

Feedback from the Aarhus Convention & Nuclear roundtable :


“Aarhus Convention implementation in the
context of a nuclear accident with long
lasting consequences – New challenges
after Fukushima”

(Luxemburg, 15th-16th February 2012)

Public participation in decision-making in the nuclear domain

Luxemburg, 12th-13th March 2013

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1. Why developing information & participation of the public in a P-A situation

What is pertinent, reliable and trustworthy information in emergency and post-emergency context? – The Aarhus Convention perspective

- Aarhus Convention (art. 5.1. c): ‘In the event of any imminent threat to human health or the environment, whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, **all information which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from the threat**,...’**is disseminated immediately** and without delay to members of the public who may be affected’.
- Information of the public in emergency & post-emergency preparedness & management refers to
 - understanding (by the public) of the evolution of the accident (& potential risks) along its management
 - capacity of the population & communities to prevent or mitigate₃ harm arising from the threat, individually & collectively

What is pertinent, reliable and trustworthy information in an emergency context? (1/3)

- Fukushima showed that the emergency phase (until end of discharge) can be of long duration (up to several months)
- From the emergency phase, a **wide range of professional and non-professional actors will have to make daily choices and need reliable information quickly**
 - Should I leave (evacuation limit 20 mSv/y. not trusted by all)?
 - How to make my daily-life choices (what do I eat, what places are safe)?
 - How to exert my responsibilities as regards my private organisation (firm / farm / production unit) or my public mandate?
- Following a nuclear accident, **trust into public institutions** is very likely to be strongly **deteriorated**.

What is pertinent, reliable and trustworthy information in an emergency context? (2/3)

- Assessment of information reliability & trustworthiness include
 - technical and scientific reliability, usefulness and clarity
 - conditions for societal trustworthiness of the information
- In a context where no central information producer is trusted by all, reliable information implies **diversified sources** of info (including information produced by citizens & civil society)
- Trusted public information also depends on the availability of a **pluralistic network of knowledgeable persons & experts** able to analyse information usefully for citizen's daily choices

What is pertinent, reliable and trustworthy information in an emergency context? (3/3)

- Quality of dialogue within this network of experts depends on
 - Availability of rationale of the management decisions
 - Availability of appropriate tools to manage complexity of information and plurality of information sources
- A key stake: availability of tools to easily share, compile, sort and feed information back in a meaningful and reliable way
 - for citizen networks
 - for experts

What is pertinent, reliable and trustworthy information in a post-emergency context?

- On the mid- and long-term, a key stake for all actors is to build a sustainable response to the contamination situation (at the family and community level) taking into account all health, environment, economic, social, cultural issues that are posed to local actors
- This response cannot be limited to the sole dimension of radiation protection
- Complexity of the situation (intermingled issues and dimensions, multiplicity of actors) cannot be managed only with traditional tools of public action: standards, regulation, controls, and incentives,
- It is necessary to create conditions for all concerned public & private actors, at local, regional and national level, to build together
 - a shared assessment of the situation and its
 - a long-term strategy where the actions of all actors complement⁷

The public is an active contributor to emergency and post-emergency response

- It is recognised that, if favourable conditions are met, local population and actors can be active contributors to post-accident response at short- mid- or long-term through
 - Information production (notably radioactivity measurements in food and the environment)
 - Contribution of their own protection through adaptation of their daily life habits and progressive construction of a practical radiation protection culture based on an assessment of their concrete situation in their territory
 - Contribution to redeployment of social and economic activities at mid- and long-term



2. Japanese & European experience in Public information and participation as regards post-accident

Public information & participation in an emergency situation – return of experience from Fukushima (1/3)

- Fukushima showed that the emergency phase (until end of discharge) can be of long duration, which entails issues which were not considered for the emergency phase :
 - long time confining
 - highly populated urban areas (evacuating Tokyo was considered)
 - maintaining supplies during a long-lasting emergency phase
 - issue for enterprises : continuation of work ?
 - animals management (cattle)
- Large number of people & local actors confronted to a wide range of difficult daily choices already in the emergency phase

Public information & participation in an emergency situation – return of experience from Fukushima(2/3)

- A variety of sources of information has developed quickly :
 - National and regional authorities (or federal / State level)
 - Universities & independent experts
 - Independent laboratories
 - Foreign nuclear safety and RP authorities
 - Professionals
 - Civil society
- Civil society quickly mobilised in an autonomous way to produce information, carry out measurements, disseminate analysis of the situation by independent experts
- Internet enabled different non-institutional networks of information to develop spontaneously and quickly, with high efficiency

Public information & participation in an emergency situation – return of experience from Fukushima (3/3)

- 3 types of experts were engaged in information production & analysis
 - Institutional experts engaged in the management of the emergency situation
 - Other institutional experts (e.g. foreign TSOs and regulators)
 - Experts from civil society or in a position of proximity to civil society
- Use of monitoring and feedback tools for experts in Europe (e.g. EnerWebWatch)
- Use of web 2.0 & crowd sourcing tools to compile measurements from different sources (including citizens)
- Issue of reliability of measures of independent laboratories: need for tools for training, cross-comparison, exchanges on methods

Public information & participation in the post-emergency phase – Japanese experience

- Lack of trust vis-à-vis the official monitoring system (contaminated fish, beef & rice in the commercial system)
- Quick development of citizen monitoring capacities for environment and food
- Information on food contamination on numerous webpages, blogs
- Official recognition of citizen contribution in environment monitoring: “From now on, we must offer equipment and ask people to look well beyond Fukushima to find hot spots” (MEXT).
Questions to be tackled in the preparation phase:
 - → issue of availability of measurement equipment
 - → issue of data sharing (as in emergency phase)
 - → issue of compilation/comparison of citizen-produced information and official monitoring data

Public information & participation in the post-emergency phase – Long-term issues (Norway & Belarus)

- Keeping the issue on the agenda on a long period of time and keeping local actors awareness and engagement
- Ensuring continuity of necessary competence at all appropriate levels (including local level), and keeping plurality of expertise sources
- Ensuring continuity of effective access to information on food and environment contamination (including for people who came after the accident)
- Developing and keeping up practical radiation protection culture
- Engagement with families in case of detection of higher exposure or body contamination to identify and find concrete ways to reduce the source of exposure

Post-accident preparedness – institutional approaches at the national, European and international level

- In some member states, post-nuclear accident preparation is tackled with concerned stakeholders
 - As a self-standing issue (CODIRPA process in France)
 - Within a wider multi-risk preparation framework involving the private sector (Finland)
- At the European level, development of research projects & platforms
 - NERIS platform supported by the EC through the NERIS-TP research project
 - PREPARE European research project including a work package on Public Information & Participation
- Reflection in the Framework of the NEA (EGSIOS study on post-accident preparedness & management)



Conclusion

Conclusion – key lessons (1/2)

- Complexity of a nuclear event situation grows very quickly including in the emergency phase
- Need for affected people to access information they need to take their decisions (different / information needed by decision makers)
- Parallel development of information from 3 types of sources: official sources, other experts and citizens
 - Need for tools to share information from these 3 sources, to articulate them and to feed them back meaningfully, which will involve different actors & networks
- Need for tools of technical mediation at the local/regional level for compiling and making available information about local situation
- PE response (especially in the long term) is the result of the actions of all concerned actors. Public participation issue is not limited to participation to public decisions, it is rather a question of processes and methods for all actors to address complexity, assess the situation and build strategies together.

Conclusion – key lessons (2/2)

- A key issue: how to facilitate preparation of all actors to cope with the consequences of a nuclear accident while this is not on top of their agenda ?
 - Importance of local actors awareness and engagement in post-emergency preparation
 - Inclusion into a multi-risk perspective (e.g. example of public-private cooperation in Finland on the issue of securing supplies)
 - Simulation and awareness-rising tools (e.g. OPAL tool in France)
 - Multi-stakeholder dialogue tools (EURANOS methodological framework)
- Need for technical tools facilitating information sharing and cooperation between all concerned actors at all levels
 - Issue of articulation between different sources of expertise and information (including citizens) as relevant as in emergency phase
- Need for flexible procedures allowing evolution and negotiation of roles and responsibilities through time

Conclusion – what can be done for favouring PIP in Europe as regards post-accident preparedness & management?

- A key stake: **setting up today favourable conditions for civil society to contribute to the quality of decisions** in the post-accident field, notably by
 - Setting up tools for local enabling local actors to **assess today the concrete stakes of a post-accident situation in their territory**,
 - in link with a **process of post-accident preparation at the regional & national level**.
 - Preparing the **access of local actors to means & tools for information production and sharing** (notably measurement tools).
 - Preparing **tools enabling quick exchanges of information and analysis between** institutional **experts** engaged in post-accident management, other institutional experts experts from or in proximity to civil society.
 - **Facilitating the contribution of civil society to the reflection & decision-making** on post-accident issues at local, regional, national & European level (e.g. as regards preparedness of large urban areas to respond to a contamination situation)