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Francesco C. Billari

Choices, opportunities and constraints of partnership, childbearing and parenting: the patterns in the 1990s

Background paper for the session on:
Childbearing and parenting in low fertility countries: Enabling choices.

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Francesco C. Billari

Istituto di Metodi Quantitativi, Università Bocconi and IGIER

Address for correspondence: viale Isonzo 25, I-20135 Milano, Italy
E-mail: francesco.billari@uni-bocconi.it

**Choices, opportunities and constraints of partnership,
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1. Introduction

The patterns of partnership formation and dissolution, childbearing and parenting in the ECE during the 1990s are often heterogeneous, with fundamental differences between nations. However, if we want to characterize the unifying direction way we can use a keyword: *postponement*. In general, with some exceptions, key demographic events, and more specifically events leading to the formation of new households and families, have been postponed in the lives of women and men. In the new millennium, leaving the parental home, forming a new union, getting married and becoming a parent are experienced on average later than before. Although there is a convergence in terms of postponing key demographic transitions in early adulthood, some countries (mostly in Southern Europe) have been characterized by extreme levels of postponement, experiencing the so-called *latest-late* pattern of transition to adulthood.

This general trend towards postponement has been foreseen by scholars who have talked of the existence of a *Second Demographic Transition* pervading demographic change, which starts from Northern Europe and diffuses to the whole area of industrialized countries. Other authors have focused more specifically on the timing of events and have spoken of a hardly reversible *postponement transition*. Some of the events, like the transition to motherhood, have been postponed to ages that have not been observed in the past and becoming a mother above age 40 can now be an issue. Within reproductive ages, the general trend towards postponement is accompanied by an increasing *de-standardization* of life courses, with varying speed.

Nevertheless, diversity is still pervading fertility and family patterns in the ECE region: there are marked differences between nations in terms of childbearing and parenting. The number of children per couple, once below-replacement levels has been attained in almost all countries, has begun fluctuating at relatively low levels, in some countries not far from the replacement level. In other countries, fertility has reached levels that can be defined as very low, below 1.5 children per woman. During the 1990s, lowest low fertility, below 1.3 children per woman, has emerged in a number of countries of Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. The *emergence of lowest low fertility* is thus one of the most important novelties of the 1990s in the ECE area. This new phenomenon has also been accompanied by the *reversal* of well-known cross-country relationships between fertility levels and related behaviors: labor force participation levels are no longer negatively correlated with fertility, while the sign of correlations between marriage indicators and fertility has changed. *Adolescent childbearing is decreasing in the whole area*, but it still exhibits great differences among countries.

The role and prevalence of cohabitation are still remarkably dissimilar among countries, as is the link between partnership form and fertility. During the 1990s, in all ECE countries, with only one exception, the share of nonmarital births to all births has increased. In terms of partnership dissolution, levels of divorce rates are still very different across countries but the general trend is towards *less stable unions*. As a consequence, *unions of higher order have become more widespread* in women's and men's lives. In addition, the divorce rate is no longer inversely correlated with total fertility at a cross-country level. The differences in the types of partnerships and in dissolution rates translate to significant heterogeneity in parenting experiences and in the lives of children, who experience living with their parents in different ways across countries. On the other side, the length of parenting itself is markedly different according to the years spent by young adults in their parental home.

Several "families" of explanations can be used to discuss trends and differences. At the macro level, *economic trends and socio-economic policies* have often changed during the 1990s, sometimes in a fluctuating way. After the fall of socialist regimes at the beginning of the decade, *institutional settings*, for instance the main features of the welfare state, have been relatively stable, with

important exceptions in areas of conflict; institutional heterogeneity may explain an important part of international differences in behavior. *Long-term, stable cultural factors* also contribute to stabilize differences and to determine the path followed by different societies even when they follow common trends. However, *ideational change* may also affect demographic change in the shorter run, as in the idea of Second Demographic Transition. This societal-level situations interact in an important way with micro-level factors in determining international differences and trends in behavior.

Micro-level factors also underpin trends in partnering, childbearing and parenting behavior. What is most relevant for an international perspective is *micro-macro interaction*: factors at the micro (individual or household) level have a potentially different impact on behavior within different macro contexts. The equality in *gender* relationships, for instance, in the labor market (at the macro level) and in the household (at the micro level) has an important role in shaping family behavior. The influence of *economic factors* at the micro level, such as income, economic security and housing circumstances is buffered by the welfare state, which varies markedly in a cross-national view. The opportunity cost of time dedicated to the family, and the quality and quantity of time spent parenting within a family are also affected the interaction between micro- and macro-level opportunities and constraints. Social and economic policies may vary over time within a society and also vary in their impact on different societal strata. For these reasons, for almost no micro-level factor it is possible to assess the “true” role in shaping partnering, childbearing and parenting without taking the macro-level situation into account. Social interactions, in addition, contribute in maintaining the persistent diversity of behavior between countries also when the original differences have been removed.

This background paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the situation and trends in the ECE region during the 1990s for partnership formation and dissolution, childbearing, and parenting¹. Reference to comparative data is a crucial ingredient for this section, with the Fertility and Family Surveys project as an important new comparative source for the decade (although most surveys took of this series place too early to track the patterns during the 1990s)². In Section 3 we selectively review the literature aiming to explain the trends and differences outlined in Section 2, with an emphasis on the different school of thoughts existing in the literature. Section 4 contains an outlook for the future.

2. Locating patterns: the situation and trends in the ECE region during the 1990s

2.1 Partnership formation and dissolution in the era of spreading cohabitation and of the emergence of latest late transition to adulthood

At the beginning of the third millennium, marriage is no longer as central to the formation of co-residential and long-term partnerships as it used to be in the last decades of the XX century. This is undoubtedly a consequence of ideational change, with the relaxation of social norms pushing young adults towards marriage. Although marriage is still experienced by the vast majority of individuals living in the ECE region during their life, in most countries it is less and less common to experience

¹ Given the scope of this paper, we focus on nations as the relevant macro-level unit. Although it is clear that in many specific situations the choice of the national level for both describing trends and explaining behaviour is not adequate, such a focus remains the best in terms of information and usefulness when studying a large group of countries and the changes in the cross-country relationships over a time period.

² In the paper we shall sometimes focus on the experience of women. This choice is only affected by the desire to be concise and to use the best and most relevant statistical sources, while addressing directly the complex topic at glance. When trends are different or gender interactions are explicitly needed we shall use data on both genders.

marriage without premarital cohabitation. Moreover, in several countries, being married is no longer a precondition for becoming a parent. We first of all focus on partnership formation during early adulthood. Partnership formation is indeed a crucial point in the process of transition to adulthood, and in general it has been postponed. Can we see this as part of the general shift of the transition to adulthood to ages that were considered as “late” in the past, to a so-called *latest late* pattern of transition to adulthood (Billari et al., 2002)?

When we focus on the timing union formation, we have access to the official statistics on the timing of marriage, while the timing of cohabitation is not yet provided in official comparative statistics (United Nations, 2002). In table 1, we report the mean age at first marriage for women at ten-year distance for 1980, 1990, and 2000 for countries belonging to the Council of Europe, Canada and the U.S. The postponement of first marriage is clearly visible in the 1990s for all ECE countries. In 1980, in most countries the first marriage of women was experienced on average before age 25: Only limited exceptions were visible. This pattern has completely changed after 20 years: in 2000, only in a minority of countries is the mean age at first marriage lower than 25. Late (and less frequent) marriage has become the rule in Nordic countries, following their unique pattern; late marriage is also spread in all Western countries. Within Europe, as far as East-West differentials are concerned, the Hajnal line with an earlier and more universal marriage to the East of an imaginary line connecting Saint Petersburg and Trieste (Hajnal, 1965; Monnier and Rychtarikova, 1992) seems to still hold its separation power, perhaps refined as “Philipov” line (an imaginary line connecting St Petersburg with Dubrovnik) (Philipov, 2001). Central European Countries all occupy intermediate positions and some of them (i.e. Croatia and Slovenia) are clustered with the West. The postponement of marriage is accompanied, as we shall see in detail below, by a postponement of first births—although the links between marriage and fertility show some surprising trend, which we shall discuss in Section 3. In figure 1 we map the rate of increase of the mean age at first marriage and at first birth during the 1990s in the countries of the Council of Europe; the postponement of first marriage (on the horizontal axis) is usually stronger than the postponement of first births, with only Sweden and Russian Federation as an exception³.

The postponement of marriage is part of a general postponement transition that is not likely to be reversed in the near future. The concept of a “postponement transition” has been discussed for fertility by Kohler et al. (2002) with the idea that the pace of postponement of first birth is similar in countries for which the postponement starts in different years. Mamolo (2003), analyzing European countries, defines the year of onset of the postponement transition for first marriage similarly to Kohler et al., as the first year in three consecutive years during which the mean age at first marriage increases by more than 0.2 years (Figure 2). Since the onset of postponement, the pattern is relatively similar for almost all countries, with some exceptions—Croatia and former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The postponement of marriages strongly influences period measures of the quantum of marriage such as the total first marriage rate (table 2): these measures are simultaneously depressed by a lower lifetime probability of ever marrying and the postponement of marriage. For the same reason, in periods of anticipation of marriage they may also reach levels higher than 100%. Looking at cohort data can give us more insights on the actual prevalence of union formation at different ages.

TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE; FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

If we use data from a targeted comparative survey project like the series of Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) coordinated by the UN/ECE, it is possible to look at more detailed data for cohorts. Before doing this, we shall alert the reader on the fact that FFS is a set of *retrospective* surveys, mostly carried on during the first half of the 1990s. The FFS thus provide retrospective information

³ Similar analyses on a wider range of indicators related to fertility and partnership in Western and Eastern Europe are presented by Macura et al. (2002).

on the period before the 1990s and cross-sectional information for the 1990s. Most of the changes we are thus describing compare the 1990s to the preceding decades.

Using the FFS, it is possible to focus more in general on union formation and not only on formal marriage. In table 3, we report the share of women who have experienced the key demographic transitions into adulthood (leaving the parental home, entering the first co-residential union, becoming a mother) by their 25th birthday in two successive birth cohorts. The rate of postponement can be read, similarly to what we have just done, by looking at the rate of change (figure 3). With the exception of some Nordic and Eastern European countries, union formation has been postponed also to a great extent. Southern European countries are in particular the “leaders” of such postponement.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE; FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

The role of cohabitation is highly variable across countries, as well as changing over time. Many authors have provided portraits on the diffusion of non-marital cohabitation. Looking at Sweden, one of the first countries in terms of spread and cohabitation, Hoem and Hoem (1988) provided an outline on the historical phases of cohabitation. First, cohabitation spread to incorporate a small “deviant” group of the population. It later emerged as a pre-marital probationary period, a gradual way of moving into a union. In a third phase cohabitation has become a real substitute to marriage. Finally, the very distinction between cohabitation and marriage tends to disappears. A more complex typology, useful for international and inter-temporal comparisons and based on the findings of the FFS, has been devised in a recent paper by Heuveline and Timberlake. They distinguish six ideal-typical roles of cohabitation, generalizing the four-type classification by Hoem and Hoem (Heuveline and Timberlake, 2003, table 1): A) *marginal* (“Cohabitation is not prevalent and is likely discouraged by public attitudes and policies”); B) *prelude to marriage* (Cohabitation “exists as a pre-reproductive phase for adults. Unions tend to be brief and non-reproductive, but end in marriage”); C) *stage in marriage process* (Cohabitation “exists as a transitory phase in reproduction. Unions tend to be longer, and children more likely to be born into a cohabitation than in (B), but with short duration of exposure”); D) *alternative to single* (“Cohabitation primarily for brief, non-reproductive unions that end in separation instead of marriage”); E) *alternative to marriage* (Cohabitation “is a discrete component of the family system. Adult cohabitation is prevalent, and for longer duration than in (C). Low proportion leading to marriage, more exposure to cohabitation during childhood than in (C) and for longer duration”); F) *indistinguishable from marriage* (“Little social distinction between cohabitation and marriage. Children more likely than in (E) to experience the marriage of parents, because cohabitation not seen as an alternative to marriage”). What is crucial for our analysis is that in the ECE region (at least among those who participated in the FFS comparative program) it is possible to find countries for which each single ideal-typical role is prevalent (table 4). The role of cohabitation is marginal in countries like Belgium, Hungary and Poland, Italy and Spain, and becomes more and more important in other countries. In a country like Sweden, cohabitation appears to be no longer distinguishable from marriage.

The alternative between cohabitation and marriage is also not necessarily exhausting all possible partnership choices. In fact, there are increasingly diverse opportunities, and observed choices, in living arrangements and partnerships. In terms of opportunities, some countries have introduced new forms of relationships that are legally recognized. An important example is the PACS (Civil Solidarity Pact) in France. This legalized form has become a sort of “competitor” to marriage which however has not prevented marriages from being formalized as well (Pison, 2002). In 2000, the first full year of PACS, the number of contracts signed amounted to almost 8% of marriage contracts. Numbers have decreased later; nevertheless, this type of nonmarital union is a new opportunity, opening the space for additional choice in partnership formation. Further research and data

collection are necessary to assess the role of formalized nonmarital partnerships in an international perspective. A linked issue relates to same-sex partnership (the PACS for instance can be subscribed also by two individuals of the same sex); data are scarcely available on the issue, although there are estimates (i.e. about 1% of men and the same percentage of women have been estimated to live in same-sex partnerships in 1990 in the U.S. by Black et al., 2000).

Living apart together (LAT) is often a stage towards the formation of a more stable co-residential union, or a marriage. It can also become a medium- or long-term choice for a flexible type of living arrangement. Furthermore, living apart together can be forced by life course situation (i.e. the necessity to work in different cities). Using FFS data, Kiernan (2002) analyzed, among other issue, the role of LAT in the life of never-partnered women aged 20-39. We report part of Kiernan's results in table 5. The heterogeneity of countries with respect to LAT is clearly visible. For instance, in Germany (in particular, in the part formerly constituting the Federal Republic of Germany), half of the women who have never co-resided with a partner are in a LAT relationship. Of them, three-fourths declare that they want to live separately. Figures are much different for other situations (i.e. France where only one quarter of women in LAT relationship declare to want to live separately). The emergence of LAT as a generalized long-term choice is not foreseeable; however it constitutes an additional partnering choice that may be increasingly more common.

TABLES 4, 5 ABOUT HERE

Partnerships have become increasingly less stable all over the ECE area during the 1990s. Nevertheless, in this general trend towards less union stability, there is high variation between nations. The variation can be decomposed in two main components. First, the stability of marriage (as measured for instance by total divorce rates) is heterogeneously distributed across countries. Second, as cohabiting unions are subject to higher dissolution rates, the varying prevalence of cohabitation, that we just outlined, influences the average stability of co-residential partnership for a given society. We first focus on the dissolution of marriages. Total divorce rates (table 6) have increased in the 1990s in almost all countries, with a small number of exceptions for countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro), as well as Switzerland. The variation in levels is however of great magnitude, with lowest values in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Southern European countries and Poland. The highest levels in 1980 were observed for the United States⁴. There is no apparent upper limit to total divorce rate, although it is logically difficult to foresee levels close to 100%.

Analyzing FFS data, it is possible to compare dissolution rates of different types of union across countries. The analysis by Andersson (2002) on 17 countries of the ECE area shows that—without exceptions—cohabiting unions are less likely to survive with respect to unions that started directly as marriages. This is also visible in Sweden, a country in which, according for instance to Heuveline and Timberlake (2003), marriage and cohabitation are not distinguishable. The varying prevalence of cohabitation is thus linked *per se* with higher union instability: countries with higher shares of cohabiting unions will also experience a higher share of unstable, dissolving unions. In addition, among married people, those who experienced pre-marital cohabitation have higher risks of divorce (see figure 4). The causal links are however not easy to grasp. Recently, Dourleijn and Liefbroer (2002) have used FFS data to test the hypothesis that the differences in dissolution rates are linked to the diffusion of non-marital cohabitation within a population. In fact, they find evidence for a selection effect (individuals who cohabit are more likely to experience union dissolution because of their individual characteristics) but also for a general stabilizing role of marriage (getting married has a causal impact in rising union stability). It thus seems that marriage as an institution protects against instability (Brines and Joyner, 1999), across a number of countries.

⁴ Unfortunately it is not possible, with current available data, to track the trend for the U.S. in a comparative fashion.

TABLES 6, 7 ABOUT HERE

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Rising rates of union dissolution contribute to underline the growing importance of union formation subsequent to the first union. This includes not only the remarriage of divorced women and men, but also second cohabiting unions, as well as cohabiting unions after divorce. Again, during the 1990s, FFS data have allowed to evaluate international differences and trends in birth cohorts. A study by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al. (2003) analyses the pathways to stepfamily formation for 19 European countries. Their analyses indicate that, within the birth cohort 1952-59, the likelihood of starting a second union before age 35 for women who ever entered their first union has been as high as 28% in Sweden, and 25% in Estonia. In almost all countries considered by Fürnkranz-Prskawetz and colleagues, the majority of women who dissolved a first union has actually entered a second union. Exceptions to this are Italy, Lithuania and Spain. The experience of a second union is thus increasingly more common in the lives of Europeans: the share of women having ever experienced a second union by age 35 is rising from the birth cohort 1952-55 to the birth cohort 1956-59, even if as we have seen first unions are in general postponed themselves (table 8). This indicates that *an expansion of unions of higher order* has taken place during the 1990s and is likely to continue.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

2.2 Childbearing in the 1990s: postponement and the emergence of lowest low fertility

Over the last decade, fertility levels have fallen substantially and they have reached extremely low levels in a number of countries located in the ECE region. For simplicity, we can speak of *low* fertility levels when fertility is below replacement (see for instance United Nations, 2002). We can speak of *very low* fertility when fertility is below 1.5 children per woman (see for instance Lesthaeghe and Willem, 1999; Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003). We can speak of *lowest low* fertility when fertility is below 1.3 children per woman (Kohler et al., 2002). In table 9, we report the total period fertility rates for the countries of the ECE area in five-year intervals in the period 1980-2000. In 1980, only “low” fertility levels were recorded (for the former Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and San Marino). In 2000, 11 have “lowest low” fertility and 11 have “very low” (but not lowest low fertility). At the beginning of the new millennium, very low fertility is pervading the ECE area, and lowest low fertility is present in substantial group of countries. In fact, very few countries, belonging to very different regions have fertility above 2 children per woman (Iceland, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, United States, and Uzbekistan)⁵.

A critical issue at low fertility levels is the importance of small differences for the overall dynamics of population: differential levels between lowest low and very low fertility levels are small only when we do not consider that below the replacement level also decimals matter (as outlined in Kohler et al., 2002). When fertility is below-replacement, a *difference* of 0.2 births is not ignorable for population dynamics, if anything because it becomes higher in relative terms. By simple calculations using standard stable population theory, one obtains that, if total fertility stabilizes at 1.3, the long-run growth rate will be -1.57%, which translates in a population halving time of 44.3 years. If total fertility stabilizes at 1.5, the rate becomes -1.07%, with a population halving time of 64.7 years. Moving 0.2 children downwards from 1.3, to a total fertility of 1.1, the rate becomes -2.14%, with a population halving time of 32.4 years⁶ (Billari, 2004).

⁵ Among the countries for which official comparative estimates of the period TFR were not available when drafting this paper, Albania, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are likely to have for 2000 a period TFR greater than 2.

⁶ Calculations assume that the mean age at childbearing is 29 years and the net reproduction rate is 0.4886*TFR.

The most important issues concerning childbearing in the ECE area are now related with lowest low fertility levels. These extreme cases have to be at the center of researchers attention insofar as they signal a path that will possibly be followed by other societies. Lowest low fertility levels were recorded at a national level for the first time in Spain and Italy in 1992/1993 (Kohler et al., 2002), and have subsequently spread to Central and Eastern Europe. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two “patterns” of lowest low fertility (Billari and Kohler, 2002a): a Central and Eastern European pattern and a Southern European pattern. In most transition economies, fertility declined very steeply during the 1990s, in some cases immediately after the fall of Socialist regimes, in some cases a few years later (UN/ECE, 2000; Macura and MacDonald, 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). We shall see later on that childlessness is not necessarily more prevalent in lowest low fertility countries. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe differ with the respect to the onset and to the extent of the postponement of motherhood: the possibility of further postponements has led Kohler et al. (2002) to foresee a longer-term persistence of lowest low fertility in countries that have not been sharply affected by the postponement of births (most of them in Eastern Europe). The latter is indeed the main characteristic of lowest low fertility in Southern Europe. In 2000, the mean age at first birth in Spain (see table 10) is equal to the one observed in the United Kingdom and higher than the one observed in the Netherlands. The Netherlands, in particular, used to be seen as “the example” country for high age at first birth before the emergence of lowest low fertility in Southern Europe.

The *postponement transition* in fertility (Kohler et al., 2002) is clearly visible, with limited exceptions mostly for states belonging to the former USSR: the transition to motherhood is generally postponed (table 10). Women still become mothers much earlier in Eastern Europe and in, and in some countries of that area the postponement of motherhood is more limited (in Armenia, for instance), although there are clear signs that some countries are heading towards western-type levels, especially among Central European countries such as Slovenia and Croatia (see also Macura and MacDonald, 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). Motherhood remains anyway experienced at different mean ages also within the West, where the United States substantially differ from Western Europe. Measuring the postponement of fertility is also crucial when studying very low and lowest low fertility because of its analytical consequences: in the presence of a widespread postponement of births, traditional period fertility measures have to be considered with great care. Period measures are however essential when we want to study what is currently happening, and to grasp changes in trends (Ní Bhrolchain, 1992): the latter is also the reason why their fluctuations are of substantial magnitude. Period total fertility rates, which have been used as well in defining the idea of lowest low fertility, are correctly criticized in the literature for being subject to various types of distortions. Different proposals have been made over the years in order to compute a distortion-free measure of period fertility, which can be interpreted as being closer to behavioral choices (see the review in Ortega and Kohler, 2002). No single measure has yet been accepted. Total period fertility is in any case crucial because it is strictly linked to the number of births in a given period, and thus it tells us about the expected consequences of fertility change. Calot (2001) for instance advocated the use of the period total fertility rate only as a measure of the ratio of the size of the newborn generation to the generation of mothers. The connection with the number of births, and thus with the age structure of the population and in particular to the ageing of population, and to cohort replacement on the other side, leave a central role for period fertility measures. For instance, ageing is affected by fertility postponement (Lutz et al., 2003). In addition, in the future of low and lowest-low fertility populations, homeostatic reactions *à la* Easterlin, with a reversal of trend, could be triggered by the diminishing relative size of cohorts entering the labor market and reproductive ages. Having said that, relying only on the period total fertility rate as a starting point for a general theory of fertility dynamics can be dangerous, especially when fertility is highly fluctuating. We thus also look at cohort fertility.

TABLES 9,10 ABOUT HERE

Frejka and Sardon (2003) have recently completed, and reported in a systematic fashion, a reconstruction of cohort fertility in low fertility countries. Some data extracted from Frejka and Sardon's analyses concerning total cohort fertility rates are reported in table 11. Looking at cohort, the lowest limits of fertility have been reached by the former Federal Republic of Germany and Austria, with the former crossing the boundary of "very low" cohort fertility (that is, below 1.5 children per woman). This observation has led some researchers (i.e. Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003) to conclude that analyses and explanations of very low fertility should be directed at explaining the patterns of the two largest German-speaking countries. We can however foresee that the now 10-year old persistence of lowest low fertility in countries like Spain and Italy will imply cohort rates that will be below the levels of Austria and Germany. The main stylized fact that can be derived from the "cohort fertility story" of Frejka and Sardon is the *smoothness of cohort fertility*, although an oscillating trend has been observed, with highest levels for the birth cohorts of the 1930s before starting a decline which has been continuous at least for Western countries. One can thus assume that "cohort fertility trends tend to react to, or change as a consequence of, fundamental structural changes of the political, economic and social systems" (Frejka, personal communication). In the case of transition economies, the fundamental structural changes have been concentrated in the early 1990s. As a rule, completed fertility was declining from one cohort to the next in almost all low fertility countries among the cohorts that will conclude their childbearing during the first decade of the 21st century (women born in the late 1950s and early 1960s). The exceptions in Frejka and Sardon's analyses are the United States, Denmark and Lithuania.

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

In addition to general patterns of fertility, it is important to focus on the lower and upper end of the reproductive age interval. Trends in adolescent childbearing and in fertility at higher ages are in fact conspicuous during the 1990s. In a major comparative effort on the topic, Singh and Darroch (2000) analyze trends in adolescent birthrates across a number of industrialized countries, up to 1995. Some of their key findings are reported in table 12. The results are clear in terms of direction: in no single country or geographical area out of the 40 areas with available data has adolescent childbearing risen between 1990 and 1995. We can thus conclude that *declining adolescent childbearing* has been a feature of childbearing during the 1990s. Notwithstanding this, levels are extremely heterogeneous across countries. The highest levels of adolescent childbearing in 1995 are recorded in the United States and in some of the Eastern European countries with traditionally early fertility (i.e. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) at levels above 50 per 1000 women aged 15-19. The lowest level are at something more than one tenth of the highest levels, that is between 5 and 7 per 1000 women in Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. According to Singh and Darroch (2000), the reasons underlying the decline in adolescent childbearing are broader than single-country factors, and relate to the increased importance of education and motivation to achieve higher education and training levels, as well as to the importance of goals that are competing with family formation and motherhood for young women. The postponement of union formation that we have described partially explains the decline in adolescent childbearing. The mixed evolution of adolescent rates, also reported in table 12, indicate that in some countries this behavior translated in a lower prevalence of undesired pregnancies, while in other countries abortion rates have risen during the same period.

Let us now consider the upper end of the reproductive age span. The postponement of fertility implies that, at constant total fertility levels, the share of fertility that is realized at higher ages over total fertility rises over time (or for successive birth cohorts). It is possible to analyze trends by birth cohort thanks to the reconstruction of Frejka and Sardon (2003). In table 13, we report their results on the share of total fertility that is due to childbearing after the 27th birthday. For Western

countries, the general trend is towards the realization of more than 50% of all births at age 27 or older. Some countries, in various regions of the Western part of the ECE, are already high up on that scale, with a tradition of “late childbearing” (the Netherlands, with 71% for the 1965 birth cohort, Switzerland, with 66%, Denmark with 64.5% and Spain with 62.9%). For transition economies, childbearing after age 27 has still a relatively minor importance. In some cases, lower fertility is accompanied by the clear reduction of fertility at later ages; for instance in Romania the percentage recorded for the 1940 cohort was 40.9, while the percentage recorded for the 1965 cohort is 22.3%. In societies in which childbearing is increasingly postponed, fertility may be pushed to higher and higher ages. In fact, one can figure out a theoretical scenario of *latest-late* fertility, with the *rectangularization* of fertility due to births taking place in a concentrated period at relatively high ages (Billari et al., 2003). This scenario is clearly not foreseeable in a generalized fashion for the ECE area as a whole, but the rectangularization of fertility may start becoming an issue in the new millennium for some of the Western countries.

TABLES 12, 13ABOUT HERE

2.3 Choices and constraints in parenting-a view from parents' and children's sides

Parenting has changed importantly during the 1990s in the ECE area. First of all, the prevalence of *not* parenting, i.e. childlessness, has generally increased, although at varying paces, and there is some evidence that both childlessness as a *choice* and unwanted childlessness have increased. Second, the “length” of parenting, that is the period that children spend in their parental home, has also changed and varies across societies. Third, from the point of view of children, the type and combination of parents they live with during their childhood has changed over time and varies across contexts.

Childlessness has generally been decreasing in industrialized countries for cohorts born after 1920 (Rowland, 1998). A first issue is whether there can be a “naturally low” level of childlessness, to what extent becoming a parent is still central in our lives (Hobcraft and Kiernan, 1995). This is questionable, as in some societies childlessness is virtually absent. A second issue is to what extent childlessness is chosen per se, becoming “voluntary childlessness”. In fact, recently the latter choice has attracted the attention of researchers. Foster (2000), drawing on evidence from several disciplines concludes that the “need to nurture” of humans ensures that the majority of women will want to become mothers in all societies. On the contrary, drawing on sociological theories, Hakim builds a “preference theory”; according to Hakim, lifestyle preferences determine the incidence of childbearing; it is plausible that individuals (the theory focuses particularly on women) who are more oriented towards childrearing have a higher probability to stay childless (see i.e. Hakim, 2003). Hakim, more specifically, states that “The appearance of voluntary childlessness after the contraceptive revolution, raising childlessness to around 20 percent in most modern societies, has generally been ignored by demographers. It disproves the unstated assumption that women will always want to have and rear children. Some do not” (p. 369). The most recent changes in childlessness can be seen comparing the 1950 birth cohort with the 1960 birth cohort (table 14), thanks to the reconstruction of Frejka and Sardon (2003). There is no clear trend towards the expansion of childlessness, although the level in some areas (i.e. England and Wales) is growing and is much higher than the level for other countries. The 20% of childless women in England and Wales for the 1960 birth cohort corresponds to the percentage of women indicated by Hakim (2003) as fully work-oriented. For the same cohorts, levels are still below 5% for countries like Slovenia and Croatia. In general, childlessness is much rarer, and even declining, in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The most recent trends for other high childlessness countries and areas (Austria and the Western part of Germany) are not yet visible. In general, there seems to be no evidence for a change in the propensity to ever become a parent.

TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE

We now take a different perspective and look at parenting by examining data on the lives of children. In table 3 and figure 2, we have already introduced the issue of the length of stay of young adults in their parental home. In some countries, notably Italy and Spain, young adults stay much longer with their parents, which constitutes an important part of their *latest-late* pattern of transition to adulthood. For the cohorts born during the early 1960s the median age at leaving home for Italian men is above 27, and for Spanish men close to the same figure (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). The same late pattern can be observed for women. Levels are much lower in Northern and Western Europe. In addition, leaving home has been subsequently postponed in Southern Europe in particular (figure 2). This long permanence of youth in their parental home imposes unavoidably an economic burden on their parents, and this is linked by some scholars (i.e. Livi-Bacci, 2001; Dalla Zuanna, 2001) to the lowest low fertility levels observed in Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, the direct link is questionable: for instance lowest low fertility co-exists with early home-leaving in Eastern Europe (Billari and Kohler, 2002a). Nevertheless, the meaning of parenting and its changes are extremely different across countries due to the differential co-residence of young adults with their parents.

In addition, to grasp the meaning of parenting it is of paramount importance to understand what is the kind and configuration of parents that children experience. On the one hand, one could take the perspective of the parents and illustrate how the presence of shared children influences the decision to terminate partnerships (we shall discuss about this point in section 3). On the other, one could take the perspective of their children, looking at what types of parents they experience in their first years. The FFS provides again important insights in both international differences and trends with respect to the perspective of the children. Heuveline et al. (2003) have estimated, out of the first 15 years, the time spent on average by each child living with specific types of parents, in particular with a single mother, in a maternal stepfamily, without the mother, and with both biological parents (table 15). International differences are remarkable: a child from the United States will—on average live—more than one third of his/her first 15 years without both biological parents (2.70 years with a single mother, 1.87 years in a maternal stepfamily, and 0.56 years not with the biological mother). Many countries are close to this order of magnitude, with more than 3 years lived on average without both biological parents (i.e. Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, and Sweden). A “traditional” parenthood model is still visible (with about 1 year on average without biological parents) in Italy, Spain, Slovenia. We can thus say that looking at FFS evidence, parenting has changed importantly as a consequence of dissolution rates, and the experience of different types of parents in children’s lives is part of everyday life in several ECE countries.

Heuveline et al. (2003) have also taken into account trends in types of parental living arrangements experienced by children (table 16). The decrease of the traditional living arrangement (with both biological parents) is mostly due to the decrease of the time spent with both biological parents as married persons: only in Sweden (where marriage plays a less important role) has the share of time spent with both biological parents as married increased over a time interval of about a decade. The decrease is however particularly small for a country like Italy. In general, also the time spent with both parents as cohabiting parents increases. What increases substantially, with the only exception of Spain, is the time spent with a single mother. Looking at these tables, we can understand that parenting has changed in parallel with changes in partnering and in the propensity to dissolve partnerships.

TABLES 15, 16 ABOUT HERE

3. Family formation and its interrelations

Partnering, childbearing and parenting, as crucial behaviors in individual lives, are themselves strictly interrelated. They are also strictly linked with other life course trajectories of individuals and couples (i.e. working lives), which may be sources of constraints, but as well of opportunities, in individual choices. The strength and direction of relationship is also potentially changing over time; it is thus important to touch upon some of the changes that have taken place in the countries of the ECE area during the 1990s. We can investigate interrelations and their changes at two levels. First, at the micro level, we shall examine the diverse and changing relationships between partnership status and fertility. Second, at the macro, cross-national level, we will put an emphasis into the modification of the links between fertility and some fertility-related behaviors.

3.1 Micro-relationships between partnering and childbearing

In this section we focus more specifically on the relationship between partnering and childbearing. Recalling the trends outlined in Section 2, we know that cohabiting unions have become more widespread during the 1990s. However, the prevalence and status of cohabitation varies substantially across countries, and so does fertility. We need to deal with two issues here. First, to what extent does the expansion of cohabitation affect fertility in the ECE area? Second, what is the role of the general postponement of the timing of first unions, and of the postponement of marriage in particular on fertility?

The expansion of nonmarital fertility in the ECE area during the 1980s and the 1990s is clearly visible (table 17). In all countries for which data are available (with the sole exception of Denmark where nonmarital fertility was already at levels close to 50% in 1980) *nonmarital childbearing has risen during the 1990s*. It is not clear whether there will be any upper limit to the share of extramarital births in the long run; marriage may lose further centrality in its role with respect to childbearing. In Iceland, in 2000, only slightly more than one third of all births have been from married parents. International variability in this basic indicator on the relationship between partnering and childbearing is very important. Nevertheless, in only six countries for which data are available is the share of nonmarital births below 10% in 2000 (Azerbaijan, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Macedonia, San Marino); moreover, the visible trend for the majority of such countries is towards a higher share. Rising levels of cohabitation, and transitions in the status of cohabiting unions as we have discussed in Section 2.1 are the most significant factors underlying the rise in the share of nonmarital births. The share of unwanted births by single mothers might potentially also contribute to this rise, but the decline in adolescent rates of childbearing goes exactly in the opposite direction.

TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE

At the individual level, however, most studies report that cohabitation is somehow discouraging fertility. De Rose and Racioppi (2001) for instance, analyzing FFS data, show that expected fertility in European countries is lower for cohabiting couples with respect to married couples. We report the results of an analysis by Pinnelli et al. (2002) in table 18. In this descriptive results, at second birth there is a higher share of individuals who started their unions directly as a married couple, even if the change for Sweden is the least significant. The causal relationships between partnership status and fertility are however not necessarily simple to isolate, even having access to micro-level retrospective information. For instance, although the vast majority of births takes place in a union (but see the exception of the United States for instance in table 18), some of the countries with the highest proportions of cohabiting couples and earlier ages at first union formation also have the highest levels of fertility in Europe (Kiernan, 1999). This inverse correlation between fertility and age at first union formation may reflect a trend to a general postponement of events in the transition

to adulthood, in which case the transition to any kind of partnership and the transition to parenthood are delayed due to common underlying factors. For instance, using U.S. data, Brien et al. (1999) show that the timing of partnership formation and of nonmarital conception depend on common unobserved factors. If this is the case in general, such events have to be addressed necessarily as a whole. Alternatively, each pathway of union formation (cohabitation and marriage) may have a causal (and potentially differential) effect on fertility (Baizán et al, 2003). In a comparative study between West Germany and Sweden (confirming a study on Spain), for instance, Baizán et al. (2002) found that there are in the propensity to have a child and to start a union there are common factors that are usually unobserved in standard demographic surveys such as the FFS. The distinction between marriage and cohabitation as triggering events is not significant in Sweden (figure 5), in accordance with the status of cohabitation in Sweden as classified by Heuveline and Timberlake, 2003. As a consequence, *if cohabitation reaches the same status as marriage, the only issue that counts in terms of fertility impact is the timing of union formation and not the type of union*; earlier union formation would then be associated with higher fertility. In fact, also in Italy, a country where cohabitation has a “marginal” role, in the Northern part fertility levels of cohabitants who had at least one birth and who entered their first union at the same time as married couples with the same characteristics are not clearly distinguishable (Billari and Rosina, 2004).

TABLES 17, 18 ABOUT HERE; FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Let us also consider the relationship between the number of unions and fertility: table 18 shows interestingly that at second birth there is a higher share of individuals who have already experienced a second union, which is somehow in contrast with the hypothesized (Pinnelli et al., 2002, p. 79) “clearly negative effect on fertility” of separation or divorce. That higher rates of union dissolution lower total fertility seems the outcome of simple intuitive reasoning. Nevertheless, there are other reasons why in some specific situations the dissolution of unions may become positive, that is union dissolution triggers fertility. We can consider a simple, paradoxical, example. In a situation like the one observed in lowest low fertility countries, childlessness is relatively rare, and so is the situation of living as a single forever, but the progression to higher parities is at particularly low levels. This implies that almost all couples have a child, with not very many progress to a second child. *If the rule is “one child per couple”, the only way to reach replacement is to have individuals experience two couples.* Children may be in fact, union-specific capital, as symbols of the partners’ commitment to their relationship (Griffith et al., 1985). Single-country analyses have shown that the first “shared” birth in a couple has a commitment value (Vikat et al., 1999), although the effect tends to disappear with higher parities (Buber and Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, 2000). Evidence for the commitment value of a first shared birth has been detected in the FFS analyses by Thomson et al. (2002). We shall come back to this point in the next Section in terms of changing relationship between total fertility and total divorce rates.

It is important also to consider the impact of childbearing on union dissolution. On this issue, there is a mixed evidence in the literature. The majority of papers, using single-country analyses, show that the presence of shared children tends to stabilize marriages and non-marital unions (Andersson, 1997; Diekmann and Engelhardt, 1999; Jalovaara, 2001; Weiss and Willis, 1997 among others). Nonetheless, specific studies on the United Kingdom have documented that during the 1990s children have had a de-stabilizing effect on unions (Böheim and Ermisch, 2001; Chan and Halpin, 2001). With respect to this issue, there is a need for more comparative research.

3.2 Macro-relationships: changing cross-country correlations over time

In the demo-economic literature, a great deal of attention has been given to the fact that the cross-country correlation between total fertility rates and the share of women participating into the labor

market has changed its sign for OECD countries. Billari and Kohler (2002a) argue that this is one of the several cross-country correlations that have changed in correspondence with the emergence of lowest low fertility in Europe during the 1990s.

The negative sign of the correlation between total fertility rates and rates of female labor force participation in the 1960s and in the 1970s was consistent with “new home economics” theories predicting that fertility would fall as a consequence of the massive entry of women into the labor market (Becker, 1981). The sign of the observed correlation for OECD countries has changed (see figure 6) during the mid-late 1980s. Later on the correlation has been relatively stable at positive levels: *during the 1990s total fertility is higher in countries with higher female labor force participation*. Several studies have discussed this changing correlation (Ahn and Mira, 2002 and Engelhardt et al., 2004, among others). The importance of the role of Southern European countries—in which lowest low fertility has emerged in the early 1990s—in shaping this correlation is underlined in these studies. Kögel (2004) challenges the causal meaning of these results, although he states that in any case the negative correlation has become weaker after controlling for fixed country-specific effects.

The attention dedicated to the study of the relationship between total fertility and labor force participation has been much more meticulous than the one dedicated to the possibly changing relationships between fertility and other related behaviors. An exception is Dalla Zuanna (2001), who documents the change of the correlation between total fertility rates and the share of nonmarital births in 16 Western European countries from 1981 to 1996. Billari and Kohler (2002a) dedicate a systematic attention to documenting, for the countries of the Council of Europe, the changing cross-country correlations between fertility and 1) total first marriage rates (the positive correlation becomes weaker and weaker); 2) total divorce rates (the negative correlation becomes positive); 3) the share of nonmarital births. In figure 7 we produced analyses similar to figure 6 on countries of the Council of Europe, including the correlation of total fertility rates and 1) mean age at first marriage; 2) the percentage of nonmarital births; 3) total divorce rates. As we can see from the figure, *for all three indicators the correlation with total fertility rates becomes positive during the 1990s*.

To sum up, cross-country analyses show that the correlation between levels of fertility and indicators that used to be traditionally negatively correlated with fertility has reversed. In some case this may be due the impact of unobserved factors that are typical of those countries where fertility diminished in a quicker way while other indicators were at lower level and did not change as quickly as in other countries (Kögel, 2004). Nevertheless, changing relationships may have links with micro-level motivations: the importance of job attachment for being able to choose to have a child for instance in the case of female labor force participation, the flexibility of unions in the case of mean age at marriage and the percentage of nonmarital births, and the role of stepfamily fertility in the case of total divorce rates. This subject, however, deserves further research.

FIGURES 6, 7 ABOUT HERE

4. Families of explanatory directions

The complex web of changes and continuity in differences that we described in Sections 2 and 3 cannot, as a matter of course, be easily accounted for by a unique explanatory factor. In fact, even if in the literature the discussion of alternative theories can often be portrayed as an “interdisciplinary soccer game” (Lesthaeghe, 1998), there is usually no clear winner in the quest for explaining the dynamics of family dynamics. We prefer to portray here “families” of explanatory directions. Each direction may in turn be particularly fruitful in understanding the evolution of a specific dimension,

the persistence of international differences, or the presence of common trend. All families are valid toolkits for understanding the patterns of partnering, childbearing and parenting in the ECE area during the 1990s. We limit ourselves to ideas that aim to explain either international differences or trends over time. For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish between families focusing at the macro-level and those who focus on the importance of the interaction between macro-level and micro-level factors.

4.1 Macro-level factors

Macro-level factors affecting family dynamics can be, in a simplified view, categorized on a 2x2 table. On one dimension of the table we can put the traditional “culture vs. economy” dichotomy (where we take a broad view of “economy”, including institutional settings and the welfare state); on the other dimension of the table we can put the historical stability of macro-level factors (slowly changing factors that can be considered usually constant for some decades *vs.* quickly changing factors changing potentially on a yearly basis or so). Approaches that aim to explain family dynamics in the 1990s have put their primary emphasis on each of these four factors.

As far as *institutional factors*—simply speaking political-economic factors that do not change quickly—are concerned, they are of primary interest to scholars interested in studying the welfare state and its impact on the life course, and they are traditionally connected to long-term differences between countries in family dynamics. In fact, researchers interested in the political economy of life courses are not directly interested in explaining international and inter-temporal differences; such differences are used mostly in order to test hypotheses on the role of institutions in shaping life courses. In particular, the idea that different *welfare regimes* exist is at the heart of the work of Esping-Andersen (1999) and Mayer (2001). The basic assumption is that the life course—for our purpose family dynamics—is strongly influenced by the welfare regime prevailing in a given country. The welfare regime cannot be modified in the short run; the type of welfare regime thus creates long-standing international differences. One of the main issues how many welfare regimes one should use to describe current institutional settings; so far, a principal focus has been on Western Europe and North America, with countries in transition as a “residual category”. A three-world categorization has first been proposed by Esping-Andersen, who has also left open doors for a four-world categorization⁷—including 1) Social democratic (Nordic) welfare regimes oriented to individuals; 2) Liberal market welfare regimes (again oriented to individuals), with the U.S., U.K. as typical examples; 3) Conservative continental welfare regimes oriented to the family (Germany and France are assumed as examples), and 4) Southern European or Familistic⁸ welfare regimes⁹. Each of the welfare regimes shapes in a completely different way the whole “life course package” from the transition to adulthood onwards. In fact, the emergence of modern welfare states is one of the main factors that have contributed to the *institutionalization* of the life course, and such institutionalization has mostly concerned the transition to adulthood and subsequent demographic behavior (Mayer and Müller, 1986). McDonald (2000) points to the importance of the rigidity of the European welfare system in shaping family choices: a labor market based on a strong insider-outsider divide is bound to delay and avoidance of family formation. The influence of institutional settings at the national level is also supposed to continue for the future: Blossfeld (2000), for instance, has argued that country-specific institution will channel the way through which the

⁷ Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 94) states: “a simple ‘three worlds’ typology may suffice for most of the purposes that this book pursues. The final judgment is not yet in, and we shall in fact see that the distinctiveness of the Southern European countries does make its mark on issues such as post-industrial employment adaptation”.

⁸ “Familistic” according to Esping-Andersen (1999).

⁹ This four-type categorisation is consistent with Mayer (2001). The typologies outlined have been criticised by feminists for their lack of genderization, and other groupings of countries have been proposed (see the review of Neyer, 2003).

globalization of economic life will affect life courses of individuals in developed countries, thus preventing life courses from becoming more similar. As a caveat and to get back to the economy (or institution) vs. culture debate, prominent scholars focusing on this approach note that welfare regimes cannot be taken as purely exogenous in the long-run perspective (Mayer, 2001). For instance, whether a society encourages young adults to attend higher education at universities with on-campus accommodation—thus implying that parenting is limited to the period when children are below 18 or so—as opposed to having a number of similar universities all over a country—in which case young adults and their parents can co-reside for a longer period—depends on the prevailing views of inter-generational relationships. The causal link would then be from the cultural framework to the making of institutional setting, which would mean that in a longer causation chain, long-term cultural differences explain a substantial part of the differences in family (Pfau-Effinger, 1999) and social policies. In addition, transition economies pose specific problems, as in principle it might well be that each one of them will fall under one of the Western types of welfare regimes, or that new ones will be created.

Economic trends and socio-economic policies that are in place during a specific time period also shape significantly family dynamics¹⁰. This is true also of specific economic trends that are not explicitly under the control of national policy-makers; the most important example is the economic crisis in transition economies, which has been hypothesized as the main factor driving family change in Central and Eastern Europe (UN/ECE, 2000). Economic trends and socioeconomic policies are so clearly interrelated that it is often not possible to identify their separate effects on demographic behavior. The adoption—or the discontinuation—of new policies, i.e. family policies such as maternity policies, parental-leave policies, the provision childcare services, and child benefits, as well as policies on housing subsidies or on limits to down-payment in mortgages are clearly important determinants of family formation. Changes in such policies may also be triggered by population trends as they are perceived by policy-makers. It is hard to disentangle whether such policies belong to the welfare state *per se* (and thus are stable in a mid-term historical perspective) or whether they belong to political choices that are continuously subject to revision. In any case, changes in such policies modify the opportunities that individuals face during their choices, and they can be read in the classic demographic terms of “period effects”. The spread of uncertainty in young adulthood, like in the case of an increasingly difficult access to the labor market, as well as other factors such as increases in the returns to education may explain period trends and international differences in family formation (Bernardi, 2000). In fact the latter type of factors has been used by Kohler et al. (2002) to argue that postponement of the transition to parenthood may arise as a rational response to socio-economic incentives. The evidence for this concerning the sharp fertility decline in Eastern Europe is however still ambiguous (Kohler and Kohler, 2002). Socioeconomic conjunctural factors may also explain sudden changes in patterns in a country or set of countries (i.e. the emergence of lowest low fertility), and they may constitute triggering macro-events for changes having long-term consequences. Such conjunctural factors are however unlikely to explain long-term stable differences between societies or long-term trends within the same society.

We now turn to *long-term cultural differences* that form the basis of present differences in behavior. The scientific literature concentrates on this issue either on a south-north or on a west-east divide. Of course, these divisions are necessarily simplistic (similar to divisions according to welfare regimes). Hajnal (1965)¹¹ traces an east-west divide in historical family systems in Europe: the *Hajnal line* runs along an imaginary line connecting Trieste and St. Petersburg. To the west of the line the family formation pattern leans towards a neo-local nuclear family with relatively late marriage and a significant proportion of people who never married. To the east of the line, marriage

¹⁰ The analysis of policies is here only briefly sketched, as it is the topic of the background paper prepared by Anne Gauthier for the same session of the European Population Forum (Gauthier, 2003).

¹¹ See also Monnier and Rychtarikova (1992).

is supposed to be early and universal, and the family is often extended. A great heterogeneity has been shown by studies focusing to the west of the Trieste-St. Petersburg line. Specific demographic, economic, and cultural factors determined family and household systems (just as they do today), including considerable regional variations on attributes such as the welfare capability of the family, the functioning of the household as a working unit, the role and status of women, marriage patterns, and co-residence of kin, among others (Wall, 1995). The presence of long-term cultural continuities, in particular concerning the strength of inter-generational ties between societies, has been emphasized by scholars looking at differences between north-western and south-western Europe (Reher, 1998; Micheli, 2000; Dalla Zuanna, 2001). Reher (1998), for instance, systematically and comprehensively compares historical and current family patterns in Europe, west of the Trieste-St. Petersburg line. He emphasizes the Southern European pattern of household formation, relating a cleavage between two patterns to the times of the late Roman Empire and the early Middle Ages. According to Reher, in Southern Europe, the influence of Muslims raised the importance of kinship and vertical relationships between generations so that the prolonged stay of children in their parent's home and the caring work of children towards their parents are two faces of the same coin, a "*strong*" family. In the North, Germanic tradition and the Reformation contributed to the development of a "*weak*" family, which is typical of the Anglo-Saxon world. Such differences have contributed to shape institutional frameworks at the societal level, with advantages and disadvantages for various living arrangements (Holdsworth, 2000). For instance, besides differences in the actual timing of life course transitions, it is interesting to notice that the share of young adults who declare to be dependent on parents and/or family members for their income (now the majority in the EU 15) is by far larger in "*strong*" family societies with respect to "*weak*" family societies. This dependence also translates in larger *inter vivos* transfers from children to parents during key events in the transition to adulthood and with a larger geographical proximity after residential independence (Glaser and Tomassini, 2000). The strength of the family can contribute to the explanation of the long-term persistence of international differences (i.e. concerning the centrality of marriage or the strength of parent-child relationships) even in presence of common trends.

Interpretations based on *ideational change*, clearly connected to sociological theories of modernization, have almost become a paradigm for the interpretation of demographic change in Western societies, with the key idea of a *Second Demographic Transition* starting in North-Western Europe during the 1960s (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). The main factors advocated by the proponents of ideational change as the main motor of demographic change are the accentuation of individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control and autonomy, and the rise of values associated to "higher order needs" (see i.e. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2002). The emergence of "new" family behaviors (like cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing) has been considered as one of the signs of the process of individualization of life courses which is used to depict the evolution of Western European and North American societies towards a "new modernity" (Buchmann, 1989; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). The individualization hypothesis implies that the normative regulation of life courses has become more lenient than in the past, and this applies in a primary fashion to the period of the 1990s. We can see this hypothesis as somehow opposed to the hypothesis that life course are increasingly institutionalized by the welfare state. The ideational change point of view can be within a "developmental" idea of societies that is common among demographers analyzing long-term trends: societies are assumed to develop through stages over a sequence leading to a certain direction. This idea, intertwined with the notion of "transition" has had an impressive impact on demographic research (Thornton, 2001). Of course, cross-country analyses in a specific period do not necessarily provide perfect tests for the transition to new situations, because if transitions follow specific sequences, different societies can be found in different stages of such sequence (van de Kaa, 1997). During a transition, there may also be rise in the difference between societies. Explanations based on ideological change are suitable to account for the common trends of the 1990s (i.e. general postponement of family formation, rising

prevalence of cohabitation, rising share of nonmarital births). They are less central to the explanation of persistent differences and sudden changes.

Some scholars put together the four families of explanations we have discussed to develop data-based clusters of countries (with a general emphasis on Europe). Mellens (1999a; 1999b) develops a clustering of European Countries based on demographic and socio-economic variables. This clustering is used to define the “diversity” of European countries that lies under scenarios for population projections (de Beer and van Wissen, 1999). Five clusters are identified, according to the dominant “culture”: 1) the *maternalistic* cluster including the 5 Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), which as a main characterization has “the relatively high level of female participation in the labour market, the high level of childcare facilities and the fact that female values like co-operation are emphasized”, together a “relatively low level of individualism and conservatism” (Mellens, 1999b, p. 34); 2) the *pragmatic* cluster includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, with high emphasis on economic performance and “not extreme” scores on the equality of gender roles and conservatism; 3) the *paternalistic* cluster including Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), with “the prevalence of traditional family values, the lack of female emancipation and the low level of childcare facilities” (p. 36), with high scores on conservatism and low on gender equality; 4) the *intermediate* culture, in Central Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), which characterizes the more westernized of the former communist countries; 5) the *post-totalitarian* cluster (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine), with an “incomplete transition to a capitalist structure” (p. 37). In building population scenarios, it is assumed that the differences among clusters persist, although convergence within-cluster will be observed¹².

To sum up, no single family of explanations is in principle satisfactory *per se* when one wants to explain international differences or common trends; nevertheless, each family contributes to part of the explanation. The challenge for future research, and especially for policy-makers interested in enabling individual choices, is to evaluate the *relative weight* of the different factors for each type of choice in a given situation. Present comparative data sources are however not fully adequate for such evaluation, and future data collection ventures will have to consider this issue as a primary task. We shall come back to this issue in Section 5.

4.2 Micro-macro interactions: from “small” at micro to large at macro?

Differences among countries in behavior can also be due to differences in the population composition according to micro-level determinants. At one extreme, differences can be due to pure compositional effects. For instance, lower income for individuals means more limited possibilities to access housing at a given equal market price, or to bear the costs of childrearing; a lower per capita income at the national level implies that in a given nation there will be more individuals with limited possibilities to form a family or to bear a child. Income inequality, besides income per capita, may also be of crucial importance in determining average fertility levels (Demeny, 2003). Compositional effects may partially account for some differences in the timing of family formation for instance, although the observed differences between Central/Eastern and Western Europe go in the opposite direction as we could expect from this simple reasoning. Another possible source of compositional effects is education. Educational attainment and educational enrolment are indeed linked to family dynamics.

¹² A similar approach is adopted by Pinnelli et al. (2001).

Micro-macro interactions are more interesting for the purpose for the possibility of explaining national differences. Some factors at the macro level are channeling the impact of micro-level characteristics on partnering, childbearing, and parenting choices. In particular, we shall discuss two types of such interactions: 1) interactions between individual-level factors and the political-economic context; 2) social interactions that may shape family choices, and that imply persisting national differences even when the underlying factors are no longer active. This type of interactions can fuel macro-level factors and contribute to perpetuating differentials both between and within societies (see also Fux and Baumgartner, 2002).

The importance of micro-level *gender* factors in shaping family dynamics can be seen from the view-point of micro-macro interactions. Bernhardt (1993) maintains that a greater equality between men and women at the micro-level can lie behind the higher fertility, among European countries, of the Nordic area. McDonald (2000) sees the importance of the gender equity in family-oriented institutions (which is reached for instance by the rising education of women) in the pathways to low fertility. The second aspect of gender equity regards individual-oriented institutions, such as the labor market; the clash between the individual (and possibly heterogeneous: Hakim, 2003) aspirations of women and the possible gender inequity within the family gives rise to very low fertility: "When gender equity rises to high levels in individual-oriented institutions while remaining low in family-oriented institutions, fertility will fall to very low levels" (McDonald, 2000, p. 437). The degree of equity in individual-oriented institutions (i.e. the labor market) is defined at the macro-level, while the degree of equity in the family, although subject to influence from the macro level, is defined at the level of a couple. *This macro-micro interaction in gender equity is according to McDonald the basis to explain the emergence of very low fertility.*

Among scholars interested in evaluating the impact of welfare regimes on life courses, there has been a long-lasting interest in comparing the impact of micro-level factors among different societies. An example of the *interaction between individual-level factors and institutional context*, in the context of leaving home, can be found for instance in Aasve et al. (2002). They argue that income differentials can partially explain the postponement of leaving home in several European societies, but what is most important is that the *effect of income is different according to the welfare regime*. Earning an own income is more important for young adults living in Southern European and in Liberal Market Welfare Regimes (i.e. the U.K) than for those living in Continental and Social Democratic welfare Regimes. This implies that 1) individual-level differences in income are more important in accounting for differences in age at leaving home in countries where leaving home happens at the latest ages (consistently with predictions from Mayer, 2001 for instance); 2) potential policies targeted to increasing the income of young adults may anticipate independent living more in countries where such independent living is postponed; 3) small differences in average income (i.e. per-capita income in Southern Europe being slightly lower than the one in Northern Europe) may become amplified by the institutional arrangement and thus account for national differences because of this interaction. Not only income is important, but also its stability; income stability is a component of general *economic security*, which constitutes a key factor in shaping household decisions. In addition to the macro-level dimensions of income volatility (especially in former Socialist countries), micro-level dimensions such as employment stability are in part explaining trends in postponement (Gustafsson, 2001). As in the case of income, economic stability may have stronger effects where less insurance provided by the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1999): this is the case for instance of unemployment in Southern Europe (i.e. Ahn and Mira, 2001).

Housing circumstances are also an important factor. First, they may lock-in families in situations that do not allow to realize their choices, especially in housing markets that are not flexible: in societies with a low share of rental, housing choices and family choices that require modifications in housing circumstances may result more difficult for individuals who are "outsiders" and who do

not own a dwelling. In addition, housing transaction costs, and the access to mortgages and other instruments to finance housing may be important factors for deciding to experience a family or household event which implies a move. In former socialist countries, housing shortage had an important impact in shaping living arrangements since young adulthood (Billari et al., 2001). After the transition they remain important, as in the whole ECE area, but their impact depends on national and regional-level policies.

Income is just one of the important micro-level constraints that underpin partnering, childbearing and parenting behavior in interaction with macro-level. *Time* constraints for instance are crucial. The opportunity cost of childbearing depend crucially on the number of working hours that have to be used for childcare. Choosing a part-time jobs for instance, where childcare is not available full-time in a generalized fashion is a micro-level strategy to overcome macro-level constraints. This micro-macro interaction on time constraints might explain why for instance results on the impact of childcare on fertility are contrasting when compared across different nations (Gauthier, 2003). The use of time is also strictly connected with the issues we discussed concerning gender equity (Apps, 2003). Time may also be important in other terms, emphasized within the literature in population economics: individuals derive utility from “togetherness”, that is time spent with a partner and with children. Hamermesh (2002) discusses this issue and argues that the synchronization of work schedules between partners is diminishing, and this translates to a loss of togetherness. In addition, parenting time has a positive effect on children’s development. In the literature, mostly focusing on the United States, the impact of increases in maternal employment on time spent with children is not clear; some experts have warned against a tendency to exaggerate the negative effects (Bianchi, 2000). Using comparative time-use, Gershuny (2000) suggests that time spent on childcare activities by fathers and mothers has increased since the mid 1980s. Further comparative research is needed on issues concerning time.

Another example of interaction is between *individual-level factors and (potentially) time-varying socio-economic factors and policies*. Not only can policies affect family dynamics, but socioeconomic or family policies may affect different social strata (i.e. defined by income or educational attainment) in a different way. Aassve et al. (2003) analyze the impact of the transition from a general to a means-tested type of family allowance in Hungary during the mid-1990s. The impact of the policy change has been to broaden the age gap in the transition to motherhood between high and low social strata (represented by educational levels). As soon as the family allowance became universal again, the differences went back to the initial level. The interaction between micro-level and macro-level is also present in the interrelationships between events in the transition to adulthood: as we have already mentioned Baizán et al. (2002) for instance, have shown that out-of-union conceptions lead more often to marriage than to cohabitation in West Germany with respect to Sweden. This could also be explained by the presence of differences in both the fiscal treatment and the acceptability of pre-marital births in the two societies.

The lesson we can learn from micro-macro interactions on the determinants of family dynamics is that there is nothing like the *true effect* of a micro-level factor in a setting like the ECE area. The institutional and cultural variables we have discussed in Section 4.1 are always—with variable extent—channeling the impact of micro-level factors, although one can devise groups of societies where similar outcomes may be predicted (i.e. welfare regimes).

As far *social interactions* are concerned, they have been of primary interest in the recent demographic literature on fertility decline (i.e. Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996; Montgomery and Casterline, 1996; Kohler, 2001) and they have been used also as a possible explanation of lowest-low fertility (Kohler et al., 2002). Social interaction effects refer mainly to “social influence” and “social learning”. Their peculiarities are such as they may entail 1) *social multiplier effects* (similar to the ones we have notice on the interaction between income and institutional setting), with overall

behavioral impact that is larger than what has been initially triggered; 2) *multiple equilibria*, with more than one stable regime (i.e. early home-leaving such as in Nordic countries and late home-leaving such as in Southern Europe); 3) *status-quo enforcement and path dependence*, where the present situations maintain long-term impact. Of great importance for our argumentation here are the consequences for national-level differences. We may name two of such consequences. First, the presence of multiple equilibria and path dependence imply a much stronger stability of long-term differences (i.e. based on long-term family models or on institutional settings), independently on the convergence in terms of other factors. Second, social interaction effects give typically rise to transitions that continue independently of the factors that originated such transitions.

5. Outlook

We have documented that, within the countries of the ECE, important changes in family dynamics have taken place during the last decade of the second millennium, following other periods of change and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Most of these changes have happened towards the same direction, within a set of common trends. Will these trends continue during the first decade of the 2000 and in the near future? We conclude this background paper with an outlook on the future, including some reflections on the information needs and on the link with some of the objectives of the United Nations.

First of all, we shall discuss the issue of whether a general *convergence* of family dynamics behaviors can be expected within the ECE area. This general convergence could be expected as an outcome of global trends towards an increasing similarity in socio-economic and institutional systems, as well towards common directions of ideational change. Some authors have emphasized that convergence is to be expected on these grounds (i.e. Roussel, 1992; Jones, 1993). Other authors have investigated the actual convergence at the global level, i.e. towards low fertility (Wilson, 2001). Persistent differences within Western Europe, a setting which is relatively homogeneous from the economic point of view, have led some researcher to emphasize the lack of convergence, or even the divergence of family formation (Kuijsten, 1996; Billari and Kohler, 2002b), as well as of family policies (Gauthier, 2002). Looking at past decades, and at studies reviewing several indicators and using different notions of convergence, the most cautious conclusion we can draw is that while there are signs of convergence for some behavioral indicators, other indicators consistently show persistent diversity (Billari and Wilson, 2001; Coleman, 2002; Mamolo, 2003). In our outlook for the future of family dynamics in the ECE area, then, it is safe not to assume a general convergence of behaviors. We thus consider separately the domains of partnering and parenting on the one side, and the domain of childbearing on the other side.

The key issues on *partnering and parenting* are related to the type of partnership and to their stability, as well as to the relationship between partnership status and childbearing. The breakdown of strict gender roles, lower social and religious pressure towards marriage, and the general trends depicted in the idea of “Second Demographic Transition” lead us to foresee that the recently observed trends are not going to stop (see also Furstenberg, 2003). The postponement of marriage is likely to continue, although it is not clear whether this will coincide with a postponement of co-residential unions in general. The latest late pattern of transition to adulthood observed in Southern Europe does not necessarily indicate the direction to which most countries will head. On the other hand, the prevalence of cohabitation will further increase in the ECE area. In addition, the diffusion of cohabitation will unavoidably contribute to a rise in the instability of co-residential partnerships; this adds to the increasing instability of marital unions. Parenting will thus become less and less linked to partnership status; not only the partnership status is likely to be increasingly less important at the moment of the birth of the child, but also dissolution may change the configuration of the parents experienced in their everyday life by children. In this scenario, we have to take into account

three components. First, policy measures may accompany, interfere, redirect and sometimes even reverse societal trends: examples of such measures include modifications in the legal treatment of partnership (including new form of recognized nonmarital partnership) and the role of partnership status in other policy-related domains (i.e. the tax system, housing and child allowances). Second, even in the presence of common trends, the levels are unlikely to become similar in all ECE countries; as we have discussed, long-term and deeply-rooted cultural differences on the one side and the heterogeneity in the institutional setting ensure that evolution will be path-dependent, and that differences are likely to persist. Third, the short- and long-term implications of the evolution of partnership forms on individuals who experience partnerships and their dissolution, and even more importantly on their children will have to become key concerns in all countries of the ECE area.

For what concerns *childbearing* (and thus in an important part, also parenting), the chief question is whether fertility will continue to be low, that is, below-replacement, in the ECE area, and whether countries that are not yet below the replacement level will experience low fertility as well. We can speculate a positive answer to this question; in general, low fertility is here to stay. This idea is agreed upon, also by observers who seemed, in the past, to see replacement-level as an equilibrium (Bongaarts, 2002), and is consistent with the observations that desired family sizes, which usually exceed actual total fertility in low fertility context, has dropped below the replacement in several European countries (Goldstein et al., 2003). It is also relatively unproblematic to foresee that adolescent fertility will continue to drop. More questionable is the future of very low, and even more of lowest low, fertility. According to Caldwell and Schindlmayr (2003), the Southern European pattern may spread to other societies based on strong intergenerational ties: “if the explanations provided by the Mediterranean, largely the Italian model, centred on patriarchy and the breadwinner, are correct, then the tendency to fall below replacement-level fertility as incomes rise will eventually occur throughout much of the rest of the world because patriarchy is widespread throughout Asia and Africa”. Within societies presently experiencing very low and lowest low fertility, the impact of the postponement of childbearing is crucial (Kohler et al., 2002). If births can be postponed further, and this is the case for instance of countries where the mean age at first birth is still relatively low, very low, and even lowest low, fertility are likely to persist. The postponement of births gives a central role to fertility at ages which are increasingly closer to the end of the reproductive age span of women; new reproductive technologies, health care, and the compatibility of childrearing with other roles during mid adulthood will shape the possibility to reach desired fertility levels as fertility starts later than in the past. Also in this scenario, we mention three principal components have to be taken into account. First of all, changes in socio-economic policies, and in particular welfare reforms may change the picture for the future; it is not clear however whether the foreseeable changes will favor a return to higher levels of fertility. Second, the implications of very low and lowest low fertility will have to become a key part of the public debate; at the micro level, kinship networks will shrink and societies in which there are important flows of care from children to their elderly parents are likely to experience a friction for a burden that will possibly be too large; at the macro level, rapid population ageing will be the main consequence of very low and lowest low fertility and it will call for great modification in societies. Third, the further flexibilization of unions, in terms of both formation and dissolution, may create the conditions for a rise in fertility, although this might come at some price for the long-term implications on children.

The evolution of partnering, parenting and childbearing is relevant to meeting UN goals. The Programme of Action adopted at the ICPD of Cairo 1994 (United Nations, 1996) includes in particular objectives on “Gender Equality, Equity and the Empowerment of Women” (Chapter IV), on “The Family, Its Roles, Rights, Composition and Structure” (Chapter V), on “Population Growth and Structure” (Chapter VI). The promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women constitutes also the UN Millennium Development Goal n. 3; some MDG country reports from countries of the ECE region have already been scrutinized with respect to gender aspects (Albania,

Armenia, Lithuania and Poland; see UNDP, 2003). For what concerns the behaviors analyzed in this paper the issue is relevant at the level of partnering and, indirectly for childbearing and parenting: “investing in women” may be a key to overcome the present trends that may have negative implications for the society (i.e. lowest low fertility). Chapter V of the ICPD Programme of Action is concerned with policies related to family issues, with a special emphasis on policies directed to single parents and on the promotion of the compatibility between “labour force participation and parental responsibilities”. As we have seen, the changing correlation between fertility and labor force participation at the cross-country level indicates that such compatibility (which is then also a gender issue) is one of the keys to moderate below-replacement fertility in the ECE area. The presence of levels of adolescent childbearing that are still highly heterogeneous indicates that there is no full realization in the ECE area of the “information, education and communication activities and services concerning reproductive and sexual health” (United Nations, 1996, p. 38) for young people (Chapters VI, VII of the Programme of Action).

The present paper has benefited in a substantial way by the availability of standardized comparative data; of particular importance to depict the trends in the 1990s have been the series of Fertility and Family Surveys carried under the coordination of the Population Activities Unit of the UN/ECE. In the outlook for the first decade of the XXI century, we need to emphasize that the collection of comparative data at the micro-level is of enormous importance. Not only this is consistent with the indications of the Programme of Action of the ICPD '94 (Chapter XII); we also need to mention two aspects here. First, it is necessary in order to be able to monitor the situation, and to describe the trends about ten years from now, to have access to figures that do not arise from data that are routinely collected in official statistics. In other words, it is necessary at least to have the opportunity to replicate the description of trends reported in Section 2 which was mostly base either on official statistics or on FFS data. Moreover, as the FFS were located mostly in the middle of the 1990s, the retrospective information we used could not adequately describe patterns of change *during* the decade of the 1990s (for instance, the demographic consequences of the economic transition in former Socialist countries). New comparative and retrospective data need to be collected to be able to fully grasp patterns of behavior. Second, it is crucial to “move beyond elaborate description” towards understanding choices, opportunities and constraints concerning partnering, parenting and childbearing in an international perspective (Hobcraft, 2002). The families of explanatory directions reviewed in Section 3 require interdisciplinary types of studies and data collection ventures, which are not yet in place at the moment of the European Population Forum. The realization of an ambitious comparative program which combines survey data and macro-level data collection such as the Generations and Gender Programme promoted by the PAU of UN/ECE at the beginning of the 2000s (UN/ECE and UNFPA, 2000) is an essential condition to reach a better understanding of family dynamics, and to try to evaluate the relative weight of each family of explanations of international differences in the next decade and even further.

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Tables and figures

Table 1. Mean age at first marriage (women): 1980, 1990, 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Albania*	22.2	23.2	23.5
Armenia	...	22.4	23.1
Austria	23.2	24.9	27.2
Azerbaijan	...	24.0	23.7
Belarus	22.9	22.0	22.6
Belgium	22.2	24.2	26.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22.0	23.3	...
Bulgaria	21.3	21.4	24.1
Canada	23.4	26.0	27.6
Croatia	22.1	23.1	25.3
Cyprus	23.7	24.1	26.4
Czech Republic	21.5	21.6	24.5
Denmark	24.6	27.6	29.5
Estonia	22.6	22.5	24.8
Finland	24.3	26.0	28.0
France*	23.0	25.6	27.8
Georgia	26.1	23.5	24.6
Germany	22.9	25.2	27.0
Germany - Former GDR	21.8	23.3	...
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	23.3	25.7	...
Greece*	23.3	24.6	26.6
Hungary	21.2	21.9	24.6
Iceland	23.7	26.7	29.9
Ireland	24.6	26.6	...
Israel	22.4	23.9	...
Italy*	23.8	25.5	27.0
Kazakhstan***	22.9	22.4	23.3
Kyrgyzstan***	22.7	22.4	22.9
Latvia	22.8	22.3	24.5
Liechtenstein	25.6
Lithuania	23.0	22.3	23.5
Luxembourg	23.0	25.3	27.1
Macedonia	22.3	22.6	23.5
Malta	24.7
Moldova	25.6	22.3	21.5
Netherlands	23.2	25.9	27.8
Norway	23.5	26.2	28.2
Poland	22.7	22.6	23.9
Portugal	23.2	23.9	25.3
Romania	21.5	22.0	23.4
Russian Federation	22.4	21.9	...
San Marino*	24.1	27.1	28.4
Serbia and Montenegro	22.5	23.4	25.0
Slovak Republic	21.9	21.9	24.0
Slovenia	22.5	23.7	26.7
Spain	23.4	25.3	27.8
Sweden	26.0	27.5	30.2
Switzerland	25.0	26.8	27.9
Tajikistan****	...	21.8	...
Turkey	20.7	21.5	22.3
Ukraine
United Kingdom	23.0	25.0	27.2
United States*****	24.1	25.1	26.6
Uzbekistan****	22.8	21.6	...

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), UN (2002), UNECE Gender Statistics Database, UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, Schoen and Standish (2001). Notes: *Last figure is for 1999; ** Second figure is for 1995; *** First figure is for 1982, last for 1998; ****Second figure is for 1991, ***** second figure is for 1980, last figure for 1995.

Table 2. Total first marriage rate (women): 1980, 1990, 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Albania	0.7	0.99	...
Armenia	...	0.92	0.34
Austria	0.6	0.58	0.54
Azerbaijan	0.9	1.04	0.54
Belarus	0.65
Belgium	0.7	0.72	0.51
Bosnia and	0.6	0.67	...
Bulgaria	0.9	0.90	0.52
Canada	0.7	0.63	...
Croatia	0.7	0.70	0.65
Cyprus	0.7	1.18	1.41
Czech Republic	0.9	1.02	0.50
Denmark	0.5	0.60	0.73
Estonia	0.9	0.79	0.39
Finland	0.6	0.58	0.62
France	0.7	0.56	0.63
Georgia	0.9	0.80	0.41
Germany	0.6	0.64	0.59
Germany - Former	0.8	0.64	0.46
Germany - FRG	0.6	0.64	0.62
Greece	0.8	0.72	0.52
Hungary	0.8	0.77	0.49
Iceland	0.5	0.45	0.70
Ireland	0.8	0.70	...
Italy	0.7	0.69	0.61
Kazakhstan**	0.9	1.07	0.66
Kyrgyzstan***	1.0	1.07	0.59
Latvia	0.9	0.92	0.40
Liechtenstein
Lithuania	0.9	1.06	0.54
Luxembourg	0.6	0.64	0.54
Macedonia	0.9	0.87	0.83
Moldova	1.1	1.19	...
Netherlands	0.6	0.66	0.59
Norway	0.6	0.58	0.51
Poland	0.9	0.91	0.63
Portugal	0.8	0.88	0.74
Romania	1.0	0.92	0.64
Russian Fed.	0.9	1.00	...
San Marino	...	0.90	0.94
Serbia and	0.8	0.78	0.68
Slovak Republic	0.8	0.96	0.52
Slovenia	0.7	0.51	0.45
Spain	0.7	0.69	0.63
Sweden	0.5	0.55	0.53
Switzerland	0.6	0.74	0.64
Tajikistan****	...	1.08	...
Turkey*	...	0.84	0.76
Ukraine***	1.0	1.07	0.65
United Kingdom	0.7	0.62	0.54
United States	0.8
Uzbekistan*****	1.0	1.09	...

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, INED (La Conjoncture des pays développés en chiffres)*. Last figure is for 1999, ** First figure is for 1982, last for 1999, *** First figure is for 1982, last for 1998, **** Second figure is for 1991, ***** First figure is for 1983

Table 3. Women having experienced demographic events by the 25th birthday, two cohorts at 10-year distance: estimates from the FFS.

Country	Cohorts	Have left the parental home	Have entered a coresident union	Have become mothers
Austria	1956-61	86.1	74.8	52.5
	1966-71	83.0	70.2	43.4
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	1951-56	89.3	86.1	47.1
	1961-66	82.3	75.7	26.3
Bulgaria	1958-62	n.a.	75.6	69.6
	1968-72	n.a.	71.9	69.4
Canada	1945-49	87.8	81.5	52.5
	1955-59	83.4	80.6	44.6
Czech Republic	1958-62	84.2	68.8	76.6
	1968-72	86.9	78.0	72.4
Estonia (native born)	1954-58	79.1	73.2	68.2
	1964-68	76.0	79.0	69.1
Finland	1950-54	90.2	75.7	49.1
	1960-64	91.0	77.8	36.1
France	1954-58	88.8	81.7	57.5
	1964-68	86.6	76.1	36.4
Greece	1960-64	83.3	75.5	54.5
	1970-74	72.8	54.9	34.8
Hungary	1953-57	80.4	85.9	71.8
	1963-67	80.6	83.8	66.0
Italy	1956-60	67.7	61.2	44.3
	1966-70	64.7	40.7	23.5
Latvia	1955-60	71.3	81.4	70.6
	1965-70	58.8	80.8	68.6
Lithuania	1955-60	74.4	77.5	62.4
	1965-70	63.7	76.9	70.4
Netherlands	1953-58	92.6	81.1	32.3
	1963-68	88.9	71.3	19.8
Norway	1950	88.7	78.0	58.1
	1960	90.7	78.5	44.2
Poland	1952-56	66.8	73.0	64.2
	1962-66	62.3	74.0	65.4
Portugal	1967-72	72.1	70.6	61.8
	1957-62	60.7	58.5	43.5
Slovenia	1956-60	82.0	84.9	80.5
	1966-70	77.4	83.8	69.7
Spain	1955-60	73.3	71.2	50.0
	1966-70	56.6	53.3	33.2
Sweden	1954	95.0	82.2	47.6
	1964	96.7	79.8	36.9
Switzerland	1950-54	95.0	68.1	34.7
	1940-64	93.9	66.2	27.1

Source: UN/ECE FFS Standard Country Tables: http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs_standtabframe.htm

Table 4. Countries by ideal-typical role of cohabitation and related indicators.

Ideal-typical role	Country	Inci- ce of cohabita- tion (%)	Median duration (years)	% ending in marriage
A. Marginal	Belgium	19.9	n.a.	n.a.
	Hungary	19.8	n.a.	n.a.
	Italy	7.0	n.a.	n.a.
	Poland	4.7	n.a.	n.a.
	Spain	9.7	n.a.	n.a.
C. Prelude to marriage	Czech Republic	33.4	n.a.	n.a.
	Switzerland	58.5	2.11	80.3
D. Stage in marriage process	Austria	49.4	2.47	83.0
	Finland	53.6	1.92	85.0
	Germany	38.4	2.10	74.2
	Latvia	37.5	0.94	91.2
	Slovenia	35.5	1.97	90.4
E. Alternative to single	United States	45.4	1.15	51.5
E. Alternative to marriage	Canada	35.9	3.51	47.4
	France	58.2	3.62	69.5
F. Indistinguishable from marriage	Sweden	82.6	3.56	54.7

Source: Heuveline and Timberlake (2003), data from the FFS.

Table 5. Proportion of women aged 20-39 “living apart together” among never partnered women.

Country	% LAT	Of which “wanted”
Austria	47	48
France	48	27
Germany – Former Fed. Rep.	48	74
Germany – Former GDR	39	42
Hungary	38	42
Italy	49	43
Latvia	44	...
Spain	36	27
Switzerland	51	66

Source: Kiernan (2002), analyses of FFS data. Note: this is the proportion of never-partnered women who have an intimate relationship with someone who lives in a separate household. The last column reports the proportion among those saying that they live apart together because they want to.

Table 6. Total divorce rate (female): 1980, 1990, 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Armenia	0.17	0.18	...
Austria	0.26	0.33	0.43
Azerbaijan	0.10
Belarus	0.53
Belgium	0.21	0.31	0.45
Bosnia and Herzegovina	...	0.05	...
Bulgaria	0.18	0.16	0.21
Canada	0.33	0.38	...
Croatia	0.13	0.15	0.15
Cyprus	0.04	0.07	0.21
Czech Republic	0.31	0.38	0.41
Denmark	0.40	0.44	0.45
Estonia	0.50	0.46	0.47
Finland	0.28	0.42	0.51
France	0.22	0.32	0.38
Georgia	0.07
Germany	0.25	0.29	0.41
Germany - Former GDR	0.32	0.24	...
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	0.23	0.31	...
Greece*	0.10	0.09	0.16
Hungary	0.25	0.27	0.38
Iceland	0.28	0.34	0.40
Italy	0.03	0.08	...
Kazakhstan**	0.35	0.38	0.34
Kyrgyzstan**	0.27	0.29	0.22
Latvia	0.54	0.44	0.34
Lithuania	0.39
Luxembourg	0.26	0.36	0.47
Macedonia	0.06	0.05	0.09
Moldova	0.28
Netherlands	0.25	0.30	0.38
Norway	0.25	0.43	0.45
Poland	0.14	0.15	0.17
Portugal	0.07	0.12	0.26
Romania	0.19	0.19	0.19
Russian Federation	0.42	0.40	...
San Marino	0.13
Serbia and Montenegro	0.14	0.14	0.13
Slovak Republic	0.18	0.23	0.27
Slovenia	0.16	0.14	0.21
Spain	...	0.10	...
Sweden	0.42	0.44	0.55
Switzerland	0.27	0.33	0.26
Turkey	0.05	0.06	0.06
Ukraine	0.36
United Kingdom	0.38	0.42	...
United States	0.59
Uzbekistan***	0.22	0.24	...

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, INED (La Conjoncture des pays développés en chiffres). Notes: * Last figure is for 1999, ** First figure is for 1982, last for 1998, *** First figure is for 1982, second for 1989.

Table 7. Cumulative percent separated, by exact time since union formation.

Country	Period	Begun as marriage				Begun as cohabitation			
		After 1 year	3 years	7 years	15 years	1 year	3 years	7 years	15 years
Austria	(1990-96)	2	7	16	26	4	19	33	45
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	(1985-92)	1	2	7	15	4	13	25	38
Czech R.	(1992-97)	1	6	14	26	7	19	29	39
Finland	(1983-92)	1	5	12	21	6	18	32	42
France	(1988-94)	1	3	8	16	8	20	36	48
Germany - former GDR	(1984-89)	1	5	13	24	8	21	37	49
Germany - former FRG	(1986-92)	0	7	16	24	5	23	38	51
Hungary	(1988-93)	2	6	12	20	10	26	40	53
Italy	(1990-95)	0	2	4	8	18	29	36	43
Latvia	(1989-95)	2	10	24	35	13	29	47	57
Lithuania	(1989-95)	1	3	11	19	8	20	41	55
Norway	(1983-89)	0	5	13	23	8	22	34	45
Poland	(1986-91)	1	2	5	8	5	12	15	21
Slovenia	(1989-95)	1	1	3	7	3	11	16	22
Spain	(1989-95)	0	1	4	7	21	33	47	55
Sweden	(1985-93)	3	5	8	20	8	26	43	55
USA	(1989-95)	5	14	25	38	25	46	60	72

Source: Andersson (2002), analyses of FFS data.

Table 8. Percentage of women who entered a second union by age 35.

Country	Cohort 1952-55	Cohort 1956-59
Austria	14.5	14.9
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	7.7	6.3
Czech R.	14.9	15.9
Estonia	23.0	2.4.
France	13.4	11.7
Germany - former GDR	14.6	14.8
Germany - former FRG	12.6	14.8
Hungary	14.9	12.8
Italy	1.7	2.4
Latvia	18.8	20.4
Lithuania	9.1	7.6
Poland	3.3	3.7
Slovenia	7.8	8.2
Spain	3.0	4.8
Sweden	20.6	26.7
Switzerland	15.2	17.2

Source: Fürnkranz-Prskawetz et al. (2003), analyses of FFS data.

Table 9. Total period fertility rates: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000.

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Albania	3.62	3.21	3.00	2.62	...
Armenia	2.33	2.56	2.63	1.63	1.11
Austria	1.65	1.47	1.45	1.40	1.34
Azerbaijan	3.23	2.94	2.62	2.30	1.71
Belarus	2.04	2.08	1.90	1.38	1.31
Belgium	1.68	1.51	1.62	1.55	1.66
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.93	1.89	1.71
Bulgaria	2.05	1.98	1.82	1.23	1.26
Canada	1.68	1.61	1.71	1.67	1.60
Croatia	1.92	1.81	1.67	1.50	1.40
Cyprus	2.46	2.38	2.42	2.13	1.83
Czech Republic	2.10	1.96	1.90	1.28	1.14
Denmark	1.55	1.45	1.67	1.80	1.77
Estonia	2.02	2.12	2.04	1.32	1.39
Finland	1.63	1.64	1.78	1.81	1.73
France	1.95	1.81	1.78	1.71	1.89
Georgia	2.26	2.27	2.19	1.69	1.35
Germany	1.56	1.37	1.45	1.25	1.38
Germany - Former GDR	1.94	1.74	1.50	0.84	1.22
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	1.45	1.28	1.45	1.34	1.38
Greece	2.23	1.67	1.39	1.32	1.29
Hungary	1.91	1.85	1.87	1.57	1.32
Iceland	2.48	1.94	2.30	2.08	2.08
Ireland	3.24	2.48	2.11	1.84	1.88
Israel	3.10	...	3.00	2.88	2.95
Italy	1.64	1.42	1.33	1.20	1.24
Kazakhstan*	2.90	3.00	2.70	2.13	1.83
Kyrgyzstan*	3.98	3.98	3.69	3.30	2.80
Latvia	1.90	2.09	2.01	1.26	1.24
Liechtenstein	1.75	1.50	1.45	1.20	...
Lithuania	1.99	2.09	2.02	1.49	1.33
Luxembourg	1.49	1.38	1.60	1.69	1.76
Macedonia	2.47	2.31	2.06	2.13	1.88
Malta	1.98	1.99	2.04	1.82	1.66
Moldova	2.41	2.75	2.39	1.74	1.30
Netherlands	1.60	1.51	1.62	1.53	1.72
Norway	1.72	1.68	1.93	1.87	1.85
Poland	2.26	2.32	2.05	1.62	1.34
Portugal	2.25	1.72	1.57	1.40	1.55
Romania	2.43	2.32	1.84	1.34	1.31
Russian Federation	1.86	2.05	1.90	1.34	1.21
San Marino	1.46	1.14	1.31	1.11	1.24
Serbia and Montenegro	2.29	2.22	2.10	1.89	1.66
Slovak Republic	2.31	2.26	2.09	1.52	1.29
Slovenia	2.10	1.71	1.46	1.29	1.26
Spain	2.20	1.64	1.36	1.18	1.24
Sweden	1.68	1.74	2.13	1.73	1.54
Switzerland	1.55	1.52	1.58	1.48	1.50
Tajikistan**	5.16	3.61	...
Turkey	4.36	3.59	2.99	2.62	2.52
Turkmenistan***	3.80
Ukraine	1.95	2.02	1.89	1.38	...
United Kingdom	1.89	1.79	1.83	1.71	1.65
United States	1.85	1.84	2.08	1.98	2.06
Uzbekistan****	4.74	4.70	4.13	3.54	3.08

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), Frejka and Sardon (2003), UNECE/PAU Demographic Database, UNECE Gender Statistics Database. Notes: * first figure is for 1982, last figure is for 1998; ** fourth figure is for 1994; *** third figure is for 1989; fourth figure is for 1994, last figure for 1997.

Table 10. Mean age at first birth: 1980, 1990, 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Armenia	22.1	22.8	23.0
Austria	...	25.0	26.3
Azerbaijan	24.7
Belarus	...	22.9	23.4
Belgium	24.7	26.4	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	23.3	23.6	...
Bulgaria	21.9	22.2	23.5
Canada	26.5	28.5	29.9
Croatia	23.4	24.1	25.5
Cyprus	23.8	24.7	26.2
Czech Republic	22.4	22.5	24.9
Denmark	24.6	26.4	...
Estonia	23.2	22.9	24.0
Finland	25.6	26.5	27.4
France*	25.0	27.0	28.7
Georgia	24.2
Germany	25.0	26.6	28.2
Germany - Former GDR *	23.5	24.6	27.6
Germany - FRG bef.unif. *	25.5	27.0	28.0
Greece*	24.1	25.5	27.3
Hungary	22.4	23.1	25.1
Iceland	21.9	24.0	25.5
Ireland	25.5	26.6	27.8
Italy	25.0	26.9	...
Latvia	22.9	23.0	24.4
Lithuania	23.8	23.2	23.8
Luxembourg	28.4
Macedonia	23.2	23.4	24.3
Netherlands	25.7	27.6	28.6
Norway	...	25.6	26.9
Poland	23.4	23.3	24.5
Portugal	24.0	24.9	26.5
Romania	22.4	22.7	23.6
Russian Federation	23.0	22.6	...
San Marino	24.1	26.7	30.2
Serbia and Montenegro	23.3	23.9	25.0
Slovak Republic	22.7	22.6	24.2
Slovenia	22.9	23.7	26.5
Spain	25.0	26.8	29.1
Sweden	25.3	26.3	27.9
Switzerland	26.3	27.6	28.7
Turkey	20.8
United Kingdom	...	27.3	29.1
United States	22.7	24.2	24.9

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), Mathews and Hamilton (2002), UNECE Gender Statistics Database. Note: * Last column is for 1999.

Table 11. Total cohort fertility rates, 1940, 1950, 1960 and 1965.

Country	Cohort 1940	Cohort 1950	Cohort 1960	Cohort 1965
Austria	2.125	1.869	1.686	1.607
Belgium	2.157	1.830	1.834	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.747	2.171
Bulgaria	2.083	2.067	1.954	1.829
Canada	2.671	1.928	1.818	1.723
Croatia	1.959	1.864	1.967	1.856
Czech Republic	2.066	2.095	2.025	1.913
Denmark	2.241	1.908	1.895	1.913
England & Wales	2.348	2.057	1.960	1.862
Estonia	...	1.974	2.034	1.827
Finland	2.039	1.857	1.954	1.898
France	2.410	2.109	2.103	1.982
Germany (Former FRG)	1.968	1.693	1.594	1.481
Germany (Former GDR)	1.982	1.791	1.795	1.561
Greece	2.095	2.019	1.924	1.717
Hungary	1.921	1.951	2.018	1.958
Italy	2.115	1.863	1.680	...
Latvia	...	1.870	1.940	1.757
Lithuania	1.989	2.008	1.880	1.695
Macedonia	3.058	2.347	2.290	2.195
Netherlands	2.221	1.889	1.849	1.756
Norway	2.450	2.095	2.086	2.063
Portugal	2.666	2.078	1.900	1.826
Romania	2.392	2.433	2.163	1.909
Russia	1.946	1.884	1.829	1.655
Serbia and Montenegro	2.377	2.281	2.278	2.132
Slovak Republic	2.545	2.308	2.177	2.036
Slovenia	2.008	1.897	1.874	1.756
Spain	...	2.160	1.753	1.565
Sweden	2.049	2.001	2.037	1.953
Switzerland	2.082	1.793	1.772	1.641
United States	2.729	2.028	2.014	2.038

Source: Frejka and Sardon (2003).

Table 12. Adolescent birthrates and abortion rates (per 1,000 women aged 15-19), by year, 1980-1995.

Country	Birth rates			Abortion rates		
	1980	1990	1995	1980	1990	1995
Albania	21.9	15.4
Armenia	45.0	70.0	56.2
Austria	34.5	21.2	15.6
Belarus	31.4	43.8	39.0
Belgium	20.3	11.3	9.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	36.8	38.0
Bulgaria	81.2	69.9	49.6	...	43.5	33.7
Canada	27.2	25.6	24.2	16.9	20.3	21.2
Croatia	45.4	27.4	19.9
Czech Republic	53.1	44.7	20.1	...	24.6	12.3
Denmark	16.8	9.1	8.3	20.9	16.9	14.4
England and Wales	29.6	33.2	28.4	18.1	22.8	18.6
Estonia	44.6	53.6	33.4
Finland	18.9	12.4	9.8	21.2	15.2	10.7
France	25.4	13.3	10.0	11.8	9.9	10.2
Georgia	45.0	60.2	53.0
Germany (Federal Republic)	19.5	16.8	13.2	5.2	1.8	...
Greece	53.1	21.6	13.0
Hungary	68.0	39.5	29.5	26.5	30.2	29.6
Iceland	57.7	30.6	22.1	23.9	16.7	21.2
Ireland	23.0	16.8	15.0	...	4.0	4.2
Israel	35.3	24.7	18.0	...	11	9.8
Italy	20.9	9.0	6.9	...	4.9	5.1
Latvia	39.9	50.0	25.5
Lithuania	28.0	41.6	36.7
Macedonia	49.3	43.1	44.1
Moldova	34.7	58.7	53.2
Netherlands	9.2	8.3	5.8	5.3	3.6	4
Northern Ireland	30.5	...	23.7
Norway	25.2	17.1	13.5	22.6	19.8	18.7
Poland	32.9	31.5	21.1
Portugal	41.0	24.1	20.9
Romania	72.3	51.5	42.0
Russian Federation	43.6	55.6	45.6
Scotland	32.6	31.8	27.1
Serbia and Montenegro	52.7	41.0	32.1
Slovak Republic	48.2	45.5	32.3	...	14.9	11.1
Slovenia	56.3	24.6	9.3	...	13.9	10.6
Spain	25.8	11.9	7.8	...	3.1	4.5
Sweden	15.8	14.1	7.7	22.2	23.9	17.2
Switzerland	10.2	7.1	5.7
Ukraine	49.4	57.4	54.3
United States	53.0	59.9	54.4	44.4	40.6	29.2

Source: Singh and Darroch (2000).

Table 13. Percentage of the total fertility cumulated after the 27th birthday. Birth cohorts 1940, 1950, 1960 and 1965.

Country				
	Cohort 1940	Cohort 1950	Cohort 1960	Cohort 1965
Austria	37.6	33.9	42.7	48.2
Belgium	39.8	38.8	49.2	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	41.2	34.2
Bulgaria	27.7	22.5	20.2	18.5
Canada	32.6	43.8	54.2	57.6
Croatia	35.0	33.7	34.4	38.7
Czech Republic	28.4	26.7	25.4	25.9
Denmark	35.3	39.0	59.1	64.5
England and Wales	38.2	43.1	53.0	55.7
Estonia	...	37.5	31.2	28.6
Finland	38.3	48.5	60.2	64.0
Former FRG	39.0	41.3	55.0	61.2
Former GDR	28.5	26.7	22.9	25.9
France	40.2	41.1	50.7	57.9
Greece	53.5	39.7	37.7	46.0
Hungary	34.1	28.3	31.8	33.3
Italy	51.9	44.1	54.3	...
Latvia	...	38.8	32.1	28.1
Lithuania	51.4	40.4	34.9	32.5
Macedonia	41.8	36.3	33.4	35.4
Netherlands	47.1	47.5	66.0	71.7
Norway	39.3	38.9	55.9	58.8
Portugal	52.3	43.1	42.8	50.2
Romania	45.6	30.7	26.0	22.3
Russia	40.9	37.6	29.4	24.5
Serbia and Montenegro	37.7	36.1	37.2	37.9
Slovak Republic	33.2	31.0	28.1	21.1
Slovenia	41.1	33.1	29.7	35.7
Spain	...	47.4	53.6	62.9
Sweden	41.0	46.7	60.9	58.8
Switzerland	43.9	48.4	61.1	66.0
United States	28.7	39.6	47.3	48.0

Source: own elaboration on Frejka and Sardon (2003).

Table 14. Percentage childless, birth cohorts 1940, 1950 and 1960.

Country	Cohort 1940	Cohort 1950	Cohort 1960
Austria*	15	17	...
Belgium*	13	14	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11.6	10.4	16.1
Croatia	8.6	6.1	4.9
Czech Republic	7.6	6.7	6.5
Denmark		10.9	10.0
England and Wales	10.6	14.5	20.5
Germany (Former FRG)*	12	17	...
Germany (Former GDR)	11.0	7.3	7.8
Greece	11.4	9.7	10.7
Hungary	9.1	9.1	7.6
Italy	14.6	12.7	14.8
Macedonia	4.0	5.7	5.7
Netherlands	11.2	14.6	17.7
Norway	9.5	9.4	...
Romania	...	6.3	8.1
Russia	5.8
Slovenia	8.3	4.4	4.7
Spain	10.5
Sweden	13.3
United States	9.9	15.6	15.4

Sources: own elaboration and selection from Frejka and Sardon (2003) and Rowland (1998). Notes: *: first column is for birth cohort 1940-44, second column for birth cohort 1950-54.

Table 15. Childhood expectancy (average number of years lived by a child in selected family structures).

Country	With a single mother	In a maternal stepfamily	Not with biological mother	With both biological parents
Austria	2.32	1.36	0.26	11.06
Belgium	0.82	0.53	0.06	13.59
Canada	2.38	0.93	0.08	11.61
Czech Republic	1.35	1.71	0.12	11.82
Finland	1.44	0.76	0.31	12.50
France	1.55	0.76	0.13	12.56
Germany	2.69	1.20	0.10	11.01
Hungary	1.46	0.68	0.26	12.60
Italy	0.52	0.16	0.13	14.19
Latvia	2.14	1.57	0.26	11.03
Poland	1.41	0.34	0.28	12.97
Slovenia	0.61	0.55	0.09	13.75
Spain	0.72	0.35	0.07	13.86
Sweden	2.08	0.75	0.33	11.84
Switzerland	1.03	0.36	0.31	13.30
United States	2.70	1.87	0.56	9.88

Source: Heuveline et al. (2003) and own elaboration. Children of female respondents of FFS surveys.

Table 16. Changes in the average number of years lived by a child in selected family structures over a 9 (to 15) time interval.

Country	With married parents	With cohabitating parents	With a single mother	In a step-family
Austria	-2.17	0.83	0.54	0.64
Belgium	-0.20	0.13	0.04	0.06
Canada	-2.60	1.12	0.91	0.47
Czech Republic	-0.38	0.33	0.09	-0.07
Finland	-0.66	0.25	0.56	-0.06
France	-2.35	1.16	1.23	-0.16
Germany	-0.16	0.00	0.29	-0.12
Hungary	-0.23	0.18	0.09	0.00
Italy	-0.10	0.01	0.21	-0.06
Latvia	-2.40	0.35	2.05	-0.03
New Zealand	-2.30	0.58	1.78	-0.18
Poland	-0.52	0.22	0.28	0.01
Slovenia	-0.49	0.51	0.16	0.02
Spain	-0.28	0.30	-0.24	-0.16
Sweden	0.14	-0.42	0.27	-0.06
Switzerland	-0.03	-0.01	0.16	-0.08
United States	-0.33	0.01	0.34	-0.08

Source: Heuveline et al. (2003). Children of female respondents of FFS surveys.

Table 17. Percentage of nonmarital births, 1980, 1990 and 2000.

Country	1980	1990	2000
Armenia	4.3	9.3	14.6
Austria	17.8	23.6	31.3
Azerbaijan	3.0	2.6	5.4
Belarus	6.4	8.5	18.6
Belgium	4.1	11.6	...
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.4	7.4	...
Bulgaria	10.9	12.4	38.4
Canada	13.0	25.5	...
Croatia	5.1	7.0	9.0
Cyprus	0.6	0.7	2.3
Czech Republic	5.6	8.6	21.8
Denmark	33.2	46.4	44.6
Estonia	18.3	27.2	54.5
Finland	13.1	25.2	39.2
France	11.4	30.1	42.6
Georgia	4.7	18.2	34.4
Germany	11.9	15.3	23.4
Germany - Former GDR	22.8	35.0	51.4
Germany - FRG bef.unif.	7.6	10.5	18.6
Greece	1.5	2.2	...
Hungary	7.1	13.1	29.0
Iceland	39.7	55.2	65.2
Ireland	5.0	14.5	31.8
Italy	4.3	6.5	9.7
Kazakhstan*	9.4	13.2	21.8
Kyrgyzstan*	9.1	13.0	27.4
Latvia	12.5	16.9	40.3
Liechtenstein	5.3	6.9	...
Lithuania	6.3	7.0	22.6
Luxembourg	6.0	12.8	22.1
Macedonia	6.1	7.1	9.8
Malta	...	1.8	10.9
Moldova	7.4	11.1	20.5
Netherlands	4.1	11.4	24.9
Norway	14.5	38.6	49.6
Poland	4.8	6.2	12.1
Portugal	9.2	14.7	22.2
Romania	2.8	4.0	25.5
Russian Federation	10.8	14.6	28.0
San Marino	3.3	2.6	8.6
Serbia and Montenegro	10.1	12.7	20.4
Slovak Republic	5.7	7.6	18.3
Slovenia	13.1	24.5	37.1
Spain	3.9	9.6	17.7
Sweden	39.7	47.0	55.3
Switzerland	4.7	6.1	10.7
Tajikistan	...	6.9	...
Turkey	2.9	4.5	...
Ukraine	8.8	13.0	...
United Kingdom	11.5	27.9	39.5
United States	18.4	28.0	33.2
Uzbekistan**	2.0	4.4	...

Sources: Council of Europe (2002), National Center for Health Statistics (FastStats), INED (La Conjoncture des pays développés en chiffres). Note: * first figure is for 1982, last figure for 1998, ** first figure is for 1982.

Table 18. Selected women's characteristics at the birth of the first child and the birth of the second child in five countries, analyses of FFS data (%).

	France	Italy	Hungary	Sweden	United States
BIRTH OF THE FIRST CHILD					
<i>Number of unions</i>					
Never in union	6.1	3.7	3.0	3.6	16.8
One union	88.3	92.7	96.2	79.0	73.3
More than one union	5.5	3.6	0.8	17.4	9.9
<i>Type of union</i>					
Direct marriage	37.6	81.6	90.3	8.9	49.8
Indirect marriage	27.0	10.0	4.3	32.1	20.5
Cohabitation	26.0	3.2	2.0	51.1	7.0
Out of union	9.4	5.1	3.4	7.8	22.7
BIRTH OF THE SECOND CHILD					
<i>Number of unions</i>					
Never in union	0.2	0.1	0.1	-	4.4
One union	88.0	91.2	98.9	78.2	79.7
More than one union	11.8	7.7	1.0	21.8	15.9
<i>Type of union</i>					
Direct marriage	44.1	84.7	93.2	9.7	54.8
Indirect marriage	30.2	10.8	5.2	51.6	23.6
Cohabitation	21.6	3.0	1.0	35.5	8.7
Out of union	4.1	1.5	0.6	3.2	12.9

Source: Pinnelli et al. (2002).

Figure 1. The postponement of first marriage and motherhood during the 1990s in Europe. Source: Billari (forthcoming), data from Council of Europe (2001).




Figure 2. The “postponement transition” for first marriage in some European countries with reference to the Netherlands. Source: Mamolo (2003)






Figure 3. The postponement of leaving the parental home and first union in Europe. Source: Billari (forthcoming), data from FFS.




Figure 4. Relative risk of union dissolution for women in different types of union. Source: Dourleijn and Liefbroer (2002), analyses of FFS data.





Figure 5. The impact of entering a union on instantaneous rates of transition to first birth, controlling for common unobserved factors: a comparison between West Germany and Sweden. Source: Baizán et al. (2002), analyses of FFS data.



*Figure 6. The correlation between total period fertility rates and female labour force participation (OECD countries).
Source: Engelhardt and Prskawetz (2002).*




Figure 7. The correlation between total period fertility rates and other family-related behaviour (countries of the Council of Europe). Source: own elaboration on data from Council of Europe (2002).

