

Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals

Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods

26 October 2010

Thirty-eighth session

Geneva, 29 November – 7 December 2010

Item 8 of the provisional agenda

Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Comments on document ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/77

Transmitted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA)

1. Document ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/77 submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proposes revisions and additions to Chapter 1.4 (Security Provisions) to add a specific paragraph to address security provisions for radioactive material and also new text proposing specific security provisions for high consequence dangerous goods in Class 7.
2. The text proposed for 1.4.2.1.1, 1.4.2.1.2 and 1.4.2.1.3 in ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/77 is almost identical to that proposed by the IAEA in ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/3 at the thirty-seventh meeting of the Subcommittee, except that the IAEA is now proposing that these provisions only apply shipments of radioactive materials, with the exception of shipments of excepted packages, LSA-I and SCO-I.
3. These proposals received almost no support during the discussions of ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/3 at the thirty-seventh meeting of the Subcommittee. In part because they were to apply to all classes of dangerous goods, but also because they were seen as unrealistic and unjustified for what are routine shipments. IATA is of the opinion that the new paragraph 1.4.2 in ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2010/77 would still propose provisions that are unrealistic and unjustified and therefore this text should not be adopted.
4. Under the heading “Specific security provisions for high consequence dangerous goods” in paragraph 1.4.4.2 it is proposed that a new paragraph 1.4.4.2.3 be added that would require consignors of high consequence radioactive materials to ensure that security inspections of conveyances are performed prior to shipment and that security measures identified in the security plan remain effective during transport.
5. IATA is of the opinion that this text is at best ambiguous and at worst completely impractical. The text does not identify or specify which entity is to perform this security inspection of the conveyance. If it's intended that the consignor is to perform the security inspection, then for air transport that will not be possible, or probably legal. Access to airport airside locations, including access to aircraft is strictly controlled through a State aviation security program. Only carrier/airport personnel who hold the appropriate airside access authority are permitted access to aircraft and even then only when specifically required to do so by their job function at that time.
6. In addition the consignor has no capacity to ensure that the carrier's security plan remains effective once the shipment has been accepted by that carrier. The content and application of the carrier's security plan will not be shared with the consignor, or any other party and responsibility for compliance with the security plan will rest with the carrier alone. For these reasons IATA does not support adoption of the text in paragraph 1.4.4.2.3 of the IAEA paper.