EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: THE ROAD TO EU ACCESSION -
POLICY ISSUES AND THE NEED FOR A STRATEGY
9 December 1996
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) releases its Economic Bulletin for Europe (Vol. 48/1996)
The political momentum for rapid entry has been built up, especially by leaders and
policy makers in eastern Europe, and the year 2000 is widely quoted as the moment when
some of the transition economies might join the Union. Even for the leading transition
economies such an early date appears unrealistic, if only in view of the actual mechanics of the
negotiation and ratification process, let alone more substantive issues says Paul Rayment,
Director of the Division for Economic Analysis and Projections of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) commenting on the findings of the Economic Bulletin for Europe.
There is little question that the enlargement of the European Union (EU) towards the
countries of eastern Europe is an objective that is urgently desired by the eastern candidates
themselves and supported in principle by most of the existing members of the EU. However,
although the transition economies want to join as quickly as possible, in part to underpin their
transition process, most of the existing members are unwilling to contemplate the admission
of new members until agreement can be reached on deepening the integration of the existing
Union and introducing new rules and procedures to enable the Union's business to be carried
out more effectively. Thus, the persistent reminders from policy makers in the EU and the
Commission that there can be no "widening" of the Union without "deepening" integration
among the existing members. In the same context, the EU has also made it clear that there can
be no compromise over the acquis communautaire: the admission of new members will not be
possible unless they accept and apply the acquis in its entirety with minimal derogations during
the period from entry to full membership.
Given the different priorities of existing and potential members of the EU, the present
situation contains a considerable potential for upsets and disappointment, especially in eastern
Europe. If, as a result of a conflict between the short-term interests of each side, enlargement
is delayed beyond the current expectations of the east European candidates, there is a danger
of widespread disillusionment with the "European project" in the transition economies with
attendant risks to political stability and security in the region.
However, such an outcome is not only highly undesirable but it is also avoidable
stresses Paul Rayment. A rushed and premature entry of the transition economies into the
EU is unlikely to be in their longer-run economic interests if they are unable to face full-fledged
competition in the single market . In such a case they would risk being confined to low value-added activities, subject to increasing competition from transition economies farther east and
from the developing countries. A longer pre-accession period would give the candidates more
time to restructure their economies and build up the comparative advantages required for them
to participate as equal partners in the highly specialized and sophisticated division of labour
prevailing in the EU. The illusion is to suppose that these changes can be achieved only by
rapid entry into the EU.
The argument presented in the UN/ECE 1996 Economic Bulletin for Europe is that many
of the advantages of membership - access to the single market and economies of scale, direct
investment by western companies, credibility for domestic policies, etc. - can be achieved
before entry if the expectations of eventual accession are firmly based, not only in the political
commitments of the parties concerned but also in coherent and articulated strategies which will
raise confidence that the conditions for membership will be met. Also, strategies that support
the restructuring of the eastern economies and help to reduce the gap in income levels between
existing members and the candidates before entry will help to lower both the budgetary and
the adjustment costs of entry.
The case for a detailed pre-accession strategy, as sketched in the Bulletin, might also
appeal to the current members of the EU who obviously need time to resolve the issues before
the IGC96 and reassurance that the very idea of Europe as an integrated economic and,
increasingly, political space will not be lost or abandoned in the process of enlargement. The
ambitions of the existing members of the Union cannot be ignored by the transition economies,
however keen they may be to join as quickly as possible; but neither can the Union ignore the
fears of many in the transition economies at being left on the European "doorstep". If each side
can appreciate the interests and anxieties of the other a realistic compromise on approaching
enlargement must be possible, and the strategy suggested here could contribute towards the
process of creating the necessary institutions and other conditions required for full membership.
In the above discussion the ambition of the European Union for deeper integration
among themselves has been taken as given; and consideration of the details of the discussions
at the IGC96 and the probability of a "successful" outcome by mid-1997 has been avoided in
order to concentrate on the main proposal. But it is obvious that not all members of the Union
share the same integration objectives and this in turn is complicating the work of the IGC96.
If the outcome of the IGC96 is less than successful, in the sense of failing to resolve those
problems whose solution is regarded by many existing members as a necessary condition for
enlargement, then the negotiations for the accession of new members are unlikely to start
within the scheduled six months following the close of the Conference. In such circumstances,
the existence of a detailed and coherent strategy to help the transition economies forge ahead
with meeting the requirements for membership could play an important role in mitigating the
inevitable disappointment and negative effects on expectations that would ensue from any
postponement of the negotiations.
One of the crucial functions of such a strategy is to maintain support for the ultimate
objective of an enlarged European economic and political space while conveying a realistic
assessment of the time required to bring about effective institutional and structural change.
Ever since the transition process began in 1989, policy discussions have been excessively
preoccupied with how quickly rather than how effectively transformations can be carried out
concludes Paul Rayment.