

# **WP.15/AC.2/14/INF.15**

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**ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE**

**INLAND TRANSPORT COMMITTEE**

Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods

Joint Meeting of Experts on the Regulations annexed to the  
European Agreement concerning the International Carriage  
of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN)  
(ADN Safety Committee)

Fourteenth session  
Geneva, 26-30 January 2009  
Item 5 of the agenda

## **INLAND TRANSPORT SECURITY**

**Note by the secretariat**

**ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE**

Informal document AC.11 No. 2 (2009)

**INLAND TRANSPORT COMMITTEE**

15 January 2009

Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland  
Transport Security

**ENGLISH ONLY**

Fifth session

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Item 5 of the provisional agenda

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Note by the secretariat

This document contains submissions (as received) by Chair of Inland Transport Committee's subsidiary bodies. The submissions are in response to recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security stipulated in the Expert Group's Final Report dated 25 January 2008 and approved by the ITC in its session of 19-21 February 2008.

## **REPORT ON TRANSPORT AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF RAIL TRANSPORT**

### ***Working Party on Rail Transport (SC.2)***

#### Introduction

Over the last few decades, terrorist attacks on rail links in the ECE region targeted passenger trains and stations rather than freight traffic and facilities (such as intermodal terminals). However, there is no reason to expect that terrorists will not attempt to attack freight trains in the future, including international main lines that have become increasingly important in modern economies.

Incentives matter because terrorists as well as profit-maximizing firms respond to them. Terrorists are most likely to attack soft targets such as poorly guarded rail stations and weakly protected trains. If the objective of rail carriers is to simply maximize efficiency (output over capital and labour inputs), then a competitive system may result in streamlined operations with minimal staffing and security levels. If the objective were instead to maximize effectiveness (output over security, safety and environmental standards implemented), the optimal resource allocation would change, resulting in higher employment, better security and higher prices of rail services.

The proper roles of rail operators, local authorities and central government depend on the institutional environment. In the first case mentioned above (simple profit maximization), the provision of security as a public good would be the responsibility of public authorities while rail operators would focus on efficiency. In the second case (profit maximization subject to diverse constraints), rail carriers themselves and other industry actors (e.g. infrastructure managers) would play a more important role in the provision of security in cooperation with public authorities. In this case, the socially optimal resource allocation is far from obvious, given the serious yet vague threat of terrorist attacks and the evolving structure of rail industry. In reality the relationship between the institutional environment and desired security level could not be determined yet. But a commercial interest in security of the profit-maximizing railway carriers operating in a competitive system has to be underlined.

Most experts emphasize that the predominant one-size-fits-all approach to security wastes resources and argue that 'risk-based' solutions are superior. Although the progress in the area of passenger transport has been limited, risk-based security procedures for air cargo and maritime shipments have been successfully implemented in a number of ECE countries. Whether such security advances provide important lessons for rail security policies remains to be determined, given the recent homeland security bill requiring all US-bound containers to be screened at ports of shipment.

What are the policy options for rail security in the ECE region? The answers may be specific for diverse countries or sub-regions because of diverse security threats and/or available resources. Nevertheless, it may be desirable to define a framework for cooperation, considering both legal and informal measures. Such a framework could also define relevant risk-assessment tools or methodologies.

## Legal framework

The European Agreement on Main International Railway Lines (AGC) administered by the SC.2 has only one reference to security. Article 7 of the Agreement specifies that a Contracting Party can limit the application of the Agreement, if it considers this necessary for its external or internal security.

Security concerns could be incorporated into the AGC by amendments that specify the minimum quality of service (i.e. the minimum level of security) as well as necessary improvements of the infrastructure (stations, rolling stock and control systems), identify priority facilities, and stipulate mandatory and recommended security measures. Moreover, SC.2 delegates could adopt a resolution with additional recommendations on best security practices in rail transport.

## Recent SC.2 activities concerning rail transport security

At its November 2008 session, SC.2 organized, in cooperation with the UIC, a Workshop on rail security. Following a general introduction by a representative of the UIC, invited experts made presentations on the following topics: the UIC Security Platform, the European rail transport security after the liberalization of passenger services in 2010, the 'all hazards' analysis and regional cooperation activities of the Norwegian Railway Administration, and the work performed by the Schengenrail group in cooperation with the EC and European border security agency FRONTEX. During the ensuing discussion, delegates emphasized *inter alia* the need for intersectoral cooperation, effective legal instruments and the willingness to learn from other transport modes.

Moreover, the Working Party decided to establish an informal task force that would follow-up on the major rail security issues identified by the workshop. The secretariat was asked to distribute the draft mandate for this group by 2 December 2008 to delegates. In the event, the draft mandate, approved by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of SC.2, was distributed to delegates on 1 December 2008.

## Informal Task Force on Rail Transport Security

The draft mandate of the informal Task Force on Rail Security is attached. So far, the following organizations expressed their interest to participate in the Task Force: European Commission, US Transport Security Administration, International Union of Railways (UIC), Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF), European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) and Norwegian Railway Administration. The first session of the Task Force will take place in March or April 2009 in Geneva.

## Conclusions

In response to the recommendations concerning inland transport security adopted at the 70<sup>th</sup> ITC session in February 2008 in Geneva, the Working Party on Rail Transport addressed security challenges in its sphere of competence in two ways. First, SC.2 organized a well received Workshop on rail security during its first meeting following the 70<sup>th</sup> session of the ITC. Second, the Working Party decided to establish an informal Task Force on Rail Security that will present its findings and recommendations at the next SC.2 session in November 2009.

## **DRAFT MANDATE OF THE TASK FORCE ON RAIL SECURITY**

1. Following the report of the Expert Group on Inland Transport Security (<http://www.unece.org/trans/doc/2008/ac11/AC11-2008-inf01r1e.pdf>) and recommendations contained therein, the Working Party on Rail Transport (SC.2) has decided on 19 November 2008 to establish a task force to address security issues in the rail sector.
2. The task force will aim to address selected rail security issues, including the cooperation between government agencies and railway sector (infrastructure managers, railway undertakings, etc.), in the framework of the recommendations mentioned above.
3. The task force will include experts from the public sector (e.g. government line Ministries, European Commission, OSJD, OTIF) and the business sector (International Union of Railways – UIC and possibly other representative organisations).
4. The task force will collect and exchange information about best practices in securing heavy rail systems, cost-benefit assessments, regional and international cooperation. The task force will focus on issues of international cooperation regarding railway security between UNECE countries that have not yet been taken up by the EU, OTIF or OSJD; e.g. on issues of cooperation on railway security between EU countries and non-EU countries.
5. The task force will prepare recommendations for the sixty-third session of the SC.2 in Geneva on 18-20 November 2009.
6. The business of the task force will be conducted in English.
7. The establishment and functioning of the task force will be consistent with pertinent UNECE guidelines ([www.unece.org/hlm/docs/guidelines%20teams%20specialists%202003%20e.pdf](http://www.unece.org/hlm/docs/guidelines%20teams%20specialists%202003%20e.pdf)).



*DONAUKOMMISSION*  
*ДУНАЙСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ*  
*COMMISSION DU DANUBE*

25 December 2008

**Transport and security:  
Note by the Chairman of the Working Party on Inland Water transport (SC.) to the  
Inland Transport Committee**

Dear Mrs Molnar,

During the meeting on 19-21 February 2008, the Inland Transport Committee (ITC) invited its subsidiary bodies to express their opinion on the recommendations issued by the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security (informal document N°1, ITC Bureau). As chairman of the Working Party on Inland Water Transport (SC.3) between November 2003 and October 2008, I would like to communicate to the Committee the position of SC.3 on the issue of inland water transport security.

The issue of "transport and security" was added to the agenda of the Working Party on Inland Water transport at its forty-sixth session in November 2002 at the request of the ITC sixty-fourth session. The Working Party agreed to evaluate the need to amend UNECE instruments concerning inland navigation, such as European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance (AGN), European Code for Inland Waterways (CEVNI), the Recommendations on Technical Requirements for Inland Navigation Vessels, with provisions aimed at enhancing security on board vessels when under way and in ports. (TRANS/SC.3/158, para.23).

During its forty-seventh, forty-eighth and forty-nine sessions the Working Party reviewed the reports by the secretariat on the initiatives undertaken by relevant international organizations (International Maritime Organization, International Standardization Organization, International Labor Organization, European Conference of Ministers of Transport, European Barge Union), by European Commission, by River Commissions (Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, Danube Commission) and by individual member-States<sup>1</sup>. The results of these discussions are summarized in the SC.3 reports: TRANS/SC.3/161 (paras. 5 – 11), TRANS/SC.3/163 (paras. 8 – 9), TRANS/SC.3/168 (paras. 6-10).

**Mrs. Eva Molnar**  
**Director**  
**Transport division**  
**United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)**

<sup>1</sup> Documents : TRANS/SC.3/2003/12, TRANS/SC.3/2004/9, TRANS/SC.3/2004/20, TRANS/SC.3/2005/4; TRANS/SC.3/2004/9.

At the SC.3 forty-ninth session in October 2005, Ukraine submitted a proposal concerning possible amendment of the AGN Agreement with provisions concerning the protection of inland waterway infrastructure from terrorist acts (TRANS/SC.3/168, para. 10). Based on this proposal, the secretariat prepared a draft annex IV to the AGN Agreement concerning the protection of the network of inland waterways of international importance from intentional external influence (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/2006/7/Add.1).

This proposal on draft annex IV to the AGN Agreement entitled "Protection of the Network of Inland Waterways of International Importance from the Intentional External Influence" was first considered at the SC.3 fiftieth session in October 2007 and the Working Party agreed to study the proposal taking into account the work on this item that was under way within the European Union (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/174, paras.21-22). The Working Party forwarded the proposal to the group of technical experts which prepare the decisions of the Working Party on navigational issues and technical and safety requirements (Working Party on the Standardization of Technical Safety Requirements in Inland Navigation (SC.3/WP.3)).

At its thirty-third session in June 2008, SC.3/WP.3 noted that the outcome of the relevant activities of other international bodies, such as IMO and European Union, reviewed by the Working Party, was not yet known and concluded that, in this context, adoption of the annex IV appeared premature. Therefore, SC.3/WP.3 recommended either postponing the discussions on Annex IV to a later stage or transforming the draft Annex IV into a separate SC.3 Resolution promoting the use of the measures contained in the annex. (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/WP.3/66, para. 18).

At its fifty-second session, the Working Party agreed with the SC.3/WP.3 proposal to postpone the discussions on Annex IV until the results of the relevant international initiatives became available. To that end, the Working Party agreed to keep the item "inland water transport and security" on its agenda and asked the Working Party on the Standardization of Technical Safety Requirements in Inland Navigation to monitor major developments in this area. The Working Party also took note of the recommendations by the ITC Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security and, in particular, the recommendations to undertake a review of international legal instruments on the security of inland water transport and to integrate security provisions into existing legal agreements (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/181, para.12).

As former chairman of the Working Party, I would like propose that the Inland Transport Committee take note of these developments and the current position of the Working Party and acknowledge that the two recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security had already been addressed by the Working Party. Integrating security provisions into AGN had been considered in depth and not adopted for the reasons stated above. As for the review of international legal instruments on the security of inland water transport, an important part of this information had been compiled in the secretariat's notes and SC.3 reports, listed earlier. More information will be received, as Governments and International Organizations are invited to report on this agenda items at both SC.3 and SC.3/WP.3 sessions. However, a more detailed report on all initiatives related to the inland water transport security is a resource-consuming activity, which cannot be undertaken using the existing resources.

Nevertheless, I would like to confirm to the Inland Transport Committee that the Working Party on Inland Water Transport will continue monitoring the most important events and initiatives in the area of the security of inland water transport and, when the time is appropriate, will revert to discussing possible amendments to the AGN Agreement or other relevant UNECE instruments with the provisions related to security.

Best regards,



Mr. Istvan VALKAR  
Chairman of the Working Party on Inland Water Transport  
Director General  
Danube Commission (DC)



## **Working Party on the Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs (WP.11)**

Chairman, Mr. Telmo Nobre (Portugal)

The WP.11 is responsible for the Agreement on the International Carriage of Perishable Foodstuffs and on the Special Equipment to be used for such Carriage (ATP).

In the context of the ATP, the most pressing problem at the moment in the area of security is that of fake (forged) ATP certificates. This is quite a common problem and one which permits the selling and use of old vehicles that normally have already reached the end of their lifetime and can no longer guarantee the efficiency of ATP equipment and should be destroyed.

This is one of the reasons why WP.11 proposed some years ago the establishment of a working group to study this problem and this year adopted a new standardized ATP certificate.

Another way to try to deal with this problem would be through the creation of an international database of ATP certified vehicles, but this proposal has not yet been universally accepted. Some delegations totally refuse this kind of control.

Regarding the safety of the perishable foodstuffs transported, this is more or less guaranteed if the transport equipment is genuine ATP equipment and not fake or old equipment.

In this respect, it is perhaps possible that a better temperature control method could be implemented, for example through the use of temperature stamps or labels that change color if the temperature of the product goes higher than the foreseen upper limit during transport.

Regarding the possibility of terrorist attacks using ATP equipment, there have been no cases up until now. However, there is always the possibility that such equipment could be used for terrorism or even that goods transported in ATP equipment could be used as agents to carry and spread a biological, chemical or even radioactive attack.

At its 64<sup>th</sup> session in 2008, a brief introduction was made to WP.11 on the work of the UNECE Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security and on its recommendations that ITC subsidiary bodies, *inter alia*, review international legal instruments under their responsibility and create an inventory of existing security measures and a list of potentially desirable additional security provisions. The WP.11 decided to undertake this work at its session in 2009.

## REPORT ON TRANSPORT AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF ROAD VEHICLES

### Highlights on regulatory initiatives by WP.29 and GRSG

#### Legal framework

Two Agreements (the 1958 and 1998 Geneva Agreements) administered by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) provide the legal framework for the development of new regulations and for the harmonization of existing regulations regarding vehicle safety, environmental pollution, energy saving and anti-theft performance.

#### WP.29 contribution concerning transport security issues

At its March 2005 session, WP.29 requested the Working Party on General Safety Provisions (GRSG), to advance the development of the prescriptions regarding Vehicle Degradation Systems (VDS) (TRANS/WP.29/1039, para. 26). (VDS are systems fitted to a vehicle aimed at preventing and restricting the vehicle being driven away during unauthorized use. In the context of transport security, VDS can prevent the use of stolen vehicles as "car bombs" in explosive attacks).

#### Development of VDS work at GRSG

In **April 2002**, GRSG considered a proposal (TRANS/WP.29/GRSG/2001/16/Rev.1) by the United Kingdom (UK) introducing new provisions for vehicle degradation systems, which can be used to immobilize the vehicle after having being reported as a stolen vehicle in a controlled manner. The VDS should be activated by authorized people (e.g. police forces).

In **May 2003**, the expert from Germany introduced new provisions for the VDS (TRANS/WP.29/GRSG/2003/8) to be inserted into Regulation No. 97 (vehicle alarm systems). This new proposal superseded the initial proposal by the UK. The necessary introduction of a new part of Regulations Nos. 97 and 116 (protection of vehicles against unauthorized use) regulating the use of VDS to be harmonised was agreed to be an urgent task, because the market of such systems showed already a variety of such degradation, most of them being immobilising systems without considering any circumstances and the environmental conditions of the vehicles (i.e. traffic situation). This proposal aimed at giving approval authorities the possibility to approve well designed systems and reject/withdraw any other already existing systems showing dangerous behaviour.

In **October 2003**, GRSG considered an updated proposal by Germany on VDS (TRANS/WP.29/GRSG/2003/26)

In **April 2004**, GRSG agreed to set up an informal group of experts for the further development of the proposal. WP.29 gave its consent at its June 2004 session. The members of the informal group discussed in detail the proposal for amending the Regulations Nos.97 and 116. Different approaches from very low-level equipment and functions until very sophisticated and smart systems using GPS signals and detailed degradation measures were developed. The technical basis for the proposal was nearly finished. Reviewing the technical provisions lead more and more to the crucial aspects of use, misuse and security of VDS-Systems. The VDS informal group decided to ask the advice of the GRSG and Contracting Parties. The group agreed not to immobilize the vehicles straight away but to degrade the driving ability step by step.

In **October 2004**, GRSG noted concerns on the possible consequences of an external access to the vehicle electronic systems and on the incompatibility of the VDS with the 1968 Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention establishes that "every driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle". Nevertheless, GRSG agreed that the VDS informal group should continue its work. In the meantime, experts were requested to reflect on "vehicle tracking systems" that could be considered as an alternative to VDS.

In **April 2005**, the expert from Germany withdrew the proposal on VDS because the possible external remote access to vehicle electronic systems was not acceptable for his country (see informal document No. GRSG-88-17). He explained that VDS cannot be isolated from other vehicle electronic systems and, therefore, a remote intervention from outside on networked vehicle electronics (e.g. VDS) could allow possible abusive criminal attacks on the vehicle electronics (i.e. software viruses) and may lead to malfunctions of vital vehicle safety and emissions systems e.g. engine, steering controls, braking and stability systems. Since there are still big concerns about the misuse of remote access to vehicle and the necessity of secure and safe electronic encrypting and authorisation measures are not sufficient, the VDS informal group decided to wait until technical and much higher standards will be developed. Meanwhile, GRSG agreed that the VDS informal group should continue working to elaborate requirements for "Advanced Vehicle Security Systems (AVSS)", like vehicle tracking systems. The use of tracking systems today is not in the scope of any Regulation except the fulfilment of the provisions of Regulation No. 10 regarding Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).

In **October 2005**, GRSG noted that the VDS informal group was awaiting inputs from the industry concerning vehicle tracking systems.

In **October 2006**, the Chairman of the informal group on AVSS informed GRSG that new information on VDS was received from Japan, but that the work of the informal group was still suspended, awaiting more inputs from its participants. The GRSG Chairman invited the experts to reflect on vehicle security issues and consider them at its next session in April 2007.

In **April and October 2007**, the Secretariat informed GRSG about the decision of the Inland Transport Committee to set up an informal group on Inland Transport Security and that the Terms of Reference of such an informal group were endorsed by the ITC (ECE/TRANS/192, para. 19 and Annex I). Experts interested in the subject were invited to contact their focal point on the matter. GRSG noted that information on the activities of this informal group would be available at the following Transport Division website <http://www.unece.org/trans/main/its/its.html>.

## Conclusions

The World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) has adopted, in the framework of the 1958 Agreement, Regulations Nos. 18 (Protection against unauthorized use (anti-theft) of motor vehicles), 97 (Vehicle alarm systems (VAS) and 116 (Protection of motor vehicles against unauthorized use), which provide enough security to motor vehicles. The World Forum considers that the update of these Regulations to the technical progress will continue to guarantee such a security.

The informal group dealing with "Advanced Vehicle Security Systems (AVSS)" is awaiting inputs from its participants since October 2005 in order to be able to submit concrete proposals on this area. Since the group is not active, the World Forum recommends suspending working

activities of the informal group. Once new inputs are available WP.29 may reconsider the reactivation of the informal group activities.

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## **Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (WP.15)**

In the area of transport of dangerous goods, this matter was brought to the attention of Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods at its 84th session (5-8 May 2008), and the outcome of the discussion was recorded in the report ECE/TRANS/WP.15/197, paras 6-10 as follows:

Informal document: INF.3 (secretariat)

6. The Working Party took note of the report of the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Inland Transport Security and of the Committee's request that it assess the implementation of chapter 1.10 of ADR, with the assistance of the other relevant international organizations.

7. It was noted that the issue of security had been a constant item on the Working Party's agenda.

8. The Working Party noted that the European Commission was carrying out a study of the application and suitability of the security requirements for the three land transport modes and that the report containing the findings of that study would probably be finalized in October 2008.

9. The Chair said that he would circulate an evaluation questionnaire, similar to that used by the European Commission for its study, to Contracting Parties to ADR that were not members of the European Union.

10. He also said that he would report as fully as possible on the situation in the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts. It was the view of the Working Party, however, that it was not realistic to expect detailed findings on the application of the requirements in all the Contracting Parties by December. "

The issue was discussed again this week at the 85th session. Since May, the European Commission has completed its study, but the report and final conclusions on the basis of the analysis of the questionnaire sent to EU and EEA member States are not yet officially available, and therefore could not be discussed by WP.15. They should be available in December and they will be discussed first by the EU member States and then by WP.15 in May next year. A preliminary list of likely conclusions-that will have to be discussed- has been provided by the European commission, see <http://www.unece.org/trans/doc/2008/wp15/ECE-TRANS-WP15-85-inf14e.pdf>

The Chairman is now going to send the same questionnaire to non-EU non-EEA member States which are parties to ADR and is expected to prepare a report on the basis of the answers received that should also be discussed in May next year.

Meanwhile, security problems continue to be discussed as they occur on a routine basis, and this may result in amendments to some particular provisions, e.g. amendments to ADR vehicle supervision requirements will enter into force on 1 January 2009. Other amendments have been adopted for entry into force in 2011. But this kind of on the spot amendments do not put into question the overall security system currently applied for all modes of transport of dangerous goods.

For carriage of dangerous goods by inland waterways, the work described above is also relevant but the issue will be discussed separately next January by WP.15/AC.2 in order to see how all

this fits in the overall work carried out by SC3 as regards the introduction of security provisions in AGN.

05 novembre 2008

**Transport et sûreté :**  
**Avis du président du Groupe de travail du transport intermodal et de la logistique (WP.24)**  
**au Comité des transports intérieurs (CTI)**

Chère Mme. Molnar,

Lors de la réunion du 19 au 21 février 2008, le Comité des transports intérieurs (CTI) a invité les présidents des organes subsidiaires à émettre leurs avis sur les recommandations formulées par le groupe multidisciplinaire d'experts de la sûreté des transports intérieurs (document informel n°1 du bureau du CTI). A cet égard, je vous prie de bien vouloir trouver ci-après celui du groupe d'experts « transport intermodal et logistique ».

Le dossier « transport et sûreté » a fait l'objet d'un point spécifique à l'ordre du jour de la 50<sup>e</sup> session du WP.24, qui s'est réuni les 6 et 7 octobre 2008. Il a notamment permis d'examiner les recommandations du groupe multidisciplinaire d'experts de la sûreté des transports intérieurs afin de recueillir les avis des Etats membres et des organismes non gouvernementaux.

En mars 2004 et en septembre 2005, le WP.24 avait déjà examiné les questions concernant la sûreté dans les transports en se référant à l'étude réalisée en 2004 par la CEMT, en collaboration avec l'OCDE, sur la sûreté du transport de conteneurs dans les différents modes de transport. Le résultat de ces examens figurent dans les rapports TRANS/WP.24/103, par. 24 et TRANS/WP.24/109, par. 44 et 45.

A l'époque, compte tenu du partage des activités entre la CEMT et la CEE/ONU dans le domaine du transport intermodal, le WP.24 avait estimé qu'il n'était pas utile de se lancer dans de nouvelles activités dans ce domaine, tant que la CEMT travaillait sur le sujet.

A présent, la CEMT étant dissoute, le WP 24 reprend cet important dossier. C'est pourquoi, préalablement à la 50<sup>e</sup> session, le secrétariat du WP.24 a élaboré le document ECE/TRANS/WP.24/2008/7 en s'appuyant sur le document informel n°1 du bureau du CTI, daté du 11 février 2008, qui malheureusement n'est disponible qu'en anglais. Le secrétariat a aussi transmis le même document au groupe d'experts des transports par chemin de fer (ECE/TRANS/SC.2/2008/7) et au groupe d'experts des transports par voie navigable (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/2008/2).

Après des échanges fructueux sur ce sujet, le WP.24 a conclu que le transport intermodal de fret est d'utiliser les différents modes de transport tout en assurant la meilleure articulation possible entre chacun de ces modes.

Mme. Eva Molnar  
Directrice  
Division des transports  
Commission Economique des Nations Unies pour l'Europe (CEE-ONU)

Ainsi, la volonté du groupe est de laisser l'examen de la sûreté à chacun des groupes mono-modaux respectifs pour ce qui concerne la traction et les réseaux d'infrastructures. Quant au WP 24, il pourrait se charger d'examiner plus particulièrement l'aspect « articulation », c'est à dire: la sûreté dans les terminaux de transbordement. Le groupe estime que la démarche appropriée pour cet examen pourrait être la suivante:

- procéder à un état des lieux des instruments juridiques internationaux existants pouvant répondre à la sûreté et à la sécurité dans les terminaux de transbordement;
- analyser le résultat de cet inventaire;
- sur la base de l'étude initiée par l'UIRR dans le cadre du programme Marco Polo, examiner les risques de menaces possibles et apprécier la vulnérabilité des terminaux;
- si nécessaire, inviter les Etats membres de la CEE et les autres parties intéressées à communiquer les dispositions réglementaires et les initiatives prises;
- analyser l'ensemble des dispositions (nationales et internationales) et examiner la transposabilité des instruments juridiques existants sur les terminaux vulnérables. Cet examen est primordial pour éviter une lourdeur administrative et incohérente avec le développement du transport combiné;
- établir la liste des mesures de sûreté supplémentaires qu'il serait souhaitable d'adopter;
- définir le type de document dans lequel il faudra les inclure.

Toutefois, cette démarche nécessite des moyens (financiers, experts spécifiques), que le WP.24 ne possède pas actuellement, pour aboutir à un résultat sans équivoque sur un sujet aussi important qu'est la sûreté et la sécurité dans les transports intérieurs.

En effet, le WP.24 n'a pas d'expertise spécifique dans le domaine de la sûreté dans les terminaux de transbordement. Pour pallier à ce manque, il faudrait peut-être concevoir un questionnaire spécifique qui serait envoyé aux services compétents (publics et privés) des 56 Pays membres de la CEE/ONU, y compris les autorités régionales et locales.

Je propose que la démarche d'expertise et l'élaboration du questionnaire soient initiées par le groupe spécifique « sûreté - sécurité » de la CEE/ONU. Ceci permettrait d'une part, de concentrer les moyens en un seul endroit et d'autre part, d'assurer une cohérence dans le traitement des documents qui pourraient également servir, moyennant quelques aménagements spécifiques, au groupes mono-modaux. Dans ce cadre, les organes subsidiaires viendraient en appui pour apporter leurs connaissances.

Ceci représente l'avis et les propositions concrètes du WP.24 au CTI sur lesquels ce dernier devrait se prononcer tant sur les modalités que sur les ressources nécessaires pour aboutir à un résultat complet des dispositions liées au domaine de la sûreté et de la sécurité dans les transports intérieurs.

Michel Viardot  
Président  
Groupe de travail du transport intermodal  
et de la logistique (WP.24)

P.S. Je vous joins un extrait du rapport de la cinquantième session du WP.24 concernant le point « Transport et Sûreté ».

**Extrait du rapport de la cinquantième session du WP.24 (ECE/TRANS/WP.24/121)**

(à présent disponible uniquement en Anglais)

**“VII. TRANSPORT AND SECURITY (Agenda item 6)**

13. On the basis of a document prepared by the secretariat (ECE/TRANS/WP.24/2008/7), the Working Party took note of recommendations prepared by a UNECE Multidisciplinary Expert Group on Inland Transport Security. These recommendations included inter alia a review of all UNECE international legal instruments in transport and, as appropriate, the inclusion of security provisions therein.

14. The Working Party recalled its considerations on this issue at its March 2008, September 2005 and March 2004 sessions and referred to the comprehensive study on container transport security across modes that had been undertaken by ECMT in 2004 (ECE/TRANS/WP.24/119, paragraph 5; TRANS/WP.24/109, paragraphs 44-45; TRANS/WP.24/103, paragraph 24). Since then the European Commission had undertaken consultations on freight and intermodal transport security and the intermodal transport industry (UIRR) had prepared comprehensive studies on this subject.

15. The Working Party underlined the importance of land transport security, but noted that information on national security measures were often dealt with by other authorities than Ministries of Transport and, sometimes, at regional and local levels. While information on road, rail and inland water transport security measures might be obtained by other competent UNECE Working Parties, security related information on transshipment operations and storage of containers and other intermodal loading units at intermodal terminals could possibly be collected and analyzed by the Working Party via questionnaires to be designed by transport security experts. Following an analysis of the replies received, the possible incorporation of security provisions into the AGTC could be considered.

16. In this context, the Working Party noted that the Working Party on the Standardization of Technical and Safety Requirements in Inland Navigation (WP.3/SC.3) had decided not pursue for the moment work on the inclusion of security provisions into the European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance (AGN) (ECE/TRANS/SC.3/WP.3/66, paragraph 20).”

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