The still fragile
east European and CIS economies
will be badly hurt by a European and global slowdown
UNECE releases its first 2001 Economic Survey of Europe
"For the first time since the start of their economic and
political transformation, the former centrally planned economies of eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union were all growing in 2000: their aggregate GDP increased by 6 per cent,
significantly more than the world economy as a whole" stresses Dr. Danuta Hübner,
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
commenting the latest issue of the Economic Survey for Europe, just released by the
UNECE. "However, the prospects for growth in countries with economies in transition
depend on the performance of North American and west European economies. According to
earlier official forecasts for 2001, the economies of eastern Europe, including the Baltic
States, as well as Russia and the other members of the CIS, were expected to grow by some
4%. But if the European and global slowdown deepens, growth in the fragile east European
and CIS economies is likely to fall significantly short of these expectations.
2000 an exceptional year
The very high rate of economic growth of 2000 was largely due to the
unexpectedly strong recovery in Russia where GDP increased by 7.7 per cent, its highest
growth rate in more than 30 years. After a weak performance in 1999, output also recovered
strongly in eastern Europe and in the Baltic states, their aggregate GDP increasing by 3.9
per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively.
These outcomes suggest that after 10 years of painful reforms, the
prolonged and deep transformational recession in these economies has for the most part
come to an end. Divergent experiences in coping with this difficult phase, as well as in
the deepening and widening of the reform process, has left the region much more
heterogeneous than it was 10 years ago. Most central European and Baltic states have
already made considerable progress in instituting a functioning market economy and have
enjoyed several years of strong economic growth. At the same time, in a number of other
countries the transformational recession and the process of introducing basic reforms has
turned out to be much longer and much more strenuous than initially expected: for some CIS
economies 2000 was the first year of positive growth in a decade while in Yugoslavia real
market reforms can only now get underway with the new, democratically elected government.
Despite weak domestic demand
The strong growth in the transition economies in 2000 is a positive and
encouraging outcome; at the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that for a number
of countries this represents only a meagre recovery after a long economic slump. In fact,
after 10 years of reform only four economies (Hungary in 2000, Poland in 1995, Slovakia in
1999 and Slovenia in 1998) have managed to surpass their levels of GDP prevailing before
the start of transformation. On average, the CIS economies are still some 40 per cent
below their GDP levels of 1989 and in a number of individual countries GDP in 2000 was
less than half of what was being produced a decade ago.
It should also be emphasized that, with the exception of a few central
European economies, domestic demand generally remains weak despite its moderate recovery
in 2000. This reflects the fact that in a number of countries, especially in south-east
Europe, central Asia and Caucasus, large sections of the population have suffered
considerable impoverishment during the prolonged recession, while investment fell
dramatically in the face of highly uncertain economic prospects. The falls in output and
incomes in these economies are of such magnitude that it will probably take many years
before the population at large begins to sense the positive outcomes of the reform
process.
A result of the sweeping reforms
Nevertheless, as a result of the sweeping reforms of the past decade,
most transition economies have established most of the basic institutions of a market
economy and have liberalized their domestic markets and foreign trade (admittedly, to
widely varying degrees). With the exception of a few CIS countries, the transition
economies can now be considered as open economies that have the potential to benefit from
their increased trade with the rest of the world. In fact, the growth figures for 2000
underline the gains from trade that are now possible for the transition economies.
Thus, in 2000, many transition economies benefited from strong and
diversified demand in their major export markets, principally for manufactured goods but
also for services and a wide range of primary commodities and semi-manufactures. In
particular, the east European and the Baltic economies capitalized on the sharp rebound in
west European import demand while the recovery in Russia stimulated exports from
neighbouring CIS countries. In addition, the commodity exporting countries (and especially
the oil and natural gas exporters in the CIS) benefited from the upsurge in world market
prices which led to a considerable improvement in their trade and current account
balances.
EU main trading partner
The EU is now the main trading partner for all the east European and
Baltic economies, accounting for about two thirds of their exports and imports. The
exposure of the transition economies to the EU in terms of the relative importance of
these trade flows, is much greater than the exposure of the EU to eastern Europe and the
Baltic states. Hence, eastern Europe and the Baltic area are extremely susceptible (in
both positive and negative directions) to changes in west European import demand. Another
element in their greater sensitivity is the fact that supply-side constraints in the
transition economies have been generally low in recent years due to the availability of
underutilized resources (labour and, to a lesser extent, physical capital) and the
start-up of large new capacities thanks to greenfield investments, usually involving FDI,
and especially in those countries bordering the EU. This, in turn, has amplified the
gearing effect of west European demand, on the one hand allowing eastern manufacturers to
export even more during periods of boom but on the other hand reinforcing the probability
of negative shocks during the downturn. During the second half of the 1990s the
approximate elasticity of total central European and Baltic exports with respect to total
west European import demand has been roughly of the order of 2 to 3 (chart 1.3.1).
CHART
1.3.1
Real west European imports and real exports of central Europe and the
Baltic states, 1995-2001
(Annual percentage change)
Source:
UN/ECE
secretariat calculations, based on national data.
Note:
Real
imports of west European countries (goods and services); real exports of central Europe
and Baltic countries do not include Slovakia, for which data are not available.
The contrast between the development of trade in 1999 and 2000
is especially revealing. In 1999 total west European imports rose by just 6 per cent which
contributed to an increase in central European and Baltic exports by a little over
7 per cent, which for the latter was one of the smallest increases during the second
half of the 1990s (chart 1.3.1). Given the persistence of weak domestic demand, aggregate
GDP in eastern Europe rose by a meagre 1.3 per cent, while the Baltic area as a whole went
into recession (the aftershocks of the Russian crisis reinforcing the general economic
weakness in 1999). In contrast, the acceleration in the volume of west European imports in
2000 (increasing in aggregate by a little over 10 per cent) was the major factor behind
central European and Baltic exports increasing by some 20 per cent in volume. This strong
export performance made a major contribution to the recovery of output in eastern Europe
and the Baltic area in 2000.
The upsurge in world market prices of oil and other primary
commodities, coupled with a stronger dollar in which most commodities are traded, provided
a substantial terms of trade gain for the commodity exporting transition economies that
underpinned their growth in 2000. As discussed in chapter 3 of the Survey, the
effect of such a terms of trade gain is indirect: in the first place it helps to raise
final domestic demand and imports; and subsequently, the increase in demand may lead to
higher domestic output as well. When such a transmission channel is functioning in a large
economy, the increase in its import demand can boost the exports of its main suppliers:
this is how Russia’s terms of trade gains in 2000 not only contributed to the strong
recovery of the Russian economy but also served as an engine of growth for a number of
neighbouring CIS economies. Indeed, the Commonwealth of Independent States was the fastest
growing regional group among the transition economies in 2000: in nine of the 12 CIS
economies GDP growth was 5 per cent or more, resulting in an average of 7.4 per cent for
the Commonwealth as a whole.
No grounds for complacency
Despite the generally favourable outcome for economic growth in 2000,
there are no grounds for complacency among policy makers. The fact is that most transition
economies, including those most advanced in the reform process, are still rather fragile
and vulnerable to external and other disturbances that are capable of causing painful
setbacks in economic performance. Indeed, as already emphasized, the strong performance in
2000 underlines the considerable sensitivity of these economies to changes in the external
environment. Commodity exporters and economies specializing in exports of resource
intensive, low value added goods are especially vulnerable. Given their large exposure to
west European demand, the more advanced economies of central Europe and the Baltic area
are also very susceptible to changes in demand in their major external markets. Thus, as
the favourable external trends of 2000 are likely to be reversed, the transition economies
may well suffer a negative external shock.
Lower growth for 2001
The short-term outlook for the transition economies therefore hinges on
the two main factors that contributed to strong growth in 2000: west European import
demand and world commodity prices (especially for oil). The sudden and rapid deceleration
of the United States economy in the second half of 2000 and early 2001 has triggered a
gradual lowering of the forecasts for economic growth in western Europe as well. In
addition, oil prices have been falling since the last quarter of 2000 and it seems likely
that their average level in 2001 will be below that in 2000 (although still higher than in
1999). The first of these developments will have a serious impact on all the transition
economies, increasing the downside risks to their short-term prospects, but the second
will affect net oil importers and exporters differently.
The recent and rapid changes in the world economy do not appear to have
been always taken into account in the official forecasts for eastern Europe and the Baltic
states, most of which were made in the context of the budgetary preparations for 2001 when
the global slowdown was not yet visible (table 3.1.1). These forecasts suggest that
governments throughout eastern Europe and the Baltic area were generally expecting a
further strengthening of the recovery in 2001 and, in many cases, an acceleration of their
rates of economic growth. In fact, the most recent data indicate that, in a number of east
European and Baltic economies, the growth of output was already decelerating in the
closing months of 2000 and at the beginning of 2001.
Against this background, the actual short-term outlook for eastern
Europe and the Baltic area largely depends on the success or failure of western Europe in
countering the weakening of its own prospects for output growth. A benign scenario (along
the lines of the official forecasts in eastern Europe and the Baltic states) is
conditional on success in arresting the slowdown in western Europe and, especially, in
Germany. But given the considerable dependence on exports to western Europe, significantly
lower growth in the latter could effectively translate into a reduction of average GDP
growth in eastern Europe and the Baltic area by 1-2 percentage points.
The unprecedented growth of Russia’s GDP in 2000 reflected the
combination of a low base (due to the 1998 crisis) and an extremely favourable external
environment which is unlikely to be sustained. Indeed, all the indications are that the
Russian economy (in particular industrial output) was also slowing down at the beginning
of 2001. If oil prices continue to fall, domestic demand and industrial activity in Russia
will be negatively affected and the official forecast for the year as a whole (GDP growth
of 4 per cent) will be difficult to achieve. The prospects for most of the other CIS
economies are conditional both on the outlook for world oil and commodity prices and on
the performance of the Russian economy, including the development of the rouble exchange
rate. Hence, the uncertainties concerning the outlook for Russia are largely translated
into uncertainties for the Commonwealth as a whole.
TABLE
3.1.1
Basic economic indicators for eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the
CIS, 1998-2001
(Rates of change and shares, per cent)
| |
GDP (growth rates) |
Industrial output
(growth rates) |
Inflation (per cent
change, Dec./Dec.) |
Unemployment rate (end
of period, per cent) |
| |
|
|
2000 |
2001 |
| |
1998 |
1999 |
Ex-ante forecast |
Actual outcome |
official forecast |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
| Eastern
Europe |
1.8 |
1.3 |
4 |
3.9 |
4.2 |
1.4 |
-0.1 |
8.3 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
12.6 |
14.6 |
15.1 |
| Albania |
8 |
7.3 |
8 |
8* |
5-7 |
21.8 |
16 |
12* |
7.8 |
-1.0 |
4.2 |
17.6 |
18.2 |
16.9 |
| Bosnia
and Herzegovina a |
.. |
.. |
12 |
10* |
7-9 |
23.8 |
10.6 |
8.8 |
2.2 |
-0.4 |
3.4 |
38.7 |
39.0 |
39.4 |
| Bulgaria |
3.5 |
2.4 |
4 |
5.0* |
5 |
-7.9 |
-12.3 |
2.3 |
0.9 |
6.2 |
11.2 |
12.2 |
16.0 |
17.9 |
| Croatia |
2.5 |
-0.4 |
2.6 |
3.7 |
3-4 |
3.7 |
-1.4 |
1.7 |
5.6 |
4.6 |
7.5 |
18.6 |
20.8 |
22.6 |
| Czech
Republic |
-2.2 |
-0.8 |
1.5 |
3.1 |
3 |
1.6 |
-3.1 |
5.1 |
6.7 |
2.5 |
4.1 |
7.5 |
9.4 |
8.8 |
| Hungary |
4.9 |
4.4 |
5 |
5.2 |
4.5-5 |
12.5 |
10.4 |
18.3 |
10.4 |
11.3 |
10.1 |
9.1 |
9.6 |
8.9 |
| Poland |
4.8 |
4.1 |
5.2 |
4.1 |
4.5 |
3.5 |
4.8 |
7.1 |
8.5 |
9.9 |
8.6 |
10.4 |
13.0 |
15.0 |
| Romania |
-5.4 |
-3.2 |
1.3 |
1.6 |
4.1 |
-13.8 |
-7.9 |
8.2 |
40.7 |
54.9 |
40.7 |
10.3 |
11.5 |
10.5 |
| Slovakia |
4.1 |
1.9 |
2 |
2.2 |
3.2 |
3.8 |
-3.6 |
9.1 |
5.5 |
14.2 |
8.3 |
15.6 |
19.2 |
17.9 |
| Slovenia |
3.8 |
5.2 |
3.75 |
4.8 |
4.5 |
3.7 |
-0.5 |
6.2 |
6.6 |
8.1 |
9.0 |
14.6 |
13.0 |
12.0 |
| The
former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia |
2.9 |
2.7 |
6 |
5.1 |
6 |
4.5 |
-2.6 |
3.5 |
-1.1 |
2.3 |
10.8 |
41.4 |
43.8 |
44.9 |
| Yugoslavia b |
2.5 |
-19.3 |
14 |
10.0 |
5 |
3.6 |
-23.1 |
10.9 |
45.7 |
54.0 |
115.1 |
27.2 |
27.4 |
26.6 |
| Baltic
states |
4.7 |
-2.0 |
3 |
4.8 |
4.7 |
6.0 |
-7.6 |
6.7 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
7.3 |
9.1 |
10.0 |
| Estonia |
4.7 |
-1.1 |
3.8-4.0 |
6.4* |
6 |
4.1 |
-1.7 |
9.1 |
6.8 |
3.9 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
6.7 |
7.3 |
| Latvia |
3.9 |
1.1 |
3.5 |
6.6 |
5-6 |
3.1 |
-5.4 |
3.2 |
2.8 |
3.3 |
1.9 |
9.2 |
9.1 |
7.8 |
| Lithuania |
5.1 |
-4.2 |
2 |
2.9 |
3.7 |
8.2 |
-11.2 |
7.0 |
2.4 |
0.3 |
1.5 |
6.9 |
10.0 |
12.6 |
| CIS |
-3.0 |
3.2 |
2.3 |
7.4 |
4.2 |
-3.1 |
7.3 |
9.6 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
9.0 |
8.3 |
6.9 |
| Armenia |
7.3 |
3.3 |
5.6 |
6.0 |
6.5 |
-2.1 |
5.2 |
6.4 |
-1.2 |
2.1 |
0.4 |
8.9 |
11.5 |
10.9 |
| Azerbaijan |
10.0 |
7.4 |
8 |
11.4 |
8.5 |
2.2 |
3.6 |
6.9 |
-7.6 |
-0.5 |
2.1 |
1.4 |
1.2 |
1.2 |
| Belarus |
8.4 |
3.4 |
2-3 |
5.8 |
3-4 |
12.4 |
10.3 |
8.0 |
181.6 |
251.3 |
108.0 |
2.3 |
2.0 |
2.1 |
| Georgia |
2.9 |
3.0 |
4.2-4.8 |
1.9 |
3-4 |
-1.8 |
7.4 |
6.1 |
13.4 |
11.1 |
4.6 |
4.2 |
5.6 |
.. |
| Kazakhstan |
-1.9 |
2.7 |
3 |
9.6 |
4 |
-2.4 |
2.7 |
14.6 |
1.9 |
18.1 |
10.0 |
3.7 |
3.9 |
3.7 |
| Kyrgyzstan |
2.1 |
3.7 |
4-5 |
5.0 |
5 |
5.3 |
-4.3 |
6.0 |
16.6 |
39.8 |
9.5 |
3.1 |
3.0 |
3.1 |
| Republic
of Moldova c |
-6.5 |
-3.4 |
2 |
1.9 |
5 |
-15.0 |
-9.0 |
2.3 |
18.2 |
43.8 |
18.5 |
1.9 |
2.1 |
1.8 |
| Russian
Federation |
-4.9 |
3.5 |
1.5-2.5 |
7.7 |
4 |
-5.2 |
8.1 |
9.0 |
84.5 |
36.6 |
20.1 |
13.3 |
12.2 |
9.7 |
| Tajikistan |
5.3 |
3.7 |
.. |
8.3 |
6.7 |
8.2 |
5.6 |
10.3 |
2.7 |
30.1 |
60.6 |
2.9 |
3.1 |
3.0 |
| Turkmenistan |
5.0 |
16.0 |
12 |
17.6 |
16 |
0.2 |
15.0 |
25* |
19.8 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
| Ukraine |
-1.9 |
-0.4 |
1 |
6.0 |
3-4 |
-1.0 |
4.3 |
12.9 |
20.0 |
19.2 |
25.8 |
4.3 |
4.3 |
4.2 |
| Uzbekistan |
4.4 |
4.4 |
5 |
4.0 |
4.4 |
3.6 |
6.1 |
6.4 |
25.9 |
26.0 |
.. |
0.4 |
0.5 |
0.6 |
| Total
above |
-1.1 |
2.4 |
3 |
6.0 |
4.2 |
-0.9 |
3.7 |
9.0 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
| Memorandum
items: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CETE-5 |
3.2 |
3.0 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
4.1 |
4.5 |
2.9 |
8.7 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
10.2 |
12.5 |
13.3 |
| SETE-7 |
-1.5 |
-3.0 |
3.6 |
3.6 |
4.5 |
-7.3 |
-9.9 |
6.6 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
15.4 |
16.5 |
17.8 |
| Former
GDR |
2.0 |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
7.6 |
4.8 |
.. |
1.1 |
0.2 |
.. |
17.4 |
17.7 |
17.2 |
Source:
National statistics; CIS Statistical Committee; direct
communications from national statistical offices to UN/ECE secretariat (IMF and World Bank
data for Albania).
Note:
Aggregates
are UN/ECE secretariat calculations, using PPPs obtained from the 1996 European Comparison
Programme. Output measures are in real terms (constant prices). Forecasts are those of
national conjunctural institutes or government forecasts associated with the central
budget formulation. Industrial output refers to gross output, not the contribution of
industry to GDP. Inflation refers to changes in the consumer price index. Unemployment
generally refers to registered unemployment at the end of the period (with the exceptions
of the Russian Federation where it is the Goskomstat estimate according to the ILO
definition, and Estonia where it refers to job seekers). Aggregates shown are: Eastern
Europe (the 12 countries below that line), with sub-aggregates CETE-5 (central
European transition economies: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and SETE-7 (south-east European transition economies: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Romania, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia); Baltic
states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); and CIS (12 member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States).
a
Data reported by the
Statistical Office of the Federation; these exclude the area of Republika Srpska.
b
Data for 1999 and 2000 exclude
Kosovo and Metohia.
c
Excluding Transdniestria.
TABLE 3.1.2
International trade and external balances of eastern Europe, the Baltic
states and the CIS, 1998-2000
(Rates of change and shares, per cent)
| |
Merchandise exports in dollars
(growth rates) |
Merchandise imports in dollars
(growth rates) |
Trade balances
(per cent of GDP) |
Current account
(per cent of GDP) |
| |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 a |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 a |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 a |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 a |
| Eastern
Europe |
9.3 |
-1.2 |
12.9 |
9.0 |
-2.5 |
11.0 |
-9.9 |
-9.6 |
-9.8 |
-4.6 |
-5.6 |
-5.2 |
| Albania |
50.9 |
28.3 |
-10.0 |
28.2 |
11.3 |
14.0 |
-19.2 |
-16.9 |
-20.6 |
-1.5 |
-4.2 |
-13.4 |
| Bosnia and
Herzegovina |
82.7 |
47.3 |
30.2 |
36.4 |
14.7 |
-5.8 |
-41.7 |
-42.1 |
-32.6 |
-18.6 |
-21.4 |
-17.7 |
| Bulgaria |
-15.1 |
-4.5 |
20.0 |
0.5 |
11.3 |
17.6 |
-6.2 |
-12.2 |
-13.6 |
-0.5 |
-5.3 |
-5.6 |
| Croatia |
8.9 |
-5.3 |
3.0 |
-7.9 |
-7.0 |
1.6 |
-17.8 |
-17.4 |
-18.3 |
-7.1 |
-7.6 |
-3.9 |
| Czech Republic |
15.7 |
-0.4 |
10.4 |
4.4 |
-2.5 |
14.9 |
-4.3 |
-3.5 |
-6.6 |
-2.4 |
-3.0 |
-4.8 |
| Hungary |
20.4 |
8.7 |
12.3 |
21.1 |
9.0 |
14.5 |
-5.7 |
-6.2 |
-8.5 |
-4.9 |
-4.3 |
-3.7 |
| Poland |
2.6 |
-2.9 |
15.5 |
10.9 |
-2.4 |
6.6 |
-11.9 |
-11.9 |
-10.9 |
-4.3 |
-7.4 |
-6.3 |
| Romania |
-1.5 |
2.4 |
21.9 |
4.9 |
-12.2 |
25.6 |
-8.5 |
-5.6 |
-7.3 |
-7.2 |
-3.8 |
-3.8 |
| Slovakia |
11.8 |
-4.6 |
15.8 |
11.9 |
-13.4 |
12.5 |
-10.5 |
-5.0 |
-4.0 |
-9.7 |
-5.5 |
-3.9 |
| Slovenia |
8.1 |
-5.6 |
2.2 |
7.8 |
-0.2 |
0.3 |
-5.4 |
-7.7 |
-7.6 |
-0.8 |
-3.9 |
-3.2 |
| The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia |
6.0 |
-9.1 |
11.3 |
7.7 |
-7.2 |
16.3 |
-17.2 |
-17.0 |
-21.0 |
-8.8 |
-3.9 |
-5.7 |
| Yugoslavia |
6.8 |
-47.6 |
15.1 |
0.1 |
-31.8 |
12.6 |
-11.8 |
-10.9 |
-7.9 |
-7.4 |
-8.7 |
-5.6 |
| Baltic states |
3.5 |
-12.5 |
24.9 |
7.5 |
-13.7 |
15.0 |
-22.7 |
-18.8 |
-17.5 |
-11.0 |
-9.5 |
-6.2 |
| Estonia |
10.3 |
-9.2 |
33.2 |
7.8 |
-14.2 |
23.7 |
-29.7 |
-22.8 |
-22.5 |
-9.2 |
-5.7 |
-6.8 |
| Latvia |
8.3 |
-4.9 |
8.1 |
17.1 |
-7.6 |
8.1 |
-22.6 |
-18.4 |
-19.0 |
-10.7 |
-9.7 |
-7.2 |
| Lithuania |
-3.9 |
-19.0 |
28.1 |
2.6 |
-16.6 |
13.0 |
-19.4 |
-17.2 |
-14.4 |
-12.1 |
-11.2 |
-5.3 |
| CIS b |
-15.2 |
-1.1 |
46.0 |
-14.0 |
-23.8 |
15.6 |
6.0 |
14.9 |
22.0 |
-1.7 |
8.3 |
14.8 |
| Armenia |
-5.2 |
5.4 |
22.5 |
1.1 |
-11.2 |
10.9 |
-36.0 |
-30.9 |
-33.3 |
-21.3 |
-16.6 |
-16.0 |
| Azerbaijan |
-22.4 |
53.3 |
235.7 |
35.6 |
-3.9 |
10.3 |
-10.6 |
-2.4 |
19.3 |
-30.7 |
-13.3 |
1.9 |
| Belarus |
-3.2 |
-16.2 |
29.4 |
-1.6 |
-22.1 |
36.5 |
-12.4 |
-6.7 |
-11.6 |
-7.3 |
-2.3 |
-1.7 |
| Georgia |
-19.7 |
23.7 |
50.3 |
-6.3 |
-31.9 |
7.1 |
-19.0 |
-12.8 |
-9.9 |
-11.4 |
-6.9 |
-7.5 |
| Kazakhstan |
-16.3 |
2.9 |
76.7 |
1.1 |
-15.3 |
30.5 |
4.9 |
11.3 |
21.3 |
-5.6 |
-1.4 |
4.8 |
| Kyrgyzstan |
-15.0 |
-11.6 |
10.6 |
18.7 |
-28.7 |
-6.1 |
-20.5 |
-11.9 |
-0.9 |
-23.2 |
-15.1 |
-4.0 |
| Republic of Moldova |
-27.8 |
-26.9 |
2.9 |
-12.6 |
-44.0 |
39.0 |
-23.1 |
-9.5 |
-24.4 |
-19.3 |
-2.9 |
-7.9 |
| Russian Federation |
-16.3 |
0.5 |
49.5 |
-17.9 |
-29.5 |
9.3 |
10.2 |
22.4 |
28.7 |
0.3 |
13.4 |
19.3 |
| Tajikistan |
-20.0 |
15.4 |
13.5 |
-5.2 |
-6.7 |
1.0 |
-8.7 |
2.4 |
12.7 |
-9.1 |
1.6 |
10.4 |
| Turkmenistan |
-20.9 |
99.9 |
92.0 |
-14.9 |
46.7 |
36.9 |
-14.6 |
-8.9 |
12.4 |
-33.0 |
-26.0 |
1.5 |
| Ukraine |
-11.2 |
-8.4 |
23.9 |
-14.3 |
-19.3 |
21.3 |
-5.0 |
-0.9 |
1.8 |
-3.2 |
2.8 |
7.0 |
| Uzbekistan |
-20.1 |
-9.0 |
-2.9 |
-25.4 |
-9.1 |
-5.6 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.8 |
-0.7 |
-1.0 |
0.2 |
| Total above |
-3.5 |
-1.8 |
28.2 |
0.4 |
-10.2 |
13.3 |
-2.7 |
-0.1 |
4.7 |
-3.4 |
– |
4.3 |
| Memorandum
items: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CETE-5 |
11.6 |
0.1 |
12.2 |
11.1 |
-1.0 |
10.3 |
-9.0 |
-8.7 |
-9.1 |
-4.2 |
-5.8 |
-5.3 |
| SETE-7 |
-0.1 |
-6.8 |
16.2 |
2.2 |
-7.9 |
13.8 |
-12.7 |
-12.5 |
-12.4 |
-6.0 |
-5.1 |
-4.7 |
Source:
National statistics; CIS Statistical Committee; direct
communications from national statistical offices to UN/ECE secretariat; UN/ECE secretariat
calculations.
Note:
Foreign
trade growth is measured in current dollar values. Trade and current account balances are
related to GDP at current prices, converted from national currencies at current dollar
exchange rates. Current price GDP values for 2000 are in some cases estimated from
reported real growth rates and consumer price indices. On regional aggregates, see the
note to table 3.1.1.
a
Full year 2000
provisional results for eastern Europe and the Baltic states; January-September for CIS
and "Total above".
b
Including
intra-CIS trade.
Policy implications
This uncertain outlook, and the increasing downside risks, implies the
need for a more active role of economic policy in the transition economies in 2001 and
modifications to the policy stances embodied in government budgets already adopted for the
year. Policy makers will have to maintain a close monitoring not only of their own
economic performance but also of current developments in their main trading partners and
on the world markets. If external conditions continue to deteriorate, policy makers in the
transition economies will have to be prepared to act swiftly with counter cyclical
measures in order to offset, at least partly, an eventual negative shock. Although a full
offset may not be in their power, given the risk of aggravating existing imbalances,
timely policy responses may help to dampen its negative repercussions.
A prolonged slowdown, first in western Europe and then in the
transition economies as well, would pose significant risks for the process of economic
transformation and the future prospects of these economies. A slowdown will undoubtedly
have a strong negative impact on the labour markets of the transition economies which are
already in distress. At the end of 2000 the average unemployment rate in eastern Europe
was still around 15 per cent: despite the high rate of economic growth, enterprise
restructuring was still releasing more labour than was being employed in new jobs. A
slowdown in economic growth will not only worsen unemployment but the likely social
tensions may put a brake on the necessary but painful process of economic restructuring
and systemic reform.
As seen from recent experience, growth in the most successful
transition economies has been based on the expansion of exports and the upgrading of their
commodity structure, both of which are conditional on large amounts of fixed investment,
and especially of FDI. A slowdown of output growth in western Europe (which is a major
source of FDI for the transition economies) may also lead to the weakening of direct
investment in the transition economies. All these increasing downside risks in the
transition economies, together with those in western Europe, reinforce the case for a
counter cyclical policy stance.
A sharp and protracted slowdown in western Europe also carries risks
for the prospects of EU enlargement. As repeatedly stressed in this Survey, if the
transition economies are to catch up with the industrialized west European economies in
terms of per capita incomes and levels of development, they need to sustain high rates of
economic growth (of the order of 5-6 per cent per annum, or even more) for a sufficiently
long period of time. The candidate countries from eastern Europe and the Baltic area are
crucially dependent on robust import demand in the west European markets for making a
reality of such a strategy. "That is why maintaining high growth rates in Europe
matters", concludes Dr. Hübner.