

**UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL COMMISSION
and ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE**

**STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (EUROSTAT)**

Joint Eurostat/UNECE Work Session on Demographic Projections
organised in cooperation with Istat
(29-31 October 2013, Rome, Italy)

Item 4 – Assumptions on future migration

Projections of ageing migrant populations in France: 2008-2028

Jean Louis Rallu, Institut national d'études démographiques (INED)

1.- Introduction

While ageing of European countries is abundantly documented, migrant ageing has not been much addressed and is still little documented, except for England and Wales (Lievesley 2010). The large waves of migrants who arrived from 1960 to 1975 are now reaching retirement ages and, in the near future, migrant ageing will significantly contribute to population ageing in older immigration countries of Western and Northern Europe¹. It is no longer expected that most migrants will return after retirement. Surveys show that, after retirement, migrants return much less than they intended to.

The issue is important, because health and social services will have to serve larger numbers of linguistically and culturally diverse elderly. Migrants often have low pensions and resources due to life histories of unstable employment. They visit less frequently health services than natives. As labourers, sometimes in unhealthy environment, they are affected by specific diseases. Migrant ageing also has implications on intergenerational transfers and support. Older migrants with small resources will rely on their children, but they will be able to assist them for child care. Migrant ageing has also implications for household composition, lifestyles, informal activities, culture transmission, etc.

Migration projections are just a component of national population projections. They draw little attention due to large uncertainties, because natives' migration is usually not well documented. And the projection of foreign-born populations, mostly at young and mid-adult ages, bears large uncertainties, because work migration is very sensitive to economic situations and policy changes that are difficult to forecast. This can strongly affect migrants' projection results. However, at older ages, migration is much smaller than at young and mid-working ages. Moreover, most of future older migrants are already in country. Thus, projections of ageing migrants can be reliable.

¹ Immigration to Southern European countries is more recent and large migrant flows are not reaching retirement ages, except for migrants from former colonies, mostly in Portugal and Spain.

This paper will present projections of older migrants in France from 2008 to 2028, using the component method. Baseline populations by age and sex in 2008 will be presented and commented to show ageing potentials of the various migrant origins. We shall estimate in- and out-migration rates at ages above 45 years from 2006 and 2008 census data and three scenarios of out-migration will be done. Results will show trends in numbers of older migrants by sex, age and origin. Special attention will be devoted to the different situations according to origin and sex.

2.- Methodology

2.1.- General issues

We project only migrant populations at ages 65 years and over for two main reasons. The first reason is the difficulty to project migration rates at working ages that are strongly affected by economic booms and crisis and changes in migration policy. This would bring large uncertainty on projection results, as soon as five or ten years after the beginning of projections. The second reason is that most of migrants' children were born in host country and they do not appear on foreign-born migrants' age-pyramid. This causes particular age-structures: specifically a narrow basis of the age-pyramid. Therefore, the proportions of large age groups and dependency ratios of foreign-born populations are not comparable with national averages or with those of natives and, thus, are difficult to use.

Projections of older migrant populations are much less affected by uncertainties than projections of total migrant populations, because migration at older ages is rather small and will not much be affected by economic changes over time. However, the projections of migrants 65 years and older will neither provide the distribution of the population by large age groups, nor dependency ratios. But, it will provide reliable growth rates of elderly migrants by age groups and sex ratios. Growth rates by age and sex are the most useful indicators to adjust services delivery to population trends.

2.2.- Projection of older migrants

We use the component method. Census data by sex, age and country of birth² are the baseline data. We project the population 65 years old and over to 2028 from the population aged 45 and over in 2008, using survival rates and migration rates.

*Mortality*³

Migrants' mortality is difficult to assess due to various bias. It is naively assumed that migrants' mortality is higher than national average, but the contrary is often observed. Migrants are selected at different times in the migration process. It is well acknowledged that migrants are positively selected for qualification, health status, etc. Once in host country, migrants experience often hard work conditions that are usually associated with high mortality. They also have poorer diet than national average. But this has some advantages, like less fats and alcohol consumption (Courbage, Khlat 1995). These authors also show that

² French by birth born outside of France have not been included because most of them are former European colonists.

³ We do not need using fertility rates as we project only the population at ages above 65 years.

migrants benefit from their cultural differences, with less smoking/drinking and other risky behaviours. Return migration is also selective. Many handicapped migrants (often from injuries on the work place) return to home country. Older migrants may also return when their condition becomes critical, because they want to be buried in homeland. Late emigration decreases mortality rates in host countries, because deaths are not registered while these people have been enumerated. Thus, there are various factors affecting positively and negatively migrants' survival rates, and, without precise data, it is not possible to tell what are global effects. They may well be different according to origins of migrants.

Survival rates by origin should be used in migrant population projections, but they are not available for France. Therefore, we use national averages. National survival rates increase migrant ageing if survival rates of ethnic minority populations are lower than national average, and decrease migrant ageing if they are higher.

Migration

Migration estimates

French immigration data provide only immigrant figures and no information is available on those who leave. As France has no population file to record departures, and as surveys of return migrants have to be carried out in origin countries⁴, we use censuses to estimate the migration of foreign-born in France.

We estimated net migration at ages 45 years and over as the difference between the 2006 population projected to survive⁵ to 2008 and the enumerated population in 2008⁶ - this is sometimes called the 'expected population method'. Then, we calculated net migration rates by 5-year age groups, sex and origin in 2006-2008.

Although they are more difficult to estimate than net migration, we calculated in- and out-migrations. Information on the components of net migration is necessary to understand its levels and trends and it is also useful to design scenarios.

In- and out-migration rates can be estimated from the information on residence 1 year (or 5 years in French censuses from 2006) prior to census date. The question on previous residence provides the number of migrants who entered in the last 5 years and are still present at census date. The estimated numbers of net migrants minus enumerated numbers of immigrants gives an estimate of out-migrants (see box).

The major concern with estimates of in- and out-migration is reporting errors on previous residence. Errors are obvious when out-migration rates are positive, but lesser errors are not easily visible. Positive out-migration rates have been set to 0. Hectic age patterns have been smoothed or replaced by averages of neighbouring countries. After smoothing, in-migration rates have been adjusted so that net migration rates remain unchanged.

⁴ Moreover, survey data could be affected by random variations due to sample size and selection bias.

⁵ As regards migration estimates from census data, using national survival rates reduce immigration rates and increases emigration rates, if rates of ethnic minority population are smaller than national average, and vice versa if they are higher.

⁶ We assume the completeness of 2006 and 2008 censuses is similar. If this is not the case, migration estimates are affected by the differences in censuses' completeness.

Net migration, immigration and emigration rates

All calculations are done **by birth cohorts**.

Net migration rates (M) are estimated by the expected population method:

$$M_{2006-2008,x,x+n} = P_{2008,x+n} / P_{2006,x} * S_{x,x+n}$$

With : P = enumerated population; x = age ; n = 2008 - 2006 = 2;

In-migration rates (IM) in 2006-2008 are calculated as a fraction^a of the number of arrivals in the 5-years-period before 2008, as reported in the question on residence five year before census date:

$$\text{arrivals}_{2006-2008,x} = 0.44 * \text{arrivals in the five years prior to 2008}$$

$$IM_{2006-2008,x,x+n} = \text{arrivals}_{2006-2008,x,x+n} / P_{2006,x}$$

Then, out-migration rates (OM) are estimated as:

$$OM_{2006-2008,x,x+n} = (P_{2008,x+n} - \text{arrivals}_{2006-2008,x,x+n}) / P_{2006,x} * S_{x,x+n}$$

Single-age rates calculated for 2006-2008 have been averaged for 5-year age-groups.

a) We used INSEE recommendations. For the two-year period before census, INSEE uses 0.44 instead of 0.40 to account for survival and departures of those who entered at the beginning of the 5 year period.

Migration hypotheses

We have no long time series to estimate trends. But, we have clues that return migration rates will decline. Most probably, lone males experience higher return migration after retirement than migrants who came or reunited with their family. Given that the share of lone males is declining in cohorts that will reach retirement age from 2018, return migration is expected to decline then (see below). However, in the frame of increasing circulation, return could become more frequently temporary, resulting in a kind of bi-residence of couples as well as of lone migrants. In this case, more migrants would spend only part of the year in host country resulting in smaller numbers of older migrants being present and enumerated by censuses – which would appear like increased return migration. It is difficult to estimate the balance between less permanent return – due to less lone males - and more frequent moves back and forth of migrants alone or in couples. Longer times series of inter-censal migration estimates will enable us to better project trends in the future.

In this exercise, we did three scenarios⁷. Scenario A assumes migration rates will be stable at their 2006-2008 level. Scenario B is similar to scenario A until 2018; then emigration rates decline by 15% for non-EU European, Algerian and Turk males (10% for Moroccans, Tunisians, ‘other Africans’ and ‘other countries’) and 10% for all females (except for ‘other countries’ - stable) in 2018-2023 and respectively for each sex by 40% (20% for Moroccans, Tunisians, ‘other Africans’ and ‘other countries’) and 20% (stable for ‘other countries’) in 2023-2028, comparatively to 2008-2018. These trends are based on changes in the proportions of lone males and females in migrant cohorts. In scenario C, migration rates are nil. It is an assumption aiming to show the relative impacts of population structures and migration by comparing scenarios A and C.

⁷ We did not do scenarios for EU migrants, because free movement will result in more frequent bi-residence the effect of which is difficult to assess.

3.- Data

3.1.- Age-structures in 2008

The shapes of age-pyramids are very different according to countries of origin of migrants. They mostly reflect the history of migration from the various countries of origin to France. The most ancient migratory flows are from Italia and Spain, starting before WW2, and Portugal⁸. Italian, Spanish and secondarily Portuguese migrants are old populations due to little recent flows of young adults from these countries, unlike for non-EU Europeans. Migration from EU member states tended to halt when – or even a few years before - these countries accessed the EU. Among non-EU migrants, Europeans and Northern Africans, mostly Algerians who started to migrate before independence, show already significant numbers of migrants in their 60s and 70s (figure 1). The most recent migration flows: ‘other African’, Turks and ‘other countries’⁹ show much smaller numbers of migrants at ages above 65 years.

These very different migration histories are translated in the proportions of population 65 years and above, with more than half of Italian and 45% of Spanish migrants in this age group (table 1). The oldest non-EU migrants: Algerians, Tunisians and Europeans, show 15% or more population 65 years and older, against around 5% for recent migrants: ‘other Africans’, Turks and migrants from ‘other countries’.

Table 1: Proportion (percent) of migrants 65 years-old and above by country of origin, France 2008.

| Italia | Portugal | Spain | ‘other EU’ | Non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | Tunisia | ‘other Africa’ | Turkey | ‘other countries’ |
|--------|----------|-------|------------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|--------|-------------------|
| 53,2 | 14,3 | 44,9 | 22,4 | 14,7 | 17,8 | 10,3 | 15,9 | 3,8 | 5,1 | 7,2 |


A closer look at the age-pyramids from age 40 shows the potential for ageing in the next 20 years. Except for Italians and Spanish, cohorts are much larger at ages 55-64 than at older ages. However, except for Italians, Spanish, ‘other Africa’ and ‘other countries’, age-pyramids show a surprising indentation for males at ages 45-54, and up to 55-59 for Algerians. This is the result of the closed border policy following the 1974 oil-shock. Workers migration came nearly to a halt for a decade or more. Young adults from North Africa and non-EU European countries arriving at working ages - which are also the main migration ages - had more difficulty to migrate to France. Therefore, these male cohorts are smaller. Later, some males entered at older ages and in smaller numbers than their elders who could migrate younger and with less restriction; some used other channels. It is the case for Moroccans who entered in large numbers, often illegally, between the 1975 and 1982 censuses. There is no similar irregularity on female age-pyramids. The closed border policy was soon followed by the development of family reunification. Thus, larger numbers of females entered from the mid 1970s.


⁸ The public census data file provides only four national categories for EU member states: Italia, Portugal, Spain and ‘others’. There was also significant migration from Poland in the early 20th century, but data are not available separately from ‘other EU countries’.

⁹ Mostly Asians: Chinese, Indians and South-East Asians.

Thus, current population ageing varies greatly according to migrants' origins due to migration histories. Future ageing will also vary for the same reasons, but migration policies enacted from the mid-1970s will also have an impact.

Figure 1 : Age-pyramids of migrants by origin, France, 2008 census.





3.2.- Migration flows at older ages

Among EU migrants, Italians and Spanish show nearly nil both in- and out-migration. Errors in reporting previous residence for Portuguese and 'other EU' migrants result in unreliable estimates of in- and out-migration. Therefore, net migration rates have been projected for EU migrants. Portuguese show net migration of 1% yearly until age 54, followed by rates of -2.0% to -2.5% until age 70. 'Other EU' migrants show very high net migration by 4% to 5% yearly from age 40 to 70. Such high levels will probably decline in the future. However, given free-movement of EU citizens in the Schengen area, migration of EU natives will be more and more temporary and difficult to assess from information on previous residence.

Emigration consists mainly of return migration, more rarely of migration forward to other destinations. Emigration rates of non-EU migrants tend to increase from age 50-54 to 65-69¹⁰, mostly for males (figure 2). At ages 60-64 and 65-69, that are retirement ages, males' emigration rates are mainly in the range of 1.1% to 2% per year¹¹, and somewhat higher for Turks and non-EU Europeans. The main component of these flows is return migration of workers after retirement. Rates are usually lower for females, except for migrants from 'other countries'. They are most often below 1% yearly, and they do not show as steep increases with age as for males. Older female migrants were less frequently workers than males. But the


¹⁰ Out-migration rates at ages 45-49 are very small and rates decline and become hectic from age 70, therefore, they are not shown.

¹¹ or in the range of 5.6% to 10.4% for five years rates, as presented on figures.

main reason of the gender differences is probably¹² that males are more likely to return to their country of origin if they are alone, while couples are less likely to return. Thus, male emigration rates are higher than for females, because males are more often alone than females, mostly among older Africans and Turks. However, the proportion of lone male workers will decline in the future due to increases in family reunification and more frequent family migration from the mid 1970s. Among the 60-64 years-old males in employment, 30% of the Algeria-born and Sub-Saharan Africa-born, and 17% of the Turkey-born were living alone, against 15%, 25% and 10% respectively among the 50-54 years-old. Lone workers were less frequent among 60-64 years old Moroccans (17%) and migrants from ‘other countries’ (18%), and these figures will only decline by 3 to 5 percentage points in younger cohorts.

Thus, the gap between male and female return migration rates is, to some extent, structurally related to household situation. Therefore, we made assumptions that emigration rates, mostly for males, will decline from 2018 (see above). Actually, it is likely that retired migrants will more and more move back and forth between France and their countries of origin.

Figure 2: Five-year out-migration rates (unsmoothed^a) for 50-69 years-old birth cohorts by sex and origin, France, 2006-2008.



a) and not corrected for errors, therefore rates can be < 0


Immigration consists mostly of late family reunification, including migration of migrants’ parents: the so-called ‘Generation Zero’, coming to spend time with their children, often for short periods. There are also small numbers of non-EU nationals migrating after retirement to enjoy better way of life. In-migration rates of older migrants are most often much smaller than out-migration rates. They also vary much more than out-migration rates according to origin of migrants. In-migration rates of older migrants are above 1% yearly¹³ for non-EU Europeans

¹² Survey data would be necessary to assess the patterns of return migration after retirement by sex, work histories and family situation.

¹³ Or 5.1% over 5 years.

only, and just below 1% for ‘other countries’. They are much lower: below 0.5%, for ‘other Africans’ and often below 0.2% for North Africans and Turks. Female in-migration of non-EU Europeans and from ‘other countries’ is rather high, about at the same level or slightly higher than for males, while ‘other African’ females show much higher migration than males. Rates are much lower for North African and Turk females, but they are significantly higher than for males at almost all ages. This is probably due to cases of family reunification after retirement and very secondarily to migration of the generation zero.

Figure 3: Five-year in-migration rates (unsmoothed) for 50-69 years-old birth cohorts by sex and origin, France, 2006-2008.



Altogether, net migration is positive at ages 45-59 for Algerian and ‘other African’ males and up to age 64 for ‘other countries’. But it is negative for other males from age 50, and even from age 45 for non-EU Europeans, Tunisians and Turks.

Net migration is most often positive for females. Thus, female migrant populations are still building up at ages between 50 and 65 years, mostly for non-EU Europeans and ‘other Africans’, and secondarily up to age 60 for ‘other countries’. At ages where it is positive for both sexes, female net migration is always higher than for males.

4.- Results

4.1.- Trends in older migrant populations

Below, we present results of scenario B that seems to be the most realistic. Then, it will be later compared with scenario A and C.

Ages 65 and above


The numbers of elderly migrants will increase by 38% to 2018 and 79% to 2028 in scenario B. However, trends will vary considerably according to origin.

Except for older migrants: Italians and Spanish, who are declining populations, increases in elderly migrant populations will occur in the future. However, in the next 10 to 15 years, increases in the numbers of 65 years-old male migrants will be tempered by the indentations seen on the age-pyramids following the restrictive migration policies from 1975. Older non-EU Europeans and Algerians, the most affected by the closed border policy, will increase by a little more than 30% to 2018 and by around 50% to 2028 (table 2 and figure 4). This is still rapid change, but less than for Portuguese and other EU migrants who entered freely after they joined the EU, erasing the effect of the closed border policy. A similar phenomenon appears for Moroccans who migrated, often undocumented, until late adult ages in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s. The numbers of older Portuguese and Moroccans will nearly double by 2018 and will increase respectively 2.3 and 2.7 folds to 2028. The number of ‘other Africans’ will more than double to 2018 and increase nearly 6 folds to 2028. Increases will also be important for Turks and migrants from ‘other countries’ (table 2).

Table 2: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100

| | Italia | Portugal | Spain | 'other EU' | non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | 'other Africa' | Turks | 'other countries' | total |
|------|--------|----------|-------|------------|---------------|---------|---------|----------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| 2018 | 86 | 180 | 89 | 145 | 135 | 132 | 195 | 249 | 231 | 185 | 138 |
| 2028 | 63 | 227 | 79 | 206 | 162 | 147 | 273 | 583 | 353 | 352 | 179 |

Figure 4: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100



Ages 75 and above

The numbers of migrants 75 years-old and over will increase by 29% to 2018 and by 82% to 2028. Thus, increases to 2018 will be slower than at ages 65 years and over, except for Portuguese, Spanish, Algerians and Moroccans (table 3). But, they will be faster for all migrant origins, except Spanish, between 2018 and 2028. The different trends by age groups are mostly the result of the sizes of the cohorts arriving at ages 65 and over and at 75 and over. It reflects variations in the timing and intensity of migration by origin as well as changes in migrants' ages at arrival in the past. These different trends sometimes reflect random variations in migration flows, especially for origins with little ancient migration.

Table 3: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, scenario B, France ages 75 years and over, 2008 = 100

| | Italia | Portugal | Spain | 'other EU' | non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | 'other Africa' | Turks | 'other countries' | total |
|------|--------|----------|-------|------------|---------------|---------|---------|----------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| 2018 | 87 | 230 | 98 | 108 | 123 | 178 | 237 | 235 | 174 | 143 | 129 |
| 2028 | 69 | 396 | 79 | 174 | 179 | 226 | 457 | 604 | 454 | 278 | 182 |

Ages 85 and above

For the oldest-old, increases will be by 41% to 2018 and by 76% to 2028. Trends are mostly due to the various sizes of the age-groups already in-country in 2008, as migration rates are very small at older ages. Thus, the number of Italians at ages 85 and over will still increase by 20% to 2018 before declining. Spanish will increase by 35% to 2018 and by 14% to 2028 (a decline comparatively to 2018) (table 4). Portuguese, Moroccans, 'other Africans' and Algerians will see the most rapid increases to 2028: respectively 7.1, 6.3, 4.6 and 4.2 folds. 'Other Africans' do not show the highest increase at these ages. The reason is that their migration is more recent and large migrant cohorts will not yet reach oldest-old ages in 2028. The numbers of oldest old will double for Turks¹⁴ and for migrants from 'other countries' to 2028. Non-EU Europeans show slow increases.

Table 4: Projected trends of the oldest old migrants by origin, scenario B, France ages 85 years and over, 2008 = 100

| | Italia | Portugal | Spain | 'other EU' | non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | 'other Africa' | Turks | 'other countries' | total |
|------|--------|----------|-------|------------|---------------|---------|---------|----------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| 2018 | 121 | 329 | 135 | 99 | 105 | 251 | 276 | 193 | 90 | 159 | 141 |
| 2028 | 91 | 712 | 114 | 113 | 136 | 416 | 630 | 459 | 194 | 219 | 176 |

4.2.- Trends by sex

Projections show very different trends for males and females. For any migrants' origin, except 'other EU'¹⁵ and 'other countries', the increase is faster for females than for males (table 5 and figure 5). This is due to declining male cohorts during the closed border policy after 1975, whereas female cohorts increased steadily. Moreover, female migrants have recently experienced lower return migration and higher immigration than males. Thus, while the

¹⁴ For Turks, the decline in 2018 results from the erratic shape of their age-pyramid at older ages, due to small numbers.


¹⁵ For other countries, this is due to higher emigration of females than males ; for 'other EU' this is due to much smaller numbers of male than female older 'other EU' migrants in France in 2008; therefore, the increase is relatively much higher for males than for females. Due to errors in reporting previous residence, 'other EU' is projected from net migration rates. For citizenships with free movement in the Schengen area, migration is more difficult to assess.

increase to 2018 is very small (12%) for Algerian males, with even a decline between 2018 and 2028 - resulting in stable numbers over the 2008-2028 period, the number of Algerian females will double by 2028. A rather similar pattern is seen for non-EU Europeans. Between 2008 and 2028, the number of Moroccan older female migrants will increase more than twice as fast as for males, with an index of 431 against 181¹⁶. Increases will also be much faster for Turk and 'other African' females than for males, with the latter seeing the fastest increase. Sex differentials are moderate for migrants from 'other countries', with males increasing slightly faster than females, due to different age structures¹⁷ and higher emigration of females than males.

Table 5: Projected trends in older migrant populations by sex and origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100

| | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 |
|-------|---------|------|----------|------|----------------|------|------------|------|-------------------|------|
| | Italia | | Portugal | | Spain | | 'other EU' | | non-EU Europa | |
| total | 86 | 63 | 180 | 227 | 89 | 79 | 145 | 206 | 135 | 162 |
| M | 87 | 65 | 174 | 210 | 87 | 79 | 163 | 251 | 124 | 123 |
| F | 84 | 61 | 186 | 243 | 91 | 79 | 133 | 176 | 144 | 192 |
| | Algeria | | Morocco | | 'other Africa' | | Turks | | 'other countries' | |
| total | 132 | 147 | 195 | 273 | 249 | 583 | 231 | 353 | 185 | 352 |
| M | 112 | 102 | 177 | 184 | 250 | 488 | 216 | 291 | 197 | 379 |
| F | 169 | 227 | 228 | 433 | 248 | 715 | 248 | 424 | 175 | 332 |

Figure 5: Projected trends in older migrant populations by sex for selected origins, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100



¹⁶ This is consistent with trends observed between the 1975 and 1982 censuses.

¹⁷ This is mostly due to smaller numbers of elderly males than females in 2008 and subsequently cohorts of similar size for both sexes arriving at ages above 65.

4.3.- Comparing scenarios

Comparatively to stable rates (scenario A), declining out-migration increases the numbers by 3% or less in 2028¹⁸ (Table 6). Changes are more important for males who emigrate more than females, reaching 6% for non-EU Europeans and Turks, while they are below 1.5% for females.

Table 6: Changes in 2028 due to declining out-migration (Scenario B/scenario A)

| | Non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | Other Africa | Turkey | other' countries |
|-------|---------------|---------|---------|--------------|--------|------------------|
| total | 1,027 | 1,025 | 1,011 | 1,025 | 1,029 | 1,007 |
| M | 1,058 | 1,038 | 1,017 | 1,041 | 1,060 | 1,007 |
| F | 1,011 | 1,014 | 1,006 | 1,011 | 1,006 | 1,007 |

Comparing scenario C (no-migration) with scenario A, shows important differences in 2028: sometimes above 20% and up to 40% for males (Table 7). Thus, return migration, the main flow for males, significantly reduces the numbers of elderly in the long-term. The impact of migration is less important for females. But, they usually experience higher immigration than emigration rates, resulting in smaller numbers of elderly females in scenario C than in scenario A for non-EU Europeans and 'other' Africans. Altogether, differences are most often under 10% or 15%, showing that age structures (cohort sizes) are the main component of ageing trends.


Table 7: Change due to no migration (Scenario C/scenario A)

| | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 | 2018 | 2028 |
|-------|---------------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|----------------|-------|--------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| | Non-EU Europa | | Algeria | | Morocco | | 'other Africa' | | Turkey | | 'other countries' | |
| total | 1,051 | 1,059 | 1,115 | 1,175 | 1,077 | 1,097 | 1,054 | 1,022 | 1,139 | 1,226 | 1,028 | 0,995 |
| M | 1,137 | 1,278 | 1,149 | 1,222 | 1,121 | 1,204 | 1,107 | 1,126 | 1,231 | 1,438 | 0,996 | 0,940 |
| F | 0,993 | 0,954 | 1,074 | 1,138 | 1,015 | 1,016 | 0,979 | 0,925 | 1,045 | 1,068 | 1,056 | 1,044 |

4.4.- Sex ratios of older migrant populations

Figure 6: Sex ratios of migrants in France, 2008 census.

¹⁸ Rates changing only from 2018, there is no difference at that date.



At ages 55 to 75, migrants from Northern and ‘other’ Africa, and secondarily Turkey, still exhibited high sex ratios in 2008, with between 150 and 200 males per 100 females (figure 6). The early waves of labour migrants are still often lone males because their nuptiality was disrupted by migration, and many of those who are married have not reunited with their wives in France, because of their precarious economic condition.


Sex differentials in migration¹⁹: higher emigration of males than females and higher immigration of females than males will have significant impact on sex ratios of older migrant populations in the future. Sex ratios will decline from 98 males for 100 females in 2008 and 2018 to 85 males for 100 females in 2028. Trends vary greatly according to origin.

Table 8 : Projected trends in sex ratios of the 65 year olds and over, Scenario B

| | Italia | Portugal | Spain | other EU | non-EU Europa | Algeria | Morocco | Tunisia | other Africa | Turkey | other countries |
|------|--------|----------|-------|----------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|--------|-----------------|
| 2008 | 84 | 94 | 68 | 68 | 79 | 181 | 179 | 135 | 140 | 116 | 79 |
| 2018 | 87 | 88 | 65 | 83 | 68 | 120 | 139 | 138 | 141 | 101 | 89 |
| 2028 | 89 | 81 | 69 | 96 | 50 | 82 | 76 | 102 | 95 | 79 | 90 |

Figure 7: Projected trends in sex ratios of migrants in France.

¹⁹ Combined with higher death rates of males than of females.



The sex ratio of migrants is affected by specific factors in relation with male and female migration in the frame of family reunification. A man has to be alive to bring his wife under family reunification. This partly erases the effect of male excess mortality and tends to raise sex ratios of older migrants. Widowed women can also enter through family reunification. But, they need to fulfil several conditions: have a French (native or naturalized) child living in France to be eligible for family reunification or be allowed to enter as visitors.

Due to more balanced sex ratios of younger migrant cohorts and to higher immigration of females than males, the sex ratios of elderly African migrants will decline from above 140 males per 100 females in 2008 to between 80 and 100 males for 100 females in 2028 (table 8 and figure 7). This will result in nearly balanced numbers of males and females for Tunisians and ‘other Africans’ and in deficits for Algerians, Moroccans and Turks. However, these levels are still above national average of 71.5 males for 100 females, because the effect of male excess mortality is compensated for by sex structures specific to migrant populations: high sex ratios of migrant cohorts in the past, and because males have to be alive to allow their wives to enter through family reunification.

For non-EU Europeans, higher emigration of males than females increases sex imbalances with a projected sex ratio of 50 males for 100 females in 2028. On the opposite, female migrants from ‘other countries’ emigrate more than males, increasing the sex ratio to 90 by 2028. ‘Other EU’ migrants’ will experience similar trends due to higher sex ratios of the cohorts arriving at ages 65 years and above, and higher male than female net migration.

The impact of declining out-migration rates on sex ratios is very small. However, trends in sex ratios are very different in the ‘no migration’ scenario, because of the large differences in out- and in-migration rates by sex. Sex ratios decline much less when there is no migration, mostly for Africans and Turks whose males show higher out-migration and lower immigration than females.

Conclusion

Projections of ageing migrants are more reliable than projections of migrants, because most of the migrants who will reach 65 years and over in the next 20 years are already in-country and immigration is much smaller at ages above 45 years than at young adult ages. Moreover, return migration is less frequent as expected. However, estimating flows, and secondarily survival rates of migrants, are the main issues in ageing migrant projections, with important differences according to origin and sex.

Age-pyramids of migrants by country of origin show very different shapes that translate the history of migration flows to receiving countries. The date of the onset of migration, pre- and post-independence migration, the size of flows and their pace of increase, as well as migration policies of host countries can be read on the age-pyramids of migrants and will determine future ageing of migrant populations. Migration has been rapidly increasing from 1950 to 1975 and migrant ageing will be very fast in the next decades. However, the closed border policy from 1975 will slow migrant ageing in the next 10 to 15 years for non-EU migrant males, whereas, increased family reunification from that date will result in rapid increase of elderly migrant females. Then, the arrival of larger cohorts at age 65 will result in rapid increases in the numbers of older migrants: between two and three folds for most origins, except non-EU Europeans and Algerians. 'Other Africans' will show the fastest ageing, their numbers increasing 6 folds to 2028.

Although relatively small, out-migration after retirement and old-age in-migration, in the frame of family reunification and secondarily arrivals of the 'generation zero', will have impacts in the trends in older migrants. Return migration is the main component of old age migration, but immigration is also significant for some origins, mostly for females. While males usually return more than females, women immigrate more than men at older ages. These flows tend to rebalance the sex ratios of migrants, mostly from Africa and other labour sending countries.

Projections show varied patterns of migrant ageing by origin. Thus, at the level of host countries, the speed and intensity of migrant ageing will be determined by the history of migration and the size of flows by origin. Past policy changes will also impact on the timing and speed of migrant ageing. This implies to use data by origin for international comparisons so that the different situations, the speed of migrant ageing and its variations are well understood. Social and health services will also need data by origin to serve linguistically and culturally diverse populations.

References:

- Gibson D, Braun P, Benham C & Mason F (2001) *Projections of Older immigrants: people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, 1996–2026, Australia*. AIHW cat. no. AGE 18. Canberra: Australia Institute of Health and Welfare (Aged Care Series no. 6).
- Blake S (2009) Subnational patterns of population ageing, *Population Trends* (136, Summer 2009) : 43-63
- Courbage Y., M. Khlat, 1995, La mortalité et les causes de décès des MArocaïns en France 1979-1991, *Population*, 1. 1995: 7-32 et 2. 1995: 447-472
- Green Marcus, M. Evandrou and J. Falkingham (2009) “Older International Migrants: who migrate to England and Wales in later life?”, *Population Trends* N°137, Office for National Statistics, London.
- Nathalie Blanpain, Olivier Chardon (2012) Projections de population à l’horizon 2060, division Enquêtes et études démographiques, Insee
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1320
- Lievesley (2010) “The future ageing of the Ethnic Minority Population of England and Wales”, Runnymede, Centre for Policy on Ageing, London.
- Office for National Statistics (2009) *Population estimates by ethnic group: 2001 to 2007 commentary; [preceded by] correction notice [to commentary paper first published 23 April 2009]*,
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_population/PEEGCommentary.pdf
- Office for National Statistics (2010) *Population estimates by ethnic group: methodology paper*,
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_population/MethodologyforPEEG.pdf
- Platt L, Simpson L and Akinwale B (2005) Stability and change in ethnic groups in England and Wales, *Population Trends* (121, Autumn 2005) : 35-46
- Rees P; University of Leeds. School of Geography (2005) *Estimating international migration at regional scale for ethnic groups in the United Kingdom; paper presented at the Workshop on International Migration organised by the Social Science Research Institute, University of Southampton and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, 28-30 September 2005, University of Southampton; [Powerpoint presentation]*,
<http://www.s3ri.soton.ac.uk/events/2005/documents/rees.pdf>

Table annex 1: Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over.

| | 2008 | 2013 | 2018 | 2023 | 2028 |
|------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Italia | 168,161 | 158,736 | 143,846 | 127,653 | 105,309 |
| Portugal | 83,282 | 117,894 | 150,249 | 169,923 | 189,130 |
| Spain | 116,089 | 110,064 | 103,576 | 98,708 | 91,440 |
| other EU | 146,042 | 175,319 | 212,000 | 251,812 | 301,404 |
| Non-EU Europa | 32,717 | 37,511 | 44,144 | 47,966 | 52,994 |
| Algeria | 126,707 | 151,145 | 167,742 | 175,612 | 185,811 |
| Morocco | 67,284 | 95,423 | 131,283 | 160,306 | 183,973 |
| Tunisia | 37,315 | 45,269 | 56,571 | 66,272 | 71,911 |
| Other' Africa | 25,019 | 38,843 | 62,398 | 98,280 | 145,817 |
| Turkey | 12,173 | 19,046 | 28,107 | 35,450 | 42,934 |
| other countries' | 51,124 | 66,952 | 94,507 | 135,042 | 180,143 |
| total | 865,913 | 1,016,202 | 1,194,423 | 1,367,023 | 1,550,867 |

Table annex 2: Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by origin, scenario B, France, ages 75 years and over.

| | 2008 | 2013 | 2018 | 2023 | 2028 |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Italia | 98,220 | 94,120 | 85,572 | 77,048 | 68,208 |
| Portugal | 22,581 | 35,682 | 51,893 | 72,069 | 89,378 |
| Spain | 63,790 | 68,614 | 62,325 | 55,726 | 50,582 |
| other EU | 76,244 | 73,210 | 82,549 | 105,817 | 132,410 |
| Non-EU Europa | 14,478 | 15,583 | 17,777 | 21,036 | 25,978 |
| Algeria | 41,831 | 59,622 | 74,587 | 86,630 | 94,729 |
| Morocco | 18,013 | 28,563 | 42,627 | 59,648 | 82,381 |
| Tunisia | 14,238 | 18,568 | 21,981 | 26,095 | 33,006 |
| Other' Africa | 6,698 | 10,119 | 15,710 | 24,593 | 40,470 |
| Turkey | 4,082 | 4,525 | 7,104 | 12,034 | 18,530 |
| other countries' | 21,551 | 25,322 | 30,740 | 41,001 | 59,818 |
| total | 381,726 | 433,927 | 492,865 | 581,697 | 695,492 |

Table annex 3 Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by origin, scenario B, France, ages 85 years and over.

| | 2008 | 2013 | 2018 | 2023 | 2028 |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Italia | 29,143 | 35,431 | 35,357 | 30,618 | 26,546 |
| Portugal | 3,019 | 5,743 | 9,928 | 15,219 | 21,492 |
| Spain | 17,923 | 20,774 | 24,136 | 25,212 | 20,387 |
| other EU | 26,479 | 29,915 | 26,193 | 23,917 | 30,048 |
| Non-EU Europa | 4,921 | 5,261 | 5,164 | 5,572 | 6,711 |
| Algeria | 6,782 | 10,453 | 16,999 | 23,731 | 28,190 |
| Morocco | 2,743 | 4,433 | 7,566 | 11,763 | 17,282 |
| Tunisia | 2,957 | 4,239 | 5,746 | 7,232 | 8,086 |
| Other' Africa | 1,416 | 1,949 | 2,735 | 4,204 | 6,495 |
| Turkey | 1,540 | 1,512 | 1,391 | 1,618 | 2,995 |
| other countries' | 5,411 | 6,852 | 8,629 | 9,746 | 11,860 |
| total | 102,336 | 126,564 | 143,843 | 158,832 | 180,093 |

Table annex 1: Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by sex and origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over.

| | 2008 | | 2018 | | 2028 | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | M | F | M | F | M | F |
| Italia | 76,964 | 91,198 | 66,995 | 76,851 | 49,675 | 55,634 |
| Portugal | 40,337 | 42,944 | 70,209 | 80,040 | 84,835 | 104,295 |
| Spain | 47,126 | 68,963 | 40,774 | 62,801 | 37,173 | 54,267 |
| other EU | 59,048 | 86,995 | 95,996 | 116,003 | 147,953 | 153,451 |
| Europe non EU | 14,402 | 18,315 | 17,834 | 26,309 | 17,745 | 35,249 |
| Algeria | 81,622 | 45,084 | 91,407 | 76,336 | 83,507 | 102,304 |
| Morocco | 43,198 | 24,085 | 76,444 | 54,839 | 79,654 | 104,318 |
| Tunisia | 21,406 | 15,908 | 32,784 | 23,788 | 36,262 | 35,649 |
| other' Africa | 14,575 | 10,443 | 36,503 | 25,895 | 71,177 | 74,641 |
| Turkey | 6,525 | 5,648 | 14,113 | 13,995 | 18,964 | 23,970 |
| other countries | 22,514 | 28,610 | 44,418 | 50,089 | 85,215 | 94,928 |
| total | 427,717 | 438,193 | 587,477 | 606,946 | 712,161 | 838,706 |

Table annex 1: Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by sex and origin, scenario B, France, ages 75 years and over.

| | 2008 | | 2018 | | 2028 | |
|-----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | M | F | M | F | M | F |
| Italia | 40,690 | 57,531 | 36,015 | 49,557 | 29,891 | 38,317 |
| Portugal | 9,902 | 12,678 | 22,040 | 29,853 | 36,401 | 52,977 |
| Spain | 25,042 | 38,748 | 21,596 | 40,728 | 18,028 | 32,554 |
| other EU | 26,419 | 49,825 | 32,490 | 50,060 | 57,421 | 74,989 |
| Europe non EU | 5,238 | 9,240 | 7,108 | 10,669 | 9,021 | 16,957 |
| Algeria | 26,363 | 15,468 | 44,088 | 30,499 | 44,592 | 50,137 |
| Morocco | 10,540 | 7,474 | 25,064 | 17,563 | 42,441 | 39,940 |
| Tunisia | 6,848 | 7,390 | 11,748 | 10,234 | 17,670 | 15,336 |
| other' Africa | 2,989 | 3,708 | 8,490 | 7,220 | 21,489 | 18,981 |
| Turkey | 1,646 | 2,435 | 3,429 | 3,675 | 8,015 | 10,515 |
| other countries | 8,392 | 13,159 | 12,392 | 18,347 | 26,335 | 33,484 |
| Total | 164,069 | 217,657 | 224,460 | 268,405 | 311,305 | 384,187 |

Table annex 1: Projected trends in numbers of older migrants by sex and origin, scenario B, France, ages 85 years and over.

| | 2008 | | 2018 | | 2028 | |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| | M | F | M | F | M | F |
| Italia | 9,727 | 19,417 | 12,256 | 23,101 | 9,638 | 16,908 |
| Portugal | 1,021 | 1,998 | 3,589 | 6,339 | 7,388 | 14,105 |
| Spain | 6,248 | 11,675 | 7,510 | 16,626 | 5,515 | 14,871 |
| other EU | 6,915 | 19,564 | 7,552 | 18,641 | 10,266 | 19,782 |
| Europe non EU | 1,307 | 3,614 | 1,658 | 3,506 | 2,272 | 4,439 |
| Algeria | 3,454 | 3,328 | 9,548 | 7,451 | 14,270 | 13,920 |
| Morocco | 1,243 | 1,500 | 3,911 | 3,655 | 8,781 | 8,501 |
| Tunisia | 1,069 | 1,888 | 2,393 | 3,353 | 3,858 | 4,229 |
| other' Africa | 513 | 903 | 1,034 | 1,702 | 3,123 | 3,372 |
| Turkey | 569 | 971 | 468 | 923 | 1,270 | 1,725 |
| other countries | 1,857 | 3,554 | 2,745 | 5,884 | 4,062 | 7,798 |
| total | 33,922 | 68,414 | 52,663 | 91,181 | 70,443 | 109,650 |