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**MEASURING POPULATION MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN A GLOBALIZED  
WORLD**

**SESSION III: MIGRATION AND SOCIETY**

DIASPORA, INTEGRATION, POPULATION MOBILITY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC  
REGION: A VIEW FROM THE EDGE

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**ABSTRACT**

1. This paper reviews the key paradigms that drive analysis of the social aspects of population mobility: integration, assimilation and acculturation. We consider the social implications of population mobility within the Asia-Pacific region<sup>2</sup> as a whole, and the Australasian part of that region in particular, to explain how this region is implicated in the global exchange of people. This is a view from the perspective of a small country which lies on the periphery of the region and which is both a significant destination for migrants and a contributor of population to the

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been prepared at the invitation of the secretariat.

<sup>2</sup> Asia-Pacific here refers to the countries included in the broad hemisphere from approximately 60°E to 130°W excluding trans-Uralic Russia, Iran and North America. The definition of the area varies: for example, ESCAP includes Russia, the Caucasus, Iran and Turkey, an area containing 61 percent of the world's population (ESCAP 2008).

region and beyond. Broader processes involved with population mobility are implicated in emigration and diaspora politics. Sections of the diaspora and of immigrant populations are linked, but in a complex way. And neither is monolithic. However, none of the issues we have is unique either to the New Zealand or to the region - hence the relevance of the region's experiences of demographic change in the context of a globalised world. Among the themes is the question of how, what and why measurement of migrant populations and diasporas is important.

## I. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR MIGRATION

2. There are three key themes in the social context for migration: integration, assimilation and acculturation, each of which is directly relevant to an understanding of diaspora<sup>3</sup>. Each of these themes have implications for both migrant settlers in host countries and the host countries' diasporas.

### A. Integration

3. An assumption underlying the traditional concept of integration is that immigrants and their children are expected quite rapidly to achieve a working knowledge of the principal local language(s), and to live in a compatible way with the culture and lifestyle of the destination country. This social and economic integration may occur in parallel with the acquisition of legal citizenship over a number of years. According to this paradigm, links to the countries of origin would normally weaken quite rapidly and retention of original cultures and mores would become less important than succeeding in the local environment<sup>4</sup>. But ties may remain for long periods. Even after many generations, some elderly New Zealanders of British stock, born in New Zealand, still refer to Britain as "home", showing that while the premise is true it may take more than a century of living locally for the ties to break entirely. The new environment of global communication and cheap travel may enable much stronger and more sustained emotional links of this nature, and while the loci of communication are radically different, the underlying psychology is the same. The real change that is occurring is the simultaneous weakening and strengthening of national boundaries and national awareness – weakening for those with strong links internationally and those who operate freely across boundaries, communities and diasporas and who think globally, but strengthening for those who are inwardly focussed.

### B. Assimilation

4. For those who are inwardly focussed, nationalism is more dominant and for this group assimilation is viewed more idealistically. Assimilation is based on the assumption that any level

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<sup>3</sup> The term diaspora is used in this paper to refer to people living in countries other than their birth countries and/or countries of citizenship. However, as discussed here, there are major definitional issues with regard to partners and families of this group of people.

<sup>4</sup> However, realities are often quite different. In many countries local languages and customs have been replaced with adopted migrant languages and customs – for example people in England generally speak a language – English – ultimately derived from migrant Saxons and fundamentally modified by migrant French speaking Normans. Similarly, northern France is largely French speaking rather than Frankish speaking. New Zealand and Australia are largely English speaking. Similar experiences can be seen among Arabic and Spanish speaking countries.

of diversity is problematic, and that immigrants and their children should adopt the language, culture and lifestyle of the host country to the exclusion of their own cultures. In this view, the existing social fabric is preferred, hence population mobility should be tightly controlled and mechanisms used to ensure that people blend seamlessly into the local environment. Diversity and change is seen as a threat to social cohesion. Putnam (2007) in the United States and Healy (2007) in Australia argue that higher levels of ethnic diversity are associated with lower levels of social capital, largely because of the fear of highly clustered enclaves of migrant settlers developing.

5. While the formation of social capital and the relationship between social capital and social cohesion is debateable, our interest here is how this provides a social context for population mobility. Jupp (2007) perceptively observes that the concerns expressed over the negative impact of diversity arise from largely unjustified preoccupations with imagined external threats. For the vast majority of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, well integrated societies tend not to have minorities tightly clustered either geographically, economically, or socially. This suggests that diversity within an integrated society may have less impact on social capital and social cohesion than has been suggested, since many of the apparent differences disappear when other factors such as age structure, settlement patterns and socio-economic status are accounted for. Moreover, people can, and do, have many identities - even within seemingly monocultural societies

### **C. Acculturation**

6. Acculturation is the process of acquiring a second culture and does not preclude the retention of the original culture (Callister, Didham, Potter 2005). While not all members of a community will acculturate, large proportions of an integrated community will do so. By contrast, assimilation is the process of replacing one's first culture with a second culture, generally associated with more coercive societies. Assuming that cultures are dynamic rather than static, the process of acculturation may nevertheless alter both the original cultures and the host cultures. In Montreal, for example, Quebecois and Anglophone cultures coexist seamlessly, though neither can any longer be regarded as either French or English, and these coexist alongside other thoroughly successful and integrated cultures such as the Vietnamese, Chinese and Russian communities.

### **D. Identity**

7. What we observe in practice is that many migrants function very well in multiple and pluralistic worlds by “retaining their ethnic identities while they learn the culture of their host country and become proficient in their new home languages” (Trueba, 2002). This process operates not just within the diaspora (and between diasporas) but between the various parts of the diaspora and the country of origin. This type of social trans-nationalism is one of the most rapidly growing outcomes of globalisation and can be more adequately explained by concepts of self and of identities in general and migration identities in particular. Although self-identification is the central thesis of ethnicity in countries such as New Zealand (Didham 2005), and Canada (Isajiw, 1992; Davis and Baena, 2000), and increasingly in other countries, such as Malaysia (Daily Express, 2008), it is by no means a static or settled field. Some see identity as “fluid, multidimensional, personalised social constructions that reflect socio-historical context”

(Howard, 2000), drawing on the view of the self as multidimensional yet unified, emotional and cognitive, and individual and social (Erikson 1995). Linking this to population mobility, trans-nationalists view migrant identities as fluid, flexible, and constantly renegotiated (Yeoh, Willis, & Fakhri, 2003). For an understanding of the diaspora, an understanding of identity and how this plays out in trans-national settings is vital, since the definition of diaspora is intrinsically linked to a sense of place. While connected to a sense of place, trans-national identities are independently constructed out of personal and dual or plural national/ethnic identities. They remain linked to their home cultures, but integrate selected aspects of the new culture<sup>5</sup>.

## II. POSITIONING AUSTRALASIA WITHIN ASIA-PACIFIC

8. The Asia-Pacific region is a diverse region in other ways which is characterised by a collection of large wealthy countries such as China, India, Japan, Australia and Korea along with some of the smallest and most remote countries in the world. Remoteness analysis has shown that the countries that make up the eastern South Pacific islands in what is sometimes still referred to as Polynesia rank 208th out of 219 in terms of the most remote when based on GDP-based distance and 201st on a population-distance ranking (Gibson, 2006).

9. In our local part of the region, Australia and New Zealand have significantly different international migration environments from most other Asia-Pacific countries with an extended history of an immigration program managed by government and which has focused for most of their history on the encouragement of permanent settlement of families (Hugo, Callister, Badkar 2008).

10. In the last quarter century, two key changes have taken place in international migration in the region – the first is the growing significance of non-permanent migrants, especially since the mid-1990s, and the second is that Asia and the Pacific have become increasingly important origins for both permanent and temporary migrants. Measurement of the social effects of temporary migration is a much more difficult task than measuring the effects of permanent migration simply because temporary migration leaves residual traces that can not easily be untangled from other social changes, and because much of it happens within intercensal periods it is generally not visible in population data. Migration data certainly can provide a limited amount of information but depends on comparability (or even existence) of collection systems at both destination and source countries. However, this is an important area for future research because the effects implicate the social fabric of both host and source countries in a more immediate way, whereas permanent migration may not, or at least not in the same way.

11. As with other OECD countries and an increasing number of non-OECD countries, low fertility and ageing have begun to exacerbate shortages of skilled and unskilled labour in Australia and New Zealand. Hugo, et al, argue that there is limited potential for these issues to be addressed by policies of increasing labour force participation rates in a region currently with close to full employment of both males and females, or of extending the retirement age. Already in New Zealand there is now no obligatory retirement age, and this is supported by very strict

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<sup>5</sup> Likewise, Chamber (1996) argues that hybrid identities result from reworking, reforming and reconfiguring aspects of the host culture, which could be seen as one of the potential drivers behind ethnogenesis within diasporas (Curta 2005).

laws against discrimination on the basis of age or sex<sup>6</sup>. Thus, immigration will continue to play a major role in meeting these shortages.

12. Outflows of people have also been a feature of the histories of these countries – for example, as Hugo et al point out, "in comparison with many low income countries New Zealand especially is ranked as the 24th largest country in terms of the ratio of its diaspora to its resident population, however when compared to higher income countries, New Zealand is unique in the OECD having the highest per capita rate of both immigration and emigration" (Hugo, Callister, Badkar 2008). The social consequences are significant as people leaving are replaced by people arriving or returning. Australia benefits directly as the major destination country for the New Zealand diaspora, both in terms of skilled New Zealand born migrants and highly educated and experienced foreign born migrants who have gained New Zealand citizenship, often local qualifications and very marketable levels of language skills<sup>7</sup>.

13. The levels of discussion however are often simplistic, reflecting a single aspect as though it operates in isolation. The migration and re-migration of skills, referred to as the 'brain drain' (or as it has been more accurately described 'brain exchange' (Choy and Glass 2001)) was such an aspect, focussing on losses of specific skills and the purported limited ability of the source countries to attract equivalent replacements, generally with an economic focus. But the real issue was the fact that the social settlement issues of migrants and the failure to accept foreign skills as equivalent lay at the heart of the matter. These issues affect all migrants, both internal and international in origin, to varying degrees. The problem is that it is a relatively simple matter to measure the internal effects but for every country there is very little similar information on the diaspora. For New Zealand, there is excellent international migration information with respect to both stock and flow information from population censuses and from arrival and departure cards completed by all people entering and leaving New Zealand. This country is among the very few countries that can accurately establish the scale and composition of emigration as well as immigration, though we have little reliable information on where those who leave might be currently living, nor in general do we know why they leave or whether or not they might return.

### **III. NEW ZEALAND'S ASIA-PACIFIC CONTEXT**

14. New Zealand is a country of just 4.3 million people with a history of human settlement barely a millennium old. Because of the settlement history, the legislative framework of the country is arguably bi-cultural<sup>8</sup>, but the social reality is multicultural. The paradigm within which policy operates is one of integration, with focus on equity of access to services and opportunities and protection and respect for the cultural identities of the many groups making up the population. While strong encouragement in policy and administration of migration is given to

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<sup>6</sup> New Zealand's labour force participation rate for people aged 65 years and over is second only to Japan's. (Tang, Boddington, Khawaja 2007).

<sup>7</sup> This is by no means a local phenomenon and is the subject of considerable literature surrounding the global mobility of medical skills and the effects on source and destination countries (Boyd and Schellenberg 2007, Callister, Badkar and Didham 2008).

<sup>8</sup> The extent, nature and historicity of this is however far from clear (Bromell, forthcoming), but the central importance of symbolic biculturalism cannot be underestimated (Bromell, pers com.).

acquisition of English as an official language, assimilationist attitudes are regarded as socially undesirable.

15. Traditionally New Zealand has been a migrant receiving country, and continues to be so, with 22.9 percent of its population born elsewhere, ahead of Canada at 22.2 percent and Australia at 19.8 percent. Frequently associated with these foreign-born populations are their locally-born families. With high levels of inter-ethnic partnering both between locally born groups as well as between migrant and locally-born, New Zealand has an increasingly multicultural population (Didham, Callister, Potter, 2007). Consequently, a feature of the history of New Zealand and Australia is that in both countries almost half the population was either born in a foreign country or has a parent who was born overseas.

16. New Zealand plays a key role as a destination country within the Asia-Pacific migration system. For some countries, the size of their diaspora living in New Zealand exceeds the home population. For example, the Niuean population in New Zealand is over 14 times the size of the population of Niue (Table 1) and is a highly integrated community with high levels of interethnic partnering<sup>9</sup> and nearly 60 percent have multiple ethnicities. Even if we just consider the foreign-born population, the population born in Niue and living in New Zealand is 4 times the population of the current resident population of Niue. In addition to the New Zealand based population, there are small numbers of Niueans in Australia and other Pacific Rim countries, and this pattern also applies to other Pacific island migrant populations.

17. For Niue and for other Pacific nations, the importance of their diasporas is both social and economic. One of the enduring and, for some countries, economically critical aspects of population mobility is the role of remittances. Remittances have been the subject of a major study in the Pacific region because of the number of nations in the region which depend directly on these to maintain their economies. Recent studies of remittance behaviour have stressed that these take many forms, but they are nearly always asymmetrical, incurring real social and economic costs to the donor, with consequential impacts on integration processes, and providing benefits to the recipient which extend beyond the individual to encompass the wider local community (Gibson, 2006a). These costs impact directly on the social outcomes for both the migrant and the source country.

18. Many Pacific countries are economically dependent on their diaspora for remittances. Almost two-thirds of the Tongan foreign exchange for instance is derived directly from remittances from expatriates, with over 90 percent of Tongan households in receipt of these transfers (Gibson 2006a, Gibson 2006b). Remittances though are a fragile source which can change quite rapidly for reasons that may be out of control of the recipient countries. In the case of some countries such as Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa the pattern changed almost overnight with the introduction of cheap flights from New Zealand. Previously, flights in and out of Vanuatu were among the most expensive air routes on the planet in terms of fare charged per kilometre and expatriates were remitting substantial amounts both in cash and in kind. With the new cheap fares, people then chose to use their savings to visit in person rather than send the same level of financial support (Gibson, pers.com.).

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<sup>9</sup> Only 22 percent of couples in New Zealand with at least one person of Niuean ethnicity have both partners Niuean.

19. The interconnected nature of social networks, together with internal domestic migration have been found to have positive impacts on the outcomes for both the migrants and the host societies (Stillman and Maré 2007). The fact remains that there is generally a wealth and social connectedness difference between foreign-born and locally-born, both in how this is held and how it is expressed (Gibson et al 2007), especially in situations where the commitments of the migrants to support family in their source countries is a factor in limiting their potential to develop a wealth base and social place in their new country. This has led to remittances being seen as a cost to the host country to the benefit of the source country.

20. However, the benefits and costs are rarely unidirectional in practice and there are increasingly significant examples of reverse remittances, for example between New Zealand and Southeast Asia, where interfamilial remittances flow from New Zealand to South East Asia whereas institutional and cultural remittances flow in the reverse direction. For example, while money and support is provided to people in home countries, royal grants and donations of cultural goods by wealthy families have enabled local temples to be developed and community groups to maintain their cultural activities. The donors and recipients are tightly interdependent. This is a feature of perhaps all diasporas, for similar patterns can be seen across Europe among migrant communities from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, as well as within intra-regional labour migration flows as we see in Ukrainian communities and among the traditionally mobile communities such as Roma. A key question is the relationship between remittances, diasporas and migrant integration. It is well known that the burden of remitting is largely upon the first and second generation migrants, with a fall-off in commitment from the locally-born off-spring as social and cultural networks evolve and new ones are created, most notably in recent years with the growth of internet migrant forums and social networking (Bürgelt, 2007).

#### **IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST? DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT VERSUS INTEGRATION**

21. As with other countries, the exchange of people between New Zealand and other countries and within countries is increasingly complex, both in terms of the magnitude of the bidirectional flows and the composition of the flows. It was well observed in September 2006, by the Secretary General of the United Nations in the background paper to the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration, that the old paradigm of sending and receiving societies for migration analysis no longer works. Traditional sending countries are recipient countries, just as recipient countries are also exporters of people. In the case of New Zealand, more than one in five New Zealand-born are living in other countries either permanently or for extended periods, with significant populations of New Zealanders in every OECD (Table 2) and almost every non-OECD country, although among enumerated adults, three-quarters of the New Zealand born diaspora are living in Australia<sup>10</sup>. For each of these OECD countries, there are sections of their diasporas living in New Zealand (Table 3). Thus, while New Zealand is home to portions of many other countries' diasporas, it has itself one of the largest diasporas as a proportion of its population. A key concern for most, if not all, countries is how, and to what extent, these flows and their consequences may be measured since the age structure of diasporas is quite different

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<sup>10</sup> Given the very close similarities between Australia and New Zealand in settlement histories and the current very close economic and social ties, it is debateable whether we should regard New Zealanders living in Australia as diaspora. The two countries operate in most respects as a single unit with almost unrestricted trans-Tasman travel.

from either the source or the destination countries and the level of commitment to the destination countries, as measured by adoption of new citizenships, varies (Table 4).

22. The reason for this concern is clear. Many countries base immigration policy on a perceived local need for migrants with specified existing skill sets in particular broad age bands. The emphasis on skilled migration rather than family and family re-unification migration tends to inhibit long-term settlement. This continues to distort flows and impact on demographic stability in a number of social and economic areas. As a result, in part, of the consequences of this process, many countries have expressed an urgent need to identify their diasporas and consider ways of attracting their outmigrants to return home. Some countries have gone so far as to suggest that enticing their diaspora home would solve many of their perceived migration woes and ameliorate population ageing. Thus, there is an inherent ambiguity in attitudes to diasporic communities. On the one hand, countries frequently have an expectation that immigrants will integrate into their society and in a few countries there is still an explicit assumption that assimilation should occur. Yet, many of these same countries actively pursue ambitions of both attracting their diasporas home and ensuring that their expatriates retain strong links with their source societies. Hence, there is a desire both to promote integration of other people's diasporas and to engender continued engagement with their own.

23. The ambition of some countries to retain immigrants, especially skilled immigrants, at the same time as engaging with their diaspora has become one step harder with the globalisation of communications. No longer do people need to be in the same country to be in immediate and intimate contact with friends and family. For this reason, migrants no longer need to become as isolated from their source countries, with consequential complexification of the relationship between the host societies, the source countries and other parts of the diasporas. This may make retention of immigrants harder as information on alternative destinations becomes more readily available – they may simply move to where they perceive it to be better. Nor does it necessarily promote engagement with the diaspora since these connections operate at an individual level whereas most engagement processes operate at an institutional level.

## V. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

24. Among the frequently expressed concerns about migration, even in well-integrated societies, is that social networks are modified in a way that may be incompatible with infrastructural support. While migrants have been cited as a solution to problems of skill shortages, in part as a response to the recognition of global skill shortages, declining fertility and impending natural decrease in population, and the competitive advantage that possession of a population with scarce skills imparts, migrants age. The difficulty is that migration can only ever be a temporary fix. If migrants do not eventually move on to countries with better prospects or return to their countries of origin as these countries, in turn, overtake the destination countries as desirable destinations, they age in place, leaving a gap in the work force as they move out of it and add to the dependency burden. Generally the solution to this dilemma is that new migrants will fill these losses. But there is a continuing global shortage of migrants of the sets of skills for which there are local needs. This has significant implications.

25. First, replacement skills may not then be available internationally and unless local educational and training infrastructures have been maintained there is limited capacity to provide

local resources<sup>11</sup>. For those migrants who have partnered locally and have families, it might be postulated that their offspring provide an ongoing resource, but retaining these people is no easier than retaining any other locally born group – it may in fact be harder given the increasing incidence of ongoing dialogue between their parents (and themselves) with family and friends in the parents' country/ies of origin. This again emphasises the significance of family migration and local intermarriage as a mechanism for integration. While putting primary focus on family migration and local education of children as part of immigration policy makes much better sense as a sustainable process, it would be unusual for policy to be sufficiently far-sighted or to not be cognisant of the reactionary concerns of colonisation by stealth. One of the key factors in well-integrated healthy societies is the maintenance of strong multigenerational communities supported by adequate family migration policies.

26. Among the outcomes of deliberative skilled migration policies is that migrants are unequally distributed throughout society. This may give rise to stereotyping and class differentiation which may not be conducive in the long-term to integration. In this, country of origin plays a part since people from some source regions may integrate, intermarry, and settle in quite different patterns from people originating in different source regions. Migrants selected on the basis of skill have quite different age and sex profiles from the host society, bring skills which are relatively rare in the host society and tend to be comparatively wealthy. This has implications for wealth distribution and social well-being.

27. Secondly, the diasporas themselves are ageing. In many countries, including New Zealand, population ageing is a major social concern because of the implications this has for sustainable development. Physically fit and active people, of whatever age, whether still employed or not, are not the immediate problem. The difficulty comes with the onset of long-term morbidity. Migrant populations may present special challenges should the population suffering degenerate diseases increase rapidly. Degenerate diseases in particular may entail loss of local language skills, inability to handle local food and require specific cultural and religious needs. Care requires strong community involvement and is resource intensive. This may be exacerbated should significant portions of the diaspora need to return home to family (or indeed with family), perhaps from very different social systems, requiring re-integration<sup>12</sup>.

28. One of the key policy challenges though is how social wellbeing of the diaspora can be assured. Currently reciprocal agreements exist between a number of countries with regard to education, health care and pensions. While the majority of a migrant population is economically active there is no real problem since they are intrinsically self-supporting but when the group are perceived as being a burden on that society questions of care and support become politically important. Definition of the boundaries of the social contract between birthplace and diaspora then becomes an issue, especially if reciprocity of care is not possible, as would be the case for many of the Pacific countries where the diaspora is larger than the remaining home populations. With the decline in the significance of national borders and the continuing pressure for open

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<sup>11</sup> It is not unknown for some governments, for economic reasons, to use a migration source country to provide highly skilled graduates, for example, rather than maintain the excellence of their own universities.

<sup>12</sup> The difficulties experienced by ethnic Germans returning to Germany is an important European example (Janssen and Schroedter, 2007).

borders, along with questions of the redefinition of the boundaries of national sovereignty will be the redefinition of boundaries to responsibility for care.

## VI. MEASUREMENT

29. While the precursor to measurement is definition (Gamlen, 2007, Butler 2001), the precursor to definition is an understanding of what we need to know and why. From the legal perspective, there are key reasons why countries need to know how many people living outside the country have rights such as voting rights, access to benefits (such as superannuation), entitlement to proceeds of particular processes (such as indigenous rights) or rights of entry to the country should they return (such as citizenship rights for partners of expats). Each of these has a specific set of factors of interest. From the economic perspective, the need differs slightly since there the focus is on skills transfer and the economic outcomes that derive from changes in the skill base of society. But from the social perspective, the information needs are quite different. In this case we might like to know how they are connected and what the implications of these connections are.

30. These outcomes are features of most migrant receiving countries and they point to one of the key problem in diaspora studies – viz. who do we count as members of the diasporas: only those born in the subject country or do we include their partners and their children born elsewhere, all of whom may or may not have legislative rights of access to residence? The size and characteristics of the diaspora may vary considerably depending on which set of criteria are being applied. For electoral purposes, only those eligible to vote or will become eligible to vote are of interest, whereas in the wider social context the diaspora may include people not eligible to vote together with their partners and children.

31. These are central questions in defining and measuring the diaspora of any country. Should only those with active links be counted, and if so how might these be defined? Conversely, at the other extreme, do we accept anybody of whatever status simply on the basis of a self-defined allegiance to the cultural or economic activities of the country, along with their extended families? These are not trivial questions and even were the basis to be strictly by birthplace, as Dumont and Lamaître (2004) have shown, available data sources are at best sparse within the OECD countries and outside the OECD the ground is even patchier, so that the United Nations were reluctant to extend the OECD work globally.

32. It is generally true that most countries know very little about their diaspora. In many countries, even basic information such as numerical records of migration flows is lacking, let alone sufficient data to be able to analyse the characteristics of these populations. For this reason the key to understanding depends on the type of initiative taken by the OECD in collecting information from member countries on foreign-born adults. This should be extended by the United Nations to gather together this information from every country. However, this assumes that each country has this information. Not all censuses and population registers collect basic information such as date of birth, sex, ethnicity and place of birth. These four variables are fundamentally important. Countries which have good migration data, such as New Zealand, are still plagued by difficulties with category jumping and sampling error. Many countries have to rely entirely on local specialised surveys.

33. The information needs are the same as for any other population group – basic demographic information such as age, sex, place of birth and ethnicity are clearly important but need to be collected in a consistent and comparable manner. Similarly other characteristics of importance to economic activity such as educational qualifications, labour force status and occupation should be collected, though in these cases the difficulty of comparability of classifications is more problematic.

34. But the concern here is on society and migration, and to better understand integration, alongside these data we also need a range of information on partnership/marital status including the ability to look at partners together and separately. Similarly, information on children in families, where these children were born and their ages, sex and relationship to their parent(s) are key pieces of information. In an ideal world each country would collect this information and this is then shared with the source countries so that a comprehensive picture of the diaspora for each country can be pulled together. To progress the study of diaspora three things need to happen – first there need to be general agreement to the most important questions to be answered, secondly the data need to be collected and thirdly the data need to be freely available to all users.

35. Beyond information on the number of people and their characteristics, we also need to reach an understanding of the motivations which drive decisions to move, if we are to begin to understand the nature of migration in any depth. There have been few surveys which have sought information on why people choose to live where they do or choose to migrate. In New Zealand for example there is information available from the survey of expatriates (run by KEA New Zealand), a Longitudinal Immigration Survey of New Zealand (run by Statistics New Zealand and the Department of Labour) which asks new migrants about their settlement experience in their first three years, and the Dynamics and Motivations for Migration Survey (run by Statistics New Zealand) which investigates the reasons why people move. Few countries currently have this type of information for internal migration and even fewer for international migration. This is seen as a significant information gap.

## VII. CONCLUSION

36. The social dimension of population mobility and globalisation has far-reaching implications for the Pacific-Asia region as it has, indeed, for all regions of the planet. Among the consequences of globalisation has been a growing interdependence of information systems and the need for sustainability at both regional and global scales. Along with this, globalisation has modified the conception and perception of both time and space within which migration happens (Harvey, 1989), the magnitude of migration flows (Hugo, Callister, Badkar 2008) and the diversity of migrants. These changes have made the measurement of population mobility in general, and of diasporas in particular, increasingly urgent.

37. Fundamental to understanding the integration of migrants is information which allows this to be monitored and measured. The assumption in this paper is that integration of migrants into their new society alongside engagement with the diaspora is important. Consistent measurement of the foreign-born across countries would enable improved measurement of the diaspora by integration of data from these various sources. Even such basic information as the number of people is difficult to extract from existing data sources because very few countries collect both country of birth and country of citizenship, and not all collect even the basic country of birth

information. Beyond where people are, where they have come from, and how many are there, some basic demographic characteristics of the groups are required such as age, sex, living arrangements and ethnicity. The challenge here is to ensure that the data are collected in a consistent manner that allows comparability across countries.

38. Along with the number of people, and the basic demographic information about them, we also need to reach an understanding of the motivations which drive decisions to move. This information is very important for understanding settlement impediments and for defining ways in which countries might engage with their diasporas.

39. However, in a globalised world there are new challenges: with global networks, the relationship between the host and source countries is no longer bilateral because the networks also involve various other locations of the diaspora, for example New Zealanders in Australia, England, Russia or Japan are often quite different in the way they relate to their host countries but have networks in common that tie them together even, in some cases, without maintaining their links with New Zealand. Thus the measurement of outcomes is as important as the measurement of population and motivations.

40. The underlying assumption in much of the literature and policy aspirations is that the diaspora consists of people who would eventually return to the birth country. However, increasingly people may move, simply because they are mobile people, but they may move to settle in an entirely different country rather than return home or integrate into their host society. How this global frame of mobility fits into a local frame of integration remains to be solved as perhaps one of the more important emerging issues.

41. Because policy tends to be reactive and to be very limited in scope, there would seem to be little potential to control many of these processes. Among the more effective instruments are reciprocal agreements but these tend to be connected with retirement benefits, for example, which apply only to some sections of the diaspora in particular countries or fiscal penalties such as interest charged on student loans for borrowers who do not reside in New Zealand. One key limitation for most countries is that there are usually strict controls on who comes in, but there is no control on who leaves except in so far as the destination country may impose restrictions on entry. But it is essential to understand who is leaving or arriving and their motivations, and to be aware of ways in which they may be influenced or modified to produce effective social outcomes.

42. Perhaps, though, Gregory's comment in a different context could be applied perfectly to diasporas: they are "complex and generalities are hard to come by. We cannot survey everything. Clearly, we need indicators sampled from the whole." (Gregory, 2006).

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## APPENDIX

### I. AN EMERGING RESEARCH TOPIC

1. As many studies of foreign born populations have shown, there is a wide variety of ways in which different communities engage with their neighbourhoods. This is true too of the diaspora. In the case of the New Zealand diaspora for example, people living in Germany will have a different relationship with Germans and with New Zealand than people living in China will have with China and with New Zealand. Hence, just as it is not valid to regard foreign-born people in any country as the same without regard to their birthplace, it is invalid to treat any diaspora in a monolithic way without regard to the context of their new country. But operating across this diversity is the effect of globalised networking, which not only allows shared experiences across many sectors of the diaspora but also across the many interfaces of the diasporas and their many host societies.

2. This complexity also applies to the national situations. Inter-regional and intra-regional flows are the main focus of migration, diaspora and social cohesion studies, but the relationship between international and intra-national migration is both complex and important. One area of growing interest is that how permanent and temporary migration interfaces with other short term moves and how these affect social interactions in an environment of greater globalisation, compression of time and distance and the exposure to greater diversity of visitors, affecting in turn the relationship between countries and their diasporas. The social impact of temporary migration has only begun to be appreciated in diaspora studies, partly because temporary migration can translate into later permanent migration and partly because temporary migrants often connect quite intensively with local settlers from their source countries. In many cases, language skills and local knowledge also create connections between diasporas and tourism linking countries as well as various service communities. What is also often overlooked is the magnitude and impact of domestic tourism on social networks and shared experiences. The economic and environmental benefits and costs of domestic and international flows are well studied, but very little has been done yet on the social aspects.

## II. TABLES

**Table 1: People usually resident in New Zealand by ethnicity and birthplace and population of associated countries of birth**

Ethnicity	Population Resident in New Zealand	Birthplace		Estimated population of source country
		New Zealand	Overseas	
Fijian	9,862	4,250	5,506	836,000
Western Samoan	131,102	77,245	52,175	182,700
Tongan	50,479	27,694	21,727	98,300
Cook Island Maori	58,010	41,886	15,177	14,000
Niuean	22,475	16,274	5,678	1,600
Tokelauan	6,821	4,626	2,088	1,392

Source: NZ Census 2006, UN estimates.

**Table 2: People born in New Zealand and living in the OECD, by age group, sex and country of residence (circa 2000)**

Country in which enumerated	Resident Population by Age							
	15-24	25-64	65+	Total	15-24	25-64	65+	Total
	Male				Female			
Australia	22912	126486	10510	159908	23133	121123	11836	156092
Austria	8	85	1	94	14	96	1	111
Belgium	18	123	2	143	26	91	11	128
Canada	465	3610	565	4640	490	3695	490	4675
Switzerland	71	384	4	459	94	397	21	512
Czech Republic	3	15	0	18	3	10	0	13
Denmark	18	258	8	284	32	132	11	175
Spain	8	135	8	151	5	109	12	126
Finland	0	45	5	50	5	20	0	25
France	53	388	28	469	69	318	29	416
UK	2756	21527	1570	25853	3740	23121	1893	28754
Greece	39	134	5	178	39	261	3	303
Hungary	1	15	0	16	3	9	0	12
Ireland	108	903	27	1038	129	816	21	966
Italy	28	188	15	231	29	263	28	320
Japan	242	1148	18	1408	241	526	8	775
Luxemburg	1	20	0	21	0	11	0	11
Mexico	3	31	2	36	0	20	2	22
Netherlands	NA	NA	NA	1491	NA	NA	NA	1812
Norway	4	105	0	109	3	95	8	106
New Zealand	198429	694281	136431	1029141	196575	736641	183330	1116546
Poland	3	15	6	24	6	9	0	15
Portugal	2	14	2	18	1	24	2	27
Slovakia	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Sweden	45	500	0	545	40	210	15	265
Turkey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USA	1134	10117	708	11959	1085	8899	1591	11575
Total				1238286				1323782

Source: OECD expatriates database

**Table 3: New Zealand Usually Resident Population, selected OECD birthplaces, 2006  
Census**

Country of birth	Resident Population by Age							
	15-24	25-64	65+	Total	15-24	25-64	65+	Total
	Male				Female			
Australia	4419	12300	2295	19017	4665	14952	3507	23124
Austria	36	381	204	618	48	315	159	522
Belgium	21	147	36	201	36	165	48	249
Canada	498	2232	396	3126	495	2745	567	3807
Switzerland	117	963	231	1308	123	876	186	1185
Czech Republic	54	183	78	315	57	171	48	276
Denmark	42	426	240	708	54	408	174	636
Spain	18	93	18	129	12	123	18	153
Finland	6	90	18	117	27	159	42	228
France	114	516	63	693	99	510	93	705
UK	4617	69456	29094	103167	4272	67272	32961	104505
Greece	21	327	117	465	21	285	132	438
Hungary	27	285	219	531	24	246	147	417
Ireland	117	1950	1371	3438	111	1824	1197	3132
Italy	33	482	210	726	36	318	285	639
Japan	1104	1638	87	2829	1590	3429	147	5166
Luxemburg	3	6	3	12	6	9	0	15
Mexico	21	69	6	96	15	81	9	105
Netherlands	519	6342	4893	11751	501	5724	3708	9933
Norway	63	117	42	219	57	120	24	198
New Zealand	198432	694287	136425	1029147	196578	736626	183330	1116531
Poland	75	393	399	864	66	483	435	984
Portugal	3	63	6	72	12	33	9	54
Slovakia	9	39	12	60	12	48	3	66
Sweden	75	243	24	342	102	369	33	504
Turkey	18	201	21	240	12	81	24	117
USA	963	3882	516	5358	972	4197	423	5595
Total	211419	797115	177021	1185556	210006	841572	227712	1279287

Source: NZ Census 2006. Note: data confidentialised

**Table 4: Age structure, citizenship status and birthplace, KEA survey of expatriate New Zealanders, 2006**

Five Year Age Group	Citizenship Status					
	NZ Citizenship only	NZ Citizenship plus other citizenships	Not stated	NZ Citizenship only	NZ Citizenship plus other citizenships	Not stated
	Number			Percent Born in New Zealand		
00-04yrs	9	16	1	100.0	25.0	100.0
05-09yrs	0	6	0	n.a.	16.7	n.a.
10-14yrs	12	14	0	91.7	35.7	n.a.
15-19yrs	84	56	7	84.5	41.1	28.6
20-24yrs	745	304	34	92.6	67.8	47.1
25-29yrs	3,568	1,234	88	93.7	73.7	46.6
30-34yrs	2,908	1,346	97	94.9	78.5	52.6
35-39yrs	1,474	1,020	55	95.0	77.2	38.2
40-44yrs	904	621	29	93.9	78.7	41.4
45-49yrs	578	477	21	93.6	80.7	47.6
50-54yrs	497	366	21	91.1	85.0	38.1
55-59yrs	427	333	25	94.1	76.0	24.0
60-64yrs	169	210	14	91.1	79.0	50.0
65+yrs	92	121	19	91.3	81.0	63.2
Total	11,467	6,124	411	93.9	76.6	45.5

Source: KEA Survey

\* \* \* \* \*