€marked€increase€in€theÏproportion€of€births€occurring€outside€marriage€(figure€8).€€This€proportionÏis€currently€close€to€or€above€œ50%€in›€northern€Europe€(Denmark,€Estonia,ÏIceland,€Norway,€Sweden)€and€near€or€higher€than€œ30%€in›€various€other€EuropeanÏcountries€(Austria,€Bulgaria,€Finland,€France,€Latvia,€United€Kingdom)€and€inÏNorth€America.€€In€southern€Europe€the€present€levels€are€significantly€lower,Ïbut€the€increase€is€widespread.ÌÌà ƒ àDivorces,€unlike€marriages,€are€becoming€more€frequent:€€the€totalÏdivorce€rate€today€is€around€40€to€50€divorces€per€100€marriages€inÏnorthernEurope€and€generally€about€30€to€40€elsewhere€in€Europe,€with€theÏexception€of€southern€Europe;€in€the€United€States,€the€divorce€rate€has€beenÏabove€50€since€the€œ1970s›,€whereas€in€Canada€it€has€hovered€around€40.ÌÌà ƒ àWhile€the€postðMðwar€period€was€characterized€by€forms€of€family€lifeÏstill€conforming€to€the€traditional€model€„€almost€universal€and€increasinglyÏearly€marriage,€low€incidence€of€divorce,€consensual€unions€and€out„of„wedlockÏbirths€„€there€is€today€a€great€diversity€of€family€life€cycles:€€numerousÏsituations€that€at€one€time€were€barely€tolerated€or€were€reproved€by€societyÏare€today€voluntarily€chosen€and€socially€commonplace.€€This€has€even€led€to€aÏchange€of€vocabulary,€certain€words€with€pejorative€connotationsÏ(illegitimacy,€concubinage)€being€dropped€and€new€terms€(reconstitutedÏfamilies,€cohabitation)€being€adopted.ÌÌà ƒ àFamily€law,€and€more€generally€social€law,€has€not€always€managed€toÏadapt€to€these€changes.€€Systems€of€statistical€observation€are€alsoÏexperiencing€difficulties€in€adjusting€to€them.Ìœñ’ñ̛Р †(”#. Ðñ’ñ›œñ“ñÔ€IŒ+ŠPÔñ“ññ“ñÔ€(Æ+ŠŠÔñ“ññžñÐ  †(ä%1 ÐÔ€KÆ+ŠŠÔÐ  †(ä%1 ÐÔ€MÆ+ŠŠÔñžñÐ  †(ä%1 ÐñŸñØ ØñŸñÑb}ÑòòOverview›€of€developments€in€eastern€œEurope›óóÐ ò ÐÌà ƒ àThere€were€still€only€a€few€countries€in€eastern€Europe€which€hadÏcompleted€their€demographic€transition€by€the€end€of€the€Second€World€War.€ÏThe€Communist€regimes€in€those€countries€liberalized€abortion€during€theÏœ1950s›,€well€before€western€Europe€(except€in€the€case€of€the€German€DemocraticÏRepublic,€which€did€so€only€in€1970).€€As€a€result,€the€reduction€in€fertilityÏwas€particularly€accentuated:€€by€1965,€the€two€countries€with€the€lowestÏfertility€rates€in€the€world€were€Hungary€and€Romania€(respectively€1.8€andÏ1.9€children€per€woman).€€Thus,€a€number€of€east€European€GovernmentsÏretreated,€at€least€in€part,€from€this€liberalization€and€instituted€variousÏpolicies€to€support€the€family€(family€allowances,€dayðMðcare€centres,Ïassistance€for€housing)€with€the€explicit€aim€of€stimulating€fertility.€€TheÏtrend€in€total€fertility€rates€as€a€whole€was€therefore€downward,€but€markedÏespecially€by€sudden€rises€resulting€from€abrupt€changes€in€legislation.€€WeÏmay€cite€the€cases€of€Bulgaria€(peaks€in€1968ðMð1969€and€in€1974),€HungaryÏ(peaks€in€1954,€1968€and€1975),€Romania€(spectacular€peak€in€1967,Ïcorresponding€to€a€leap€in€the€annual€rate€from€1.9€to€3.7€children€per€woman,Ïand€another€peak€in€1986),€Czechoslovakia€(1974)€and€Russia€(peaks€in€1983€andÏ1987).€€Lastly,€during€the€œ1970s›€and€œ1980s›,€fertility€in€eastern€Europe,€atÏslightly€above€the€generation€replacement€level,€exceeded€that€ofÏœwesternEurope.›ÌÌà ƒ àEarly€family€formation€was,€and€indeed€still€is,€a€feature€common€toÏmost€countries€of€eastern€Europe.€€It€was€not€unusual€for€the€fertility€rateÏat€age€20€to€be€close€to€or€even€higher€than€the€rate€at€age25,€a€phenomenonÏnever€observed€in€western€Europe€(figuresœ3A›€and€œ3B›).€€By€contrast,€the€ratesÏat€age€30€or€more€are€significantly€lower€in€eastern€than€in€western€Europe.€ÏIn€the€event€of€difficulties€affecting€young€people€more€especially,€a€patternÏof€early€childbearing€is€probably€more€likely€than€one€of€later€childbearingÏto€show€a€downward€trend.ÌÌà ƒ àSince€the€collapse€of€the€Communist€regimes,€together€with€the€economicÏcrisis,€rising€unemployment€and€reduced€social€budgets€to€support€families,Ïtotal€fertility€rates€have€suffered€a€particularly€drastic€fall,€bringing€themÏwithin€a€few€years€to€the€levels€observed€in€the€West€and,€in€some€cases,€toÏeven€lower€levels.€€In€1997,€the€rates€were€1.5€children€per€woman€in€Poland,Ï1.4€in€Hungary,€Lithuania,€œSlovakia›€and€Ukraine,€1.3€in€Estonia,€Russia€andÏthe€Czech€Republic,€and€1.1€in€Latvia€and€Bulgaria.ÌÌà ƒ àIn€the€countries€of€the€former€USSR€where€fertility€was€generally€higherÏthan€in€Russia€itself,€particularly€in€the€œRepublics›€of€the€Caucasus,€the€fallÏis€roughly€parallel€to€that€observed€in€Russia€or€Ukraine.€€Only€the€œStates›€ofÏthe€former€Yugoslavia,€where€fertility€is€nevertheless€continuing€to€decrease,Ïseem€to€have€escaped€this€drastic€downturn.€€œSlovenia›,€however,€scarcelyÏexceeded€1.2€children€per€woman€in€1997.€€Albania,€for€which€the€fertilityÏrate€was€still€above€3.5€children€per€woman€in€1980,€is€rapidly€joining€theÏother€countries€in€its€geographical€area.ÌÌà ƒ àThe€differences€in€fertility€levels€prevailing€until€the€late€œ1980s›€haveÏtherefore€been€heavily€blurred€during€the€present€decade.€€While€theÏUnitedStates€and€Ireland€in€the€West€and€Albania€in€the€East€are€stillÏspecial€cases,€no€country€of€the€œECE›€region€today€has€a€TFR€higher€than€theÏgeneration€replacement€œlevel.ñ¡ñÐ ð-þ(5 Лñ¡ññ£ñÔ€ÖÆ+ŠŠÔñ£ññ£ñÔ€-ÖÆ+ŠŠÔñ£ññ¢ñÐ  ð-ˆ*8 Ðñ¢ññ ñÐ  òŠ Ðñ ññ¦ñØØñ¦ñрϛÑòòÑÆÈÑTotal›€fertility€rate€and€completed€œfertility›óóÐ ò ÐÌà ƒ àBefore€discussing€the€present€situation€as€regards€fertility€in€Europe,Ïit€might€be€worth€recalling€the€significance€of€the€total€fertility€rate€(TFR)Ïand€of€completed€fertility€for€female€birth€cohorts.ÌÌà ƒ àAgeðMðspecific€fertility€rates€are€established€for€a€given€region€and€aÏgiven€year:€€the€fertility€rate€at,€for€example,€age€25€is€the€ratio€of€theÏnumber€of€children€born€to€mothers€aged€25€to€the€number€of€women€aged€25Ïresiding€in€the€region.€€The€total€fertility€rate€for€the€year€underÏconsideration€is€obtained€by€adding€the€various€ageðMðspecific€fertility€ratesÏ(e.g.€for€ages€15€to€49)€established€for€that€year.€€Like€each€of€these€rates,Ïthe€total€rate€is€expressed€as€the€number€of€liveðMðborn€children€per€woman.ÌÌà ƒ àIt€can€be€shown€that€the€TFR€is€2.05children€per€woman€when€the€size€ofÏthe€female€birth€cohort€born€during€the€year€under€consideration€is€equal€toÏthe€mean€size€(weighted€by€the€ageðMðspecific€fertility€rates)€of€the€variousÏfemale€birth€cohorts€which€that€year€are€of€childbearing€age€(cohorts€thenÏaged€15€to€49).€€This€result€can€be€refined€somewhat€and€stated€as€follows:€Ïthe€TFR€is€2.08€(usually€rounded€up€to€2.1)€when,€taking€account€of€mortalityÏbut€not€of€any€migration,€the€future€size€of€the€female€birth€cohort€which€hasÏjust€been€born€is€equal,€when€that€cohort€itself€reaches€childbearing€age,€toÏthe€current€mean€size€of€the€female€birth€cohorts€of€an€age€to€be€mothers.ÌÌà ƒ àIn€other€words,€the€total€fertility€rate,€divided€by€2.1,€measures€theÏrelationship€between€the€size€of€the€birth€cohort€just€born€and€the€mean€sizeÏof€the€birth€cohorts€currently€of€childbearing€age.€€That€is€why€this€value€ofÏ2.1€children€per€woman€is€called€the€generation€replacement€rate.€€A€TFR€ofÏ1.4,€for€example,€means€that,€in€the€absence€of€international€migration,€theÏsize€of€the€birth€cohort€just€born,€when€it€reaches€childbearing€age€itself,Ïwill€be€a€third€lower€(1.4/2.1€=€2/3)€than€the€mean€size€of€the€birth€cohortsÏcurrently€of€childbearing€age.ÌÌà ƒ àThe€completed€fertility€of€a€female€birth€cohort,€i.e.€all€females€whoÏare€themselves€born€in€a€given€year,€is€the€mean€number€of€liveðMðborn€childrenÏwhich€these€women€have€had€during€their€fertile€life.€€This€number€may€beÏfound€by€a€census€or€survey€conducted€shortly€after€the€birth€cohort€hasÏpassed€the€age€of€50.€€It€can€be€shown€that€the€completed€fertility€of€a€birthÏcohort€may€also€be€obtained€by€adding€the€ageðMðspecific€fertility€rates€for€theÏsame€birth€cohort€observed€over€successive€years,€and€thus€at€successive€agesÏof€the€childbearing€lifespan.€€The€temporal€pattern€of€completed€fertility€isÏmuch€more€regular€œ× ƒ+ ×Ý ƒ"­ÏÝòòÙñòòñññÙÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó/Ý  Ý×  ×›€than€that€of€the€TFR€(compare€the€lower€graphs€inÐ ¨$¶) Мfigure4›€with€the€corresponding€graphs€above):€€twoneighbouring€birth€cohortsÏexperience€the€same€events€at€nearly€the€same€ages€and€in€general€react€toÏthem€in€a€similar€way.ÌÌà ƒ àThere€are€many€factors€which€condition€the€temporal€pattern€of€the€TFR.€ÏVariations€in€this€indicator€may€derive€from€particular€events€which€have€theÏeffect,€for€example,€of€lowering€the€rates€of€fertility€at€most€ages,€butÏwithout€the€completed€fertility€of€the€birth€cohorts€concerned€being€modifiedÏsignificantly,€because€corrective€adjustments€will€be€made€later.€€They€canÏalso€result€from€variations€in€completed€fertility€across€birth€cohorts.€€œÐ  d,r'3 ÐThey›œmay›€furthermore€derive€from€variations€in€the€timing€of€maternity.€ÏInœparticular,›€a€lowering€of€the€age€at€maternity,€with€completed€fertilityÏunvarying,€has€an€inflationary€effect€on€the€TFR,€while€a€rise€in€age€atÏmaternity€has€a€deflationary€effect.ÌÌà ƒ àThe€factors€contributing€to€variations€in€the€TFR€over€a€given€periodÏcannot€be€singled€out€until€all€information€concerning€the€birth€cohorts€thenÏof€childbearing€age€becomes€available,€i.e.€about€15years€at€least€after€theÏperiod€under€consideration.€€Likewise,€a€birth€cohort's€completed€fertilityÏcannot€be€evaluated€without€too€much€uncertainty€until€it€has€completed€theÏlarger€part€of€its€fertile€life.€€In€practice,€the€cohort€must€be€aged€atÏleast€30years€in€the€latest€available€statistics,€and€preferably€at€leastÏ35years.ÌÌà ƒ àWhatever€factors€cause€variations€in€the€TFR,€it€has€to€be€understoodÏthat€this,€combined€with€the€legacy€of€past€natality€(possibly€correctedÏslightly€by€mortality€and€migration)€which€is€constituted€by€the€members€ofÏthe€various€birth€cohorts€currently€of€childbearing€age,€is€what€determinesÏthe€number€of€births€per€year.œ× ƒ$ ×Ý ƒ"­ÏÝòòÙñòòñññÙÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó/Ý  Ý×  ×›€€It€is€therefore€the€TFR,€and€not€completedÐ Þì  Ðfertility,€that€conditions€the€evolution€of€the€magnitude€essential€for€theÏfunctioning€of€the€demographic€machinery:€€the€annual€number€of€births,€uponÏwhich€the€future€age€composition€of€the€population€will€depend€for€manyÏdecades.ÌÌà ƒ àNevertheless,€the€durability€or€nonðMðdurability€of€given€changes€in€theÏTFR€is€to€be€appreciated€differently€according€to€the€change€in€completedÏfertility€within€the€birth€cohorts€concerned,€and€that€change€willÏunfortunately€not€be€known€until€about€15years€later.€€This€is€why€monitoringÏchanges€both€in€the€TFR€and€in€completed€fertility€is€indispensable€for€theÏanalysis€of€fertility.€€It€should,€however,€be€kept€in€mind€that€the€mostÏrecent€data€available€to€us€concerning€completed€fertility€inevitably€lagÏbehind€the€data€available€for€the€TFR€by€a€good€decade.ÌÌòòTotal€first€marriage€rate€and€proportion€of€ever„married€by€age€50€in€birthÐ x†! ÐcohortsÌóóÌà ƒ àRather€as€when€studying€fertility,€each€year€we€establish€ageðMðspecificÏfirst€marriage€rates,€for€both€males€and€females,€i.e.€the€ratio€of€the€numberÏof€neverðMðmarried€of€the€sex€in€question€and€of€a€given€age€who€marry€in€theÏcourse€of€the€year€to€the€size€of€the€resident€population€of€the€same€sex€andÏage€during€the€year.€€The€total€first€marriage€rate€for€females,€for€example,Ïis€obtained€by€adding€the€age„specific€first€marriage€rates€for€females.€€TheÏages€taken€into€consideration€are€usually€limited€to€less€than€50years.ÌÌà ƒ àIt€may€be€shown€that€the€proportion€of€ever„married€by€age€50€in€a€givenÏbirth€cohort€which€can€be€observed€in€a€census€or€survey€is€generally€close€toÏthe€result€obtained€by€adding€the€before„50€first€marriage€rates€for€the€sameÏbirth€cohort€over€successive€years.€€For€this€to€be€so,€internationalÏmigration€must€not€be€too€large€and€the€difference€between€the€number€ofÏmarriages€of€residents€contracted€outside€the€region€and€the€number€ofÏmarriages€of€nonðMðresidents€contracted€within€the€region€has€to€be€small.Ì̜Р *-8(4 ÐÑÏ› ÑÑÆÆÑÑ  Ññ¦ñÑÏ›ÑÑÆÆÑÑ  Ññ¦ñ›à ƒ àIt€can€also€be€shown€that€the€first€marriage€rate€of€a€given€sex€for€aÏgiven€year€is€equal€to€the€ratio€of€the€number€of€first€marriages€for€the€sexÏconsidered€which€are€contracted€in€the€course€of€the€year€to€the€mean€sizeÏ(weighted€by€the€ageðMðspecific€first€marriage€rates)€of€the€birth€cohorts€thenÏœof›€an€age€for€first€marriage.€€When,€for€example,€the€first€marriage€rate€forÏfemales€is€50marriages€per€100women,€this€means€that€the€number€ofÏneverðMðmarried€women€who€married€in€the€course€of€the€year€represents€half€ofÏthe€mean€size€of€the€female€birth€cohorts€then€of€an€age€to€contract€a€firstÏmarriage.ÌÌà ƒ àUp€to€the€generations€born€around€1945,€which€were€not€concerned€by€theÏdevelopment€of€cohabitation,€the€proportion€of€ever„married€by€age€50€variedÏquite€little,€remaining€at€around€the€90%€mark,€from€one€birth€cohort€toÏanother,€and€even€from€one€sex€to€the€other€and€from€one€country€to€anotherÏ(lower€part€of€figure6).€€However,€the€total€first€marriage€rate€could€varyÏmuch€more€widely€under€the€influence€of€specific€events€(economic€crises,Ïwars,€changes€in€legislation,€etc.).€€Except€during€particular€periods€ofÏtension€in€the€ð ðmarriage€marketðð,€resulting€from€discontinuities€in€the€ageÐ &  Ðpyramid,œ× ƒ ×Ý ƒ"­ÏÝòòÙñòòñññÙÚ  Ú3Ú  Úóó/Ý  Ý×  ×›€the€first€marriage€rate€for€males€changes€in€parallel€with€thatÐ Þì  Ðfor€females,€so€that€it€suffices€to€follow€the€variations€in€only€one€of€theÏtworates.€€The€rate€for€females€is€the€indicator€more€commonly€chosen.ÌÌòòCauses€of€variations€in€fertilityóóÐ ö ÐÌà ƒ àIt€must€be€recognized€from€the€outset€that€we€do€not€know€the€rootÏcauses€of€the€most€striking€variations€in€fertility.ÌÌœà ƒ àAre€we€today€on€the€verge€of€a€new€baby€boom?€€It€would€be€very€daringÏindeed€for€anyone€to€make€such€a€prediction€in€the€present€circumstances,€butÏexcluding€the€possibility€completely€would€surely€not€be€reasonable.ÌÌà ƒ àThe€baby€boom€of€the€1940s€and€subsequent€years€surprised€all€observersÏat€the€time,€who€realized€the€magnitude€of€the€phenomenon€only€after€theÏevent.€€The€same€applied€also€to€the€baby€bust€of€the€1960s.€€We€can,€ofÏcourse,€identify€without€ambiguity€the€causes€of€sharp€variations€that€followÏmajor€events,€such€as€the€collapse€of€the€communist€regimes€in€eastern€EuropeÏor€the€almost€total€ban€on€abortion€in€Romania€in€October€1966.€€However,Ïother€than€with€regard€to€such€exceptional€circumstances,€we€can€only€makeÏsuppositions€about€the€causes€on€the€basis€of€correlations€and€associationsÏthat€are€always€uncertain.€€Hence€it€is€extremely€difficult€for€analysts€toÏforecast€medium„€or€long„term€developments€and€for€governments,€when€they€wantÏto,€to€influence€those€developments.ÌÌà ƒ àWe€have€no€satisfactory€explanation€for€the€baby€boom.€€Looking€inÏparticular€at€the€Swedish€and€Swiss€data,€as€compared€with€the€data€for€otherÏcountries€that€were€belligerents€(Belgium,€France,€the€Netherlands,€Norway€andÏthe€United€Kingdom),€one€might€think€that€it€corresponded,€in€the€late€1930s,Ïto€a€kind€of€historical€necessity:€€it€became€manifest€first€in€the€countriesÏwhere€the€Second€World€War€did€not€prevent€it€from€happening,€and€then,€afterÏthe€end€of€the€war,€but€very€forcefully,€in€those€countries€where€the€war€hadÏin€some€way€contained€it.€€In€any€case,€it€was€not€the€war€itself€that€gaveÏrise€to€the€baby€boom,€whose€magnitude€far€exceeded€the€recovery€which€hadÏfollowed€the€First€World€War.€€Was€it€a€delayed€effect€of€that€First€War,€and€Ð  *-8(4 Ðof€the€considerable€losses€and€major€social€changes€it€had€entrained,€was€itÏan€effect€of€the€economic€and€moral€crisis€of€the€1930s,€or€was€there€someÏother€cause?ÌÌà ƒ àConcerning€the€baby€bust,€it€does€appear€that€control€of€reproduction,Ïwhich€became€more€and€more€total€and€increasingly€widespread,€played€a€crucialÏrole.€€Various€national€studies€indicate€that€the€decline€in€the€number€ofÏbirths€went€hand€in€hand€with€a€certain€decrease€in€the€numbers€of€childrenÏwho€were€wanted€and€with€a€marked,€and€significantly€larger,€reduction€in€theÏnumbers€of€unwanted€children,€that€being€made€possible€by€greater€fertilityÏcontrol.€€Furthermore,€the€appearance€of€the€baby€bust€in€North€AmericaÏseveral€years€before€western€Europe€and€the€decrease€in€fertility€first€of€allÏafter€age€25€(easier€access€and€greater€motivation€to€use€contraceptives,Ïfewer€reservations€among€the€medical€profession)€and€then,€only€a€few€yearsÏlater,€at€the€beginning€of€fertile€life€and€in€particular€before€marriage,Ïcorroborate€this€view.€€The€later€entry€of€the€countries€of€southern€EuropeÏinto€the€phase€of€rapid€decline€in€fertility€could€be€connected€with€a€lesserÏdegree€of€openness€in€southern€societies€to€the€idea€of€fertility€control€andÏto€the€later€diffusion€of€modern€means€of€contraception.€€As€is€frequently€theÏcase,€a€phenomenon€that€had€for€a€certain€time€been€contained€later€manifestedÏitself€with€even€greater€vigour.ÌÌà ƒ àTogether€with€the€dissemination€of€modern€means€of€controllingÏreproduction,€other€major€developments€occurred€within€European€societies,Ïsome€causally€linked€and€some€not€to€such€control,€but€most€of€them€beingÏfacilitated€or€reinforced€by€it.€€First€of€all,€we€should€note€the€developmentÏof€the€gainful€employment€of€women€outside€the€home.€€This€greaterÏparticipation€by€women€in€the€labour€force€derives€in€part€from€the€progressÏmade€in€schooling€for€females€and€the€desire€of€many€couples€to€raise€theirÏstandards€of€living€whenever€possible,€given€the€huge€difference€that€existsÏbetween€a€family€budget€sustained€by€one€wage€earner€and€a€two„income€familyÏbudget.€€Moreover,€in€a€society€where€occupation€is€a€determinant€of€socialÏstatus,€this€increase€in€female€employment€has€played€a€major€role€inÏimproving€the€situation€of€women.€€With€unions,€both€consensual€and€legal,Ïtending€to€become€more€fragile,€a€gainful€occupation€for€a€woman€represents€aÏform€of€insurance€against€the€risk€of€a€break„up.€€The€continued€rise€inÏfemale€activity€rates,€despite€the€economic€crisis€and€the€persistently€highÏlevel€of€unemployment,€attests€to€the€vigour€of€this€change:€€women'sÏparticipation€in€the€labour€force€is€an€irreversible€datum,€something€that€isÏtaken€for€granted.ÌÌà ƒ àIt€seems€very€probable€that€the€increase€in€female€activity€rates€hasÏdepressed€fertility.€€Thus,€government€action€to€enable€couples,€andÏespecially€women,€to€combine€family€and€occupational€responsibilities€moreÏeasily€is€of€the€utmost€importance.€€Indeed,€it€is€in€the€countries€ofÏnorthern€Europe,€where€social€policies€have€been€implemented€to€provideÏfacilities€for€early€childhood€(nurseries,€kindergartens,€etc.),€paid€parentalÏleave€and€part„time€working,€that€fertility€has€generally€declined€the€least.ÌÌà ƒ àSome€other€major€trends€may€also€be€referred€to€in€connection€withÏtoday's€low€fertility:€€the€decline,€or€virtual€disappearance,€of€farming,Ïsmall„scale€trading€and€handicrafts,€sectors€in€which€wives€could€work€andÏstill€look€after€their€children,€the€generalization€of€urban€ways€of€life,€Ð  *-8(4 Ðthesecularization€of€society€and€the€reduced€influence€of€religions,€the€riseÏof€individualism€and€hedonism,€the€greater€sensitivity€to€differences€inÏstandards€of€living€and€the€encouragement€of€consumerism,€particularly€underÏthe€influence€of€the€media,€and€so€on.ÌÌà ƒ àAll€of€these€changes€have€a€common€feature:€€they€are€very€probablyÏirreversible.€€It€is€therefore€difficult,€while€recognizing€our€limitedÏcapacity€to€predict,€to€see€how€fertility€could€spontaneously,€i.e.€withoutÏdeliberate€government€action,€increase€in€a€significant€fashion.ÌÌà ƒ àIndeed,€an€examination€of€the€variations€over€a€lengthy€period€in€theÏthree€countries€represented€in€figure€1€leads€one€to€wonder€whether€EuropeanÏfertility€has€not€quite€simply€reverted€to€its€long„term€trend,€a€trend€fromÏwhich€it€mysteriously€departed€during€the€interlude€of€the€ð ðForty€GloriousÐ   ÐDemographic€Yearsðð€(broadly€the€period€1935„1975).€€Must€it€then€be€deducedÐ ÆÔ  Ðthat€post„transitional€fertility€could€register€large€pulsations,€of€which€theÏSwedish€fluctuation€between€1983€and€1997€would€be€the€second€example€afterÏthe€long€interlude€of€four€decades?€€We€are€clearly€not€in€a€position€toÏanswer€those€questions,€but€they€are€worth€asking.ÌÌòòPossible€government€action€to€influence€the€fertility€rateóóÐ jx ÐÌà ƒ àWhatever€the€case€may€be,€a€basic€human€right€has€been€progressivelyÏacquired:€€the€right€to€have€only€the€children€one€wants€at€the€time€one€wantsÏthem.€€Even€if,€here€and€there,€some€imperfections€remain,€as€witnessed€by€theÏstill€high€proportion€of€adolescent€pregnancies€in€some€countries,€it€may€beÏsaid€that,€overall,€the€European€and€North€American€populations€have€todayÏattained€a€high€degree€of€control€over€their€fertility.€€Considering€theÏmonthly€apprehension,€or€even€anxiety,€of€so€many€women€just€three€to€fourÏdecades€ago,€such€developments€can€only€be€welcomed.€€No€democratic€governmentÏcan€therefore€seek€to€influence€the€fertility€rate€by€limiting€that€basicÏright€in€any€way€whatsoever.ÌÌà ƒ àSome€people€think€that€government€intervention€in€family€choicesÏ(encouragement€of€marriage€and€of€larger€families,€particularly€through€socialÏand€fiscal€policies)€is€not€legitimate:€€the€State€must€refrain€fromÏinterfering€in€any€way€in€what€is€a€strictly€private€domain.€€Even€advocacy€ofÏone€family€choice€rather€than€another€constitutes€unacceptable€pressure€on€theÏindividual.ÌÌà ƒ àOthers€believe,€on€the€contrary,€that€the€State,€as€guarantor€of€theÏcollective€interest,€must€be€concerned€with€the€nation's€harmoniousÏdevelopment€in€the€short,€medium€and€long€term.€€The€number€of€foot„soldiersÏthat€might€have€to€be€mobilized€for€a€country's€defence€is,€of€course,€noÏlonger€a€crucial€parameter€in€modern€Europe.€€However,€a€government€cannot€beÏindifferent€to€population€changes€because€the€future€functioning€of€societyÏdepends€on€them,€at€least€in€part.€€Social€welfare€systems,€for€example,€haveÏan€important€demographic€component.ÌÌà ƒ àIf€action€by€the€State€to€stimulate€fertility€is€not€considered€to€beÏillegitimate,€one€must€still€make€sure€that€it€does€not€have€the€effect€of€inÏany€way,€directly€or€indirectly,€increasing€the€number€of€unwanted€children;€Ð  d,r'3 Ðit€must€be€aimed€primarily€at€enabling€couples€to€have€the€number€of€childrenÏthey€actually€want,€and€secondly€at€encouraging€society€itself€to€wantÏchildren.€€The€instruments€for€such€a€policy€are€naturally€the€same€as€thoseÏof€social€policy,€and€are€designed€to€attenuate€the€economic€and€otherÏdisadvantages€of€having€children.€€All€fields€of€economic€and€social€policyÏare€concerned,€but€three€are€particularly€important:€€employment€and€workingÏconditions,€action€to€deal€with€differences€in€the€standards€of€living€ofÏhouseholds€according€to€the€number€of€children€they€have€(allowances,Ïtaxation,€community€services,€particularly€for€the€care€of€small€children,Ïeducation,€culture€and€recreation)€and€housing.ÌÌà ƒ àThe€demographic€argument€is€rarely€put€forward€when€government€decisionsÏin€favour€of€the€family€and€children€are€taken.€€The€social€concern€is,€ofÏcourse,€often€the€main€or€even€the€only€argument.€€Above€all,€politicians€areÏreluctant€to€invoke€it€for€fear€of€appearing€hostile€to€change€that€bears€theÏhallmark€of€modernity.€€In€addition,€the€political€regimes€which€have€insistedÏthe€loudest€on€the€demographic€argument€are€not€among€those€one€likes€toÏremember€and€still€less€to€recommend.€€Furthermore,€a€lowering€of€fertilityÏfor€several€decades€is€generally€received€very€favourably€by€all€the€actors€ofÏsocial€life.€€For€households,€it€affords€the€opportunity€of€using€forÏsecondary,€but€more€gratifying€needs,€the€resources€that€would€otherwise€haveÏbeen€devoted€to€children.€€Employers€have€to€cope€with€fewer€absences€forÏmaternity€or€child€illness.€€The€State€reaps€an€immediate€benefit€from€a€fallÏin€the€number€of€births:€€less€expenditure€on€maternal€and€child€health€careÏfor€the€social€security€system,€less€school€facilities€to€be€provided,€fewerÏfamily€allowances€to€be€disbursed,€less€tax€relief€to€be€granted.€€However,Ïthis€is€probably€a€nation€that€is€reducing€its€investment€in€human€capital,Ïrather€like€a€business€that€cuts€back€on€investment€spending:€€it€immediatelyÏimproves€its€cash€flow€situation,€but€leaves€itself€exposed€to€problems€at€aÏlater€stage.ÌÌà ƒ àMoreover,€there€is€quite€general€scepticism€about€the€demographicÏeffectiveness€of€family€policies,€particularly€in€view€of€their€cost€forÏpublic€finances.€€The€impossibility€in€the€present€circumstances€ofÏundertaking€controlled€experiments,€which€would€help€to€determine€moreÏprecisely€the€effectiveness€of€such€policies,€further€reinforces€thisÏscepticism.€€However,€while€it€is€true€that€we€have€virtually€nothing€butÏsuppositions€to€work€on,€these€are€on€the€whole€sufficiently€convergent€toÏallow€us€to€think€that€there€is€indeed€some€effectiveness.€€We€may€cite€theÏcase€mentioned€earlier€of€the€Scandinavian€countries€and€particularly€that€ofÏSweden,€where€the€total€fertility€rate€and€especially€completed€fertility€haveÏvaried€relatively€little€over€a€lengthy€period€(figure€1).€€Similarly,€theÏfact€that€fertility€in€France€has€been€slightly,€but€almost€constantly,€higherÏthan€that€of€its€neighbours,€especially€in€terms€of€completed€fertility,€isÏprobably€attributable€to€its€family€policy.€€Certain€episodes€of€EuropeanÏhistory€point€in€the€same€direction.€€Thus,€Saarland,€where€French€familyÏlegislation€was€applied€from€1945€to€1955,€before€its€return€to€Germany,€hadÏat€that€time€one€of€the€highest€fertility€rates€among€the€11€federal€Lnder.€ÏThirty€years€later,€it€had€one€of€the€lowest,€although€developments€in€theÏother€Lnder€largely€paralleled€one€another.ÌÌÐ  d,r'3 Ðà ƒ àAll€the€same,€the€demographic€effect€of€family€policies€is€limited.€€ToÏgive€an€order€of€magnitude€in€terms€of€completed€fertility,€one€could€suggestÏa€figure€of€about€20€or€perhaps€30€children€per€100€women.€€On€the€basis€ofÏeconometric€calculations,€one€French€researcher,€Olivia€Ekert,€estimated€atÏ50children€per€100€women€the€likely€effect€of€a€policy€whereby€the€communityÏwould€bear€the€full€economic€ð ðcostðð€of€children.€€It€seems€certain€thereforeÐ ÐÞ Ðthat,€if€any€demographer€had€been€farsighted€enough€to€announce€the€arrival€ofÏthe€baby€bust€by€1965€in€western€Europe,€no€policy€would€have€been€able€toÏoffset€its€effects.ÌÌà ƒ àHowever,€particularly€in€countries€where€the€completed€fertility€ofÏcohorts€born€after€1960€is€likely€to€deviate€significantly€from€theÏreplacement€level€(160€children€per€100€women€in€some€countries€for€the€cohortÏborn€in€1962;€see€the€lower€part€of€figure€4),€the€implementation€of€an€activeÏpolicy€might€be€desired€by€some€governments€because€it€would€make€it€possibleÏto€fill€perhaps€not€all€but€at€least€a€substantial€part€of€the€gap€in€theÏsimple€replacement€rate.ÌÌà ƒ àSome€think€that€the€demographic€deficits€created€by€low€fertility€canÏalways€be€offset€by€immigration.€€It€is€true€that€for€a€century€in€someÏEuropean€countries€international€migration€has€been€an€appreciable€andÏappreciated€element€of€population€change.€€This€has€generally€been€prompted€byÏthe€desire€to€meet€manpower€needs€rapidly.€€While€candidates€for€migration€toÏEurope,€and€even€more€so€to€North€America,€probably€run€little€risk€of€notÏhaving€a€real€future,€it€might€be€asked€whether€their€skills€will€match€theÏfuture€requirements€of€the€post„industrial€economies.€€Moreover,€the€wideningÏculture€gap€between€the€countries€of€origin€and€the€host€countries€will€notÏfacilitate€the€migrants'€integration.€€Above€all,€however,€the€demographicÏdeficit€of€many€European€countries€is€on€such€a€scale€as€to€raise€the€fearÏthat€the€volume€of€immigration€necessary€for€its€absorption€might€undermineÏthe€internal€cohesion€and€balance€of€the€host€countries.€€Indeed,€to€ensureÏsimple€replacement€with€a€fertility€rate€of€1.6€children€per€woman,€a€quarterÏof€the€adult€population€(1.6/2.1€ðsð€0.75)€would€have€to€be€comprised€ofÐ ²À  Ðimmigrants.€€Thus,€although€immigration€is€bound€to€remain€an€adjuvant€forÏpopulation€change,€we€cannot€hope€to€use€it,€when€fertility€becomes€very€low,Ïas€a€tool€for€redressing€the€balance.ÌÌòòFuture€fertility.€€Demographic€projectionsóóÐ !ž% ÐÌà ƒ àDespite€our€limited€capacity€to€understand€and€consequently€to€predict,Ïwe€are€forced€to€make€forecasts.€€Even€if€clumsy€and€imprecise,€and€even€ifÏperiodically€revised,€as€are€the€world€demographic€projections€of€theÏUnitedNations€Population€Division,€they€nevertheless€help€us€to€look€forward,Ïtranslating€at€least€the€idea€that€we€have,€at€a€given€time,€about€the€future.ÌÌà ƒ àWe€should€note€that€not€all€elements€of€a€forecast€have€the€same€degreeÏof€uncertainty.€€The€present€weighs€to€a€greater€or€lesser€extent€on€theÏfuture,€if€only€by€reason€of€a€certain€continuity€in€temporal€changes.€€In€theÏdemographic€field,€this€weight€of€the€present€stems€above€all€from€the€factÏthat€the€future€size€of€a€cohort€already€born€at€the€starting€point€of€theÏprojection€is,€while€the€horizon€is€not€too€far€removed,€close€to€its€initialÏsize€and€linked€to€it€by€a€relationship€that€is€not€too€hard€to€evaluate€withÏa€satisfactory€level€of€precision.ÌÐ ð-þ(5 Ðà ƒ àA€demographic€projection,€at€least€in€its€commonest€form,€involvesÏtranslating,€in€terms€of€future€numbers€of€the€population€(by€sex€and€age),Ïassumptions€regarding€the€three€factors€of€population€change:€€fertility,Ïmortality€and€migration.€€The€projection€method€normally€used,€i.e.€theÏcohort„component€method,€is€the€converse€approach€to€that€of€analysis.€ÏWhereas€the€analysis€of€past€observed€data€leads€to€the€determination,€forÏeach€year€in€the€past,€of€fertility€and€mortality€tables€(collection€ofÏageðMðspecific€rates€for€fertility)€and€balances€of€migration€by€sex€and€age,Ïthe€projection€successively€builds€up€the€future€numbers€of€the€population€onÏthe€basis€both€of€the€current€observed€numbers€and€of€the€series€of€tables€andÏbalances€used€to€make€assumptions€for€future€years.ÌÌà ƒ àA€projection€exercise€usually€considers€not€one€but€several€temporalÏpaths€for€each€of€these€factors.€€The€projections€concerning€the€EuropeanÏUnion€countries€made€by€Statistics€Netherlands€at€the€request€of€Eurostat€thusÏenvisage,€for€each€of€the€15€countries,€three€paths€(middle,€high€and€low)€forÏeach€of€the€three€factors.€€The€combination€of€these€various€paths€for€any€oneÏcountry€involves€3òò3óó€=€27€projections,€called€scenarios,€but€only€5€have€beenÐ &  Ðdrawn€up€and€published€to€cover€the€period€up€to€2050.€€The€central€scenarioÏcombines€the€three€middle€paths€for€each€of€the€three€factors.ÌÌà ƒ à€A€fertility€path€defined€for€a€given€country€may€be€summed€up€as€theÏdevelopment€from€1995€to€2050€of€its€total€fertility€rate.€€StatisticsÏNetherlands€has€systematically€assumed€the€TFR€to€be€invariable€as€from€2020Ïand€change€in€the€TFR,€as€observed€before€1995,€has€been€linked€× ƒ\ ×Ý ƒ"­ÏÝòòÙñòòñññÙÚ  Ú4Ú  Úóó/Ý  Ý×  ×€to€theÐ ‚ Ðlevel€projected€for€2020.€€Lastly,€the€vision€of€the€future€incorporated€intoÏthis€projection€exercise€relies€essentially€on€the€values€expected€to€beÏattained€by€the€TFR€as€from€2020.ÌÌà ƒ àIn€no€European€Union€country€is€the€TFR€expected€to€rise€above€theÏgeneration€replacement€level€(2.1€children€per€woman).€€Only€on€the€highÏpaths,€and€for€only€five€countries€(Finland,€France,€Ireland,€Sweden€and€theÏUnited€Kingdom),€does€the€TFR€attain€this€value€in€2020.€€By€contrast,€the€lowÏpaths€of€three€countries€(Germany,€Italy€and€Spain)€correspond€to€a€TFR€ofÏ1.3children€per€woman€in€2020.ÌÌà ƒ àThis€vision€of€a€future€of€persistent€low€fertility€is€very€generallyÏshared€by€statistical€offices€when€they€make€national€projections.€€Thus,€inÏthe€case€of€France,€the€latest€levels€are€respectively€1.6,€1.8€and€2.1Ïchildren€per€woman€in€the€Statistics€Netherlands€exercise€and€1.5,€1.8€andÏ2.1in€the€INSEE€exercise.€€The€Federal€Statistical€Office€of€Switzerland,Ïacountry€which€does€not€belong€to€the€European€Union,€makes€very€similarÏchoices€„€1.35,€1.6€and€1.8€children€per€woman€„€while€Statistics€NetherlandsÏhas€arrived€at€1.4,€1.6€and€1.9€for€Austria€and€1.3,€1.5€and€1.8€for€Germany,Ïa€country€where€change€in€fertility€for€the€past€half„century€has€been€closeÏto€that€observed€in€Switzerland€(figure€4).ÌÌà ƒ àThese€assumptions,€which€revise€downwards€very€heavily€the€projectionsÏwhich€the€countries€had€made€two€or€three€decades€ago,€seem€reasonable€in€theÏpresent€context.€€Nevertheless,€they€are€very€fragile€and€are€bound€to€undergoÏnumerous€revisions€between€now€and€2050.ÌÌÐ  *-8(4 Ðà ƒ àYet€this€fragility€does€not€invalidate€the€analyses€that€can€be€made€ofÏthe€ageing€of€European€populations.€€That€is€because€the€deformations€in€theÏage€pyramid€to€be€expected€between€2010€and€2040€result€from€specific€eventsÏthat€are€of€known€magnitude,€since€they€belong€to€the€past.€€On€top€of€theÏlong„term€ageing€resulting€from€lower€mortality€and€lower€fertility,€whichÏmany€European€countries€have€already€been€experiencing€since€the€first€decadesÏof€the€twentieth€century,€there€will€be€an€exceptional€ageing€due€to€theÏfollowing€combination€of€circumstances:€€the€1945„1975€birth€cohorts,€asÏcompared€to€preceding€generations,€are€characterized€by€both€higher€numbersÏand€lower€fertility.€€This€combination€has€had€a€stabilizing€effect€on€theÏabsolute€number€of€births€for€the€past€30€years,€but€in€the€first€decades€ofÏthe€next€century€it€will€have€the€effect€of€amplifying€the€process€ofÏpopulation€ageing.€€Even€if€fertility€were€to€increase€markedly€in€the€shortÏor€medium€term,€that€increase€would€have€no€impact€on€the€balance€between€theÏages€of€gainful€employment€and€the€ages€of€retirement€for€at€least€25€years.ÌÌòòNew€forms€of€family€life€and€social€policyóóÐ R`  ÐÌà ƒ àThe€transformations€which€have€been€recorded€in€family€life€over€severalÏdecades,€together€with€the€development€of€cohabitation€and€the€decliningÏinterest€in€legal€marriage,€the€greater€incidence€of€divorce€and€the€risingÏnumber€of€births€occurring€outside€marriage,€call€for€various€adjustments€inÏsocial€policy.ÌÌà ƒ àAt€the€time€when€couples€were€almost€all€married,€social€legislationÏvery€often€referred€to€marital€status€as€a€way€of€defining€an€individual'sÏsocial€situation.€€This€reference€was€convenient€and€made€other€evidenceÏunnecessary€because€marriage€is€an€event€determining€civil€status€that€is€dulyÏrecorded€and€verifiable,€with€divorce€governing€the€alteration€of€that€status.ÌÌà ƒ àThus,€the€rules€for€calculating€income€tax,€for€example,€may€refer€toÏmarital€status€and€result€in€a€total€tax€that€differs€according€to€whether€theÏcouple€is€married€or€not,€with€more€favourable€treatment€varying€in€relationÏto€the€particular€circumstances€(existence€of€dependent€children,€number€ofÏincomes€and€difference€between€the€amounts€received).€€Some€social€benefitsÏare€provided€to€unmarried€persons€with€low€incomes€and€having€children€to€careÏfor;€it€is€not€uncommon€for€priority€in€assigning€places€in€nurseries€to€beÏgiven€to€lone€parents.€€With€regard€to€social€rights,€the€risk€of€illness€ofÏthe€non„working€spouse€of€a€wage€earner€participating€in€a€social€securityÏscheme€is€covered€by€the€wage€earner's€contribution€to€that€scheme.€€A€widow'sÏpension€is€generally€half€the€amount€of€the€pension€drawn€by€the€husbandÏbefore€his€death.€€These€particular€arrangements,€cited€by€way€of€example,Ïclearly€correspond€to€the€family€model€of€the€immediate€post„war€period:€€fewÏconsensual€unions,€few€divorces,€few€births€outside€marriage€and€few€gainfullyÏemployed€women.ÌÌà ƒ àMatrimony€today€no€longer€has€the€significance€it€once€had€in€EuropeanÏsocieties.€€A€large€number€of€unmarried€persons€live€together€as€couples€and,Ïamong€under„25€year„olds,€in€various€countries,€married€couples€by€no€meansÏconstitute€the€majority.€€Since€society€does€not€object€to€these€situations,Ïthe€State€must€respect€the€personal€choices€made€in€the€private€domain:€Ïstrict€neutrality€must€be€its€rule€and€the€law€has€to€treat€all€couples€in€theÏsame€way,€whatever€the€form€of€their€union.ÌÐ ð-þ(5 Ðà ƒ àBut€the€question€which€then€arises€is€whether€the€law€needs€to€beÏchanged€so€that€it€can€be€applied€on€a€purely€individual€basis,€withoutÏreference€to€the€concept€of€the€couple,€or€whether€it€should€continue€toÏdistinguish€between€couples€and€persons€who€are€really€lone€individuals.€ÏInsome€fields,€such€as€taxation,€pension€schemes€or€inheritance,€for€example,Ïthe€question€is€debatable€but,€as€regards€social€assistance€to€disadvantagedÏpersons,€the€answer€can€only€be€negative.ÌÌà ƒ àFurthermore,€with€a€view€to€replacing€the€marriage€certificate,€whichÏserves€as€proof€in€the€case€of€the€married€couple,€various€alternatives€haveÏbeen€proposed,€such€as€a€certificate€prepared€on€the€basis€of€a€simpleÏdeclaration,€and€perhaps€attested€by€two€witnesses,€to€the€effect€thatÏthecouple€live€together,€or€a€contract€drawn€up€with€a€notary€or€anÏadministrative€service.ÌÌà ƒ àHowever,€aside€from€the€fact€that€the€debate€is€made€more€complicatedÏand€heated€by€the€demands€of€cohabiting€homosexuals€to€be€treated€likeÏheterosexual€couples,€including€for€purposes€of€adoption€or€medically€assistedÏprocreation,€these€alternatives€can€hardly€have€the€same€evidentiary€value€asÏa€paper€issued€by€a€civil€registry€office€that€would€document€not€onlyÏmarriage€but€non„marriage.€€Furthermore,€verifying€the€individuals'€actualÏsituation,€while€superfluous€in€the€case€of€marriage,€otherwise€poses€bothÏmoral€problems€and€practical€problems€that€quickly€become€inextricable.ÌÌà ƒ àAlso,€in€many€fields€of€law,€the€European€countries€are€faced€withÏmaking€careful€changes€in€their€legislation€to€adapt€to€the€evolution€of€theÏfamily.ÌÌà ƒ àThere€is,€lastly,€another€area€in€which€the€government's€vigilance€is€ofÏthe€utmost€importance,€namely€that€of€reproductive€health.€€In€particular,Ïthere€is€a€need€for€ongoing€and€in„depth€analysis€of€data€not€only€aboutÏbirths€but€about€abortions,€obtained€on€the€basis€of€a€high„quality€system€ofÏobservation.€€If€shifts€become€apparent,€showing€for€example€that€youngerÏgenerations€are€reducing€their€contraceptive€practices€and€resorting€moreÏoften€to€abortion,€or€that€adolescent€pregnancies€are€increasingÏsignificantly,€the€country's€public€health€authorities€should€be€alertedÏwithout€delay.€€The€same€applies€to€the€monitoring€of€sexually€transmittedÏdiseases,€especially€AIDS.€€The€efforts€of€the€educational€system€in€the€fieldÏof€sex€education€should€also€be€pursued€unrelentingly.ÌÌòòFor€intensified€international€cooperationóóÐ â#ð( ÐÌà ƒ àIn€most€areas€directly€or€indirectly€connected€with€population€and€theÏfamily,€the€rapidity€and€extent€of€the€changes€have€already€led€or€willÏincreasingly€lead€States€to€amend€their€laws,€with€a€view€to€adapting€them€toÏdevelopments€in€society€and€perhaps€also€with€a€view€to€influencing€some€ofÏthose€developments.€€Regular€exchange€of€information€between€the€EuropeanÏcountries,€as€regards€projects€and€accomplishments€in€the€legislative€andÏregulatory€field,€as€well€as€concerning€demographic€trends€themselves,€isÏparticularly€useful.€€Various€international€organizations€are€helping€toÏfacilitate€such€exchanges:€€the€Economic€Commission€for€Europe,€the€Council€of€Ð  ž+¬&2 ÐEurope€and€the€Commission€of€the€European€Union.€€The€creation€of€theÏObservatory€on€Family€Policies€within€the€European€Union€is€also€a€response€toÏthat€concern.ÌÌà ƒ àNow€that€the€continent€is€no€longer€divided€politically,€and€now€thatÏdemographic€situations€have€become€very€similar€and€that€their€effects€areÏsubstantially€the€same,€as€also€very€probably€are€their€causes,€efforts€mustÏbe€redoubled.€€While,€as€we€have€pointed€out€above,€our€difficulties€ofÏunderstanding€and€prediction€are€considerable,€there€is€no€doubt€that€commonÏreflection€can€only€be€beneficial€to€all.ÌÌÌà@vv)pàòòNotesóóˆÐ :H  ЛÌ